Rights and Remedies under California Conditional Sales

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The question of the rights and remedies of the parties to conditional sales has proved a troublesome one to the courts, "the rules prevailing at common law being in great confusion and in the majority of states being founded on no just principle." Such confusion is to be expected in the development and recognition in the courts of a relatively new security device, where "just principle" must be built upon an economic rather than an analytical legal foundation. An attempt will be made not only to set out in some detail the results of California decisions in this field, but to organize and rationalize in some degree these decisions upon an economically realistic yet logically coherent body of principles.

It has been pointed out that much of the confusion as to these rights and remedies arises from divergent views as to the essential nature of the conditional sale transaction. To obtain an understanding of this conflict, it is helpful to explore the respective interests of the parties in the subject-matter of the sale.

If the conditional sale contract is seen as a purely executory contract, transferring to the buyer no property rights, the seller's remedies are likely to be very different than if the buyer is held to have the beneficial property interest and the seller a security interest only. For example, on the theory of executory contract, the seller's repossession of the goods will constitute a rescission, or at least give the buyer, when sued for the balance of the price, the defense of failure of consideration. On the theory of foreclosure of the buyer's property interest, repossession will not prevent judgment for a deficiency after re-sale by the seller.

2 The writer is greatly indebted to Professor Vold of the University of Nebraska Law School for this approach to the problem. See Vold, The Divided Property Interests in Conditional Sales (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 713, incorporated into Vold, Sales (1931) § 95, pp. 267-288.
3 See also LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES (1930) p. 705.
4 See for example, Murphy v. Hellman Commercial etc. Bank; Cocires v. Assinopoulo, both infra note 125; and authorities cited in note 215, infra; Vold, Sales (1931) p. 291; (1882) 6 VA. L. J. 894.
5 See infra note 232; Vold, Sales (1931) p. 291.
In general the earlier decisions viewed the conditional sale as an ordinary executory contract of sale, by which the buyer acquired no interest in the property. The greater number of recent decisions recognize that the buyer has the beneficial interest in the property and that the seller retains legal title for security only. The distance the courts have traveled from the one viewpoint to the other is well illustrated in the following statements:

"This is not a sale, but only a contract for the sale of the property, and the legal title to the property is not thereby transferred or changed. . . . The rules of forfeiture do not seem to have any application to the question of the right to the possession of the property. Forfeiture involves both the idea of losing property by a delinquent party, and the transfer of it to another without the consent of the delinquent. Here the ownership was not transferred; for it remained in the plaintiff and his assignors; nor was the right of possession transferred; for the defendant had only such right to the possession as the contract gave, which was merely the right to the use and possession until default should be made in the payment of installments." 8

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See also: Notes (1882) 6 Va. L. J. 584; (1934) 18 Mizz. L. Rev. 429; (1915) 3 Calr. L. Rev. 166.


8 Hegler v. Eddy, supra note 5, at 598, 599.
"In a conditional sale, the title in the seller is for security only, to assure the payment of the purchase price. It carries with it none of the ordinary incidents of ownership. The buyer has the possession and use of the property to the complete exclusion of the seller, subject only to the seller's remedies in case of default. Both in a practical and a legal sense the buyer is the beneficial owner."\(^9\)

The succeeding pages will show that in California these contradictory viewpoints have been manifested in more than one line of cases. It has been pointed out that the California decisions have for the most part achieved equitable results upon the particular facts, but have spread a barrage of loose dicta which has done considerable damage to the logical development of doctrine.\(^10\)

**NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE INTEREST OF THE BUYER IN THE PROPERTY**

The buyer under a contract of conditional sale has all the ordinary incidents of ownership. The outstanding beneficial incident is the right of the buyer, as long as he is not in default, to hold possession of the property against the seller \(^11\) and against the world.\(^12\)

The buyer, upon his performance of the contract, has further the unqualified right to become owner of the property. Upon payment of the price, the buyer automatically obtains legal title and becomes complete owner.\(^13\) Since the seller's security title is merely an incident of the buyer's obligation to pay the price, a tender of the price by the buyer has the same effect as payment.\(^14\) In other words, no further assent by the seller is necessary to the buyer's complete ownership.

\(^9\) County of San Diego v. Davis, *supra* note 6, at 147, 33 P. (2d) at 827, 828.

\(^10\) "We have seen that while the general rules governing conditional sales in California as contrasted with those of Massachusetts and Mississippi are somewhat confused, the California courts, and especially the California Supreme Court, have successfully managed to solve in an equitable manner the particular fact situations that were presented in the different cases. They have shown skill in avoiding unfortunate precedents to arrive at desirable results. The California lawyer has shown small skill in presenting the issues properly or in providing the court with a logical reason for its decision. Hence, we have this group of decisions, which could be molded into a coherent body of law, in a large part obscured by incoherent dicta and generalizations." Note (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 1123, 1130-1131.


CAL. CIV. CODE § 1504 provides as follows:

"An offer of payment or other performance, duly made . . . stops the running of interest on the obligation, and has the same effect upon all its incidents as a performance thereof."
Although no decisions upon the point have been found in California, it would follow from the buyer's right to become complete owner upon payment that any increase in value of the property would pass to the buyer, subject of course to his performance of the contract. The same principle would apply to the increase of animate chattels, possibly even though the buyer did not perform the contract. If the buyer defaulted, the seller's rights might depend upon whether or not the offspring had been in gestation when the contract was entered into, but probably the seller would prevail in any event.

The buyer likewise has the power to transfer his interest in the property and to give a mortgage good except as against the seller, even though the contract provides against assignment or mortgage of the property. In the Davies and Walker cases, a tender of the full price was made to the seller by the transferee, but the court in the Davies case intimated that the seller was entitled only to a tender of the current installment. Other decisions have held that where the contract provides for the termination of the buyer's rights upon a transfer, the seller may upon such transfer retake the property.

Whether the buyer's interest passes by succession has not been decided in California, but there seems no reason why it should not do so.

The buyer has an insurable interest in the property, at least to the extent of his payments on account of the price. The value of the buyer's property interest is more logically the value of the property less the balance due, however. If the theory of election of remedies is followed, the buyer's insurable interest will vary according to the seller's election, of course.

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15 See Vold, Sales (1931) p. 280.
17 See Vold, Sales (1931) p. 280.
19 Walker v. Houston; Davies-Overland Co. v. Blenkiron, both supra note 7.
20 Davies-Overland Co. v. Blenkiron, supra note 7.
21 Walker v. Houston, supra note 7.
22 Compare authorities cited in note 63, infra.
24 Vold, Sales (1931) p. 279.
26 See cases cited, infra note 298.
27 A full discussion following the theory of election of remedies is found in Wilcox, Insurance of Interests under Contracts of Conditional Sale (1927) 12 Iowa L. Rev. 235.
Since the risk of loss falls on the buyer under the Sales Act,\textsuperscript{27a} it would seem that the buyer now has an insurable interest up to the full value of the property. The same result would follow where the contract placed the risk on the buyer.

The conflict between the old and new theories of the conditional sale has led to a conflict as to whether or not the buyer is entitled to the benefit of implied warranties.\textsuperscript{28} Such warranties are clearly allowed the buyer by the Sales Act.\textsuperscript{29}

Although strictly speaking, the buyer has no equity of redemption,\textsuperscript{30} nevertheless where time is not made of the essence, the buyer may restore his rights after repossession by a tender to the seller within a reasonable time of the balance of the price.\textsuperscript{31}

The buyer's interest is recognized in the Motor Vehicle Act provision for issuance of a certificate of registration to the "owner" and a certificate of ownership to the "legal owner."\textsuperscript{32} The statutory definition of the term "owner" clearly includes a buyer under a conditional sale, and that of "legal owner" includes a conditional seller.\textsuperscript{33}

The buyer has likewise been given certain burdensome incidents of ownership. He and not the seller is liable as owner for personal property taxes.\textsuperscript{34} So long as the buyer has possession of an automobile, he and not the seller is liable as owner of the car under the terms of Civil Code, section 1714\textfrac{3}{4}, making the owner liable for damages from negligent operation of a car by another person with the owner's permission.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{27a} See infra note 45.

\textsuperscript{28} See infra notes 281-287.

\textsuperscript{29} See infra notes 288, 289.

\textsuperscript{30} See infra note 250; (1934) 18 Minn. L. Rev. 429.

\textsuperscript{31} See infra note 223.

\textsuperscript{32} See Cal. Vehicle Act § 41.

\textsuperscript{33} Cal. Vehicle Act § 16 provides as follows:

"'Owner.' A person having the lawful use or control of a vehicle under a lease or otherwise for a period of ten or more successive days."

Section 17 provides as follows:

"'Legal owner.' A person who holds the legal title of a vehicle or a mortgage thereon."


\textsuperscript{35} Cal. Civ. Code § 1714\textfrac{3}{4}:

"If a motor vehicle be sold under a contract of conditional sale whereby the title to such motor vehicle remains in the vendor, such vendor or his assignee shall not be deemed an owner within the provisions of this section, but the vendee, or his assignee shall be deemed the owner notwithstanding the terms of such contract, until the vendor or his assignee shall retake possession of such motor vehicle."
Certain incidents of ownership were denied the buyer by the courts upon the theory of executory sale, but it is of considerable significance that all these incidents have finally been recognized by statutory enactment as being in the buyer. The theory of executory sale, while largely favorable to the seller, sometimes resulted in placing unexpected burdens upon him. Thus upon the principle that risk follows title, the risk of loss of the property was placed upon the seller, rather than the buyer. Not only was the seller denied the balance of the price after loss of the property, but the buyer could recover his payments, upon the theory of failure of consideration. Such recovery probably should have been limited to the payments less the reasonable value of the use to the buyer. If the loss is due to the buyer's fault, the buyer bears the risk, in any event. Of course the risk may be placed upon the buyer by agreement, and as a practical matter the risk is always so shifted by the contract.

On the theory of security title in the seller and beneficial interest in the buyer, it seems clear that the buyer in possession should bear the risk of loss. Such a rule obtains in a majority of states as to conditional sales and obtains in California as to a purchaser in possession of real property under a contract of sale. The Sales Act in 1931 expressly placed the risk on the buyer in possession.


37 Waltz v. Silveria, supra note 36; see also Tyson v. Wells, supra note 36.

38 Kirtley v. Perham, supra note 36.

39 See infra note 270.

40 Campbell Chevrolet Co. v. Walsh (1929) 102 Cal. App. 100, 282 Pac. 510.

41 Ibid. See Cocores v. Assimopoulos, supra note 36.


43 Vold, Sales (1931) p. 281; 1 Williston, op. cit. supra note 16, § 304; Bogert, The Proposed Uniform Conditional Sales Act (1917) 3 Cornell L. Q. 1; (1914) 3 Calif. L. Rev. 165; (1928) 1 So. Calif. L. Rev. 302.

44 See by way of illustration Kelley v. Smith (1933) 218 Cal. 543, 24 P. (2d) 471, noted (1934) 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 475.

45 As to what constitutes loss or destruction of the property, see the following cases:

Kirtley v. Perham, supra note 36 (right to deliver newspapers destroyed when publication stopped); Campbell Chevrolet Co. v. Walsh, supra note 40 (seizure by government for illegal transportation of liquor probably not "loss"); Drown v. Haddock (1923) 61 Cal. App. 654, 215 Pac. 689 (failure of machine to perform contemplated work not a destruction).

46 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1742(a): "Where delivery of the goods has been made to
Early decisions held that the buyer, not being the owner of the property, could not create a statutory agistor's lien valid against the seller. Under present statutes the buyer may create a valid lien for repairs and for storage. Such liens are limited to $100.00 in amount unless express notice is given to the holder of the legal title prior to the creation of the lien. This limit applies to individual lienors rather than to the total amount of liens which may be created, however. The decisions are in sharp conflict as to the validity of the storage lien where the car is withdrawn daily for use. It is obvious that the storage lien is of little value if not upheld in this situation, yet the statutory language is clear.

Upon the theory that the buyer had no property interest, it was said that creditors of the buyer could not attach the property or levy execution on the buyer, or to a bailee for the buyer, in pursuance of the contract and the property in the goods has been retained by the seller merely to secure performance by the buyer of his obligations under the contract, the goods are at the buyer's risk from the time of such delivery.

No decisions under this section have been found. The court was careful to point out, in Cocores v. Assimopoulos, supra note 36, that section 1742 was not in force at the time there in question.


51 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3051; see also CAL. Civ. CODE § 2913. See the following cases: Goodman v. Anglo-Calif. Trust Co., supra note 47; Davis v. Young, supra note 5; Covington v. Grant (1927) 82 Cal. App. 749, 256 Pac. 213. Contra: Pacific States Finance Corp. v. Freitas; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Silva, both supra note 5; see also Huie v. Howard Soo Hoo, supra note 48.

tion upon it.\textsuperscript{54} Somewhat illogically it has also been held that a transfer from the buyer to a third person without change of possession is fraudulent as against the buyer's creditors.\textsuperscript{55} Logically, the buyer's creditors should be able to reach the property as long as the buyer is in possession, even if the doctrine of election of remedies is followed, and certainly as long as the buyer is not in default.\textsuperscript{56} Practically, the creditor's seizure lessens the value to the seller of the buyer's promise, since the buyer is not likely to pay if he has lost possession, and the creditor buying upon forced sale probably has a smaller stake in the property than the buyer had. On the other hand, the seller legally is no worse off by such a transfer and may still use his remedies on default. The decisions laying down the general rule that the buyer's interest was not leviable property actually and properly held that the creditor could not obtain rights superior to those of the seller.\textsuperscript{57} Thus the creditor could not retain the property after default by the buyer, even though the default occurred after the levy and before the seller's demand for possession,\textsuperscript{58} or although the levy itself caused the default.\textsuperscript{59} The earliest decision where the contract required immediate release of an attachment held that there could be no valid attachment, although there was no default except by reason of the attachment itself.\textsuperscript{60} This case may be explained upon the accrual of the seller's right to possession simultaneously with the attachment levy, but the \textit{King} case\textsuperscript{61} cannot be so reconciled since there the buyer was required to procure a release from attachment, not immediately but only within three days. The court has said by way of \textit{dictum} that if the creditor upon attachment tenders the balance due, he will be subrogated to the buyer's rights.\textsuperscript{62} It has been held, however, that the tender of one installment is insufficient.\textsuperscript{63} This result is possibly sound for the reasons given above—that the buyer is no longer likely to pay after seizure by the creditor, and the creditor is not obliged to pay. The case of the buyer's transferee may be distinguished on the ground that both the buyer and

\textsuperscript{55} Ross v. Thomas, \textit{supra} note 54; Abrahams v. Hammel (1919) 40 Cal. App. 11, 180 Pac. 41.
\textsuperscript{56} See cases cited, \textit{supra} notes 53, 54.
\textsuperscript{57} See cases cited, \textit{supra} notes 53, 54.
\textsuperscript{58} Rodgers v. Bachman, \textit{supra} note 36; Kellogg v. Burr, \textit{supra} note 53.
\textsuperscript{59} Morris v. Allen, \textit{supra} note 5; King v. Cline; Heffner v. Jackson, both \textit{supra} note 53.
\textsuperscript{60} See Reeves, \textit{Conditional Sale Contracts in Indiana} (1926) 1 Ind. L. J. 194.
\textsuperscript{61} See cases cited, \textit{supra} notes 53, 54.
\textsuperscript{63} Morris v. Allen, \textit{supra} note 5 (\textit{dictum}); King v. Cline, \textit{supra} note 53 (\textit{dictum}).
\textsuperscript{64} Heffner v. Jackson, \textit{supra} note 53; see Note (1932) 21 \textit{CALIF. L. REV.} 51, 53.
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the transferee are more likely to pay where the transfer is voluntary and not forced by a creditor.64

The rule as to creditors was changed, or at least clarified, by statute in 1921, providing that personal property in possession of the buyer under an executory agreement for its sale may be taken under attachment or execution issued at the suit of a creditor, notwithstanding any provision in the agreement for forfeiture in case of levy or change of possession.65 A tender of the balance by the creditor was also required.66 The effect of a failure of the attachment, after the creditor has paid the seller the balance due, is a question involved in some confusion. Upon the reasoning that title has passed to the buyer, free of the seller's claim, and that the attaching creditor is subrogated only to the buyer's rights, not the seller's, it has been held that upon failure of the attachment, the creditor is without claim upon the property or remedy against the buyer of any sort.67 The same result has been held to follow although the creditor obtains an assignment of the seller's rights after he has paid off the seller.68 If the creditor obtains an assignment before or at the time of the payment, query as to what result the court would reach.69 The statute further provides that the proceeds of the sale on execution shall be applied first to the repayment of the sum paid to the seller, with interest. Query, whether a creditor taking the property on execution after failure of attachment, could deduct from the proceeds of the sale on execution the sum he paid to the seller.

NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE INTEREST OF THE SELLER
IN THE PROPERTY

Before default, the seller's beneficial incidents of ownership are in general limited in scope to conform to his security interest. The seller has an insurable interest in the property logically to the extent of the

64 See supra notes 19-21.
68 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 689b provides that when payment is made "then the title shall pass to the buyer and the property may be sold as in this chapter provided, free of all lien or claim of the seller."
69 Casady v. Fry, supra note 13.
60 Cf. Kinsey v. Ryan, supra note 67, and see infra notes 304, 305.
61 Edises, in a full discussion of the rights of the buyer's creditors before and after the statute in Note (1932) 21 Calr. L. Rev. 51, indulges in well founded criticism of the Casady case and suggests that recovery should be allowed against the buyer in quasi-contract upon the theory of unjust enrichment, or that the buyer should be subrogated to the seller's rights.
balance due. It has been held that the seller has the "sole and unconditional" ownership within the terms of an insurance policy, but it has likewise been held that the buyer has such "sole and unconditional" ownership. It is obvious that neither party is the sole and unconditional owner, but that unless the court holds each to be such owner, the legitimate insurable interest which each party has will fail of recognition under such a clause. If the doctrine of election of remedies is followed, the seller's insurable interest will of course vary with his election.

It has not been decided in California whether or not the seller may recover for injury or conversion by a third person before default by the buyer. Logically, the seller should have such right only where his security is impaired by the acts of the third person. As a practical matter this will cover most situations, whether of substantial injury to the property or of removal of the property from the possession of the buyer.

The seller has an interest in the property allowing him to redeem from the liens for repairs or storage which may be created by the buyer under Section 3051 of the Civil Code. The seller, before default, likewise has certain burdensome incidents of ownership. He has been held liable for the use and occupation of premises occupied by the property, although such property was not in the seller's possession, where the buyer's lease of the premises had been terminated and the seller given notice to remove the property.

It has been seen that prior to statutory changes, creditors of the buyer were not successful in levying upon the property. Consequently, it would be natural to expect that the seller's interest in the property is subject to levy by the seller's creditors, and it has been so held. On the other hand, if the buyer is not in default, the seller's creditors, having no better right than the seller, cannot seize the property from the buyer's

72 See supra notes 25, 26.
75 See a good discussion in 3 Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales (6th ed. 1933) §§ 1187-1189.
76 Wilcox, op. cit. supra note 27.
77 See the following cases: D. Q. Service Corp. v. Securities etc. Co. (1930) 210 Cal. 327, 292 Pac. 497; Ross v. Thomas, supra note 54; Covington v. Grant, supra note 51; Coachella Valley State Bank v. Wilson, supra note 7.
78 Covington v. Grant, supra note 51. See also C. I. T. Corp. v. Biltmore Garage, supra note 5.
80 Such inaction by the buyer would probably constitute an abandonment of the property so that the seller might take possession without being held to an election of remedies. See infra note 156.
81 See supra notes 53-70.
The buyer may, however, waive his right to possession by a failure to object to the levy. Although no decisions in point have been found, there seems no reason why the seller's interest in the contract, as distinguished from the physical property itself, could not be levied upon by the seller's creditors in proper proceedings.

Other incidents show that the seller is not complete owner of the property before default. In the first place he is not liable for personal property tax as owner of the property, but is liable for tax as owner of "credits." 84a

Civil Code, section 1714/4, making an owner of a motor vehicle liable for damages arising from its negligent operation by another with the owner's permission, expressly excepts the conditional seller or his assignee from the term "owner" and provides that the vendee is owner "until the vendor or his assignee shall retake possession of such motor vehicle." To escape liability under this section, the seller must either endorse over the certificate of ownership or give notice of the transfer to the department of motor vehicles. Thus, as a practical matter, the seller's only choice is to give the required notice. If he fails to do so, he is liable as owner of the car.

The decisions with regard to assignment or transfer of the seller's interest also show that the seller has a bare legal title for security. As we have seen, the seller's title is merely an incident of the buyer's obligation to pay the price, and as such is discharged by the buyer's tender of the price. It would follow that a transfer of the conditional sale notes would transfer as an incident of the obligation the seller's security title.

It has been held, however, that the assignment of the "within agreement" for collection only, without an assignment of the note, does not transfer the seller's security title.

The assignee of a conditional sale contract is subject to all defenses which could be used by the buyer against the original seller. A conditional sale contract cannot be made negotiable by stipulations waiving

82 Bickerstaff v. Doub, supra note 81.
83 Escobar v. Rogers, supra note 81.
86 Bunch v. Kin, supra note 7.
87 Walker v. Houston, supra note 7, and authorities cited, supra note 15.
88 Cal. Civ. Code § 1084 provides in part as follows: "The transfer of a thing transfers also all its incidents."
90 Dunn v. Price (1896) 112 Cal. 46, 44 Pac. 354.
such defenses, nor may such defenses be eliminated merely by notice of intended assignment. On the other hand, the holder in due course of a negotiable title-retaining note is not subject to defenses other than those to which the holder of an ordinary negotiable instrument is subject.

Where risk of loss was involved, the courts refused to view the seller as holder of a security interest only, and, following the executory contract theory coupled with the principle that risk follows title, placed such risk upon the seller, in the absence of agreement otherwise, until the enactment of the Sales Act in 1931.

Upon default, the incidents of the seller's ownership are greatly enlarged. Thus, upon the buyer's default the seller has the right to possession of the property as against the buyer, the buyer's transferee, the buyer's creditors, and third persons in general, and even against the state government seizing an automobile for illegal transportation of liquor by the buyer, or by a third person without the seller's knowledge or consent. In an action for conversion the seller recovers under such circumstances not merely the payments due but the total value of the property at the time of conversion.

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93 People's Bank v. Porter, supra note 7. See also Hale, op. cit. supra note 42.
94 See supra notes 36-45.
98 See, as an illustration, D. Q. Service Corp. v. Securities etc. Co., supra note 77.
100 Ross v. Thomas, supra note 54; King v. Cline, supra note 53. CAL. CIV. Code § 3336 provides as follows:

"Damages for conversion of personal property. The detriment caused by the wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to be:
value, he obtains either possession plus damages for the detention (including depreciation), or the value of the property at the time of the conversion. No decision has been found where the seller recovered for conversion by the buyer where the buyer took the property after the seller's repossessiton, but such recovery would probably be allowed. It has been held that the buyer's breach of a promise made after default to return the property within a certain time gives the seller a right to sue for conversion of the property.\textsuperscript{103}

**REMEDIES OF THE SELLER**

Before the seller is entitled to use any remedy, it must be determined that he has not waived the buyer's default. As an inevitable consequence of the forfeiture rule,\textsuperscript{104} the doctrine of waiver has been liberally, not to say loosely, applied, to lessen the hardship on the buyer.\textsuperscript{105} That waiver has been used solely to avoid forfeiture is shown by the court's refusal (on the ground that no forfeiture is involved) to apply the doctrine where the seller sues for the price rather than for possession.\textsuperscript{106} It would seem more reasonable to relieve the defaulting party only where there is an equitable estoppel.\textsuperscript{107}

As is to be expected, the decisions upon waiver are in hopeless confusion, since the court is guided by its ideas of fairness as applied to the detailed situation. Some earlier decisions stubbornly refused to recognize

First—The value of the property at the time of the conversion, with the interest from that time, or, an amount sufficient to indemnify the party injured for the loss which is the natural, reasonable and proximate result of the wrongful act complained of and which a proper degree of prudence on his part would not have averted; and

Second—A fair compensation for the time and money properly expended in pursuit of the property.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{101}Morris v. Allen, \textit{supra} note 5. The usual measure of damages in an action of claim and delivery is the value of the property at the time not of the conversion but of trial. See 5 Cal. Jur. (1922) 204, Calif. Juris. (1928 Supp.) Art. Automobiles, p. 43. Of course the result is the same if damages for the detention are also allowed.

\textsuperscript{102}Vold, \textit{Sales} (1931) p. 288.

\textsuperscript{103}Francisco v. Schleischer (1920) 50 Cal. App. 670, 195 Pac. 691.

\textsuperscript{104}See \textit{infra} notes 215-222.

\textsuperscript{105}Dean Pound, discussing contracts for the sale of land in California, said: "Strict doctrines as to forfeiture inevitably produce loose doctrines as to 'waiver.' Where before time for performance vendor signifies his intention not to insist on timely or exact performance and purchaser, in reliance thereon, acts accordingly, the principle of equitable estoppel is quite sufficient to preclude insistence upon the condition to purchaser's injury." Pound, \textit{The Progress of the Law 1918-1919: Equity} (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 952. See also Notes (1913) 1 Calif. L. Rev. 300; (1919) 5 Calif. L. Rev. 60; (1923) 11 Calif. L. Rev. 286; (1926) 14 Calif. L. Rev. 417.


\textsuperscript{107}See authorities cited \textit{supra} note 105.
that any forfeiture was involved in the seller's retaking the property. At the other extreme, recent decisions have given relief from forfeiture under Civil Code, section 3275, independently of the waiver doctrine.

Of course where time is not made of the essence, the buyer may cure his default by tender. Hence no unjust forfeiture occurs and the doctrine of waiver is unnecessary. It should be noted that since the two decisions in Miller v. Steen, conditional sale contracts generally provide that time is of the essence of the contract.

A waiver is said to result from conduct on the part of the seller consistent only with a purpose to regard the contract as still subsisting. Where the contract provides that time is of the essence, it has been held that acceptance of late payments is a waiver of the "time of the essence" provision as to future defaults. Consequently most conditional sale contracts now provide that acceptance of late installments shall not constitute a waiver as to future defaults. Such provisions have been upheld as to future defaults, but acceptance of late payments has still been held to waive previous defaults occurring before the time of such acceptance. The seller may reinstate the "time of the essence" provision only by giving the buyer reasonable notice of the seller's intention to insist on strict performance.

An oral extension of time to pay, although unenforceable as such, does constitute a waiver, in so far as acted upon by the buyer, of both

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108 Hegler v. Eddy; Wiley B. Allen v. Wood (quoting Hegler v. Eddy); McConnell v. Redd, all supra note 5.
110 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3275 provides as follows:
"Relief in case of forfeiture. Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom, upon making full compensation to the other party, except in case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty."
111 Infra note 215.
116 Miller v. Modern Motor Car Co., supra note 6 (notice held unreasonable); Redd v. Garford Motor Truck Co., supra note 112a (dictum, since no notice was given).
past and future defaults, according to the better authority, unless, of course, the buyer fails to live up to the extension agreement. An oral agreement to accept partial payments is likewise a waiver, in so far as acted upon by the buyer. As to past defaults, it has been held that the acceptance of one installment waives a default of a prior installment accruing before the time of such acceptance. Likewise, the acceptance of one installment waives the default upon an installment accruing later but in default before such acceptance. Acceptance of part of the price after all is due is not a waiver, nor is the seller's inaction or delay in enforcing his rights.

To be distinguished is the situation where upon default the contract has been formally terminated by the seller. Then any new agreement between the parties is upon such conditions as the seller may lay down, and such new agreement is not a waiver of past defaults under the original contract.

In the absence of special contract provisions otherwise, the general rule obtains that the seller has two remedies: to repossess the property or to recover the price, that these two remedies are mutually inconsistent, and that pursuit of one is an election of remedies which prevents later use of the other.

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118 See Morrison v. Veach, supra note 95.


123 McConell v. Redd, supra note 5; Middlecamp v. Zumwalt, supra note 117. See also People v. One 1924 Studebaker Auto, supra note 99.


Two theories of election have been advanced by the courts: first, that conduct showing an intent to rely upon one remedy constitutes an election;\(^1\) second, that such conduct must not only occur, but must be relied upon by the buyer to the point of creating an equitable estoppel before there is an election.\(^2\) The first theory has generally prevailed with regard to conditional sales,\(^1\) although not with regard to other situations.\(^1\) It is further held in regard to conditional sales that ignorance of the facts when the remedy is selected will not prevent an election.\(^1\)

This result seems opposed to decisions in other fields.\(^1\) It has long been recognized that the doctrine of election of remedies as applied to conditional sales is a purely artificial one.\(^1\) In the first place, there is no inconsistency between a suit for possession and recovery of the price.\(^1\) By the terms of the contract itself, title, retained for security, is to remain in the seller until the price is paid. Furthermore, the election doctrine always aids the party who is in default.\(^4\) The pecu-

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\(^{126}\) Martin Music Co. v. Robb (criticised in (1932) 20 CALIF. L. REV. 206); Smith v. Miller, both supra note 125; see also Boas v. Knewing, supra note 125.

\(^{127}\) De Laval Pac. Co. v. United etc. Co. (1924) 65 Cal. App. 584, 224 Pac. 766. See also Pacific Carbonator Co. v. Haydes & Son; Harter v. Delno, both supra note 125.

\(^{128}\) See cases cited supra note 126, and passim, infra notes 141-158.

\(^{129}\) Brice v. Walker (1920) 50 Cal. App. 49, 194 Pac. 721 (suit on note secured by chattel mortgage dismissed before judgment does not bar later foreclosure.) See also Hines v. Ward (1898) 121 Cal. 115, 53 Pac. 437; Mailhes v. Investors Syndicate (1934) 220 Cal. 735, 32 P. (2d) 610; Verder v. American Loan Soc. (1934) 1 Cal. (2d) 17, 32 P. (2d) 1081.

Further decisions will be found in 10 CALIF. L. REV. (1923) 3, and biennial supplements thereto.

\(^{130}\) Holt Mfg. Co. v. Ewing, supra note 125; see also Parke etc. Co. v. White River Lumber Co., supra note 125.

\(^{131}\) Verder v. American Loan Soc., supra note 129. See further cases cited in 10 CALIF. L. REV. (1923) 6, and biennial supplements thereto.

\(^{132}\) (1932) 20 CALIF. L. REV. 206. See also Hines, Election of Remedies, a Criticism (1913) 26 HARV. L. REV. 707; Deinard & Deinard, Election of Remedies (1922) 6 MICH. L. REV. 341, 480; Rothschild, A Remedy for Election of Remedies: A Proposed Act to Abolish Election of Remedies (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 141.


Cf. decisions allowing resale and recovery of deficiency, infra note 232.

liar strictness of the doctrine as applied to conditional sales shows that its true reason for existence is to protect the buyer against recovery of the property and the price both, and to balance this hardship upon the seller against the buyer's forfeiture when the seller retakes.\textsuperscript{135} There is of course a certain rough equalization of profit and loss to the seller in such a rule.\textsuperscript{136} The supposed protection to the buyer is slight, however, since the seller may retake, resell and obtain a deficiency, even without a contract provision to that effect;\textsuperscript{137} sue for the price and attach the property;\textsuperscript{138} or provide in the contract for recovery of both the price and the property.\textsuperscript{139} Thus the California decisions merely add confusion to an already confused subject. The net result of the courts' efforts to protect the buyer would seem merely to be the addition of numerous clauses to the contract.\textsuperscript{139a} It would seem preferable to apply the election doctrine only to the situation where the seller retakes and seeks to recover the full price and not merely a deficiency after resale.\textsuperscript{140}

The following conduct has been held sufficient to constitute an election to recover the price: obtaining judgment for the price;\textsuperscript{141} filing a suit for the price and attaching the property sold;\textsuperscript{142} filing a suit for the price even though such suit is later voluntarily dismissed;\textsuperscript{143} presentation and approval of a claim for the price against the estate of the buyer;\textsuperscript{144} filing a claim for the price with the buyer's referee in bank-

\textsuperscript{135}Horack, \textit{The Uniform Conditional Sales Act in Iowa} (1920) 5 Iowa L. B. 129; Starr, \textit{Conditional Sales and Chattel Mortgages} (1934) 9 Wash. L. Rev. 143, 183; Note (1929) 20 Col. L. Rev. 960.

\textsuperscript{136}Cf. Magill, \textit{The Legal Advantages and Disadvantages of the Various Methods of Selling Goods on Credit} (1923) 8 Corn. L. Q. 210.

\textsuperscript{137}See supra note 232.

\textsuperscript{138}See infra notes 173-187.

\textsuperscript{139}See infra notes 159-168.

\textsuperscript{139a}Cf. Horack, \textit{op. cit. supra} note 135.

\textsuperscript{140}See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Brown, supra note 125. \textit{Cf.} (1932) 2 Calif. L. Rev. 206.

Section 24 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act expressly eliminates the doctrine of election of remedies. See Bogert, \textit{loc. cit. supra} note 43.

141 Parke etc. Co. v. White River Lumber Co., \textit{supra} note 125; Matteson v. Equitable etc. Co., \textit{supra} note 7 (\textit{dictum}).


ruptcy; the seller’s stating to the buyer’s transferee that he is trying to collect the price from the buyer; continued demands by the seller for payment and refusals to accept the property when offered by the buyer.

Taking notes for the balance of the price does not constitute an election, nor can a demand for payment after the filing of a replevin suit be construed as an election to recover the price.

The following circumstances have been held sufficient to constitute an election to recover possession: retaking the property; filing a possessory action against the buyer or against a third person; making a threat to replevy followed by voluntary surrender of possession by the buyer.

On the contrary, other circumstances have been held not sufficient to constitute an election to recover possession: repossession for the purpose of making repairs as authorized by the contract; repossession to protect the property after abandonment by the buyer; a demand for possession followed by a voluntary delivery of part of the property only, which the seller refused to accept; a threat to retake if the price is not paid; oral notice to a sheriff in possession of the property to hold the property for the seller, where the contract did not provide that default ipso facto terminated the buyer’s rights.

Most decisions enforcing the doctrine of election of remedies have dealt with the simple form of conditional sale contract. May the seller by contract make his remedies of repossession and suit for the price concurrent? Many contracts so provide in express terms. No decision in

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146 See Martin Music Co. v. Robb, supra note 125.
147 See Harter v. Delno, supra note 125.
148 Smith v. Miller, supra note 125.
149 Washington etc. Co. v. McGuire (1931) 213 Cal. 13, 1 P. (2d) 437; see also Van Allen v. Francis, supra note 95.
150 Wiley B. Allen v. Wood, supra note 5.
152 Wiley B. Allen v. Wood, supra note 5; Teter v. Thompson, supra note 23; Cocores v. Assimopoulos, supra note 125. See also Automobile etc. Co. v. Salladay, supra note 125.
153 Covington v. Lewis, supra note 125.
154 Boas v. Knewing, supra note 125.
155 Maddux v. Mora, supra note 125.
157a Pacific Carbonator Co. v. Haydes & Son, supra note 125.
159 See for example the following cases: Silverthorne v. Simon (1922) 59 Cal. App. 494, 211 Pac. 26; Bice v. Harold L. Arnold, Inc. (1915) 75 Cal. App. 629, 243 Pac. 468; Kinsey v. Boyes, supra note 67; McConnell v. Redd, supra note 5; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Brown, supra note 125.
California has been found, however, where the seller retook and also obtained the full price. The language of the decisions is broad enough to indicate that there is virtually no limit to the remedies the seller may obtain by contract. It has been held that making the remedies concurrent and providing for resale and deficiency at the seller’s option does not transform a conditional sale contract into a chattel mortgage. As will be seen, the seller may sue for installments due at the time of repossession, if the contract so provides. He may use any other security given for the price and later retake the property, where the contract so provides, and the security has not fully satisfied the obligation. If he does not retake, he may use his other security for the price, and obtain judgment for any deficiency. Certainly the whole purpose of the election doctrine has been to prevent the seller’s obtaining both the property and the price. Although courts in some jurisdictions have allowed double recovery under concurrent remedies, there seems little doubt that when the question arises in California the courts will find some way to protect the buyer.

Conditional sale contracts, or the notes given for the price, or both ordinarily provide that on any default by the buyer the seller may at his option declare the entire balance due. Consequently, upon the buyer’s default, the seller may sue for the entire price. In some cases the seller

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100 The seller attempted to do this in Muncy v. Brain, supra note 125, but was not fully successful in the lower court. Only the buyer appealed. See infra note 255.

161 Muncy v. Brain, supra note 126; Adams v. Anthony (1918) 178 Cal. 158, 172 Pac. 593; Bice v. Harold L. Arnold, Inc., supra note 159. See also Covington v. Lewis, supra note 125; Kinsey v. Boyes, supra note 67. Cf. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Brown, supra note 125, where, although the contract made the seller’s remedies concurrent, there was a dictum that repossession not followed by resale would constitute an election of remedies.


103 See infra note 190.

164 See infra note 256.

165 See infra note 254.

166 See Note (1920) 29 Col. L. Rev. 960.

167 See Note (1932) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 66; (1931) 7 Wis. L. Rev. 38; (1932) 1 Fortnightly L. J. 229.

168 In Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States (1909) 216 U. S. 177, at 195, Mr. Justice Harlan said: “It will be time enough to deal with such cases as and when they arise. Suffice it to say, that the courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so restrained by technical rules that they could not find some remedy, consistent with the law, for acts, whether done by government or by individual persons, that violated natural justice or were hostile to the fundamental principles devised for the protection of the essential rights of property.” See cases cited supra note 125 passim. See also Bogert, The Evolution of Conditional Sales Law in New York (1923) 8 Corps. L. Q. 303.
has been refused a right to sue for the price upon the ground that the terms of the contract made repossession his sole remedy. The seller's suit for the price vests title in the buyer, under the doctrine of election of remedies, and the seller need not tender a bill of sale to the buyer before filing suit for the price.

Many times the seller's most advantageous course is to sue for the price and levy an attachment upon the property sold. Rapid depreciation of the property, together with the buyer's usual lack of other tangible assets at a given moment, makes this remedy a popular one. The seller has three theoretical obstacles to overcome, however. First, the statute allowing attachment is clearly designed to exclude situations where the plaintiff is secured. The statute expressly excepts actions upon contracts "secured by any mortgage, deed of trust or lien upon real or personal property or any pledge of personal property." It has been held, however, that the seller's retained title does not constitute a mortgage, lien or pledge and hence that an attachment may issue. This result is technically sound but clearly contrary to the spirit of the statute. The courts purport to apply the rule that the statute is to be strictly construed, but originally this meant strictly against the one attaching, not against the debtor. The result may be justified since the seller, in the absence of special contract provision, has at present no other satisfactory


171 Parke etc. Co. v. White River Lumber Co., supra note 125; Holt Mfg. Co. v. Ewing, supra note 125; Van Allen v. Francis, supra note 95 (dictum); Silverstein v. Kohler & Chase, supra note 143 (dictum); Johnson v. Kaeser, supra note 7 (dictum); Elsom v. Moore, supra note 142; George J. Birkel Co. v. Nast, supra note 125; Waltz v. Silveria, supra note 36; Martin Music Co. v. Robb, supra note 125; Cocores v. Assimopoulos, supra note 125 (dictum).


173 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 537.


175 Cf. Walker v. Houston (reserved title similar in purpose to a lien); Alexander v. Walling, both supra note 7; (1920) 8 CALIF. L. REV. 250.

176 Standard Auto Sales Co. v. Lehman, supra note 7; criticised on this ground in (1920) 8 CALIF. L. REV. 250.

177 Payne v. Bensley (1857) 8 Cal. 260 (holding that the word "mortgage" in the attachment statute included a pledge).
means of realizing upon the property as security without losing his right to a deficiency.\textsuperscript{178} It has been held with regard to contracts for the sale of real property that the seller, having retained title, has security at least equal to a vendor’s lien or a mortgage, and may not attach.\textsuperscript{179} The only distinction between the two rulings seems economic rather than legal, \textit{i.e.}, personal property ordinarily depreciates faster than real property.\textsuperscript{180}

The second obstacle is that under the theory of executory sale the buyer has no property interest,\textsuperscript{181} and the seller’s attachment would be fruitless. As a corollary of the doctrine of election of remedies, however, title passes to the buyer automatically when the seller files suit for the price,\textsuperscript{182} and hence the attachment is levied upon property completely owned by the buyer,\textsuperscript{183} and does not constitute a recaption by the seller under the terms of the contract.\textsuperscript{184}

A third obstacle is the buyer’s claim of exemption from attachment. Since necessary household furniture is exempt,\textsuperscript{185} such a claim would often be well founded. The only applicable exception made by the statute is in favor of execution issued upon a judgment recovered for the price of the property.\textsuperscript{186} Attachment in a suit for the price could scarcely be included within this exception.\textsuperscript{187}

Of course the seller cannot, under the doctrine of election of remedies, procure an attachment in a possessory action, and the argument that past

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{178} See \textit{infra} note 238 as to uncertainty in remedy of resale.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Richvale Land Co. v. Johnson, \textit{supra} note 174.
\item \textsuperscript{180} The Richvale case, \textit{supra} note 174, is distinguished substantially on the economic ground in Standard Auto Sales Co. v. Lehman, \textit{supra} note 7, at 771, where the court said: “The difference, however, between the two kinds of property is the reason for the difference in the rule applicable to each. Real property is fixed and cannot be destroyed, lost, stolen, or taken away. And the vendor, therefore, always has his security for the payment of the balance of the purchase price. While personal property, as the automobile in the present case, may be taken away or destroyed with the consequent loss of his security and without the knowledge of the vendor.”
\item \textsuperscript{181} See cases cited \textit{supra} note 5.
\item \textsuperscript{182} See cases cited \textit{supra} note 171.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Elsom v. Moore, \textit{supra} note 142; George J. Birkel Co. v. Nast, \textit{supra} note 125. See also Williams v. Lowenthal, \textit{supra} note 174.
\item \textsuperscript{184} George J. Birkel Co. v. Nast, \textit{supra} note 125.
\item \textsuperscript{185} \textsc{Cal. Code Civ. Proc.} § 692 (2). The word “necessary” is given no restrictive meaning whatever according to the practice of the Sheriff’s office in Los Angeles county.
\item \textsuperscript{186} \textsc{Cal. Code Civ. Proc.} § 690 (21).
\item \textsuperscript{187} In George J. Birkel Co. v. Nast, \textit{supra} note 125, the property attached was a piano, but no claim of exemption was made. In Martin Music Co. v. Robb, \textit{supra} note 125, the seller’s failure to attach allowed a successful claim of exemption and withdrawal from the bankrupt buyer’s estate of a piano. See also \textit{Note} (1932) 17 \textsc{St. Louis L. Rev.} 143.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
due interest constitutes an obligation separate from the price has not prevailed.

The seller may, without waiving his right to repossess upon a later default, sue for installments as they become due. Query, whether under this rule the seller might sue for all but the final nominal payment under a conditional sale in the form of a so-called lease contract with the option of purchase. The seller may, if the contract so provides, retake the property and still recover the amount due at the time of retaking.

Upon the buyer's default (but not before), the seller has the right to retake the property and may do so by virtue of his reserved title even in the absence of express provision for repossession. Apparently the seller need not tender notes given for the price, as a condition of repossession. It is unsettled whether or not a demand for possession is necessary before the seller may retake, but after the seller has made such demand, the buyer is liable for any further depreciation in the value of the property. The buyer's consent is not necessary to repossession by self-help and without legal process. Such repossession may be taken forcibly without constituting a conversion, but the seller is liable for any damage or injury he causes if he fails to secure possession peaceably.

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187a Cocores v. Assimopoulos, supra note 125.
188 Silverstein v. Kohler & Chase, supra note 143; Covington v. Lewis, supra note 125 (dictum). See also McMurray, A Review of Recent California Decisions in the Law of Property (1921) 10 Cal.R. Rev. 42, 49; Note (1919) 7 Cal.R. Rev. 442, 449; (1920) 8 Cal.R. Rev. 191.
189 For full discussion, see (1920) 8 Cal.R. Rev. 191.
190 Adams v. Anthony, supra note 161; Commercial Discount Co. v. Howard, supra note 125 (dictum). See also Hogan v. Anthony (1921) 52 Cal. App. 158, 198 Pac. 47; Stavnow v. Winfree, supra note 125.
191 Maggio Bros. Co., Inc. v. Wood (1932) 216 Cal. 260, 13 P. (2d) 694. See also cases cited supra note 11.
193a See Estreich, Instalment Sales (1926) pp. 746-750; but cf. Van Allen v. Francis, supra note 95.
194 See P. J. Freiermuth Co. v. Faustino (1932) 120 Cal. App. 136, 7 P. (2d) 370. See also (1932) 18 Coast. L. Q. 71 to the effect that such demand is necessary unless the contract provides otherwise. No notice or demand is necessary where the contract so provides. See Pacific Finance etc. Co. v. Pierce, supra note 114.
195 P. J. Freiermuth Co. v. Faustino, supra note 194.
196 Silverstein v. Kohler & Chase, supra note 143.
197 Ibid. See also (1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 987; (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 884; (1934) 12 Tenn. L. Rev. 225.

Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 16, provides in part as follows: "Unless the
The usual ground of repossession is of course the buyer's default in the payment of the price. Most conditional sale contracts provide numerous other grounds, however, for acceleration of the balance due and for repossession. For example, when a contract so provides, the seller may retake if he deems the financial condition of the buyer such as to endanger the seller's rights. The seller must have reasonable ground to take advantage of this provision, however. The Rockon case actually held that the seller's discovery of debts existing at the time the contract was made was not sufficient, although the buyer had stated in his application that he had no such debts. The court remarked that the buyer's financial condition had not changed. Nevertheless it certainly had changed so far as the seller's knowledge was concerned, and this would seem to be the important point. The seller may retake upon the buyer's transfer of the property, removal of the property from the county without the seller's consent, or if the buyer repudiates the contract, abandons the property, or fails to procure a release of attachment within a given time. It has not been decided whether the seller may by contract reserve the right to retake without default upon the buyer's part.

Many conditional sale contracts of automobiles provide that all parts and accessories placed upon the car by the buyer shall become the property of the seller as security for the price. May the seller retake such added property upon the buyer's default? Upon the principle of accession, the seller without such contract provision might be entitled to retake as against the buyer, if the property were not readily severable, and a fortiori he may do so if the contract so provides. As against a goods can be retaken without breach of the peace, they shall be retaken by legal process; but nothing herein shall be construed to authorize a violation of the criminal law."
conditional seller of accessories, however, it has been held that the seller of the car loses, both on the ground that the property (in this instance, tires) was severable, and that the conditional seller of the accessories retained title.\textsuperscript{210} A different result would follow, of course, if there were grounds for estoppel of the seller of the accessories.\textsuperscript{211} It has been held that knowledge of the conditional sale contract of the car on the part of the seller of accessories may be sufficient to create such an estoppel if there has been a change of position in reliance.\textsuperscript{212} Where the seller of the car claims not against a conditional seller of the accessories but against one who purchased from the conditional buyer after the accessories had once been attached to the car, it has been held that the seller prevails, at least where the purchaser is on inquiry as to the conditional sale contract.\textsuperscript{213} This result was reached even though the property (in this case a detachable truck body) was readily severable, on the ground that the contract provisions controlled over the principle of accession. Theoretically, the distinction is clear. The seller of the accessories never lost title, while the purchaser from the conditional buyer acquired only such title as the buyer had, under the terms of the contract.\textsuperscript{214}

Under ordinary circumstances repossession is not a rescission\textsuperscript{215} and the seller after retaking need not return the payments made by the buyer.\textsuperscript{216} The burden of proof, however, is upon the seller to show performance of all conditions necessary to his right to repossession before he may enforce a forfeiture.\textsuperscript{217} Although the early decisions declared no

\textsuperscript{210} D. Q. Service Corp. v. Securities etc. Co., \textit{supra} note 77. See also Hendy v. Dinkerhoff (1880) 57 Cal. 3; A. Meister & Sons Co. v. Harrison (1922) 56 Cal. App. 679, 206 Pac. 106.

\textsuperscript{211} D. Q. Service Corp. v. Securities etc. Co., \textit{supra} note 210.

\textsuperscript{212} \textit{Ibid.} See also Dersch v. Thomas, \textit{supra} note 209.

\textsuperscript{213} \textit{Ibid.} See also A. Meister & Sons Co. v. Harrison, \textit{supra} note 210; (1932) 7 Ind. L. J. 507.

\textsuperscript{214} See (1932) 12 B. U. L. Rev. 673.


\textsuperscript{217} Johnson v. Kaeser, \textit{supra} note 7 (\textit{dictum}). See also Miller v. Steen, 30 Cal. 402, \textit{supra} note 215; (1919) 8 CALIF. L. REV. 60.
forfeiture was involved since the buyer had no property right, recent decisions tend to give relief against forfeiture under Civil Code, section 3275. It would seem necessary to the seller's security, in view of the rapid depreciation of the type of property sold under conditional sale contracts, that he should have the right to retake without accounting for payments made. This also provides a simple procedure which (under ordinary circumstances) any layman may follow without the necessity of consulting attorneys and becoming involved in lawsuits. The power of a court of equity to relieve against forfeiture aids the buyer (perhaps more in theory than in fact, however), and at the same time protects the seller by requiring the buyer to pay the full price.

After the seller retakes, the buyer is entitled to possession upon making a tender of the price within a reasonable time, unless the contract expressly makes time of the essence. In an action by the seller for possession against the buyer's assignee, it has been held proper to render judgment for the seller conditional upon the defendant's failure to pay the balance due. This is, of course, in accordance with the trend to relieve not only the buyer but his transferee against forfeiture.

Although the seller after repossession may not ordinarily obtain the price, the court has held that the seller may sue for the reasonable value

218 See supra note 108.
219 See supra note 109.
221 "Above all things, it (business) abhors the necessity of going to court."
See also Magill, loc. cit. supra note 136.
In many states the buyer has been given a statutory right to redeem. See 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 16, § 579; Note (1933) 43 Yale L. J. 323; (1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 128; (1934) 18 Minn. L. Rev. 429; (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 281.
226 See supra note 109.
of the buyer's use on quantum meruit. Obviously this remedy is useful only where the buyer has paid an insubstantial amount or nothing at all. It is doubtful whether the seller may sue for breach of contract and obtain the difference between the price and the value of the property, and certainly he cannot obtain the agreed rental of the property under the lease type of conditional sale. On the other hand, the seller is not restricted to a claim for damages rather than the price. There would seem no sufficient reason why the seller should not be allowed to sue for breach of contract the same as for breach of any other contract of sale.

It is settled that the seller without special provision in the contract may retake the property, resell and recover any deficiency from the buyer. This result was originally reached on the theory that the seller had a lien enforceable by pledgee's sale. Although this theory of lien or pledge has been thoroughly discredited, the rule still holds. The resale really amounts, of course, to a foreclosure on the part of the seller. It is clear that if any method of sale is to be followed, it must be the procedure for sale of a pledge; no other statutory procedure would seem applicable. Nevertheless, one decision held, upon grounds that are far from clear, that a sale apparently following such procedure was invalid. This decision makes the resale remedy a hazardous one for the seller at present, unless, of course, the contract provides for the

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227 Burr v. Gardella, supra note 216 (opinion of Supreme Court in denying hearing). See also (1929) 29 Cal. L. Rev. 960, 1123.

228 Burr v. Gardella, supra note 216 (opinion of Supreme Court in denying hearing). But see Cocores v. Assimopoulos, supra note 125; Rayfield v. Van Meter, supra note 125; Murphy v. Hellman Comm't etc. Bank, supra note 125; Burr v. Gardella, supra note 216 (opinion of District Court of Appeals).

229 Burr v. Gardella, supra note 216 (opinion of Supreme Court).


232 Matteson v. Equitable etc. Co., supra note 7; Jeanson v. Zangl, supra note 125. See also Bagwill v. Spence, supra note 230 (dictum); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Brown, supra note 125; Covington v. Lewis; Maddux v. Mora, both supra note 125.

See Williston, loc. cit. supra note 1; (1932) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 66. Cf. Cooper, loc. cit. supra note 162.


235 See Jeanson v. Zangl, supra note 125.

236 See infra note 248.

237 Matteson v. Equitable etc. Co., supra note 7. See also Alexander v. Walling, supra note 7.

238 Frankel v. Rosenfield, supra note 125. Apparently California is not the only state where a similar uncertainty exists. See Note (1932) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 66.
right of resale and for the method thereof. A provision for such resale does not make a conditional sale contract into a mortgage, at least not unless such resale is compulsory. Since a resale is not ordinarily obligatory upon the seller, the availability of this remedy puts the buyer at the seller’s mercy. The seller may retake and then either keep the property if he decides it is worth more than the balance due or resell and sue for a deficiency, if he decides that it is worth less. Apparently the seller need not at the time of repossession give the buyer notice of his intent to resell on the buyer’s account. Thus it may be argued that to protect the buyer, the resale by the seller should be compulsory, if the seller is ever to be allowed to recover a deficiency. On the other hand, if the buyer has a substantial equity, he should be able to find a purchaser for it.

Apparently the seller may not obtain a decree for strict foreclosure, although retaking does in itself constitute such foreclosure. Although allowing the seller to resell and obtain a deficiency is in substance a foreclosure he is neither obliged to make such resale, nor to foreclose the buyer’s interest by court action. Indeed there are no decisions as to whether the seller may be allowed to foreclose by court action and obtain a deficiency.

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239 See Commercial Discount Co. v. Howard, supra note 125; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Brown, supra note 125. The court in Frankel v. Rosenfield, supra note 125, pointed out that the contract did not provide for resale.

240 Perkins v. Mettler (1899) 126 Cal. 100, 58 Pac. 384; Bice v. Harold L. Arnold, Inc., supra note 159; McConnell v. Redd, supra note 5. See also Rodgers v. Bachman, supra note 36. Cf. Van Allen v. Francis, supra note 95; Lawson, loc. cit. supra note 162.


243 See Hale, The Uniform Conditional Sales Act (1922) 2 Ore. L. Rev. 1; McDonald, Conditional Sales in Tennessee (1925) 2 A. B. Rev. 141; Note (1932) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 66.


245 Many statutes require such a resale. See, for example, 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 16, § 579; Pharr, Installment Sales in Tennessee (1933) 12 Tenn. L. Rev. 12.

The Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 19, provides for compulsory resale where the buyer has paid at least fifty per cent of the price.

246 Youngshaf v. Weiserger, supra note 125.

247 See (1932) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 66.

248 See supra note 235.

249 See supra note 242.


251 Cf. Youmashef v. Weiserger, supra note 125.
After repossession by the seller, his right to resort to other security given for the buyer's performance will necessarily depend upon his right to recover a money judgment against the buyer. On the election doctrine, the seller after repossession will ordinarily have no right to sue for the price and hence no right to use the security. Where, however, the seller is allowed to sue for a deficiency after resale, he may use the security to apply upon such deficiency. A contract provision giving the seller the right to use the security after repossession is probably not enforceable with regard to the whole balance of the price due. The seller after first using the security may later retake the property, if the contract so provides, at least where the buyer's obligation has not been fully satisfied. Security for the buyer's performance given by a third person is in the position of a surety and is released by any act which would discharge a surety.

Fraud on the part of the buyer does not justify the seller's repossession. The seller must either rescind, which would apparently involve a return of the payments, or affirm the contract and sue for damages, or else seek other remedies under the terms of the contract.

The seller's failure to deliver all of the property contracted for or to deliver the property specified by the contract prevents him from retaking the property that has been delivered to the buyer, unless the seller returns the payments made. Apparently the seller may obtain pro rata the price for part of the property in spite of the failure of his title as to the balance of the property. Where the seller has been guilty of fraud, he cannot retake without restoring the consideration.

REMEDIES OF THE BUYER

Ordinarily the seller's retaking does not constitute a rescission and the buyer is not entitled to recover the payments made. This is true

253 See Covington v. Lewis; Frankel v. Rosenfield, both supra note 125. See also supra note 187a.
254 Jeanson v. Zangl, supra note 125. See also Muncy v. Brain, supra note 125.
255 Ibid. See Note (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 1123.
256 See authorities cited supra note 255.
257 Parke etc. Co. v. White River Lumber Co. (1896) 110 Cal. 658, 43 Pac. 202; Murphy v. Hellman Comm't etc. Bank; Frankel v. Rosenfield, both supra note 125.
258 Rochon v. Pacific Coast Mortgage Co., supra note 199.
259 Ibid. (dictum).
260 Heine Piano Co. v. Crepin (1904) 142 Cal. 609, 76 Pac. 493; Parker v. Funk, supra note 11.
261 See dicta in authorities cited supra note 260.
262 King v. Moreland, supra note 172.
264 See supra note 215, 216.
even though the seller has been guilty of fraud, provided the buyer has
failed to rescind.205 For the seller's fraud or upon failure of considera-
tion, the buyer may rescind and recover the payments made,206 provided
he does so promptly,207 at the same time returning the property.208
Where the seller retakes wrongfully, it has been said that the buyer may
recover his payments without a formal rescission.209 The buyer's re-
covery upon rescission is of the payments less, not the reasonable rental
value, but the reasonable value of the use to the buyer,270 which may be
a very different amount. Of course the seller cannot deduct the value of
such use, if he fails to put the matter in issue.271 Rescission by agree-
ment gives the buyer whatever rights and remedies the agreement may
provide for.272 The buyer may not rescind while he is in default.273 The
buyer is entitled to interest upon the money paid the seller only from
the date of rescission.274

The buyer may, of course, sue for damages for the seller's breach of

205 Hogan v. Anthony, 34 Cal. App. 24, supra note 215; Hogan v. Anthony,
52 Cal. App. 158, supra note 190. See also authorities cited infra note 273. Cf. Whiting
v. Squeglia, supra note 90.
206 Kirtley v. Perham, supra note 36 (failure of consideration); Knight v.
App. 679, supra note 215 (fraud); Pendell v. Warren (1925) 76 Cal. App. 33, 243
Pac. 707 (fraud); Pendell v. Warren (1929) 101 Cal. App. 407, 281 Pac. 658 (fraud);
See also Whiting v. Squeglia, supra note 90 (fraud).
207 Knight v. Bentel, supra note 266; Hogan v. Anthony, 52 Cal. App. 158, supra
note 190; Markus v. Lester, supra note 215. Cf. Stewart v. Hollingsworth (1900)
129 Cal. 177, 61 Pac. 936.
208 Knight v. Bentel, supra note 266; Williams v. Lowenthal, supra note 174.
209 Bray v. Lowery, supra note 216; Hesse v. Comm'l Credit Co., supra note 113.
Cf. cases cited supra note 265. This rule has been criticised. See Williston, loc. cit.
supra note 1.
210 Bray v. Lowery, supra note 216; Pendell v. Warren, supra note 266.
211 Hesse v. Comm'l Credit Co., supra note 113; Pendell v. Warren, 101 Cal.
App. 407, supra note 266; Starr Piano Co. v. Martin (1932) 119 Cal. App. 642,
7 F. (2d) 383.
212 Sauble v. Gary etc. Agency (1922) 56 Cal. App. 606, 206 Pac. 141 (return of
payments on resale); Green v. Darling (1925) 73 Cal. App. 700, 239 Pac. 70 (return
of payments); Miles v. Zadow (1927) 87 Cal. App. 405, 252 Pac. 396 (surplus on
resale). See also Francisco v. Schleicher, supra note 103. Cf. (1933) 8 Ind. L. J. 501.
213 Russell v. Penniston (1921) 55 Cal. App. 492, 203 Pac. 813. In this case the
buyer alleged fraud but on appeal relied on implied warranty of title. The court
pointed out that a party in default could neither sue on the contract nor rescind.

In decisions dealing with land sale contracts a distinction is made between
the seller's breach of contract, where a buyer in default is not allowed to rescind, and
the seller's fraud, where the buyer's default is held immaterial. See Graham v. Los
Angeles-First National Trust and Savings Bank (1935) 89 Cal. Dec. 454, 43 P. (2d)
543; 25 CAL. JURIS. (1926) 716, and Supplements, and cases there cited. Cf., for
example, Bryan v. Baymiller (1928) 95 Cal. App. 481, 272 Pac. 1106 (citing only
Russell v. Penniston, supra). See also authorities cited supra note 265; Corbin, loc.
cit. supra note 220. Compare authorities cited supra note 263.
214 Knight v. Bentel, supra note 266.
contract, but only where the buyer is not himself in default. Where the buyer sues for breach, it is error to allow him only the amount paid on the contract. No decisions have been found upon the measure of damages for the seller's breach.

The conflict between the old and the new theories of the nature of a conditional sale appears again in the question whether implied warranties exist under a conditional sale contract. The old Civil Code, section 1764, repealed in 1931, provided: "Except as prescribed by this article, a mere contract of sale or agreement to sell does not imply a warranty."

Numerous exceptions were made in the statute, however, and decisions involving situations covered by these exceptions are to be distinguished. On the theory of executory sale, most decisions held that there were no implied warranties under a conditional sale contract, but other decisions allowed recovery. One decision attempted to establish the distinction that the buyer may recover special damages, but not general damages for breach of warranty on the ground that the buyer is not entitled to the difference between the price and the value until he becomes complete owner. In the first place, this measure of damages seems incorrect; the buyer should get the benefit of his bargain. Later decisions use as a measure of damages the difference between the actual value of the property and the value it would have had if there had been no breach of warranty. This attempted distinction is not generally followed.

There seems no valid reason why the buyer should not have the benefit of implied warranties. He gives a consideration and is en-

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275 Hogan v. Anthony, 52 Cal. App. 158, supra note 190 (dictum); Starr Piano Co. v. Martin, supra note 271.
276 Russell v. Penniston, supra note 273.
277 Starr Piano Co. v. Martin, supra note 271.
278 For measure of damages for breach of warranty, see infra note 284.
279 See old CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1675-1771.
280 See, for example, American Soda Fountain Co. v. Martin (1929) 100 Cal. App. 43, 279 Pac. 680 (under old CAL. Civ. CODE § 1767).
282 Hot-N-Cold Corp. v. Todd (1930) 105 Cal. App. 718, 288 Pac. 687; Starr Piano Co. v. Martin, supra note 271 (warranty probably express); Williams v. Lowenthal, supra note 174 (dictum). See also People's Bank v. Porter, supra note 7; King v. Moreland, supra note 172.
286 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 16, § 607; (1934) 14 B. U. L. Rev. 853.
REMEDIES UNDER CALIFORNIA CONDITIONAL SALES 587
titled to complete ownership upon payment of the price.\textsuperscript{287} The Sales Act enacted in 1931 allows implied warranties in "contracts to sell or a sale."\textsuperscript{288} Although no decisions have dealt with contracts made after 1931, it would seem clear that the rule has been changed.\textsuperscript{289}

Of course an express warranty in a conditional sale contract will be given effect.\textsuperscript{290} Where a warranty is allowed, the buyer may rescind,\textsuperscript{291} providing he does so promptly,\textsuperscript{292} or he may sue for the breach.\textsuperscript{293} The buyer cannot do either, however, if he himself is in default.\textsuperscript{294}

Upon the seller's wrongful repossession, the buyer may use a possessory action,\textsuperscript{295} or sue for conversion.\textsuperscript{296} If there is no re-delivery in the first action, the buyer may sue in a second separate action for conversion.\textsuperscript{297} The measure of damages for such conversion is the value of the buyer's special property interest only—that is, the difference between the market value of the property at the time of the conversion and the balance of the price due.\textsuperscript{298} Where the plaintiff was the assignee of the original buyer, it was held that he was entitled only to the amounts paid by him to the seller.\textsuperscript{299} The trial court had held that the plaintiff was entitled to the full value of the property, without deduction. While a modification of the trial court's opinion was obviously proper, the plaintiff should have recovered according to the ordinary measure of damages, since presumably he had to pay to the buyer the value of his equity.

\textsuperscript{287}See authorities cited supra note 286.
\textsuperscript{288}CAL. CIV. CODE § 1733.
\textsuperscript{289}See Note (1933) 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 96; (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 957. Cf. (1916) 1 Corn. L. Q. 126.
\textsuperscript{290}Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 2, gives the buyer the benefit of warranties, express and implied. See Bogert, loc. cit. supra note 43; Burdick, Codifying the Law of Conditional Sales (1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 103.
\textsuperscript{291}California Press Mfg. Co. v. Stafford Packing Co. (1923) 192 Cal. 479, 221 Pac. 345 (dictum); Starr Piano Co. v. Martin, supra note 271.
\textsuperscript{292}Hot-N-Cold Corp. v. Todd, supra note 282.
\textsuperscript{293}Hogan v. Anthony, supra note 190.
\textsuperscript{294}Starr Piano Co. v. Martin, supra note 271.
\textsuperscript{295}Russell v. Penniston, supra note 273.
\textsuperscript{296}Redd v. Garford Motor Truck Co., supra note 112a; Davies-Overland Co. v. Blenkiron, supra note 7; Miller v. Modern Motor Car Co., supra note 6.
\textsuperscript{298}Carvell v. Weaver, supra note 6.
\textsuperscript{299}Lindsey v. Butte, supra note 114; Bunnell v. Baker, supra note 296; Dupont v. Allen, supra note 143. See also (1932) 18 Corn. L. Q. 71.
\textsuperscript{300}Rathbun v. Hill, supra note 11.
REFUSAL TO EXTEND CONDITIONAL SALE REMEDIES TO THE LOAN SITUATION

It is significant that the courts have consistently refused to extend the rights and remedies of the conditional seller to a lender under a loan masked as a conditional sale. It is held to be merely a chattel mortgage. It has thus become as true that "not at first a conditional sale, never a conditional sale" as that "once a mortgage, always a mortgage." Although most recent decisions have involved the rights of third persons, the leading decisions involved only the parties to the transaction. These decisions may be interpreted to mean that the rights and remedies of the seller which are peculiar to the conditional sale transaction and which give the seller an advantageous position in order to protect his security, are economically undesirable to be given an ordinary lender as against an ordinary borrower. The chief reason may well be greater inequality of bargaining power in the loan situation, but the greater need for security in order to make conditional sales possible is surely an important factor. The technical distinction made by the decisions is extremely narrow. It has been held that where the contract is originally one of conditional sale and the seller assigns to a lender of the balance due, the lender succeeds to the seller's rights, but that if there is no assignment by the seller to the lender and a new and subsequent conditional sale contract is drawn up between the lender and the borrower, the contract is only a

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304 Haskett v. Hartwick, supra note 95; Coachella Valley State Bank v. Wilson, supra note 7. See Greene v. Carmichael, supra note 95; Kinsey v. Ryan, supra note 67; (1934) 9 WASH. L. REV. 143, 183.

Banks in making modernization loans under the terms of Title 1 of the National Housing Act, use conditional sale forms but carefully follow this distinction by taking an assignment from the original seller of the supplies to the borrower. The
chattel mortgage. This distinction seems without sound economic foundation except possibly to prevent a cloak for usury. In any case where the contract was originally a bona fide conditional sale, the lender should be given the rights of a seller, as to the balance advanced. The evils aimed at would seem to exist only where the original transaction is merely a loan and not an actual sale.

**CONCLUSION**

The economic function of the conditional sale would seem to be this: It makes possible mass consumption of goods for use, by persons who have no established credit rating and are unable to pay cash. Obviously the seller has an absolute need for reliable security before he can afford to make sales involving such great credit risk. His reserved title is not effective as security, unless he may enforce it in a summary, simple, and inexpensive manner. Repossession and forfeiture have been allowed by the courts as such a remedy. Obviously the seller is entitled to no more than the price, but the difficulty is to find an efficient and inexpensive method of foreclosure. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act seeks to provide such a method where the buyer has paid a substantial proportion of the price, and the act is generally favored by academic opinion.

conditional sale contract forms furnished by the bank provide for later application for a modernization loan and for assignment of the contract to the bank upon its approval of the application.

305 Blodgett v. Reinschild; Mercantile Acceptance Corp. v. Pioneer etc. Co.; Abdallah v. Jacob, all supra note 300.


308 Vold, *Sales* (1931) p. 283; Corbin, loc. cit. supra note 220. See also supra note 180.

309 And, of course, unless he may maintain it against third persons, including creditors and transferees of the buyer. See Isaacs, loc. cit. supra note 221; Magill, loc. cit. supra note 136.


311 See supra note 245.

312 For a comprehensive discussion of the Uniform Act, see Bogert, *Commentaries on Conditional Sales* (1924) 2a U. L. A.

adopted the Act, although most states have some statutory provisions intended to protect the buyer from oppression by the seller. Probably no foreclosure method can furnish a satisfactory remedy. It would seem preferable to allow the seller to use, at his option, either strict foreclosure by repossession, or resale and suit for a deficiency, although the advantage thus given may occasionally result in injustice to the buyer, rather than to make such sales economically impossible by denying such remedies. This argument involves two assumptions. The first, difficult of proof, is that the requirements of the Uniform Act would materially diminish the usefulness of the conditional sale device. The second, more suited for debate in another forum, is that conditional sales for mass consumption are economically desirable.

It should be noted that the recording requirement of the Uniform Act places a triple burden of expense, red tape, and publicity upon the transaction without being of much practical value, except with regard to fixtures intended to be attached to real property. The registration requirements with regard to automobiles, the most valuable single articles widely sold under conditional sale contracts, suffice to protect the rights of the seller and of unsuspecting third persons.

The law of conditional sales in California has been purely a development of case law, without statutory interference. While a statute might do much to clarify and simplify the remedies of the parties, no essential change from the case law seems necessary or desirable.

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314 Ibid.; 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 16 § 579; (1934) 18 Minn. L. Rev. 429. See also supra note 223.
315 See Glenn, Creditors' Rights and Remedies (1915) p. 169; Isaacs, loc. cit. supra note 221; Magill, loc. cit. supra note 136; Notes (1932) 21 Calif. L. Rev. 51; (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 740; (1932) 17 St. Louis L. Rev. 143. Cf. Reeves, loc. cit. supra note 56; (1926) 20 Ill. L. Rev. 708; Williston, op. cit. supra note 16 § 327.
316 See (1923) 22 Calif. L. Rev. 114; (1934) 18 Minn. L. Rev. 812.
317 Conditional sale contracts upon animate chattels or upon mining machinery must be recorded, or the conditional sales contract "shall be void as to the lien of the seller" against bona fide purchasers and creditors without notice. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2980. Query, as to the effect upon this provision, if any, of the decisions holding the seller has not a lien but title. See supra notes 174, 234.
318 Conditional sales of railroad or street railway rolling stock must likewise be recorded by filing with the Secretary of State. See Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 6475.