Prescriptive Water Rights in California:
An Addendum

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The article of Mr. Russell R. Kletzing, *Prescriptive Water Rights in California: Is Application a Prerequisite?*, appearing in the September, 1951, issue of this Review, is a sound and excellent paper and the conclusions stated seem to be unassailable. A consideration of recent cases in other western states, including Utah before and since its interesting 1939 legislation, emphasizes the soundness of Mr. Kletzing's conclusions.

The issue discussed in most of the western appellate courts is whether the so-called "water codes," now adopted in some form in every western state, provide an exclusive or only an alternative method for acquiring new water rights by physical diversions of water.

On United States lands new water rights are acquired only by appropriation, since according to well-known principles prescriptive rights can never be acquired against the government. However, where watercourses traverse private lands, rights may be acquired by prescription in most of the western states. The codes usually provide for filing formal applications, accompanied by maps and engineering data, with some state officer who then holds hearings and grants permits, often on conditions protecting the rights of other water users, present or future. The officer, of course, has the power to deny permits for good cause shown.

The majority of the western courts have held that these codes are in the nature of recording acts, giving priority to applicants as of their filing dates regardless of the length of time of use, and are not the exclusive method for acquiring new rights. The "continued, open, notorious, exclusive, uninterrupted, and adverse use and enjoyment of the water under a claim of right" for the statutory period (in California five years) in most western jurisdictions constitutes the perfection of new water rights as of the end of the statutory period. These rights often are not matters of public record and when in question require proof of all the necessary facts to the satisfaction of a court.

In Wyoming (and in Utah by statute since 1939) the courts hold that

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2 Utah Laws 1939, c. 111; 100 Utah Laws Ann, c. 3, §1 (1943).
3 Smith v. Hawkins, 110 Cal. 122, 42 Pac. 453 (1895).
4 Contra: Wyoming, Utah by statute and possibly Oregon and New Mexico. See text at notes 6-9 infra.
7 Utah Laws 1939, c. 111.
all the formalities of the water codes must be complied with and that no new
groups by appropriation or prescription can be acquired without compliance.
In Oregon and New Mexico the courts are not clear but seem to lean the
same way.

Mr. Kletzing quotes Mr. Samuel C. Wiel's excellent article with great
enthusiasm, but unfortunately Mr. Wiel's article was written just a little
too early as far as most of the decisive cases are concerned. The principal
Utah case referred to by Mr. Wiel, Deseret Company v. Hoopiana, as
ruling out prescriptive water rights, was shortly thereafter overruled by
Wrathall v. Johnson, which expressly recognized the validity of water
rights acquired by adverse possession in Utah. There are also other cases
since Deseret Company v. Hoopiana which have recognized the validity of
prescriptive water rights in Utah. The decision in Wrathall v. Johnson led
the Utah Legislature in 1939 to add the following interesting sentence to
its water code:

No right to the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be
acquired by adverse use or adverse possession.

This statute came before the Utah Supreme Court for consideration in 1943
in the case of Wellsville Company v. Lindsay Company, and in applying
it the court clearly held that prescriptive rights to water acquired prior to
passage of this statute in 1939 were valid. Mr. Justice Hoyt, in his dissent-
ing opinion, conceded that the 1939 act was not retroactive. He therefore
desired to limit some of the language in the majority opinion defining pre-
scriptive rights prior to 1939, since he realized that if these rights existed
they would not be affected by the legislation. While he did not say so, it
seems clear that neither the court nor the legislature could, under prin-
ciples of constitutional law, seriously diminish established water rights
(which the court held pre-1939 prescriptive rights to be) except by con-
demnation proceedings. This is also made clear in the admirable article
of Edward F. Treadwell entitled Developing a New Philosophy of Water
Rights.

On the basis of the court decisions to date, only Wyoming, of all the
western states, has squarely held that the statutory method for appropriat-

\[\text{Supra note 6.}\]
ing water is exclusive and that prescriptive rights cannot be acquired by mere adverse possession, as in the case of land.

The states upholding by decision the acquisition of water rights by adverse possession alone are: Colorado,\textsuperscript{19} Idaho,\textsuperscript{20} Montana,\textsuperscript{21} Nevada,\textsuperscript{22} Utah (reversed by statute) and Washington.\textsuperscript{24}

There is nothing to add regarding the position of the California courts because of the paucity of decisions as to the effect of its water code, as pointed out by Mr. Kletzing.

The decisions referred to above make it clear that rights to water already acquired by five years’ adverse possession in California, should be held definite, valid rights which neither the supreme court nor the legislature can at this time affect.


\textsuperscript{20}Basinger v. Taylor, 36 Idaho 591, 211 Pac. 1085 (1922); Crane Falls Co. v. Snake River Co., 24 Idaho 63, 77, 133 Pac. 655, 661 (1913); Hinton v. Little, 50 Idaho 371, 296 Pac. 582 (1931).

\textsuperscript{21}Clausen v. Armington, 123 Mont. 1, 212 P.2d 440 (1949); Murray v. Tingley, 20 Mont. 260, 50 Pac. 723 (1897).

\textsuperscript{22}Application of Filipini, 202 P.2d 535, 539 (Nev. 1949).


\textsuperscript{24}In re Crab Creek and Moses Lake, 134 Wash. 7, 235 Pac. 37 (1925); Lawrence v. Southard, 192 Wash. 287, 73 P.2d 722 (1937).