Comment

CALIFORNIA STAY LAW—SUPERSEDEAS AND STATUTORY

Presence of an appellate court structure in a legal system inevitably poses the question: what should be the litigants’ rights pending appellate review? Should the successful party in the trial court be allowed to enforce his judgment immediately, despite possibility of reversal? Or should the losing litigant’s appeal suspend the trial court’s power to enforce its judgment? Undoubtedly the answers to these questions will vary according to the type of judgment under consideration.

As an example, consider the competing equities which must be weighed in seeking a solution to these problems when a money judgment is rendered. If enforcement is suspended and the judgment is affirmed, the plaintiff will be greatly damaged if the defendant’s assets have been dissipated during the review period. But on the other hand, if plaintiff enforces the judgment prior to appellate review, a reversal will be useless to appellant if plaintiff has squandered the proceeds and is unable to make restitution.1

In the search for a workable solution to the problem, tentative answers...

1 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 957 gives appellate courts power to make restitution of property or rights lost by an erroneous judgment which is reversed or modified. See also Asato v. Emirzian, 177 Cal. 493, 171 Pac. 90 (1918).
must be tested in light of the probabilities as to affirmance or reversal. Considerable deference is due the trial court's determination, thus tipping the scales in respondent's favor.  

What solutions have been reached by the California courts and legislature in the myriad varieties of orders and judgments resulting from judicial processes? The purpose of this comment is to attempt to answer this question; to evaluate the effectiveness of the solutions, and to suggest changes if any are needed.  

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA STATUTORY STAY LAW

A brief summary of the historical basis of the present California law may prove useful in its description and analysis. At early common law a writ of error, without security, suspended the trial court's power to enforce its judgment until appellate review was completed. Abuse of this procedure, by its use solely as a dilatory tactic, led the English Parliament to enact legislation requiring security in certain instances before the writ could suspend the lower court's enforcement power. In the United States, to avoid the common law rule, the Judiciary Act of 1789 contained provisions which made security a requisite for the validity of the writ of error. Experience had demonstrated the need for protecting respondent's right if the judgment was to be stayed.

Following this trend the California legislature early enacted statutes assuring such protection upon appeal from certain judgments. Adopted in the 1850's, this legislation has continued in essentially its original form in the Code of Civil Procedure. In essence it provides for the perfection of statutory stays in the trial court. The effect of a stay is to prevent the trial court from initiating any further proceedings "upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein."  

3 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 974-982 dealing with appeals from justices' courts are not within the scope of this comment. It is also limited to civil actions.  
4 See Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., 107 U.S. 378, 381 (1882), for a discussion of the historical development of supersedeas. See also POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 148 (1941).  
5 Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., supra note 4 at 382.  
6 See Kitchen v. Randolph, 92 U.S. 86 (1876). Sufficient security to protect respondent's rights if the judgment was affirmed had to be posted in all cases in which the writ maintained the status quo during appeal.  
8 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 942, money judgments; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 943, judgments for delivery of documents or personality, orders appointing receivers, and foreclosure of chattel mortgages; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 944, judgments directing execution of a conveyance or other instrument; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 945, judgments directing the sale or delivery of possession of real property.  
9 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 946. The statement is often made that a stay deprives the trial court of all jurisdiction in the action. This is incorrect; the trial court may proceed upon other matters in the action not affected by the order appealed. E.g., the appeal stays the judgment but not proceedings to prepare a record on appeal from the judgment. Imperial Beverage Co. v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 2d 527, 150 P. 2d 881 (1944). The trial court may proceed upon a motion to re-tax cost. Hennessy v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 368, 228 Pac. 862 (1924). An appeal from judgment of divorce does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction in regard to a motion for temporary alimony and counsel fees pending the appeal. Bruce v. Bruce, 160 Cal. 30, 116 Pac. 722 (1911).
Classification of the pertinent code sections into two divisions, based upon the different procedures utilized to effect a stay, facilitates understanding the statutory scheme. One category includes Sections 942, 943, 944 and 945, which provide the procedure for staying one or more designated types of judgments. Generally these sections require the filing of an undertaking in the trial court or the deposit of the disputed property. The second category includes only Section 949. However, this is an important section which provides that in all other cases the mere perfection of an appeal creates an automatic stay without an undertaking.

THE WRIT OF SUPERSEDEAS

The trial court is not the sole guardian of the status quo. Superimposed upon the code provisions is the constitutional power of appellate courts to grant the writ of supersedeas. This writ suspends the lower court's power to enforce the judgment while the issuing court is reviewing the case. Thus the rules governing the stay of any one type of judgment can be studied only by considering concurrently the impact of both the statutory law and the writ. Accordingly, a general discussion of the writ is needed to facilitate subsequent analysis of the stay law applicable to the various types of judgments.

Supersedeas is a writ the sole function of which is to prevent the court rendering judgment from enforcing it prior to completion of review. It may issue only in aid of the reviewing court's jurisdiction. A supersedeas does not supersede, reverse or suspend the validity of the judgment.

10 Certain sections give the trial judge discretionary power to fix the amount of the undertaking necessary to create a stay. See Section 943 at note 61 infra, Section 945 at note 77 infra, and Section 949 at note 98 infra.
11 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 949 at note 98 infra. Although the court had no power to require a stay bond under this section until 1927, an appeal bond was required until 1921. Cal. Stats. 1921, p. 193. See People v. Jackson, 190 Cal. 257, 212 Pac. 4 (1923). This section was amended in 1927 to give trial courts discretionary power to require an undertaking. Cal. Stats. 1927, p. 874. For construction of amendment see text at note 173 infra.
12 The California Supreme Court derives the power to grant supersedeas from CALIF. CONST. Art. VI, § 4, which states, "... the said court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus and all other writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction." Hill v. Finnigan, 54 Cal. 493 (1880). An identical provision in Art. VI, § 4b grants this power to the district courts of appeal. Homestead Mining Co. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. App. 2d 488, 54 P. 2d 535 (1936).
13 "The writ of supersedeas is 'an auxiliary process designed to supersede the enforcement of the judgment of the court below brought up by writ of error for review'... In modern times the term is often used synonymously with a stay of proceedings, and is employed to designate the effect of an act or proceeding which of itself suspends the enforcement of a judgment." Dulin v. Pacific W. & C. Co., 98 Cal. 304, 306, 33 Pac. 125, 126 (1893), quoting Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U.S. 248, 250 (1879). See constitutional authorization for the writ of supersedeas in note 12 supra.
16 See Smith v. Smith, supra note 14 at 464, 116 P. 2d at 5. But the distinction between suspending the enforcement of a judgment and suspending the validity of a judgment should be carefully noted.
Neither can it operate as an injunction by restraining the litigants from conducting their affairs in accordance with the lower court’s decision. A writ of supersedeas is obtained by filing a petition in the reviewing court in which the appeal is pending, and may be granted only when the court has jurisdiction over an appeal properly before it. A successful petitioner, but for one possible exception, must establish that his rights may be prejudiced unless the status quo is maintained during appellate review.

If the appeal is from a judgment of a type which does not require court process for enforcement purposes, supersedeas may not issue as there is nothing upon which the writ can operate. Such judgments are described as self-executing. Dulin v. Pacific W. & C. Co. is illustrative of the principle. In a contest over election of a corporate director, the trial court declared one contestant duly elected, limiting its judgment to an adjudication of status. A supersedeas to prevent the board of directors from accepting the trial court’s nominee pending review was denied because the board’s action was not pursuant to court process.

Use of the Writ to Complement the Statutory Law

Study of the code provisions on stays might lead to the conclusion that the writ of supersedeas is unnecessary. But decisional law shows that certain judgments are not within the statutory scheme. Yet in certain

18 Rule 49, Rules on Appeal, 22 Cal.2d 32 (1943).
20 This requirement is apparently not needed when appellant is seeking the writ to prevent violation of a statutory stay. See text at note 30 infra.
22 Caminetti v. Guaranty Union Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2d 759, 141 P.2d 423 (1943); Hulse v. Davis, 200 Cal. 316, 253 Pac. 136 (1927); In re Imperial Water Co. No. 3, 199 Cal. 556, 250 Pac. 394 (1926); Dulin v. Pacific W. & C. Co., supra note 13; Tyler v. Presley, 72 Cal. 290, 13 Pac. 856 (1887); Erickson v. Municipal Court, 131 Cal. App. 327, 21 P.2d 480 (1933); People v. City of Westmoreland, 135 Cal. App. 517, 27 P.2d 394 (1933). For discussion of the rule for which these cases are cited in regard to prohibitory injunctions see text at note 129 infra.
23 "The term ‘self-executing’ is practically self-defining and obviously denotes a judgment that accomplishes by its mere entry the result sought, and requires no further exercise of the power of the court to accomplish its purpose." Feinberg v. One Doe Co., 14 Cal.2d 24, 29, 92 P.2d 640, 642 (1939).
24 Supra note 13.
25 A judgment giving relief other than mere declaration of status, such as ordering removal of directors, apparently would be stayed under Section 949. See De Garmo v. Goldman, 19 Cal.2d 755, 767, 123 P.2d 1, 7 (1942).
26 Such a false thesis would be attributable largely to Section 949. Its introductory phrase suggests that all judgments not regulated by other sections are provided for in that section. Note 98 infra.

As the statutory stay provisions are in Part II (Civil Actions) of the Code of Civil Proce-
cases, unless a possible reversal of the judgment is to be a Pyrrhic victory for appellant, it is necessary to maintain the status quo during review. Accordingly, a supersedeas has been granted to fill the void.

Use of the Writ as a Remedy When Stay is Being Violated

Aside from its function of complementing the code provisions, supersedeas also serves as a remedy when the trial court threatens to enforce its judgment despite a valid statutory stay. Utilization of the writ in its remedial capacity will prevent further violation, but it will have no effect upon enforcement proceedings consummated before the statutory stay became operative. Although the writ is discretionary, there is some indication that it will issue as a matter of right to protect a statutory stay.

Use of Writ When Appellant Fails to Perfect Stay

As a general rule supersedeas will not be granted if the appellant could have perfected a statutory stay in the trial court. Exceptions to this rule have in the main been instances in which the appellant's sureties failed to qualify due to accident, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. To prevent them, they are not applicable to special proceedings unless expressly made so by statute. Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 13 Cal. 2d 306, 89 P. 2d 637 (1939). In such cases the appellate court may issue the writ in its discretion.
vail, appellant must prove a good faith attempt to comply with the applicable statutory provision and post a bond for respondent's protection. Respect for the legislature's statutory plan warrants such a restrictive policy aimed at preventing excessive appellate litigation, encouraging trial court control, and safeguarding respondent's right.

STATUTORY STAYS CREATED ONLY BY FILING AN UNDERTAKING OR
BY PLACING DISPUTED PROPERTY IN COURT CUSTODY

Stays Upon Appeals from Money Judgments

Execution on a money judgment may be stayed by most California trial courts for thirty days or until ten days after a motion for a new trial has been determined. After this discretionary period, respondent may execute unless appellant has appealed and perfected a stay pursuant to Section 942. This requires an undertaking by which the sureties must promise that they are each worth the sum specified in the undertaking, the stipulation to execute the same by the court from which the appeal is taken, judgment may be entered on motion of the respondent in his favor against the sureties for such amount, together with all damages and costs which may be awarded against the appellant upon the appeal, and that if the judgment or order appealed from is made payable in a specified kind of money or currency, the judgment entered against the sureties upon the undertaking must be made payable in the same kind of money or currency. If the undertaking in this section first provided for be executed on the part of the appellant by a corporate surety authorized to execute the same by Section 1056 of this code, such undertaking shall be sufficient in amount if the surety be bound in one and one-half times the amount named in the judgment or order appealed from.


88 See Williams v. Borgwardt, supra note 34. The necessity for appellate court interference could be alleviated if Section 948 were amended to grant trial courts some discretion in the procedure for justification of sureties. This could be done simply by giving the trial courts power in meritorious cases to allow justification by sureties after the statutory period expires.


90 "If the appeal be from a judgment or order directing the payment of money, it does not stay the execution of the judgment or order unless a written undertaking be executed on the part of the appellant, by two or more sureties, to the effect that they are bound in double the amount named in the judgment or order; that if the judgment or order appealed from or any part thereof be affirmed, or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will pay the amount directed to be paid by the judgment or order, or the part of such amount as to which the judgment or order is affirmed, if affirmed only in part, and all damages and costs which may be awarded against the appellant upon the appeal, and that if the appellant does not make such payment within 30 days after the filing of the remittitur from the supreme court in the court from which the appeal is taken, judgment may be entered on motion of the respondent in his favor against the sureties for such amount, together with the interest that may be due thereon, and the damages and costs which may be awarded against the appellant upon the appeal. If the judgment or order appealed from be for a greater amount than two thousand dollars ($2,000), and the sureties do not state in their affidavits of justification accompanying the undertaking that they are each worth the sum specified in the undertaking, the stipulation may be that the judgment to be entered against the sureties shall be for such amounts only as in their affidavits they may state that they are severally worth, and judgment may be entered against the sureties by the court from which the appeal is taken, pursuant to the stipulations herein designated. When the judgment or order appealed from is made payable in a specified kind of money or currency, the judgment entered against the sureties upon the undertaking must be made payable in the same kind of money or currency. If the undertaking in this section first provided for be executed on the part of the appellant by a corporate surety authorized to execute the same by Section 1056 of this code, such undertaking shall be sufficient in amount if the surety be bound in one and one-half times the amount named in the judgment or order appealed from."
ise that appellant will pay the amount of the judgment if his appeal is unsuccessful plus all damages and costs which may be awarded against appellant. An appellant fortunate enough to obtain a written waiver from respondent or able to deposit the amount of the judgment in court need not comply with Section 942.

Inapplicability of Section 942 unless appellant himself is directed to pay money.—Section 942 has been construed as applicable only when the appellant is ordered in the judgment to pay money. Accordingly, if the money judgment is against another party to the action, appellant cannot perfect a statutory stay. This interpretation is illustrated by Halsted v. First Savings Bank. Plaintiff, claiming a bank deposit, joined the bank and another claimant as defendants. The trial court rejected plaintiff's claim and gave the defendant claimant a judgment against the bank. On plaintiff's appeal and petition for a supersedeas, alleging compliance with Section 942 and a threatened violation of the stay, the supreme court held that although appellant had filed an undertaking, no stay existed because appellant was not required to pay the money. Only the bank, which did not appeal, could utilize Section 942. However, the court, exercising its discretionary power, granted the writ on the condition that appellant file a bond.

It is arguable that since the judgment was not within Section 942, it was a "case not provided for in sections 942, 943, 944 and 945" and therefore stayed under Section 949 merely by perfecting an appeal. The court conceded that any judgment against appellant was stayed by the appeal, but decided the judgment against the bank was not one against appellant, thus concluding the money judgment was not stayed even under the broad coverage of Section 949. Regardless of the possible statutory arguments for the proposition that the judgment was stayed under Section 949, a proper result was reached. To grant a stay under Section 949, which requires no undertaking, would deprive respondent of the protection he needs, regardless of who is appealing. Respondent's protection, not appellant's status, should be the paramount consideration in granting a stay. Nevertheless, in Halsted the need for a stay was apparent and its availability

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41 Breach of the undertaking entitles respondent to a judgment against the sureties who are bound for double the amount of the judgment. If the undertaking is by a corporate surety, the amount is decreased to one and a half times the judgment. Respondent may obtain the judgment in an ex parte proceeding, Gray v. Cotton, 174 Cal. 256, 162 Pac. 1019 (1917); Meredith v. S.C.M.A. of Baltimore, 60 Cal. 617 (1881); Ladd v. Parnell, 57 Cal. 232 (1881); Roberts v. Fitzgerald, 94 Cal. App. 747, 271 Pac. 1110 (1928); Duerr v. Sloan, 50 Cal. App. 512, 195 Pac. 475 (1920); and since it is a consent judgment there cannot be an appeal, Judnick v. Judnick, 47 Cal. App. 380, 190 Pac. 480 (1920).

42 Either procedure will create a stay under the provisions of Section 948, note 35 supra.

43 Halsted v. First Savings Bank, supra note 21; McCallion v. Hibernia Etc. Society, 98 Cal. 442, 33 Pac. 529 (1893); Pennie v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. 31, 26 Pac. 617 (1889); Born v. Horstmann, 80 Cal. 452, 22 Pac. 169 (1889); In re Schedel, supra note 30; Loudon v. Loudon, 63 Cal. App. 204, 218 Pac. 442 (1923).

44 Supra note 21.

45 See text at note 30 supra.

46 Note 98 infra.
should not depend on the discretionary writ. Legislation allowing such an appellant to obtain a statutory stay upon filing an undertaking would save litigants and appellate courts time and expense.

Of course, if *Halsted* had arisen as an interpleader action with the disputed fund deposited in court, a stay would have resulted without an undertaking whether the judgment was held to be a money judgment or one for the delivery of personality.\(^{47}\) The policy rationale is clear, a fund held by a court officer is not subject to dissipation as would be one held by a litigant.

What is a money judgment?—Although the answer to the question of what is a "judgment or order directing the payment of money," within the meaning of Section 942, is usually obvious, there are some judgments for money which are not within the section's scope. It is well settled that a judgment for costs does not require compliance with the section; execution is stayed merely by perfecting an appeal.\(^{48}\) Equally clear is the rule that an alternative judgment for the delivery of personality or payment of money is not stayed pursuant to this section,\(^{49}\) but rather by the procedures of Section 943.\(^{50}\)

Alimony orders are regulated by Section 942.\(^{51}\) Since they usually direct payment of a certain sum monthly, necessarily the amount cannot be computed as a liquidated sum for the appeal period.\(^{52}\) Nevertheless, the problem of fixing an amount for the bond has been resolved in the following manner: the probable duration of the appeal in months is estimated and that figure is multiplied by the monthly allowance, with the resultant as the basis for fixing the amount of the undertaking.\(^{63}\) Coverage by Section 942 is desirable, for if the order is not regulated by this section, it will be controlled by Section 949 and therefore stayed by the appeal without an undertaking. Protection of respondent requires a stay bond.

The present mode for determining the amount of undertaking is subject to criticism since duration of an appeal can only be estimated. Amendment

\(^{47}\) McCallion v. Hibernia Etc. Society, *supra* note 43. A deposit in court stays a money judgment. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 948, note 35 *supra*. Likewise when the disputed property is placed in court custody a stay is created. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 943 note 61 *infra*.


\(^{50}\) See text at note 63 *infra*.

\(^{51}\) Smith v. Smith, 201 Cal. 217, 256 Pac. 419 (1927); McAneny v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. 6, 87 Pac. 1020 (1906); Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 185, 7 Pac. 456 (1885); Ex Parte Earl, 132 Cal. App. 445, 22 P. 2d 773 (1933); Hogan v. Locke Paddon, 91 Cal. App. 606, 267 Pac. 392 (1928); Millar v. Millar, 51 Cal. App. 718, 197 Pac. 811 (1921).

\(^{52}\) Accordingly, a literal interpretation of Section 942 would prevent its application, as the undertaking requires that the sureties be bound for "double the amount named in the judgment or order."

\(^{53}\) See Hogan v. Locke Paddon, *supra* note 51.
of the section to authorize an undertaking in which the amount is designated by a sliding scale formula would remedy the objection. The sureties would promise to pay the sum resulting from multiplication of the monthly allowance by the number of months which actually elapsed between the order's rendition and its affirmance.

Stays operate only on the judgment appealed from.—Closely related to the problem of what is a money judgment is the rule that the appeal must be taken from the specific judgment sought to be stayed. An appeal from another order will not stay a money judgment in the same action even if the conditions of Section 942 have been satisfied. In Carit v. Williams, defendant moved to set aside an execution order issued on a money judgment. Upon denial of the motion he appealed and sought to stay the original judgment. The court held no relation back doctrine could be applied and the stay was denied.

Although reaffirmed, there has been some deviation from the rule in district court of appeal opinions. These cases involve orders under Code of Civil Procedure Section 685, which grants trial courts discretion to issue execution although the five year period for execution of judgments has expired. It has been held that an appeal from such an order will stay execution without an undertaking. Perhaps the result in these cases should not be questioned, since before the execution order the plaintiff had lost his unconditional right to satisfy his judgment. But surely in the usual case, appellant should not escape the bond requirement by appealing from the order granting execution instead of from the money judgment. Nevertheless, it may be vital to prevent enforcement of the judgment while the order is being reviewed. The supreme court has solved this problem by issuing a supersedeas conditional upon the filing of an undertaking.

Undoubtedly a stay of the main judgment is often desirable although the appeal is from a related order. The decisional law upon this subject demonstrates the inherent difficulty in drafting stay statutes which will be

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54 Macario v. Macario, supra note 21; Bryan v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. 761, 149 Pac. 938 (1915); Weldon v. Rogers, 154 Cal. 632, 98 Pac. 1070 (1908); Reay v. Butler, 118 Cal. 113, 50 Pac. 375 (1897); Carit v. Williams, 67 Cal. 580, 8 Pac. 93 (1885).

55 Supra note 54.

56 Macario v. Macario, supra note 21; Crowley v. Superior Court, supra note 49. See Weldon v. Rogers, supra note 54 at 637, 98 Pac. at 1071.


58 However, the failure in Weil v. Welz, 97 Cal. App. 2d 378, 217 P.2d 979 (1950) (alternative holding), to distinguish between Section 685 orders and a regular execution order cannot be treated in such a cavalier manner. If the appeal prevents the issuance of execution, the money judgment is effectively stayed.

59 Macario v. Macario, supra note 21.

60 When an appeal could be taken from an order denying a motion for a new trial, appellant could stay execution on a money judgment in the action by appealing from denial of such a motion and complying with Section 942. See Starr v. Kreuzberger, 131 Cal. 41, 66 Pac. 1 (1900); Holland v. McRae, 125 Cal. 353, 58 Pac. 9 (1899); Fulton v. Hanna, 40 Cal. 278 (1870). However, the right to appeal from such an order was abrogated in 1915. Cal. Stats. 1915, p. 209. Roberts v. Colyer, 179 Cal. 669, 180 Pac. 937 (1919). The courts have refused to create other exceptions to the rule announced in Carit v. Williams. See text at note 55 supra.
adequate in all possible situations. If trial courts were granted some discretion in staying judgments where an appeal has been taken from a related order, the problem would be alleviated.

The surety bond procedure utilized to stay execution on a money judgment illustrates that it is possible to compromise the competing equities which must be considered in staying a judgment. However, it must be noted that in many cases appellant will be financially unable to procure a stay bond. Perhaps this objection must be dismissed as insolvable, as are others directed at litigation costs, but the problem should be minimized as much as possible by not requiring security in excess of what is necessary. The possibility of decreasing the amount now required in the undertaking should be carefully studied.\footnote{It seems to be the practice of surety companies to require collateral from the appellant equal to the amount of the undertaking unless appellant appears to be financially able to satisfy the appellate courts' order in case of affirmance. Coupled with the cost of the premium, the collateral requirement undoubtedly prevents perfection of a stay in many cases. A decrease in the amount of the undertaking should result in a corresponding decrease in the amount of security required by bonding companies.}

\textit{Stays Upon Judgments Directing Delivery of Documents or Personalty; Appointing Receivers; Foreclosing Mortgages Upon Personalty}

On appeal from a judgment commanding assignment or delivery of personal property or documents, the appellant is afforded an alternative method of preventing enforcement pending review.\footnote{\textsc{Cal. Code Civ. Proc.} \S 943: "If the judgment or order appealed from direct the assignment or delivery of documents or personal property, the execution of the judgment or order cannot be stayed by appeal, unless the things required to be assigned or delivered be placed in the custody of such officer or receiver as the court may appoint, or unless an undertaking be entered into on the part of the appellant, with at least two sureties, and in such amount as the court, or a judge thereof, may direct, to the effect that the appellant will obey the order of the appellate court upon the appeal . . . ." \textit{Estate of Bond}, 193 \textit{Cal.} 482, 225 Pac. 450 (1924); \textit{Eastern O. Co., Inc. v. Superior Court}, 38 \textit{Cal. App.} 374, 176 Pac. 366 (1918).} The judgment can be stayed under Section 943, either by placing the document or property in the custody of a court officer or by filing an undertaking.\footnote{If the latter procedure is selected, sureties must engage that appellant will obey the reviewing court's order. If the trial judge refuses to fix the amount of the undertaking, the writ of mandate will lie to compel such action. \textit{Winsor Pottery Wks. v. Superior Court}, 13 \textit{Cal. App.} 360, 109 Pac. 843 (1910).} This section is not limited to judgments which only order the delivery of personality or documents; it also covers judgments which direct either delivery of personal property or, in the alternative, its value.\footnote{Failure to comply with the appellate court's order within a reasonable time after return of the remittitur constitutes a breach of the stay bond for which respondent can recover. \textit{U.S. Film Co. v. U.S. Fidelity Etc. Co.}, 44 \textit{Cal. App.} 227, 186 Pac. 364 (1919). But unlike the section regulating money judgments, Section 943 does not authorize entry of a judgment against the sureties on an \textit{ex parte} motion. \textit{Churchill v. More}, supra note 49.}

However, Section 943 is inapplicable if appellant does not have the sub-
ject matter of the judgment in his possession. Illustrative of this rule is a judgment ordering the sale of pledged property. Since appellant as pledgor does not have possession, the judgment can be stayed on appeal only pursuant to Section 949 without a bond, as a case "not provided for" in the other sections. If the disputed property has been placed in court custody during the trial, perfection of an appeal will stay further proceedings to enforce the judgment.

Whether a judgment which adjudicates rights in a specific fund is a money judgment or one directing the delivery of personalty is an open question. The question is academic if the money has been deposited in court, since a stay is created regardless of which section controls. If the specific fund is personalty, deposit in court satisfies Section 943, and assuming it is a money judgment, Section 948 provides that deposit in court operates to stay the judgment.

The question becomes more than academic, however, when the fund is held by one other than appellant. If the judgment is characterized as a money judgment, not only will Section 942 be inapplicable because a third person, not appellant, is directed to pay the money, but Section 949 will also be held inapplicable. On the other hand, if the fund is personalty, Section 943 will not apply because appellant does not have possession, but the automatic stay provisions of Section 949 will apply, allowing a stay without an undertaking. Therefore, in order to protect respondent, it seems advisable to classify "specific fund" judgments as money judgments. Especially would this be true if Section 942 were amended to allow a non-performing appellant to obtain a stay by filing an undertaking.

Where the judgment directs delivery of personalty justification of Section 943’s option to post a surety bond is not difficult. Continued utilization of the property is an obvious advantage to the community. But where the judgment directs assignment or delivery of a document, the stay bond pro-

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64 Baar v. Smith, supra note 49; Rohrbacher v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. 631, 78 Pac. 2d 22 (1944). See Jensen v. Hugh Evans & Co., supra note 30 at 404, 90 P. 2d at 73; In re Schedel, supra note 30 at 243, 10 Pac. at 335.
65 Rohrbacher v. Superior Court, supra note 64. Of course, there is a risk that respondent will dispose of the property without judicial sanction during appeal, but this risk is always present in a pledge transaction. The pledgor presumably contemplated this risk in selecting the pledgee, and the usual remedies are available.
67 A dictum in In re Schedel, supra note 30 at 243, 10 Pac. at 335, stated that a specific fund was not personal property. But a contrary dictum appears in McCallion v. Hibernia Etc. Society, supra note 43 at 445, 33 Pac. at 330. No decision was made in Navarro v. Lippold, 86 Cal. App. 2d 677, 195 P. 2d 543 (1948), and in Halsted v. First Savings Bank, supra note 21, it was assumed that it was a money judgment.
69 Note 35 supra.
70 Halsted v. First Savings Bank, supra note 21.
71 Baar v. Smith, supra note 49; Rohrbacher v. Superior Court, supra note 64.
72 See text at note 46 supra. It should also be noted that if the judgment were controlled by Section 949 the court could not require a stay bond. See text at note 173 infra.
cedure has no such justification. This suggests that deposit in court should be the only method allowed.

Section 943 also provides a means for staying orders appointing receivers. Appellant can obtain the stay by filing an undertaking in which the sureties engage that appellant will pay the damages occasioned by the appeal if it is unsuccessful.

A judgment or order which directs the sale of personal property upon foreclosures of a mortgage can also be stayed under Section 943. The undertaking must assure respondent that appellant will deliver the property or its value to the proper officer if the judgment is affirmed.

**Stays Upon Judgments Directing the Sale or Delivery of Possession of Real Property**

A judgment directing the sale or delivery of possession of real property is stayed by complying with Section 945. To give respondent the required

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73 "... If the judgment or order appealed from appoint a receiver, the execution of the judgment or order cannot be stayed by appeal, unless a written undertaking be executed on the part of the appellant, with two or more sureties, to the effect that if such judgment or order be affirmed or the appeal dismissed, the appellant will pay all damages which the respondent may sustain by reason of such stay, not exceeding an amount to be fixed by the judge of the court by which the judgment was rendered or order made, which amount must be specified in the undertaking." See El Don Oil Co. v. Gibson, 201 Cal. 231, 256 Pac. 550 (1927); Doudell v. Shoo, 159 Cal. 448, 114 Pac. 579 (1911).


75 "If the judgment or order appealed from direct the sale of personal property upon the foreclosure of a mortgage thereon, the execution of the judgment or order cannot be stayed on appeal, unless an undertaking be entered into on the part of the appellant, with at least two sureties, in such amount as the court, or the judge thereof, may direct, to the effect that the appellant will, on demand, deliver the mortgaged property to the proper officer if the judgment be affirmed, or in default of such delivery that the appellant and sureties will, on demand, pay to the proper officer the full value of such property at the date of the appeal."

Prior to 1897, an appeal without a stay bond suspended the trial court enforcement. Cal. Stats. 1897, p. 56. Powers v. Chabot, 93 Cal. 266, 28 Pac. 1070 (1892); Powers v. Crane, 67 Cal. 65, 7 Pac. 135 (1885); Snow v. Holmes, 64 Cal. 232, 30 Pac. 896 (1885).

76 Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. 250, 139 Pac. 69 (1914); Toele v. Heydenfeldt, 138 Cal. 56, 70 Pac. 1013 (1902).

77 "If the judgment or order appealed from direct the sale or delivery of possession of real property, the execution of the same cannot be stayed, unless a written undertaking be executed on the part of the appellant, with two or more sureties, to the effect that during the possession of such property by the appellant, he will not commit, or suffer to be committed any waste thereon, and that if the judgment be affirmed, or the appeal dismissed, he will pay the value of the use and occupation of the property from the time of the appeal until the delivery of possession thereof, pursuant to the judgment or order, not exceeding a sum to be fixed by the judge of the court by which the judgment was rendered or order made, and which must be specified in the undertaking. When the judgment is for the sale of mortgaged premises, and the payment of a deficiency arising upon the sale, the undertaking must also provide for the payment of such deficiency." See Archer v. Miller, 192 Cal. 67, 215 Pac. 410 (1923); Sing v. Baker, 187 Cal. 587, 203 Pac. 737 (1921); Jameson v. Chanslor-Canfield Etc. Oil Co., 173 Cal. 612, 160 Pac. 1056 (1916); Southern Pacific Co. v. Superior Court, supra note 75; Wheeler v. Karnes, 130 Cal. 618, 63 Pac. 62 (1900); Sheppard v. Tyler, 92 Cal. 552, 28 Pac. 601 (1891); Walsh v. Soule, 66 Cal. 443, 6 Pac. 82 (1885).
protection the section prevents an appeal from functioning as a stay unless appellant also files an undertaking, covenanted that no waste will be committed,79 and assuring respondent compensation for the use and occupation of the property if the appeal is unsuccessful.79 And if the judgment directs the sale of mortgaged property and payment of any deficiency, the undertaking must also provide for the deficiency payment.80 Although there must be a covenant upon each applicable provision, it is not necessary that a separate sum be designated for each; a lump sum to cover all covenants will be sufficient.81 The trial judge must fix the amount of the undertaking and if he refuses, mandamus will lie to compel his action.82 But appellate courts have no power to demand additional security.83

**Trial court permission a prerequisite in certain cases.**—When appealing from a judgment in forcible entry, forcible detainer, or unlawful detainer appellant must meet additional requirements. Section 1176 declares that these judgments cannot be stayed without the trial judge's permission.84 Once permission has been obtained, compliance with Section 945 is still necessary.85 This procedure apparently represents a legislative decision that respondent would not be sufficiently protected in all cases by a bond and that the trial judge could best determine whether there should be a stay. Appellate courts have deferred to this decision and have refused to issue a *supersedeas* where a stay has been denied.86

**Section 945 inapplicable if appellant is not in possession.**—When appellant is not in possession of the property Section 945 is not applicable.87 Rather, the judgment will be stayed merely by the appeal under Section 949.88 There is no reason to object to such a stay without security in some situations. For example, if the property is held by a court receiver, respond-

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80 Boob v. Hall, 105 Cal. 413, 38 Pac. 977 (1895).
82 Hinkel v. Crowson, 182 Cal. 68, 186 Pac. 1042 (1920); Gordan v. Graham, 153 Cal. 297, 95 Pac. 145 (1908); Gutierrez v. Hebbard, 104 Cal. 103, 37 Pac. 749 (1894); Green v. Hebbard, 95 Cal. 39, 30 Pac. 202 (1892).
83 Jameson v. Chanslor-Canfield Etc. Oil Co., *supra* note 77.
88 Cases cited note 87 *supra*. 
ent will be sufficiently protected. Likewise, where respondent is in possession no security is necessary.

Nevertheless, situations exist in which failure to require security would jeopardize respondent’s rights, although appellant is not in possession. The first case holding Section 945 inapplicable when appellant was not in possession, Root, Neilson & Co. v. Bryant, illustrates such a situation. In this action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien upon saw-mill property, plaintiff impleaded a bank which held a subordinate lien. From a decree directing sale of the property, the bank appealed and petitioned for a supersedeas on the theory that a stay existed by virtue of the appeal, since they were not in possession. The court agreed, concluding that since this was not a case provided for in Sections 942, 943, 944, and 945, appellant was therefore entitled to the automatic stay of Section 949. The court’s construction of these sections is perhaps necessitated by the language, but if so, it is questionable whether the result demanded by the code is desirable. If a stay bond is necessary for respondent’s protection this necessity is not obviated because appellant does not occupy the property; it is still subject to waste. Thus in the Root case if the value of the saw-mill property barely covered plaintiff’s claim at time of trial, protracted waste committed during the appeal period would seriously injure respondent. While it may seem harsh to subject appellant to liability for damages beyond his control, it is he who benefits from the stay.

The Root case was cited with approval fifty years later in Keeling Collection Agency v. McKeever, a similar case involving a mechanic’s lien and a deed of trust. It was held that appellant, not in possession of the realty, was entitled to an automatic stay under Section 949. Keeling was more than a reaffirmation of Root, however, since three years before Keeling was tried Section 949 had been amended to grant trial courts discretionary power to demand an undertaking. The possibility that this power could have been utilized to protect respondent was recognized in Keeling, even though the court concluded there was no showing that the trial court had abused its discretion in not requiring a bond. But this possibility of relief held out to future, similarly situated, respondents was considerably weakened a few years later when it was held an abuse of discretion to require a bond from an appellant not required to perform by the judgment.

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89 See Zappettini v. Buckles, supra note 33.
91 Supra note 87.
92 Compare Root, Neilson & Co. v. Bryant, supra note 87, with Johnson v. King, 91 Cal. 307, 27 Pac. 644 (1891), and Spence v. Kowalsky, 95 Cal. 152, 30 Pac. 202 (1892). In the latter two cases it was held that although appellant was not the mortgagor, he was responsible for the deficiency judgment provided for in the bond.
93 Supra note 87.
94 See text at note 172 infra.
95 See text at note 173 infra.
Stays Upon Judgments Directing Execution of an Instrument

Section 944 declares that a judgment or order which directs execution of an instrument cannot be stayed until the instrument is executed and deposited in court.96

It is probable that while compliance with this section is sufficient in some instances to stay the judgment, in others it is only a prerequisite to a statutory stay. Thus, if the judgment merely commanded execution of an instrument, a stay could be obtained by appealing and depositing the executed instrument in court. On the other hand, if the judgment ordered appellant to execute a deed and deliver possession of real property, compliance with Section 945, by filing an undertaking, also would be necessary. There have been no square holdings as to the Section 944's scope, but dicta in two cases support this thesis.97

STAYS CREATED BY THE PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL

Mere perfection of an appeal stays the judgments covered by Section 949.98 The section embodies a vestigial remnant of the early common law

96 "If the judgment or order appealed from, direct the execution of a conveyance or other instrument, the execution of the judgment or order cannot be stayed by the appeal until the instrument is executed and deposited with the clerk with whom the judgment or order is entered, to abide the judgment of the appellate court." See Guardianship of Morro, supra note 34; Ambrose v. Alioto, 62 Cal. App. 2d 680, 145 P. 2d 32 (1944). See Ballinger v. Ballinger, supra note 33 at 308, 61 P. 2d at 45; Archer v. Miller, 192 Cal. 67, 70, 218 Pac. 410, 411 (1923); Greenspot Desert Inns, Inc. v. Roy, 63 Cal. App. 2d 54, 59, 146 P. 2d 39, 41 (1944); Ott Hardware Co. v. Holmberg, 36 Cal. App. 402, 404, 179 Pac. 422, (1918).

97 In Greenport Desert Inns, Inc. v. Roy, supra note 96, a lessee in possession obtained a judgment ordering the lessor to execute a conditional sale contract. The court indicated that the lessor could have obtained a stay by depositing an executed contract with the county clerk, implying that only Section 944 was involved.

In Archer v. Miller, supra note 96, plaintiff in possession sought to quiet title to land. The trial court found defendant entitled to a decree of specific performance upon payment of the purchase price designated in a sales contract between the parties. Plaintiff appealed and sought a supersedeas. He contended that although a stay had been perfected by depositing a deed in court, the court clerk had indicated his intention of delivering the deed to respondent. Respondent's position was that no stay existed as appellant had not also filed a bond pursuant to Section 945. This contention was accepted by the supreme court but the writ was granted because respondent had failed to pay the purchase price.

98 "In cases not provided for in sections 942, 943, 944 and 945, the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or order appealed from; but the court in its discretion may require an undertaking in an amount to be fixed by it conditioned for the performance of the judgment or order appealed from if the same is affirmed or the appeal is dismissed; provided, that where such judgment or order appealed from directs the sale of perishable property the court below may order the property to be sold and the proceeds thereof to be deposited with the clerk of the court to abide the judgment of the appellate court. But such appeal does not stay proceedings without a writ of supersedeas, where it adjudges the defendant guilty of usurping, or intruding into, or unlawfully holding a public office, civil or military, within this State, or where the order grants, or refuses to grant, a change of the place of trial of an action, or where it orders a corporation or its officers or agents, or any of them, to give to a person adjudged to be a director, stockholder, or member of such corporation a reasonable opportunity to inspect or take copies of such books, papers or documents of the corporation as the court finds that such director, stockholder or member is entitled by law to inspect or copy, or where it adjudges a building or place to be a nuisance, and as a part of the judgment in the case orders and directs the closing of the building or place against its use for any purpose for any period of time."
doctrine that a writ of error functioned as a *supersedeas*. Scope and effect of the section are defined in the introductory clause which states:

In cases not provided for in sections 942, 943, 944, and 945, the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or order appealed from . . . 99

The exclusions are not limited to those of the introductory clause,100 four others being enumerated in remaining portions of the section. But, unlike the judgments excluded in the introductory clause which are stayed under other code provisions, judgments within the four exclusions can be stayed only by issuance of the writ of *supersedeas*. These specially treated judgments or orders are those which adjudge defendant guilty of usurping or unlawfully holding a public office,101 grant or deny a change of venue,102 allow inspection of corporate records,103 or close a building which has been declared a nuisance.104

The remaining portions of this comment will be devoted to an investigation of those judgments or orders coming within the automatic stay provisions of Section 949, concerning which the most confusion has arisen. But before this consideration it seems advisable to analyze a concept which

99 Since 1927 the trial court has had discretionary power to require an undertaking wherever a defendant is ordered to perform by the judgment. See text at note 173 *infra*.

100 The section also allows the trial court to sell perishable property and deposit the proceeds. See Rogers v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. 467, 111 Pac. 357 (1910).

101 Appeal from judgment that appellant had usurped the office of police judge did not stay the judgment. *Ex Parte Henslaw*, 73 Cal. 496, 15 Pac. 110 (1887). A judgment removing an officer for malfeasance in office is not within the exception, and will be stayed by appeal. Covarrubias v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal. 622 (1878). Formerly judgments determining election contests under *Civ. Proc.* § 1126 (repealed) were stayed by appeal. *Day v. Gunning*, 125 Cal. 527, 58 Pac. 172 (1899). Now, however, Section 8575 of the Elections Code declares "... the person declared elected by the superior court shall be entitled to the office in like manner as if no appeal had been taken."


103 "It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that substantial questions will be presented upon appeal and that some special reason exists why the inspection of the record should be stayed pending the appeal." Laher Etc. Corp. v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 2d 467, 468, 126 P. 2d 391 (1942). The writ issued in these cases: Capron v. Pacific Southwest D. Corp., 1 Cal. App. 2d 295, 36 P. 2d 664 (1934); Becker v. Hendricks, 109 Cal. App. 166, 292 Pac. 546 (1930); Sisson v. Guaranty Mortgage Co., 90 Cal. App. 510, 265 Pac. 1031 (1928). The writ was denied in these cases: Laher Etc. Corp. v. Superior Court, *supra*; Homestake Mining Co. v. Superior Court, *supra* note 12; Pierce v. Hill, 101 Cal. App. 547, 281 Pac. 676 (1929).

has caused much confusion in the application of Section 949's automatic stay rule.

**Self-Executing Judgments**

So-called self-executing judgments are not stayed either by the statutory stay provisions of Section 949 or by the writ of *supersedeas*. A self-executing judgment is one which creates rights in and of itself without need for implementation by further court proceedings. This doctrine has its basis in the theory that a stay, statutory or *supersedeas*, does not deprive the trial court's decision of its validity, but merely prohibits any further proceedings which would be utilized to enforce the judgment, for example, execution on a money judgment. Since there are no further trial court proceedings to be initiated upon a self-executing judgment, there is no judicial process upon which a stay could operate. Action on the judgment could be prevented only by an injunction restraining the litigants or other parties from acting, but neither a stay nor a *supersedeas* can function as an injunction.

A judgment which merely adjudicates status may serve to illustrate this rule. A litigant who has been adjudged the duly elected director of a corporation cannot be deposed by an appeal. The board of directors may exclude the losing litigant and admit the winner to the board. Such action requires no further court proceedings for the trial court's decision to be effective. Similarly, an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law is held to be self-executing.

Examples of other self-executing judgments include: an order to the Insurance Commissioner approving a proposed rehabilitation and reinsurance agreement, an order dismissing a petition for postponement of a

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106 See note 23 *supra*.

107 See note 105 *supra*.


110 Statements can be found in cases from other jurisdictions declaring that a self-executing judgment can be stayed. However, examination shows these cases involve either the trial court's power to suspend its judgment without statutory authorization, e.g., Blaustein v. Standard Oil Co., 4 Terry 236, 45 A. 2d 533 (Super. Ct. 1945) (trial court kept alive writ of foreign attachment by staying its order quashing the writ); Palmer v. Harris, 23 Okla. 500, 101 Pac. 852 (1909); or the trial court's power to enjoin litigants from disturbing the status quo pending appeal, e.g., Strangways v. Ringgold, 107 Ark. 433, 153 S.W. 619 (1913) (injunction by trial court restraining party from proceeding in organization of a drainage district).

sale under a deed of trust, a judgment that a city never had been lawfully incorporated, and an order quashing execution.

Courts in many jurisdictions use injunctive power to restrain litigants from disturbing the status quo pending appeal from a self-executing judgment. California courts have refused to do so and also have denied supersedeas when to grant it would be equivalent to issuing an injunction.

The California rule is well grounded in precedent, but does not appear strongly supported by reason. A contention that the supreme court has injunctive power in aid of appellate jurisdiction was summarily rejected in an early case with the statement that the power had not been granted by the legislature. The constitutional provision that "They [the supreme court] shall also have the power to issue all other writs and process necessary to the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction," went unmentioned. Courts in some jurisdictions have reached a contrary result in construing similar provisions.

Power to grant injunctions seems well within the constitutional provisions and would be highly desirable. In meritorious cases where supersedeas would be inapplicable because the judgment was self-executing, the appellate court could restrain the parties so as to preserve the subject of the appeal.

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113 People v. City of Westmoreland, supra note 22.
114 Halse v. Davis, supra note 22.
116 Canavarro v. Theatre Etc. Union, 15 Cal. 2d 495, 101 P. 2d 1081 (1940); Seltzer v. Musicians Union Local No. 6, 12 Cal. 2d 718, 87 P. 2d 699 (1939); McCann v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 4 Cal. 2d 24, 47 P. 2d 283 (1935); Wollenshager v. Riegel, 186 Cal. 622, 200 Pac. 726 (1921); Napa Val. Elec. Co. v. Calistoga Elec. Co., 174 Cal. 411, 163 Pac. 497 (1917); Hicks v. Michael, 15 Cal. 107 (1860); Solorza v. Park Water Co., 80 Cal. App. 2d 809, 183 P. 2d 275 (1947). The rejection of this doctrine is advocated in Note, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 211 (1942). If this were done a prohibitory injunction could be "stayed" by enjoining the litigant from enforcing it.
117 Cases cited note 116 supra.
118 Hicks v. Michael, supra note 116.
120 Astca Inc. Co. v. Lake County, 86 Fla. 639, 98 So. 824 (1922); Finlen v. Heinze, 27 Mont. 107, 123, 69 Pac. 829, 70 Pac. 517 (1902).
121 This would allow the court to maintain the status quo upon an appeal from a decree denying an injunction, where such action seemed advisable to preserve the rights involved in the appeal. As an illustration of this rule see Strangways v. Ringgold, supra note 110. For contrary California rule see Napa Val. Elec. Co. v. Calistoga Elec. Co., supra note 116.
Orders Concerning Court Officers

Orders to,\textsuperscript{122} or appointing, administrators,\textsuperscript{123} guardians,\textsuperscript{124} or executors\textsuperscript{125} are stayed on appeal by Section 949. As court officers these individuals derive their power to act from the court,\textsuperscript{126} and their acts, like the processes of a court, are considered further court proceedings. In practical effect there is no distinction between a sheriff proceeding under a writ of execution and a guardian executing court orders. Both are enforcing the court's decision, under its authority.

Failure of respondents to discern the similarity between orders to court officers and other enforcement proceedings, such as a writ of execution, has often led to needless litigation. \textit{Coburn v. Hynes} is a case in point.\textsuperscript{127} Appellant contended that his appeal from an order appointing a guardian created a stay. In answer to respondent's argument that the order was self-executing, the supreme court granted \textit{supersedeas} and observed that a guardian is an officer of the court and acts pursuant to court authority.

The self-executing argument was again rejected in \textit{Estate of Dabney}, a recent case involving an appeal from a decree of distribution.\textsuperscript{128} The court held that an appeal prevented the executor from distributing the assets of the estate until appellate review was completed.

\textbf{Injunctions}

\textit{Statutory law.}—Whether injunctive decrees are governed by the automatic stay of Section 949 has led to confused reasoning and results. As the rules have developed, prohibitory injunctions are not stayed by an ap-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{122} E.g., an order to an executor, a decree of distribution. \textit{Estate of Dabney, supra} note 30; \textit{Estate of Welling}, 197 Cal. 189, 240 Pac. 21 (1923); \textit{Firebaugh v. Burbank}, 121 Cal. 186, 53 Pac. 560 (1898); \textit{Pennie v. Superior Court, supra} note 43; \textit{Born v. Horstmann, supra} note 43; \textit{In re Schedel, supra} note 30; \textit{Estate of Garaud}, 36 Cal. 277 (1868); \textit{Linstead v. Superior Court}, 17 Cal. App. 2d 9, 61 P. 2d 355 (1936).
  \item \textsuperscript{123} \textit{Pennie v. Superior Court, supra}, held that an appeal from an order granting family allowance stayed enforcement of that order. Now, under \textit{Cal. Prob. Code} § 684 an appeal will not stay such an order if an undertaking is filed in double the amount of the payments.
  \item \textsuperscript{125} \textit{Estate of Hultin, supra} note 30; \textit{Estate of Stough}, 173 Cal. 638, 161 Pac. 1 (1916).
  \item \textsuperscript{126} \textit{That an executor is an officer of the court see \textit{Larrabee v. Tracy}, 21 Cal. 2d 645, 134 P. 2d 265 (1943); \textit{Estate of Conkley}, 35 Cal. App. 2d 581, 96 P. 2d 383 (1939). That an executor or administrator derives his power to act from the order of the court see \textit{County of Los Angeles v. Morrison}, 15 Cal. 2d 368, 101 P. 2d 470 (1940).
  \item \textsuperscript{127} \textit{Pennie v. Superior Court, supra note 43.}
  \item \textsuperscript{128} \textit{Supra note 30.}
\end{itemize}
peal; yet an appeal from a mandatory injunction does create a stay. The reason for this dichotomy is not readily apparent.

Two rationales have been advanced to support the proposition that an appeal does not stay a prohibitory injunction. In an early case the supreme court, stating that a prohibitory injunction restrains rather than commands performance, analogized the automatic stay section to its companion sections which reach only those judgments commanding that an act be done, and thus held that no stay could be created.

An apparent rationale of subsequent cases is that a prohibitory injunction is not enforced by subsequent court proceedings, leaving nothing upon which a stay will operate. Ensuing contempt proceedings for violation of the injunction are not viewed as enforcement of the original decree, but rather as separate punitive proceedings, in no way "proceedings in the court below upon . . . the order." Characterizations of a prohibitory injunction as self-executing, and thus not subject to stay, seems to be a re-statement of the same doctrine.

But enforcement of a mandatory injunction by the contempt power is regarded as an affirmative enforcement of the judgment, likened to execution, and thus stayable. This mandatory-prohibitory distinction has been soundly criticized on the ground that use of the court's contempt power is equally coercive in either situation.

Thus under present law, classification of injunction as prohibitive or mandatory is crucial. The distinction often being but a matter of form, courts have repeated that substance and not form controls the classification. Frequently injunctions are declared mandatory, although couched in prohibitory terminology. Ambrose v. Alioto exemplifies this construc-


130 This distinction is criticized in a comment in 28 CALIF. L. REV. 599 (1940).

131 Merced Mining Co. v. Fremont, supra note 129.

132 Feinberg v. One Doe Co., supra note 23; Ohaver v. Fenech, supra note 129; Wolf v. Gall, supra note 129; Clute v. Superior Court, supra note 130. See also Comment, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 599, 601 (1940).

133 Ohaver v. Fenech, supra note 129; Wolf v. Gall, supra note 129; Heinlen v. Cross, supra note 129.

134 See language of Section 949, supra note 98.

135 Comment, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 599, 601 (1940). As suggested in that comment, the contempt power is especially coercive when the action prohibited is of a continuous nature such as diversion of water. See also Note, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 209 (1942).

136 See Feinberg v. One Doe Co., supra note 23. Defendant employer was restrained "from employing, or continuing to employ, or hereafter employing" a present employee. The court held the order mandatory. It was said "the order directed and commanded the defendant to discharge said employee."

137 Byington v. Superior Court, supra note 130; Feinberg v. One Doe Co., supra note 23; Ohaver v. Fenech, supra note 129; Clute v. Superior Court, supra note 129; Foster v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. 279, 47 Pac. 58 (1896); Ambrose v. Alioto, supra note 130.
tional rule; the decree restrained defendant from delivering a fishing boat's "catch" to anyone other than a designated company. The provision was held to be mandatory.

Further alleviating the harshness of the mandatory-prohibitory distinction is the doctrine that an injunction is mandatory if it compels surrender of property rights. In Byington v. Superior Court the supreme court held that an order which denied petitioner the right to appropriate water was mandatory and thus stayed, on the ground that it compelled surrender of a property right.

Impact of writ of supersedeas.—Many injunctions remain too clearly prohibitive to be thus transformed and remain outside the pale of the automatic stay. In Food & Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, supersedeas was issued to fill the void and provide a stay upon an appeal from a prohibitory injunction. Attorneys faced with prohibitory injunctions long had contended that in this situation the appellate courts had power to issue the writ to aid its appellate jurisdiction. Considerable dicta afforded encouragement to this contention, but not until Garfield in 1941 did the oft repeated dicta become law.

Contradiction between statutory law and writ law as applied to prohibitory injunction.—The Garfield case seems self-contradictory. It holds the injunction self-executing and therefore not subject to stay under Section 949; yet, although it has been repeatedly held that the writ of supersedeas has no effect upon such a judgment, the writ was granted.

Since Section 949 was held inapplicable it hardly can be argued that the case impliedly overruled the cases holding a prohibitory injunction self-executing. Indeed, the proposition was expressly reaffirmed. Nevertheless, action upon a judgment was suspended and this could have been taken only by court process or by independent action by litigants. Therefore, since supersedeas functions only to suspend the lower court's power to enforce its judgment, implicit in the writ's issuance in Garfield is the recognition that enforcement proceedings are possible upon a prohibitory injunction.

This conclusion can be avoided only if the writ itself functions as an

140 Supra note 130.

141 Byington v. Superior Court, supra note 130; Joeger v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., supra note 130; Clute v. Superior Court, supra note 130; Stewart v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. 543, 35 Pac. 156 (1893). See dissenting and concurring opinions in United Railroads v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. 80, 155 Pac. 463 (1916), for discussion of this doctrine. See also Comment, 28 Calif. L. Rev. 599, 602 (1940).

142 Supra note 130.

143 Clayton v. Schultz, supra note 129 at 708, 87 P. 2d at 357; Dry Cleaners & Dyers Institute v. Reiss, 5 Cal. 2d 306, 310, 54 P. 2d 470, 471 (1936); Goodall v. Brite, 1 Cal. 2d 583, 36 P. 2d 190, 191 (1934) seem; People v. Associated Oil Co., 211 Cal. 95, 98, 294 Pac. 717, 720 (1930); Ohaver v. Fenech, supra note 129 at 124, 273 Pac. at 557.

144 See text at note 22 supra.

145 "If on the other hand the injunction is prohibitory, it is self-executing and its operation is not stayed by appeal." Supra note 27 at 177, 114 P. 2d at 580.

146 See text at note 22 supra.
injunction, restraining the respondent from initiating contempt proceedings on the original injunction pending review. But other judicially created roadblocks render this escape route unavailable. First, the courts have held the writ may not function as an injunction. Second, and more important, the courts have rejected the theory that any injunctive relief can be utilized in aid of their appellate jurisdiction. Unless this rule is overturned, cases in which a *supersedeas* issues upon a prohibitory injunction cannot be explained upon an injunction theory.

A realistic solution to the problem would be to recognize that prohibitory injunctions are not self-executing and that contempt proceedings for their violation are court proceedings which carry out the original injunction. Such a decision would reconcile the writ cases. Further, it would follow, that an appeal from a prohibitory injunction would create an automatic stay since the point of distinction from mandatory injunctions would thus be eliminated.

Perhaps such a result would not be desirable, since it is arguable that neither injunction should be automatically stayed by appeal. Appeal is often utilized as a delaying tactic. The solution of the promulgators of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was to give discretionary power to the trial court to stay the decree. A similar plan might be desirable in California. If injunctions were removed from the automatic stay section, appellant would still have two opportunities to prevent enforcement pending appeal. The trial court might suspend its decree until it has been affirmed, and failing there, appellant could apply for a *supersedeas* in the appellate court.

However, a countervailing argument for including injunctions in Section 949 merits mention. Since the 1927 amendment to the section allows the trial court to give respondent protection by requiring the appellant to file an undertaking it is possible to argue that both litigants would receive sufficient protection even with an automatic stay. One conclusion seems certain. Whichever alternative is selected, there should be no distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions.

**Stays Upon Appeals from Child Custody Decrees**

Appeal from a child custody decree automatically stays further trial court proceedings to carry out that decree. Accordingly, if a wife has

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149 Cases cited note 117 *supra*.
150 See text at note 145 *supra*.
151 Fed. R. Civ. P. 62. This does not deprive the appellate courts of their power to stay the judgment. See subdivision g of Rule 62.
custody and the husband obtains a modification order awarding custody to him, the wife may retain the child until her appeal is determined, without fear of contempt proceedings.154

Is an automatic stay desirable when child custody is the issue? Experience in other fields has demonstrated the necessity for deleting certain judgments from the automatic stay section.155 These decisions were based on the realization that the harm occasioned by staying these particular judgments outweighed the advantages of maintaining the status quo until the litigants' rights were finally determined. Re-examination of the automatic stay effect upon custody decrees may be warranted.

Usually trial courts modify custody decrees because a change in circumstances convinces the court that the child's welfare would be better served by such modification.156 Yet, an appeal from the order, and consequently a stay, may continue for three years.157 The immediate change found necessary by the trial court is nullified during a crucial period. Courts have rejected arguments pointing out this anomaly, stating that the statutory law was clear and any remedy must come from the legislature.158

Perhaps denying a stay would produce dire results in those cases which are reversed upon appeal. Reversal of a decree which has been enforced would cause the child's environment to be changed twice within a short period. Admittedly, this would not serve the child's best interest, but removal of custody decrees from Section 949 should not preclude the possibility of a stay.

First, trial courts should have discretionary power to suspend orders pending review.159 Second, as a last resort, an appellate court could issue supersedeas in meritorious cases.160 Furthermore, since the trial court's decision will be accorded great weight in these cases it is fair to assume that in a large majority of cases the decree will be affirmed.161 The litigants' rights seem adequately protected by this procedure, and, more important, there would be increased assurance that the child would have proper care during the appeal period.162

\[154\] Ex Parte Queirolo, supra note 153. If, however, the appellant delivers the child to the respondent without trial court coercion, the children will not be returned because the appeal effects a stay. The appeal stays only trial court proceedings. DeLemos v. Siddal, supra note 153.

\[155\] Of the exceptions new found in Section 949, only one was in the original statute. Cal Stats. 1851, p. 108. See text at note 100 supra.

\[156\] Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. 2d 719, 68 P. 2d 719 (1937).

\[157\] See Foster v. Foster, supra note 153.

\[158\] Ex Parte Queirolo, supra note 153.

\[159\] This would be analogous to the trial court's power to suspend injunctive relief during appellate review. See text at note 152 supra.

\[160\] The Iowa Supreme Court has construed its statutory stay provision as not applying to child custody decrees. Scheffers v. Scheffers, 241 Iowa 1217, 44 N.W. 2d 676 (1950). The court held the decree could be enforced unless appellant obtained a stay order from the appellate court. Many similar cases are collected from other jurisdictions. See also Note, 163 A.L.R. 1319 (1946).

\[161\] See note 2 supra.

\[162\] There is some authority that the juvenile department of the superior court could protect the child's welfare during appeal. Dupes v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 440, 168 Pac. 888
A recent case, Gantner v. Gantner, held that an appellate court could entertain motions and enter orders necessary to the child's welfare, when the trial court had been deprived of power by the appeal. It had been held in Gantner v. Superior Court that the father's appeal from an order denying his motion to change custody to him deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to make any order changing the status quo during appellate review. However, when acting on the mother's request to the supreme court to grant the order, the court indicated that an appellate court would have jurisdiction to do so, but would not disturb the status quo "without a showing that serious evils threatened the welfare of the children."

In Gantner v. Gantner, the court was concerned only with an appellate court's power to allow the children to be taken from the country during appellate review. But the underlying theory upon which the court relied does not appear to be limited to such orders. Apparently appellate courts have power to transfer actual custody of a child to respondent during an appeal from a modified custody decree when such action is proved necessary for the child's welfare.


As to the power of the trial court to vacate a temporary custody order although an appeal is taken from an order denying a petition for guardianship, see In re Pinnell, 184 Cal. 270, 193 Pac. 574 (1920). It was held that the trial court could vacate the order and restore the children to the mother from whom they had been removed by the temporary order.

In re Bullock, 139 Cal. App. 664, 668, 34 P.2d 769, 771 (1934). In that case, the supreme court held the appellate court's jurisdiction could be invoked to provide for the child's welfare during appeal. The wife had been granted custody of the children in a divorce decree which provided that neither party should remove the children from California without court approval. Subsequently the mother sought an order allowing her to take the children to Australia for a vacation. The father resisted the motion, alleging she would not return the children to California since her family home was in that country. He also asked the court to modify the divorce decree so as to award custody to him. Both motions were tried together. Meanwhile, he obtained a temporary stay from the district court of appeals restraining the lower court from entering an order upon the mother's motion. The application for modification of the divorce decree was denied and the court stated the order for a vacation would be granted whenever the temporary stay was lifted. This was the posture of the case when it reached the supreme court.

A writ of prohibition also issued in Lerner v. Superior Court, supra note 30. The facts were similar. The mother appealed from an order granting custody to the father. The father then petitioned the court for modification of a provision concerning education. If the trial court had been allowed to issue the order, the child would have been moved to New Jersey.

The decision in both Gantner v. Superior Court and Lerner seems realistic. Since the trial court orders which were prohibited would have allowed removal of the children beyond the jurisdiction, it hardly can be contended that they did not affect the orders which were pending review in the supreme court.

Gantner v. Gantner, supra note 163 at 756, 242 P.2d at 330. As an example of a situation in which the court's power would be exercised the court cited the following example, "It might be necessary for a mother to remove her child from the state for an operation necessary to save the life of the child that could be performed only in another state or country." Supra at 755, 242 P.2d at 330.

It should be noted that "the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the court below." (Emphasis added.) Note 98 supra. It has no effect upon the appellate court.

What will be done when a trial court allows removal orders similar to those in Gantner v. Superior Court and Lerner, supra note 164, while the court has jurisdiction? Such an order
Whether this solution is preferable to one in which the order is stayed only in the trial court's discretion or by an appellate court writ of supersedeas seems doubtful. Not only are appellate courts swamped with litigation, but trial courts should be better equipped, through experience, to deal with this type of proceeding. The trial judge has had the parties before him, he should be fairly well acquainted with the litigation's history, and it is the type of litigation usually tried in trial courts. However, there is an opposing argument for retaining the present statutory law as supplemented by the Gantner v. Gantner decision. It is arguable that a trial judge would be more reluctant to stay his orders in custody cases than in cases tried under less emotionally charged conditions. Further, to expect a trial judge to suspend enforcement of an order which he considered necessary to a child's welfare is perhaps an unrealistic assumption of judicial objectivity.

Yet, assuming in many meritorious cases appellant would be forced to rely on the appellate court for a stay, the recommended change still seems superior to the present law. Under the proposed change, appellant would carry the burden of obtaining a stay. But under the present law, appellant receives an automatic stay, subject to modification only by respondent proving a case under the Gantner v. Gantner rule. As between litigants, it is more consonant with the general stay law that appellant should carry the burden.

Stays Upon Judgments in Which the Appellant is Not Ordered to Perform

Several classes of judgment are stayed under Section 949, although the judgments do not direct the appellant to perform. Many of these judgments could be stayed only pursuant to this section; for example, an appeal by a legatee from a decree of distribution. However, some of these judgments would be stayed under a companion section but for the fact that appellant was not ordered to perform. Illustrative of this group is an appeal from a judgment ordering the sale of realty when the appeal is by an appellant not in possession. Thus instead of complying with Section 945, appellant obtains a stay under Section 949, and consequently no security is required.

Trial court power to require security seems necessary whenever the

would seem to be self-executing thus precluding both a statutory stay and supersedeas and allowing the child to be removed from the jurisdiction, without need of further court proceedings. See DeLemos v. Siddall, supra note 153. (Note a contrary dictum in Gantner v. Gantner, supra note 163 at 735, was deleted in a modification opinion, 38 A.C. 868.) Furthermore, an appeal from such order would prevent the trial court from subsequently enjoining removal of the child from the jurisdiction, nor could the appellate court restrain the party, since California appellate courts cannot utilize injunctive power in aid of their appellate jurisdiction. See text at note 117 infra.

Perhaps the appellate court will use commissioners if facts in addition to those in the record are needed to dispose of a motion. See Walkow v. Walkow, 36 Wash. 2d 510, 210 P.2d 108 (1950), 26 Wash. L. Rev. 55 (1951), in which the Washington Supreme Court utilized the trial court in disposing of a motion during an appeal from a child custody decree.

See text at note 12 supra.

See text at notes 64, 87 supra.

See text at note 88 supra.
delay occasioned could possibly jeopardize respondent's chance to satisfy completely his judgment if affirmed.

However, in interpreting an amendment to Section 949, apparently granting trial courts this discretionary power, the supreme court held it was an abuse of discretion to require security where the appellant was not required to perform by the judgment. Jensen v. Hugh Evans & Co., in construing the amendment stated this rule in unnecessarily broad terms. There was no need to require a bond in that case, respondent being amply protected without it. The Jensen case rule should be limited to cases in which it would be a useless act to require an undertaking. This would allow the trial court to require security in situations where the judgment's value is subject to diminution during appeal. It seems equitable that, as between respondent and appellant, the one benefiting from the stay should assume the risk.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

One conclusion that can be drawn from a study of the California law pertaining to judgment enforcement pending appellate review is that the law is unduly complicated, unwieldy and inflexible. As a procedural mechanism for safeguarding substantive rights, stay laws should not be so cumbersome that they deprive courts and litigants of energy which should be devoted to the merits of the case. Too often the present law requires counsel to expend a disproportionate amount of time in determining the stay law applicable to a particular judgment. An injunction decree illustrates this thesis. A maze of decisional law would have to be closely analyzed in classifying a particular injunction for the purpose of staying its enforcement and even then, as evinced by the reports, the characterization is often wrong.

In addition to the objections to the stay law on grounds of complexity and inflexibility, it is questionable whether the optimum has been attained in compromising the competing equities which must be considered in developing laws on this subject. Judicial construction of certain sections as inapplicable to appellants not required by the judgment to perform, thus casting the particular judgment into the purview of the automatic stay section, has resulted in an inequity which disregards respondent's rights since he is denied security.

172 This language was added: "but the court in its discretion may require an undertaking in an amount to be fixed by it conditioned for the performance of the judgment or order appealed from if the same is affirmed or the appeal is dismissed." Cal. Stats. 1927, p. 874.
173 This holding had been accurately predicted by Brannen, Discretionary Requirement of Bond for Stay of Execution in California, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 602 (1935).
174 13 Cal. 2d 401, 90 P. 2d 72 (1939). In this case third parties were claiming funds held by a sheriff under a writ of execution. A proceeding was held pursuant to the provisions of CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 689. Judgment was rendered for the original plaintiff and the claimant appealed. They sought supersedeas upon the theory that the trial court abused its discretion in demanding an undertaking as a prerequisite to a stay. This contention was accepted. But as the court indicated, respondent was amply protected without a stay bond. The sheriff held the money, and his performance was assured by his official bond.
175 For an example of the inflexibility of the present law see text at note 54 supra.
While solution of this particular problem can be effectuated by the judiciary in limiting the broad rule announced in the Jensen case, legislative change is preferable. This is largely due to the judicial codification of the Jensen rule which has begun in a manner which forecasts little hope that the rule will be limited. The rule has been stated in its broadest aspect in cases in which the trial court's discretionary power was considered.176

An additional reason exists for preferring legislative action. Many proposed changes can be effected only by legislation.177 Thus, it would be advantageous for the legislature to examine all stay provisions as construed by decisional law and to enact coordinated laws directed toward simplicity and preservation of both appellant's and respondent's substantive rights. Further study by a group able to draw upon the practical experience of the judiciary and appellate counsel would be helpful in drafting this needed legislation.178

In drafting legislation, careful consideration should be given to the question of whether certain judgments should not be removed from the effect of Section 949 so that the stay would not be automatic. Special attention should be focused upon injunctions and child custody decrees. However, members of the bar with varied appellate court practice may suggest many more. If more judgments are excepted from Section 949, it would be desirable to grant the trial court power to stay its judgment with or without security rather than to shift the burden entirely to the appellate courts, as is done by the existing exceptions to the section.179

Another change is needed to give California courts power to protect adequately rights involved in an appeal. Appellate courts should be able to issue injunctions in aid of their appellate jurisdiction. Repeated denial of this power by the courts indicates express constitutional authorization is needed.180 If appellate courts had this power, the status quo could be maintained whenever it was necessary to preserve the rights to be adjudicated upon appellate review. Court proceedings could be stayed by supersedeas, while action by litigants would be prevented through use of the injunction.

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177 See text at notes 53, 60, 150 and 158 supra and note 38 supra.
178 Fed. R. Civ. P. 62 would serve as a helpful point of departure for such a study. It embodies both the desired simplicity and flexibility needed in procedural rules.
179 See text at note 100 supra.
180 This would necessitate amendment of Sections 4 and 4b of Art. VI of the Constitution, so that an injunction would be enumerated as a writ which could be issued in aid of appellate jurisdiction. See note 12 supra.