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Rehearing in American Appellate Courts†

David W. Louisell* and Ronan E. Degnan**

Probably few applications in our procedural system are so often made and so seldom granted as petitions for rehearing.1 The practitioner, in the first flush of defeat at the hands of an appellate court, has a practically automatic and inevitable reaction: petition for rehearing. The appellate courts are deluged with floods of objectively hopeless petitions. While many of them can only be characterized as frivolous, doubtless a substantial percentage are reasonable at least in the sense that, in the absence of an adequate explication of grounds for rehearing in court rules, the conscientious advocate is justified in leaving no stone unturned. But frivolous or reasonable, most are doomed to peremptory denial; a few succeed, sometimes producing a complete change in the original decision, presumably thereby avoiding grievous miscarriage of justice2 or dramatically unsettling reasonable expectancies of finality.3

Is the game worth the candle? Is the expenditure of so much advocates’ and judges’ time and energy, not to mention litigants’ money, justified by

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† This article is being concurrently published by the California Law Review and the Canadian Bar Review. For detail as to the origin of rehearing, and the Canadian experience with it, the reader is referred to the version in 34 Can. B. Rev. 898 (1956).

The numerous letters on rehearing received from various appellate judges and quoted from or referred to in this article are not generally identified by the name of the writer because, while it is improbable that any judge would object to such identification, when their views were solicited they were not expressly notified that they would be identified by name. The letters were unusually forthright and candid.

1 The form of application is most commonly known in the United States as a “petition for rehearing.” Texas practice names it a “motion for rehearing,” and Mississippi prefers to call it “suggestion of error.” Motions to modify or correct the mandate or opinion are occasionally employed by attorneys and considered by courts with the same ultimate objective in mind. Motion for reargument is a common variant.

2 As in Boucher v. The King, [1950] 1 D.L.R. 657, 96 Can. Crim. Cases Ann. 48 (1949), rehearing, [1951] Can. Sup. Ct. 265, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 369 (1950), the first case in which the Supreme Court of Canada granted rehearing and reversed its original decision, and which is discussed in the Canadian version of this article. See introductory footnote supra, marked by †.

results so meager, at least from the quantitative viewpoint? Is rehearing inevitably a dilemma, a schizophrenic offspring of the law's ceaseless conflict between the often opposing goals of finality, on the one hand, and complete justice, on the other?

Superficially viewed, rehearing is a simple procedural device for correction of appellate errors. Usually court rules make relatively clear the general procedure contemplated. A decision unsatisfactory to one of the parties has been rendered. He petitions to have the cause set down for reargument, assigning briefly his grounds. There may or may not be oral argument on the petition, new briefs, and answer to the petition. If the court concludes that the petition should be granted, the case is set for reargument and treated substantially as though it had not been heard before. Initiative for rehearing may come from the court or a member, but normally comes from a party. If after reargument the court concludes that its original decision is erroneous, it revokes that decision and substitutes what it now deems appropriate. If, as is more often the case, it remains satisfied with what it first did, it reaffirms the original decision.

Despite the apparent simplicity of the system contemplated by rules on rehearing, the lawyer faced with an appellate defeat is often at a loss to know, and without means of ascertaining, whether a petition for rehearing has a chance to succeed or at least invoke serious consideration, or will be peremptorily denied, accomplishing nothing but the excitation of judicial wrath. And from a busy appellate court's viewpoint, the wrath may be quite understandable: rehashing once again matters to which the judges already have given their best efforts can only deplete judicial energy needed for other equally important causes. Yet the advocate most often is justified in retorting that neither the court's rules nor opinions adequately inform him as to whether he has a good claim to rehearing.

This article is a comprehensive study of rehearing in an attempt to throw light on these and related difficulties in present rehearing practices. It is remarkable that extensive use of rehearing in the United States has produced little scholarly attention to it. Law reviews and procedural treatises hardly mention the subject. The many references in appellate opinions

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4 "When a rehearing is granted, it means what the term 'rehearing' indicates, *i.e.*, that the case is for reargument and resubmission, before judgment can be entered therein." Granite Bituminous Paving Co. v. Park View Realty & Improvement Co., 270 Mo. 698, 701, 196 S.W. 1142, 1143 (1917).

We point out in the text that occasionally courts grant rehearing and rehear in the same proceeding—*i.e.*, that whether a court should rehear and whether it should change its prior decision are treated by both courts and attorneys as a single question. The Granite case is the only one found in which this process was condemned; the Supreme Court of Missouri held that such action by the St. Louis Court of Appeals was void to the extent that it purported to reverse the prior decision without reargument.

5 An exception is the coverage of rehearing in 3 Witkin, California Procedure 2406–10 (1954).
to the fact of rehearing tell almost nothing about either the mechanics of the process or the standards applied in judging petitions. And court rules on the subject are inadequate to present the realities of rehearing—notoriously so, as we shall see, in their failure to explicate grounds for rehearing. The writers therefore sought the help of judges of the federal and state appellate courts, which was generously given by letters explaining rehearing in their courts.\(^6\) We have limited ourselves to appellate rehearing, putting aside trial court devices for reexamination of decisions such as motions for new trials, judgments n.o.v., amended findings, or other reconsideration by the trial judge.\(^7\) Generally in the United States rigorous distinction is maintained between trial and appellate process,\(^8\) and our present concern is with the latter.

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\(^6\) Inquiries were sent to courts of final instance in all of the forty-eight states, as well as to the eleven United States Courts of Appeals, and to the Supreme Court of the United States. Almost all of those canvassed responded. Many answered follow-up letters designed to clarify original answers or to elicit more detailed information than that called for by the original questionnaires.

\(^7\) In connection with trial court devices for reconsideration of decisions, note that Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) incorporates former Federal Equity Rule 69 in providing that in actions tried without a jury, new trials may be granted “for any of the reasons for which rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity . . . .”

\(^8\) The usual rule in the United States, which limits the appellate court to the record made in the trial court to the preclusion of new evidence in the appellate court, has been modified in several jurisdictions (as it has been in England, see (English) Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 58, Rule 4), California being one of the principal ones. Eminent scholars have urged this reform in the United States generally. See Pound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases 368, 387 (1941); Clarke, Code Pleading 67 (2d ed. 1947); XXXV A.B.A. Rep. 645 (1910). The usual rule is of ancient lineage (see 3 Blackstone Commentaries 454-55), but in the United States today it is largely a function of the constitutional guarantee of jury trial, as demonstrated by the California provision for taking additional evidence in the appellate court in cases “where trial by jury is not a matter of right or where trial by jury has been waived.” Cal. Const. art. VI, § 434; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 956a; see People v. Carmen, 43 Cal. 2d 342, 349, 273 P.2d 521, 525 (1954). The procedure for taking the additional evidence is specified in Cal. Rules on Appeal, Rule 23(b); see Witkin, New California Rules on Appeal, 17 So. Calif. L. Rev. 232, 247 (1944). Probably the most significant practical characteristic of this California exception is its sparing use, especially in situations where the additional evidence aims at reversal of the judgment instead of affirmation. See Tupman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256, 270, 280 Pac. 970, 975 (1929), 3 So. Calif. L. Rev. 351 (1930); Estate of Schluttig, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950); cf. Bassett v. Johnson, 94 Cal. App. 2d 807, 211 P.2d 939 (1949). For a comprehensive treatment of this California exception to the usual United States rule, and of the related provisions of Cal. Const. art. VI, § 434, also executed by Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 956a, concerning new findings by the appellate court, see 3 Witkin, California Procedure 2392-400 (1954); see also Comment, Appeal and Error: Fact Finding Power of Appellate Courts in California, 20 Calif. L. Rev. 171 (1932); Note, 1 So. Calif. L. Rev. 387 (1928). In at least one instance in California the additional evidence was taken while the case was in the supreme court after rehearing had been granted, and the additional evidence led to affirmation of the judgment on rehearing whereas it had been ordered reversed prior to rehearing. Adolph Ramish, Inc. v. Woodruff, 2 Cal. 2d 190, 40 P.2d 509 (1934).
Before turning to our detailed study, several general observations should be made. First, the problem of rehearing, like so many legal problems, is beset by the vagaries of semantics. "Rehearing" may be used precisely or generically, and may mean a number of different things. Ideally, as we will attempt to show, a petition for rehearing should be devoted to a showing of why the case should be reheard, not a discussion of the merits. But the ultimate justification for rehearing is error in the original decision and naturally an advocate will sometimes conclude that his petition will fail unless it shows such error. Thus the petition sometimes covers the same ground that the requested rehearing would itself cover. Courts are apt to treat the two as coincident and write more or less elaborate opinions on the merits, amounting to reconsideration, only to deny the petition for rehearing. Whether rehearing has been denied or granted in such circumstances is apt to be a matter of definition only.9

Second, it is probable that the limited prerogative of the common law courts to reconsider and rescind their judgments, within the term of rendition,10 is the closest historical antecedent of modern appellate rehearing. True, the "rehearing" which flourished in equity bore kinship to modern appellate rehearing in that it too enabled the deciding agency (the chancellor or one of his assistants) to reconsider a decision and revise it; but historic equity rehearing was much more pervasive and extensive than the modern device.11 The standard for granting rehearing in equity degenerated to the point where any party could obtain one by specifying some part or all of a decision deemed objectionable and attaching to the petition a certificate of counsel that the case was one appropriate to be reheard.12

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9 Nor will the problem of definition be restricted to those cases in which the court reveals its action by rendering an opinion. The simple order "Petition for rehearing denied" which appears in almost every volume of the reports of every appellate court in the United States must conceal a number of occasions on which the order was entered only after more or less full review of the original decision. But it should be noted that definitions are sometimes of significance. As a letter from the Chief Justice of Utah points out, granting a rehearing stays the mandate under its rules, while substitution of an opinion does not.

10 See 2 TID, PRACTICE 942 (4th American ed. 1856): "And, during the same term in which the judgment is given it is amendable at common law, in form or in substance." For a complete treatment, see MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE c. XXII (1952). Millar treats as well the evolution and present function of the writ of error coram nobis.

11 The genesis of rehearing, and the common law and equity techniques of review in relation to rehearing, are considered more fully in the Canadian Bar Review version. See introductory footnote supra, marked †.

12 This applied to all orders, interlocutory and final, so long as they were not, as Francis Bacon's ordinance had it, under the Great Seal. The problem became increasingly acute as the chancery staff increased: In the 19th century it was possible to have a matter decided before the Master of the Rolls then reheard before him; heard before the Chancellor then reheard before him; and finally reviewed on appeal in the House of Lords. And the matter might be but an insignificant fragment of a larger case. See POTTER, HISTORY OF EQUITY
But whatever the historical antecedent, if any, of modern appellate rehear-
ing, it seems clear that judicial administration has changed so much that it
would be foolish, even if possible, to attempt a conformity with older re-
hearing practices. If rehearing is to achieve its potential as a safety valve
in modern appellate practice, its existence must depend on current need
and its scope be determined by that need.

Third, rehearing is but a step in the total appellate process and should
be considered in relation to the totality. The pattern of appellate review
for the federal courts and of most of the state courts has been the writ
of error of the common law courts, which was theoretically an entirely new
proceeding. It was designed to correct error which appeared of record
in a day when records often were so sparse as to be largely uninformative.
Writ of error review was essentially review of a record rather than a case,
in contrast to equity review. While many of the most archaic vestiges of
writ of error practice have been eradicated by statute or rule so that appeal
is quite uniformly regarded as a removal of a case to a superior court rather
than the initiation of new proceedings, and while the common law problem
of the sparse record has been ameliorated by modern verbatim
recording, nevertheless, the basic pattern of writ of error technique was strong enough
to dominate in review of both law and equity cases in the United States
and to some extent continues to dominate in their conjunct administration.
This contrasts with the situation in England, and apparently in at least

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13 From the Judiciary Act of 1789 until 1929 review in the federal courts was by writ of
error only. 1 Stat. 73 (1789). In 1803 a review proceeding styled "appeal" was introduced
for equity cases, but it was modeled upon the writ of error. 2 Stat. 244 (1803). See Payne,

14 Pound in his elaborate study Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases (1941) points
up the pervasive influence of the writ of error on state procedures generally and describes as
the major problem in the field of what is now called appeals the elimination of the remnants
of error practice. See note 8 supra. The general consolidation of law and equity, both sub-
stantive and procedural, has helped, but some states preserve the distinction at the appellate
practice level because it is there incorporated in the judicial article of the state constitution.
E.g., Iowa Const. art. V, § 4; Utah Const., art. VIII, § 9.

15 The law courts from their beginning until the 19th century knew little of review
as we conceive of that form of the appellate process today. The prime device for correcting a
mistaken decision was the writ of error. Pound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases 88-94
(1941). Very limited alternatives were provided by certiorari. Id. at 60-62.

16 See Louisell & Pirsig, The Significance of Verbatim Records of Proceedings in American
Adjudication, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 29 (1953), for an account of this development and its impli-
cations.

17 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66; Supreme Court
Rules, Order 58, Rule 1.
some of the Canadian provinces, where all appeals are by way of "rehearing" of trial court processes and hence analogous to historic equity review. But rehearing in the sense the term is used throughout this article, that is, reargument in the appellate court of a case once argued and decided there, has been abolished in the Court of Appeal in England. This at least suggests the possibility that the necessity for appellate rehearing may, to some extent, be a function of our narrow and restricted type of review which is rooted in writ of error practice and which contrasts with the comprehensive review of equity.

I

GROUNDS FOR GRANTING REHEARING

The basic postulate of rehearing must be that a court which is final must also be careful; it must admit of the possibility that error may occur and that original decisions may not always be the best possible decisions. Because it is final, it must make its own provisions for correcting its error or misjudgment. But it seems equally obvious that automatic reconsideration will largely fail to achieve the objective desired, as well as sacrifice "decent finality." Some standards must be evolved to single out those cases in which reconsideration will be profitable to the system.

With few exceptions the starting point is the rules of the several appellate courts. Forty-five of the forty-eight states have provided by rule for some type of rehearing procedure. Of the three remaining, only Maine provides no opportunity; informal, non-rule procedures create the equivalent of rehearing in both Rhode Island and Massachusetts. The eleven federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States have rules of varying degrees of specificity.

19 See British Columbia, C.A. Rule 3; New Brunswick, Order 58 Rule 1; Nova Scotia, Order 57, Rule 1; Prince Edward Island, Order 58, Rule 1.
20 See note 128 infra.
22 The rules are generally all-inclusive, but not entirely identical in scope. Mont. Rule XV(1) permits preclusion in advance of rehearing in certain types of proceedings. Many have special limitations on petitions in criminal cases, particularly in reference to time limitations.
23 Maine has no rule for rehearing in law cases, and no case has been found. Chancery Rule XXXIX seems to apply to equity cases only. But a letter from the Supreme Judicial Court says, "I have no doubt that, if a patent error should be discovered in an opinion, a method would be found by which the same could be corrected."
24 Known as a motion for reargument, the mechanics and function of which seem to be the same as rehearing elsewhere. Letter from the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
25 A letter from Massachusetts says that rehearing is not forbidden, but that no rule exists because it is not encouraged. A letter from the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court describes the petition as an informal, "friendly information" to the court. And see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Pepper, 268 Mass. 467, 167 N.E. 656 (1929).
REHEARING IN APPELLATE COURTS

This virtual unanimity is strong evidence that the need for rehearing is recognized. But with recognition of need, consensus ceases. Of prime importance are the grounds upon which rehearings will be granted, for here should be found indication of when and why finality must accommodate deliberateness and thoroughness for proper discharge of the judicial function. And it is just here that the most confusion and uncertainty exist. Only about twelve of the forty-five states having formal rehearing rules specify any grounds and but one of the federal courts of appeals makes the attempt.27

The following are typical of the grounds regarded as sufficient by those which attempt to specify:

a. The court has overlooked, misapplied, or failed to consider a statute, decision, or principle directly controlling.28
b. The court has overlooked or misconceived some material fact.29
c. The court has overlooked or misconceived a material question in the case.30
d. There is serious doubt as to the validity, correctness, or adequacy of precedent relied upon and the case itself is of great precedent potential or of grave public concern.31

The major difficulty in regarding specified grounds as a reliable measure of the scope of rehearing is that of the relatively few courts which attempt by rule to specify, most are extremely indefinite. An example may be drawn from rule 15(a) of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit:

For the sole purpose of directing the attention of the court to some controlling matter of law or fact which a party claims was overlooked in deciding a case, a petition for rehearing may be served and filed not later than twenty days after the filing of an opinion . . . .

Despite its emphatic form, the rule tells little to an attorney who must determine whether his petition has a chance for favorable reception.

27 United States Court of Appeals, 8th Cir. Rule 15(a).
29 E.g., Florida and Montana Rules, note 26 supra.
30 E.g., Colorado, Illinois and New York Rules, note 26 supra.
31 E.g., Howard v. New York, 234 N.Y. 505, 138 N.E. 424 (1922); Parks v. Western Union Tel. Co., 45 Nev. 411, 204 Pac. 884 (1922).
Rule 18 of the New Mexico Supreme Court represents what is probably the greatest attempt at precision:8

The motion for rehearing shall be directed to the opinion of the court, and shall distinctly specify wherein the same is erroneous; but shall not renew contentions previously argued and submitted and expressly disposed of except to invoke an earlier decision, a statute or a rule of court deemed controlling and previously overlooked. The motion may also direct the court’s attention to fundamental or jurisdictional error not previously presented, and may renew any contention deemed controlling and not expressly passed upon.

To fill out the spectrum, we may include Utah,83 one of those states which has a rule on rehearing but does not specify the grounds for a petition, and Massachusetts, which has no rule. Letters have been received from justices of each of the courts mentioned: New Mexico, with the most detailed rule; the court of appeals for the eighth circuit, which refers vaguely to grounds; Utah, which has a rule not mentioning grounds; and Massachusetts, without a rule. The letters all are frank and detailed, and in substance they are the same. Each court is reluctant to grant rehearings; will not do so when the only object could be to rehash arguments already raised and disposed of; will do so when their attention is called to some matter of law which is deemed controlling; but almost without exception will not do so if the matter urged is now being raised for the first time.84

In short—and this is the single “ground” referred to most often in the responses received—if the court is persuaded it has or may have blundered, it will grant rehearing to avoid an unjust result or to correct material error. It is a safe suggestion that nine out of ten lawyers who have lost a case on appeal are genuinely convinced that the court has blundered, that the error is material, and that the result is grossly unjust. Lapse of time tends to restore perspective but the decision of the attorney on the matter of rehearing must be made, as we shall see, before time can have much of this effect. The result has been, in many states, a deluge of quite useless and objectively hopeless petitions. Since no expressed standards exist by which attorneys may guide themselves there is no non-judicial screening device to

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82 See also MONT. RULE XV(2), which provides: “A petition for rehearing may be presented upon the following grounds and none others: That some fact, material to the decision, or some question decisive of the case submitted by counsel, was overlooked by the Court, or that the decision is in conflict with an express statute or controlling decision to which the attention of the Court was not directed.”

83 UTAH R. CIV. PRO. 76(e) (1): “The petition shall state briefly the points wherein it is alleged that the appellate court has erred.”

84 On this last point—matter raised for the first time—the letters from judges are less adamant than rules and cases; several letters note that the fact that new matter is presented would not control their attitude in every instance.
The common law, procedural no less than substantive, gains its content as much or more from decisions as from rules. Examination of the multitude of cases on the subject, as well as the responses of the various courts, does not bear out the hope that case authority will supply the obvious defects of the rules. There is general agreement that rehearing will not be granted merely for the purpose of again debating matters on which the court has once deliberated and spoken—on this rules, cases, and justices speak with one voice. Nor is there much disposition to grant a petition which raises for the first time a question of law or a legal theory which was not raised on the first argument, especially when that question has not been raised in the trial court and appears for the first time in the petition. The latter principle is really a corollary of the common appellate rule which bars consideration, except under exceptional circumstances, of matters not raised in the trial court. The simultaneous preclusion from rehearing of certain matters which have been previously raised, on the one hand, and matters which have not been previously raised, on the other, superficially suggests an impasse based on inconsistency in the philosophy of rehearing. Actually, however, there are sound policy reasons for excluding both types—the former because they have had their day in court, the latter because the parties did not see fit seasonably to bring them to court. And there is left as the legitimate subject of rehearing matters seasonably presented by the parties but neglected by the appellate court itself in the first decision.

There are pronouncements that rehearings are not granted when the object of the petition or application is to obtain a restatement of a proposition or correction of an erroneous statement which would not result in a change in the mandate or in the practical result of the decision. It is

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35 This, of course, is a standard rather than a rule. On occasion, courts have quite simply changed their minds without any new considerations being advanced. Official reports ordinarily will not disclose this information, but Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571, 575 (2d Cir. 1954), is a notable recent example.
36 Rayner v. Rayner, 216 La. 1099, 45 So. 2d 637 (1950); Standard Clothing Co. v. Wolf, 219 Minn. 128, 17 N.W.2d 329 (1945); Hays Finance Co. v. Bailey, 56 So. 2d 76 (Miss. 1952); Wholey v. Columbia Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 29 R.I. 254, 33 A.2d 192 (1943); Shoaf v. Bringle, 192 Tenn. 695, 241 S.W.2d 832 (1951); Morrill v. Boardman, 117 Vt. 103, 86 A.2d 146 (1952) (refusal to note new references to evidence); Walgreen Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 62 Wyo. 336, 169 P.2d 76 (1946). But see In re Riverton State Bank, 48 Wyo. 372, 49 P.2d 637 (1935) (rehearing granted on a point not originally raised because of the important public interest involved); Dabney v. Stearns, 73 Wash. 583, 132 Pac. 400 (1913) (a statement of facts considered though not available for the first hearing through non-culpable inadvertence of counsel).
interesting to note, however, that the order denying the rehearing is often accompanied by an opinion which accomplishes the object of the petition: a clarification of the original opinion or a correction of it.\textsuperscript{88} To the extent that the pronounced rule is actually followed, however, it sometimes seems unfortunate. Opinions of appellate courts are published, and indeed often written, primarily because they are of interest to people other than the parties to the instant dispute. So far as the parties alone are affected, they should bear whatever burden inheres in non-prejudicial error and perhaps in an adversary system should not complain if an inadequate presentation of the case has led to or permitted the court to commit even prejudicial error. But whatever the consequences of error to the parties, the precedent role of the decision sometimes seems sufficiently important to justify limited use of rehearing to amend or clarify unfortunate statements which may result in confusing or even misleading indications of what the law may be.

The application of this rule that the error, if any, must be prejudicial to the parties has another, sometimes unfortunate, aspect. It logically excludes applications or petitions by amicus curiae, and the relatively few cases on the subject seem to accept the logical thrust.\textsuperscript{89} But in so far as the decision has legislative as well as adjudicative aspects, this emphasis may be misplaced. A court could rationally take the position that while the parties might be precluded from objecting to certain errors or misjudgments because they had participated in formation of the posture of the case, an amicus or intervener who had not previously been heard would be the only person with sufficient standing to obtain reconsideration. And upon that reconsideration, the original decision might stand as to the parties with a new opinion substituted for the one deemed defective. Such a rule

\textsuperscript{88}E.g., Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Hobart, 244 Fed. 385 (1st Cir. 1917); Forrester v. Johnson, 126 Kan. 590, 270 Pac. 602 (1928); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 191 Miss. 103, 199 So. 278 (1941).

In Fenstermaker v. Tribune Publishing Co., 13 Utah 532, 45 Pac. 1097 (1896), the court granted a rehearing to reform the opinion although it adhered to its original procedural disposition. When the result of the order will be a new trial or other subsequent proceedings below, the doctrine of law of the case provides a special reason for care in the expression of the holding.

\textsuperscript{89}Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 33 N.E. 119 (1893); New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798 (1924); State v. McDonald, 63 Ore. 467, 128 Pac. 835 (1912); cf. Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878 (1939). \textit{Contra}, Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). The Iowa Supreme Court refused rehearing when petitioned by counsel for a since deceased party on the ground that authority to act for him expired with his death and that counsel had no interest of their own to vindicate. State v. Rutledge, 243 Iowa 201, 50 N.W.2d 801 (1952). The court stated another, less shaky ground for its decision, however.

That distinction may be taken between the propriety of rehearing and the right to petition for it, see Folding Furniture Works v. Wisconsin Labor Relations Bd., 232 Wis. 170, 286 N.W. 875 (1939), considering but denying rehearing despite the fact that one of the parties no longer existed.
would not be easy to administer and it might invite an increase in the already excessive number of petitions filed. We believe, however, that a substantial percentage of this new type of petition would be meritorious and that distinguishing between the amicus who presents an interest which deserves hearing and the one who is but the losing party in another guise would not present insuperable difficulties. However, permitting a result concededly erroneous to stand for the parties who invoked the court's aid to settle their troubles, and at the same time correcting the result for the public at large, presents obvious psychological and even moral difficulties. 40

A number of cases suggest that an equal division of judges in the first instance is not sufficient reason to grant a rehearing. 41 Petitions are frequently filed in such cases, however, and the temptation to file them must be greater here than elsewhere when the losing party appreciates that if he "swings" but one of the judges he will succeed. Indeed, the inclination must vary in direct ratio with the number of dissents he obtains. Despite the suggestions that equal division is not an adequate basis, rehearings often are granted when this seems the only apparent ground. 42

40 But see Green v. Biddle, supra note 39, where the petition was advanced to protect numerous parties claiming under the same right as appellee but not joined in the proceeding. In Mayflower Inv. Co. v. Brill, 132 Fla. 530, 180 So. 754 (1938), the petition of an intervenor was granted. In Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 130 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 315 (1943), the court called a petition by one not a party "incongruous" but considered it nevertheless. And in Boucher v. The King [1950] 1 D.L.R. 657, 96 Can. Crim. Cases Ann. 48 (1949), rehearing [1951] Can. Sup. Ct. 265, 2 D.L.R. 369, the case which prompted this study, one of the points made by counsel was that more than one hundred cases identical in character were then pending in the Province of Quebec.

41 Shreveport v. Holmes, 125 U.S. 694 (1888); Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Jones, 119 Ga. 907, 47 S.E. 320 (1904); Latimer v. Sovereign Camp, 62 S.C. 145, 40 S.E. 155 (1901). But a number of petitions have been granted in the Supreme Court of the United States after decision by a divided Court when an important constitutional question is involved. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 216 U.S. 614 (1910); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 119 U.S. 129 (1886). State cases granting rehearing under such circumstances probably outnumber those denying it.


A letter from Connecticut says: "The motion is least likely to avail in such a case [decision by a divided court], for the very fact of disagreement indicates that the questions involved have been particularly thoroughly argued pro and con by the members of the court before such an opinion is handed down." While this is doubtless true, it seems to ignore the value assumed to inhere in argument to the court.

42 This conclusion is somewhat subjective on the part of the authors. A letter from a justice of the Iowa Supreme Court states: "There have been some [petitions for rehearing] granted during the ten years I have been on the court due to a change in personnel of the court. By that I mean an opinion in a case will have been filed and before the petition for rehearing is submitted one or two new judges have taken office and if the original opinion was by a divided court the new judges voting with the minority, become the majority and grant the petition for rehearing, and what was once the dissenting opinion might become the majority opinion."
A slightly different case exists when the rehearing, if granted, would be heard by a reconstituted court. This may come about because a new judge has replaced a deceased or retired one and will be able to break the deadlock, or because the membership of the court has been increased since the time of the original hearing and decision of the case. Whatever may be said about granting rehearing when the deadlock seems likely to continue, the reconstituted court might well allow it as a matter of routine for the purpose of resolving the matter. 43

Consideration of the specific grounds upon which petitions for rehearing have been granted is probably more enlightening than the generality of statement employed when they are dismissed or denied. We have already adverted to four general grounds which appear in the rules and statutes and are supported by letters from the several appellate courts and their decisions. In addition to these, cases have granted rehearing to cure defects of parties or where one of the parties made no appearance because of lack of notice, 44 where the party who appealed had no appealable interest 45 and to amend an inadvertent confusion in the mandate. 46 The normally cautious attitude of courts toward jurisdiction of the subject matter has occasioned rehearing to determine whether the court had any power to conduct the original hearing, 47 and the same result followed when matters were

43 As in Olds v. Alvord, 136 Fla. 549, 188 So. 652 (1939), where the opinion was by a divided court and one petition to rehear had been denied also by a divided court, the appointment of a new judge prompted the court to rehear, but it should be noted that it was a class action and purported to bind many parties not represented. In Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), the Supreme Court had granted certiorari and affirmed the Supreme Court of Iowa by a four to four decision. On the appointment of Justice Harlan, it granted a petition to rehear and dismissed the petition for certiorari. 349 U.S. 70 (1955). In Boucher v. The King [1951], Can. Sup. Ct. 265, 2 D.L.R. 369, 99 Can. Crim. Cases Ann. 1, though the Supreme Court of Canada did not explain its grant of rehearing, two new judges had been added to the court since the original argument. At least one court has refused, correctly it seems, to call in another judge to resolve the deadlock when the court is equally divided on the petition to rehear. Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 227 P.2d 365 (1950). But cf. James v. Clements, 217 Fed. 51 (5th Cir. 1914), where a new judge was called when one of the three who heard argument had died before decision.

A letter from the Supreme Court of Iowa reports that it frequently grants rehearing because of change in personnel of the court. See note 42 supra.

44 E.g., Mayflower Inv. Co. v. Brill, 132 Fla. 530, 180 So. 154 (1938).


46 E.g., Florida East Coast Ry. v. Townsend, 104 Fla. 371, 142 So. 909 (1932). In Chicago and Vincennes R.R. v. Fodick, 106 U.S. 47, 80 (1882), and In re Warren's Estate, 74 Ariz. 385, 249 P.2d 948 (1952), rehearing was granted to assure that the mandate did not reverse the wrong judgment, one from which appeal had not been taken.

47 Jacques v. Wellington Corp., 134 Fla. 211, 183 So. 718 (1938); Armes v. Louisville Trust Co., 306 Ky. 155, 206 S.W.2d 487 (1947); West v. Edwards, 12 Nev. 1, 139 P.2d 1022 (1943); State v. Sexton, 11 S.D. 105, 75 N.W. 895 (1898). Some strange things masquerade as jurisdictional defects; see Ross v. Robinson, 169 Ore. 293, 128 P.2d 956 (1942), granting rehearing on a claim, raised for the first time, that the complaint did not state a cause of
raised which would have caused one of the sitting judges to disqualify himself for the original hearing, had they been known.48

It is only in rare cases in the United States that raising facts not in the record will avail the petitioner and that is almost invariably true when the facts existed at the time of trial.49 This attitude is not peculiar to rehearing procedure, of course, and the only consistent exception is Louisiana,50 which has a procedural history largely untainted by the writ of error.

The courts have understandably been less adamant when the new matter, whether fact or law, is something which arose between the time of trial and the time the rehearing is requested. And when the matter—almost invariably one of law—arose between the time of the original hearing and the application for rehearing, the petition is commonly granted—assuming, of course, that the new matter is of rather high relevance. The latter case seems easily justified as well as easily distinguished. Since the new matter arose after the original hearing, it is not really being reheard; the question is what impact such things have upon the decision formerly made. The procedural name of rehearing is not precisely descriptive of this process and some other designation might well be employed.

Examples of this situation have arisen in the federal courts of appeals, where a controlling or analogous decision has been rendered by the Supreme Court after the decision in the court of appeals,51 or where an authority, either in case or statute form, has been discovered in state law52 in that

action. In Sime v. Malouf, 95 Cal. App. 2d 82, 213 P.2d 788 (1949), the question whether one not named in the suit was an indispensable party was considered on petition for rehearing, although raised for the first time in such petition, on the ground that it was jurisdictional; the original opinion was modified but rehearing was denied.


49 Letter, Supreme Court of North Carolina: when new evidence is presented, "... it must be made to appear prima facie that the petitioner was not advised of the existence of the evidence at the time of the original trial, that it is of such nature that it would probably affect the result of the trial; and that petitioner's failure to discover the evidence prior to the original trial was not due to any neglect on his part." See Miller v. Scott, 185 N.C. 93, 116 S.E. 86 (1923); Briggs v. Kennedy Mayonnaise Products, 209 Minn. 312, 297 N.W. 342 (1941). But cf. Morrill v. Boardman, 117 Vt. 103, 86 A.2d 146 (1952); Wantulok v. Wantulok, 67 Wyo. 22, 223 P.2d 1030 (1950).

50 See Comment, 19 Tulane L. Rev. 305 (1944); note 8 supra, describing the California practice.


52 E.g., American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Belch, 100 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1938); Magill v. Travelers Ins. Co., 134 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1943), denied rehearing when the object was merely to delay the mandate until a parallel state case was decided. This is a consideration which cuts both ways; Massachusetts has vacated an order for reargument when a statute was enacted which clarified the point on which reargument was ordered. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 328 Mass. 653, 104 N.E.2d 437 (1952). See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park, 349 U.S. 70 (1955), where certiorari, once granted, was dismissed on rehearing because of a clarifying Iowa statute.

In Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953), the court granted rehearing
rather tender area of state-federal conflict known in the United States under the rubric of *Erie v. Tompkins*. Similarly, a conflict with the decision of another circuit may prompt reconsideration, even though the other case is not "controlling." A decent respect for conformity and the stature of a coordinate court justifies such action, whether failure in the first instance to acknowledge the decision is caused by its non-existence at the time of the original hearing or by the failure of counsel for the parties to call it to the attention of the court. Such conflict, indeed, is a major—perhaps the pre-eminent—ground employed by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretionary power of review in federal cases. But the fact that a court's error is subject to correction by a superior court seems not sufficient excuse to refuse to consider its own errors when a procedure adequate for the purpose already exists.

The same problem has been presented in regard to rehearing by the fact that the federal courts of appeals, as well as a few state appellate courts, customarily sit in panels which consist of less than the full membership of the court. The probability of intra-court or intra-circuit conflict thus presented may move and has moved a panel to grant a rehearing and reconsider the result reached, even though the alternative of convening the entire membership of the court to consider the conflict and finally resolve it for the circuit exists everywhere as a possibility and in some cases as a probability. This alternative is of sufficient significance to warrant separate treatment in a later part of this article.

The conclusions to be drawn from examination of the rules and cases dealing with the grounds upon which rehearings have been granted or will be granted are obviously disappointing. The standard, perhaps more precisely called ideal, which appears almost everywhere is that rehearing will

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54 See Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923); U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 19(h); Roehner & Roehner, *Certiorari—What is a Conflict Between Circuits?*, 20 U. Crim. L. Rev. 656 (1953).
55 *But see* Stamphill v. Johnston, 136 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1943), denying rehearing yet distinguishing cases said to be inconsistent. *Cf.* Camfield v. United States, 67 Fed. 17 (8th Cir. 1895), a pre-*Erie* case.

The United States Courts of Appeals are essentially final although apparently intermediate, as contrasted with some state intermediate courts, from which appeals normally may be taken to the highest court of the state. In the year ending June 30, 1954, the courts of appeals disposed of 2,427 cases; in that same period, petitions for certiorari to obtain Supreme Court review were denied in 481 such cases and granted in 70. *Adm. Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report* 138, 141 (1954).
56 See text at note 111 infra.
be granted to avoid doing substantial injustice. It is not disparagement of the concept of justice to note that this standard is most uninformative to the practitioner. Perhaps the most satisfactory generalization is that petitions which point specifically to some conflict between the holding of the case or decision and a "controlling" statute or precedent are those likely to receive favorable consideration; another expression of the same basic notion seems contained in the cases which grant rehearing when the court has misconceived some material proposition of law or fact. Those relatively few cases in which petitions have been granted because of a change in the composition of the court or its personnel seem to stand on their own quite satisfactory footing as accommodations necessary to the adequate administration of an appellate system.

A final remark on the question of grounds is that a certain amount of flexibility must be retained, even though it be imagined that it would be possible to eradicate it. The prime justification of rehearing as a procedural device is that it permits an element of accommodation in an otherwise rigid system. The result of crystallizing rehearing would almost surely be to create another device to relieve that rigidity— a safety valve on a safety valve.

Admitting this much does not lead to the conclusion that the present condition of rehearing is satisfactory. The road to repair of the defects seems to lie primarily in explicating more carefully the grounds which move the courts to act favorably on petitions. This kind of law is peculiarly lawyer law. Granting rehearings because justice requires it exposes precious little of value to a lawyer in his professional capacity, however much it may satisfy him and lay persons generally that our judicial system is trying hard to accomplish the main purpose of its existence.

II

DEVICES LIMITING REHEARING PETITIONS

We have noted above that the major adverse effect of having nebulous grounds for granting rehearings is the hoard of hopeless petitions which result and which the courts, to some extent, invite. There may be some method other than clarification of grounds to accomplish reasonable limitation in the number of petitions. If there is, it is doubtful whether it has been found. The devices in common employment are not new; they existed in Lord Eldon's tenure in Chancery and they failed then. It is not really possible to measure the effect of the devices in present practice; even if statistics were available, they would be doubtful bases of judgment. We attempt here only to set out the forms employed, without effort at detailed assessment of their efficacy.

The first is one routine in appellate proceedings in the United States:
the losing party must pay the costs, including printing, of the successful
one. Since the odds are vastly against success when a petition for rehear-
ing is filed, this sometimes might act as a deterrent. Probably it is not very
effective; the costs incurred on a routine petition are apt to be nominal
when contrasted with the expense which the losing party has already in-
curred. And many courts do not require printing, accepting petitions in
typewritten form. None of the states seem to have adopted Lord Eldon's
rule of requiring a deposit of £50 to be forfeited if the petitioner failed to
prevail, but his scheme evidently did not work either. It is questionable
whether such a system has much to commend itself even if it works; true,
it may discourage some petitioners, but the discouragement is apt to be a
function of the resources of the petitioner rather than the merits of his case.

Another screening device more commonly employed is that the petition
must be accompanied by a certificate of petitioning counsel that it is filed
in good faith and not for purpose of delay. Lord Hardwicke noted that
in his day "such credit is given by the Court to their [counsels'] opinion
that the cause ought to be reheard, as to order it to be set down." There
is little reason to suppose that the advocate's capacity for objective judg-
ment is much greater today than at that time, or that judges are more
inclined to discipline lawyers who solemnly certify a frivolous petition.
Nor does it seem that much assurance is added by the rare requirement
that the certificate of merit be made by "impartial" counsel. Any mem-
ber of a large bar can obtain such a certificate if he is inclined to do so.

The remarks of Roscoe Pound are appropriate here, although they were
made about the appellate process generally: "The way to insure prompt
and proper disposition of appellate work is not to penalize abuse of an un-
workable system but to insure efficiency and dispatch in the system itself."
This is not only the best but really the only way of winnowing the wheat
from the chaff.

67 E.g., U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 26. Many courts accept a short petition in a form other than
printing; e.g., Colo. R. Civ. Proc. 118(c), 107 Colo. 138. Text at note 132 infra. When the
petition and argument are a single document, printing normally is required.
68 The penalty provision varied from time to time. 2 DANIELL, CHANCERY PLEADING AND
PRACTICE 1480 (1871), reports that a deposit of £20 plus an undertaking to pay costs assessed
was then necessary to obtain a calendar setting. Rule 15(d) of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit provides that the court may assess costs not exceeding $100
against petitioner or certifying counsel if satisfied that the petition is "vexatious, without merit
and filed for delay." Cf. 10th Cir. Rule 24(3).
69 At least Del. Sup. Ct. Rule 13; Ga. Code (1933) § 24-4544 (Rule 40); and N.J. Rule
1:9-4, as well as 9 of the 11 federal courts of appeals, require the certificate; so also does the
Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 58.
70 Quoted in 2 DANIELL, CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 1478 (1871).
71 Seemingly North and South Carolina are alone here; see N.C. Rule 44(2); S.C. Rule 17.
72 POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 88 passim (1941).
REHEARING IN APPELLATE COURTS

III

PROCEDURE ON REHEARING

A.

The Petition—Form and Content

The form and content of the petition are the heart of the rehearing process. It is here that most battles are won or lost. With a few exceptions, the vast bulk of petitions are refused out of hand and without opinion. Comprehensive statistics are not available, but the few which are show this conclusively. A letter from the Supreme Court of New Hampshire states that 92 per cent of the petitions filed over a period of twenty years were denied; 5 of the remaining 8 per cent granted were limited to a specific issue. Letters from other courts tell the same story; some judges with twenty years of intimate experience with appellate work recall the granting of but 2 or 3 petitions during that period. The Supreme Court of Arkansas, during its 1954-55 term, disposed of 256 appellate and 12 original proceedings. Sixty petitions for rehearing were filed in these cases (almost 1 for every 4) but only two were granted. The Texas Supreme Court has much the same record: of 71 petitions (known there as motions), 1 was granted, 67 were overruled and 2 were denied with new opinions substituted for the originals.

And the petition alone must carry the load. In only one court, Nebraska, is oral argument permitted as a matter of course. Elsewhere it is either non-existent or allowed only upon exceptional order of the court.

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63 Kentucky is notable as an exception, for some form of rehearing is, as in ancient chancery practice, virtually automatic. Although known as a petition for rehearing, it is actually a request for reversal of the original decision or a modification of it. Letter from the Judicial Council of Kentucky. Description of the procedure makes it doubtful, however, if standards there differ.

64 Letter, Supreme Court of Nevada. The Chief Justice of Massachusetts estimated that petitions were filed in about 5 per cent of their cases; he thought that about 4 had been granted during his twenty year tenure. The Judicial Council of Kentucky, by letter, reports that 109 petitions were overruled during 1951, while 15 were granted. This proportion is somewhat high and may be explained by the unusual conception of the petition there. See note 63 supra.

65 For the year 1952, the Supreme Court of Missouri, which sits sometimes in divisions, see note 111 infra, denied 38 motions for rehearing by the divisions and 58 alternative motions to rehear or transfer to the court en banc, while granting 16 motions to rehear or transfer. The Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1952, 18 Mo. L. Rev. 331, 333 (1953).

66 TEXAS CIVIL JUDICIAL COUNCIL, JUDICIAL STATISTICS STATE OF TEXAS 1-4 (1953).

67 Neb. Sup. Ct. Rule 19. The Supreme Court of Iowa expressed doubt, via letter, of the wisdom of allowing oral argument as routine, but formerly allotted 20 minutes to the petitioner and 15 minutes to the opponent. By amendment effective March 6, 1956, Rule 21, IOWA R. CIV. Proc. 2466, now provides: "Oral arguments on petitions for rehearing shall be permitted only at the request of the court."
The ideal petition must be aimed not at the reason or reasons why the court was wrong in its original decision but at establishing reasons for the court to reconsider rather than grounds to change. This is the initial hurdle; it normally behooves the petitioner to observe the distinction carefully (despite a natural temptation to the contrary growing out of realization that the ultimate justification for rehearing is error in the original decision) and to deal carefully with the problems we have referred to under grounds for rehearing above, whether or not the rules of his particular court attempt to specify or detail such grounds. If he is unable to state grounds other than that the court was wrong in its original decision, the prospect that his petition will be granted with consequent opportunity for full reargument on the merits is remote, and he does not even have assurance that the petition will receive more than perfunctory attention.

Some few of the rules of court clearly contemplate service of the petition on the opponent; 8 a few clearly do not. 9 The majority are indefinite. As a matter of practice, of course, the petitioner should follow the hallowed rule that when in doubt, serve everybody in sight. But as a matter of policy, whether or not service is to be required must depend upon (1) whether a response to the petition is required or permitted; (2) whether the opponent is certain that he will not lose his victory without having a chance to oppose the argument on whether the court was in error; and (3) whether or not the petition and argument are combined in a single document.

The important thing, of course, is that the rule about service be consistent with the central scheme of rehearing. The ideal would seem to us to be that the petition be a brief non-argumentative statement of why the matter should be reheard; it should not be an elaborate argument on the merits. Assuming this, service on the opponent seems normally to serve no purpose other than to warn the opponent that he should be prepared for the eventuality of possible reargument. This we think is reason enough to justify service, although service involves the countervailing danger that it will produce quite unnecessary and quite useless responses on the merits. 10 Prohibition of replies to petitions for rehearing except by leave of court, coupled with assurance that no petition will be granted or at least that the

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8 E.g., Minn. Rule 20; Mont. Rule 15. Iowa R. Civ. Proc. 350 requires the filing with the court of sufficient copies for each of the other parties to the appeal; the clerk is directed to mail these copies to the other parties.

9 It should be noted that while the rule relating to rehearing may make no specific provision for service, other rules of court regarding service may have general application.

10 E.g., N.C. Rule 44. The opponent there is not informed that a petition has been filed unless it is also granted.

See note 86 infra and accompanying text.
original result will not be changed, without giving the opponent a chance to reply, seems the best solution.\textsuperscript{71}

A perhaps unnecessary warning is that petitions for rehearing are like other applications in our procedural system: they avail only those who make them. Thus Idaho has quite properly ruled\textsuperscript{72} that a judgment became final as to losing parties who did not petition, but stayed its mandate as to those who did petition.

\section*{B. The Problem of Time}

Time for filing an application for rehearing is commonly provided by the various rules on the subject. These periods range from a minimum of eight\textsuperscript{73} to a maximum of forty days,\textsuperscript{74} but fifteen days is about average, this being the limit provided by twenty-one of the courts studied.\textsuperscript{75} A few courts require notice of intention to file a petition,\textsuperscript{76} the petition itself being filed at a later time. As might be expected, courts ordinarily insist upon compliance with time requirements and waive non-compliance in exceptional circumstances only. It is difficult to make a flat statement about the chances for obtaining an extension of time in this matter, since the information commonly is not reported. It is certain, however, that some courts have, at one time or another, granted such extensions, and several rules

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} See note 134 \textit{infra} and accompanying text. One additional qualification must be made here. The opponent is entitled to notice of an extension of time as well as of a grant, since the former will disturb his expectations as to finality.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Koehler v. Stenerson, 74 Idaho 281, 260 P.2d 1101 (1953).
\item \textsuperscript{73} In California, the period is eight days in a criminal case in the district court of appeal. Otherwise, the period is fifteen days. Calif. Rules on Appeal, Rule 27. Several states have ten day periods, e.g., Minnesota, Minn. Rules of Proc. Sup. Ct. Rule XX.
\item \textsuperscript{74} N.C. Sup. Ct. Rule 44, 221 N.C. 570. Several states have thirty day periods, e.g., Iowa, R. Civ. Proc. § 350.
\item \textsuperscript{75} E.g., California, except criminal cases in the district court of appeal, Rules on Appeal, Rule 27; Colo. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 118(c), 107 Colo. 138; Fla. Sup. Ct. Rule 25(a), 156 Fla. 871; United States Court of Appeals, 2nd Cir. Rule 28(a); United States Court of Appeals, 3rd Cir. Rule 33; United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Cir. Rule 26(a). In the United States Supreme Court, prior to the rules of 1925, the petition had to be presented "at the term at which judgment is entered unless by special leave granted during the term." 28 U.S.C.A., Rules, Supreme Court, Rule 33, historical note. In 1925, the period was fixed "within forty days after judgment is entered." Rule 30, 266 U.S. 677. In 1928, the period was changed to twenty-five days. Rule 33, 275 U.S. 619. See also Rule 33, 286 U.S. 619; Rule 33, 306 U.S. 713. By order of Oct. 13, 1947, the period was cut to fifteen days. Rule 33, 332 U.S. 857. The period is again now fixed at twenty-five days. Rule 58 §§ 1, 346 U.S. 1007.
\item \textsuperscript{76} E.g., Ill. Rule 44; notice in fifteen days, petition in twenty-five; Va. Rule 5:13: notice in ten days, petition in thirty.
\item \textsuperscript{77} U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 58(1); Del. Rule 13. The United States Supreme Court Rule also provides that the time may be shortened. While this is a much less common occurrence, a recent instance is Flynn v. United States, 348 U.S. 956, 99 L. Ed. 1298 (1955).
\end{itemize}
provide for extension. Since rehearing rules are court-promulgated, there is ordinarily no legal reason why the court cannot depart from them. There is little evidence that time considerations have been of major difficulty in administration. Probably the outstanding problem has been what shall be done when the time allowed would carry the case beyond the term of court in which the decision has been rendered, doubtless a problem because of the ancient notion of the law courts that they had inherent power to revise their judgments within the term but that the power died with its expiration. To this purpose, the rules of some courts explicitly state that expiration of the term does not conclude their power to reconsider within the time provided by rule. There is little evidence, however, that hardship has been worked without such a proviso.

More perplexing but even less common is the question as to whether the case can be reheard after the mandate has been returned to the lower court. In about half of the states, and all but one of the federal courts of appeals, the mandate is stayed by the filing of a petition. This is also now true in the United States Supreme Court, except where the twenty-five day period in which to petition for rehearing expires in vacation, or unless otherwise expressly ordered. The court of appeals for the fourth circuit

77 See note 12 supra; Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 90 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1937); Kirchberger v. American Acetylene Burner Co., 142 Fed. 169 (2d Cir. 1905). It is not surprising to find that the “term” rule on occasion has controlled over rules provisions, courts considering petitions which were not timely within the rule but were still within the term of rendition. Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 130 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1942); Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 97 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1938); Unitype Co. v. Long, 149 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1906); Weintrub v. Heintz, 346 Ill. App. 30, 104 N.E.2d 534 (1952).

While such decisions are not surprising, they are deplorable. The “term” of a modern appellate court is so different from the “term” at which the common law courts considered decisions and ruling at nisi prius that the common law concept should be irrelevant today. The effect of 28 U.S.C. § 452 (1952) may lead to curious results in this context: “The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of the court to do any act or take any proceeding.” Cahill v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 351 U.S. 183 (1956), is at least curious although the majority does not rely upon the statute. 78 E.g., 8th Cir. Rule 15(b); 10th Cir. Rule 24(1). Without such express authority, it would seem that most courts would recognize that the time permitted by rule would, in effect, extend the “term.” Cf. Burget v. Robinson, 123 Fed. 262 (1st Cir. 1903).

79 E.g., N.J. Rule 1:9-1; MINN. SUP. CT. RULE XX (CIV.); UTAH CIV. PROC. RULE 76(c) (3); S.C. SUP. CT. RULE 17 § 2.

80 1st Cir. Rule 35; 2d Cir. Rule 25; 3rd Cir. Rule 36; 5th Cir. Rule 32; 6th Cir. Rule 30; 7th Cir. Rule 25; 8th Cir. Rule 15; 9th Cir. Rule 26; 10th Cir. Rule 28; D.C. Cir. Rule 27.

81 Compare the old rule, “Mandates shall issue as of course after the expiration of twenty-five days from the day the judgment is entered, irrespective of the filing of a petition for rehearing . . .” Rule 34, 306 U.S. 713, with the new rule, “. . . mandates shall issue as of course after the expiration of twenty-five days from the day the judgment is entered . . . Except in cases where the twenty-five day period expires in vacation, the filing of a petition for rehearing will, unless otherwise ordered, stay the mandate until disposition of such petition . . . .” Rule 59 § 2, 346 U.S. 1009.
and at least four states\textsuperscript{83} will stay the mandate only by special order of the court or one of its justices.

In exceptional cases rehearing has been granted after the mandate has been returned to the trial court.\textsuperscript{84} While this seems so infrequent a case that it spells little threat of confusion or contradiction, it might be avoided by adoption of the majority rule that the mandate is stayed by the filing of a petition. A contrary danger appears, however: delay is already too ubiquitous in the judicial process and especially at the appellate level. The attorney who is resorting to all of the delaying tactics at his command is thus given another arrow to add to his already overflowing quiver. The confusion which may result from a petition granted after return of the mandate is probably a small price to pay if in fact it avoids much delay.\textsuperscript{85}

C. Answer or Response

Some rules prohibit replies to petitions altogether; several require them; others make replies optional unless requested by the court.\textsuperscript{86} Whether or

\textsuperscript{83}The states in which this is provided by rule are Alabama, \textit{Sup. Ct. Rule} 34, 261 Ala. xxxii; Maryland, \textit{Ct. of App. Rule} 43, § 2, Md. \textit{Ann. Code} art. 43, § 2 (Supp. 1954); and North Carolina, \textit{Sup. Ct. Rule} 44(7), 221 N.C. 571. It may happen elsewhere as well. In this, as in other procedural areas, rules do not always accurately portray the practice. The word "mandate" is used in a generic sense to describe the device of remand from superior to inferior court; "procedendo" and "remittitur" are common variants.

\textsuperscript{84}Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 97 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1938); Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 130 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1942); Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 108 Vt. 510, 192 Atl. 197 (1937). The last was a chancery case in which the final decree had not been enrolled despite the return of the mandate—another example of the persistence of ancient and presently pointless distinctions. See also Cahill v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 351 U.S. 183 (1956), in which the mandate had been returned and the judgment collected before the petition to "recall and amend" the judgment was filed.

\textsuperscript{85}This is not to say that exceptional cases may not be treated on an individual basis despite general rules. An example is Town of Narragansett v. Kennelly, 115 A.2d 693 (R.I. 1955), where the court made final so much of the decree as would determine a rate base during the period the court was in vacation, leaving the application for leave to file a motion for reargument over until the commencement of the fall term. See also Albright v. Moeckly, 196 Iowa 366, 193 N.W. 625 (1923). But such exceptional consideration takes time, and routine use of this device would but add to delay while seeking to avoid it.

not a reply is appropriate must in large measure be determined by the character of the petition itself. If the petition is but a summary non-argumentative statement of the errors relied upon or reference to allegedly controlling authority, a reply brief usually serves only to delay disposition of the matter.

In a slight majority of courts, however, the petition is either in form of a brief or is accompanied by a brief on the merits of the points raised. In those courts, the opponent must feel decidedly uneasy in the knowledge that the court is considering, at least in part on the merits, points on which he has not been permitted to speak. He may gain some solace from the remark attributed to William Howard Taft when he was serving as a judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit:

A young lawyer asked whether he was expected to respond to a petition for rehearing and Judge Taft replied, "Son, until we handed down our opinion, the controversy was between your adversary and you. Now, it is between your adversary and the court and don't you think the court is able to take care of itself?" Occasional voices may be heard to doubt, and probably most petitions are met by opposing briefs when rules of court permit. The substantial number of cases in which courts dispose of petitions or otherwise act upon them by examination of the merits contributes to the tendency to submit opposing briefs. More rigorous adherence to the concept of the petition raising only the question as to whether the case shall be reheard might minimize this tendency, but it might also interfere with expeditious disposal of the vast majority of petitions, doomed as they are to denial.

\[\text{Ct. Cl. Rules 53, 56, seem to require a response. In other jurisdictions, response is either optional or upon special request of the court. See, e.g., U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 58(3).}\]

The wisdom of the varying requirements can be assessed only in the light of the form of the petition to which response is to be made. In any event the petition must make out what might be called a prima facie case for rehearing before the response should be considered. Since so few of the petitions filed accomplish this, most responses filed go for naught.

87 Few of the rules speak on this point. Beyond occasional admonitions that the petition "briefly" or "concisely" point to the errors relied upon, S.C. Rule 17(2) and Colo. R. Civ. Proc. 118(c) alone seem to prohibit argument. 5th Cir. Rule 29 and 8th Cir. Rule 15(b) impose the same requirement among the federal courts. Case authority may add to this. See Reiff v. Portland, 71 Ore. 421, 142 Pac. 827 (1914). It seems obvious that this is the preferable practice; the petition is essentially a pleading, and the absence of argument should characterize it. Despite the ideal, the reluctance of a lawyer to point without elaboration to a "controlling" authority, when the court has once wholly missed the point of that authority, is understandable.

88 Information about form, as we have noted, is particularly imprecise. It seems that at least thirty-two jurisdictions tend to blend the petition and the argument by making them the same document or by having them filed together. It is to the distinct advantage of counsel, however, to recall that the question as to whether a court should reconsider is quite different from the question as to whether it should reverse itself. If he fails to convince on the first, he cannot win on the second.

89 Letter from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Consideration by the Court—Processing and the Burden of Persuasion

1. Processing the Petition

The hurdles which the petitioner must overcome are complicated by the processing procedure in a number of states which sends the petition first to the judge or justice who wrote the opinion complained of for his consideration and report to the court. There is something to be said for such a practice since it is presumably directed to the man best acquainted with the case and the authorities relied upon. If an authority which controls has been overlooked, he is the judge in the best position to realize that fact. But being human, he may have some personal pride in the matter, and thus he may be a doubly difficult man to persuade that his ideas, expressed for all the world to see, are wrong. If his report is the primary means of informing the rest of the court about the merits of the application, hope of success is lessened unless he is a judge of high caliber.

Recognition of this difficulty has persuaded another body of courts to adopt the opposite course; the petition is assigned to one judge for initial consideration, but with the proviso that he must not be the author of the opinion under attack. At least one state, Kentucky, required such procedure by the judicial article of its constitution. With remarkable frankness, an early Kentucky judge attributed this to a factually baseless suspicion of judges and revealed that the court did not follow the constitutional command, assigning it instead to the writer of the original opinion. Still a third

\[90\] This follows the common United States procedure of initially assigning cases to individual judges who are expected to read the record and examine the briefs with a care not accorded that case by other members of the court. At least 18 state courts and 4 federal courts assign the petition to the original writer. The United States practice on the appellate level differs from what seems more common in English and Canadian practice of separate opinions by the sitting judges.

A letter from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which assigns the petition to the judge who rendered the decision of the court, reports: "In a great majority of the cases he advises against a rehearing and in practically every case his views are accepted."

\[91\] E.g., Illinois: letter from supreme court; Louisiana: letter from supreme court; Mississippi: letter from supreme court; Oklahoma: letter from supreme court. In California, "copies of the petition and answer are left with each of the seven Justices of the court for examination prior to conference consideration thereof. The petition is assigned in rotation to one of the seven justices for preparation of a conference memorandum—the petition, however, is not assigned to the author of the opinion for preparation of such a conference memorandum." Letter from the Clerk of the California Supreme Court.

\[92\] PROCEEDINGS OF KENTUCKY STATE BAR ASS'N 48–49 (1904). With all deference to the judges, we suspect that the rules and even the letters received are not a wholly accurate portrayal of actual procedure. The internal functioning of a court, particularly what happens at conferences and relationships between judges, has long been regarded as privileged information, the courts revealing only so much as they feel the bar and the public should know. We thus report here on the information available to us, neither assuming nor representing that the whole picture is disclosed.
group assign the petition to the original writer for investigation but transfer it to someone else if the court as a body concludes that a rehearing should be granted. This device would seem to do little to remove the initial major obstacle in the path of petitioners since they must still persuade the whole court through the medium of the original writer. It does tend to save the face of judges, however, since it does not compel the writer publicly to retract his views.

Again, the special problems raised by petitions addressed to courts which customarily sit in panels comprising less than their full membership are reserved for separate discussion. A few courts make special rules prohibiting initial assignment to a judge who dissented from the original decision. If the procedure of initial assignment must be employed at all, as apparently it is in appellate procedure in many of the courts in the United States, it would seem most appropriate that the petition be assigned to some judge who neither dissented nor wrote the prevailing opinion. At least one court so provides.

When the petition and the accompanying briefs, if any, have been circulated and considered, a conference is held to determine whether the petition shall be granted or denied. Most, of course, are peremptorily denied; very occasionally the court may, because it is in doubt, request oral argument on the question as to whether the petition shall be granted. Doubtless it is also at this conference that it is so frequently decided that the petition should be denied with the denial accompanied by an explanatory or clarifying opinion. As noted before, this occasionally amounts to a granting of the petition in everything but name. In some cases the petition has been granted and the original decision summarily reversed without the reargument which the procedure normally contemplates.

Letters from Delaware and Wisconsin indicate that those states, at least, follow this practice. See text at note 111 infra. E.g., N.C. Sup. Ct. Rule 44(3). The unusual Nebraska provision for oral argument results in assignment to an individual judge after argument has been had, when it is given to a judge who concurred in but did not write the majority. North Carolina assigns to two judges, neither of whom dissented. Because of the secrecy surrounding conferences, our information is extremely vague here. Doubtless they are of varying degrees of formality.

E.g., Granite Bituminous Paving Co. v. Park View Realty & Improvement Co., 270 Mo. 698, 196 S.W. 1142 (1917). Such decisions are a product of courts and lawyers combining the questions of “should it be reheard?” with “should it be reversed?” Doubtless such a combination is sometimes inevitable when the decision is to deny, because of the economy of time and effort accomplished. It should never be permitted when the answer is that the case is worth rehearing, and at least enough formality should be observed to guarantee the party originally prevailing an opportunity to be heard in opposition. If the practicing profession is assured that its victories will not be vacated without that opportunity, it will have much less inclination to prepare and file opposition or resistance to petitions for rehearing. And courts would
Not at all infrequently, the petition when granted is limited to issues or points which do not comprehend the whole case. Sometimes this is because that is all petitioner has requested; probably as often it is on some point less than the whole case that the court feels it may have erred.

2. The Burden of Persuasion

It is evident from what has been said that the intendments are all against granting the petition. The burden of persuasion is high. At least some of the judges who concurred in the majority must be shaken in their views—a common expression in the letters is "conviction of error" and a feeling that "injustice will result." Measures of persuasion are always difficult to state; probably the most apt is the following: ①

In general, I should say that it is not enough for the petition for rehearing to leave us in doubt as to the correctness of our previous decision. We may have had doubts before; but it is our job to come down off the fence and decide the case, which we do to the best of our ability. We might be aware that even if we had been persuaded to decide the case the other way, doubt would still remain in our minds as to the correctness of the decision . . . . Of course it is something else again if the petition discloses that our previous opinion materially misapprehended the state of the record, or mis-understood the purport of a major argument advanced by counsel, or overlooked a controlling precedent.

Putting the expression in any of the forms above tends to conceal yet another problem. All of the courts involved consist of more than one man. How many must cross the line between mere doubt and decided reluctance? Doubtless a majority always suffices. But that many is not invariably required. Several courts seem to feel that an unpersuaded majority may profit from hearing reargument if one who was originally with them has recanted to the point that he desires that the matter be reheard. ② New Jersey fol-

① See, e.g., IOWA R. CIV. PROC. 350(a). Letters from five courts specifically mention the practice of limited grants of rehearing. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reported that only eight per cent of petitions filed were granted and of these more than half were limited to specific issues. We are inclined to believe this typical. See, e.g., Hadrian v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Transport Co., 241 Wis. 122, 3 N.W.2d 700 (1942).

② Letter from United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

According to letters received, Minnesota, South Dakota, Virginia and Wyoming have employed this test. However, this may mean that initiative from within the court must come from a judge who concurred with the majority, but still require a majority vote on whether the petition shall be granted. This is the pattern of the federal court rules, including the Supreme Court of the United States. To this extent, it is not unlike the New Jersey rule described in note 102 infra.

It has long been the rule of the United States Supreme Court in the administration of its
allows the parliamentary rule that only a member of the original majority may ask for reconsideration; North Carolina will not grant a petition unless two judges endorse it. Some caution about counting of numbers is in order, however; without reflecting in any way on the integrity of judges, it is possible to believe that many of the frivolous petitions which are submitted neither deserve nor receive the kind of consideration which the stated procedures would indicate they get.

E.

Reargument and Resubmission

When the petition has survived the conference and is granted, it is normally set down for argument and heard as though no prior argument had been had. It may well be doubted that judges are able to erase from their minds what they heard and what they did before, but it is not surprising to find that a very substantial percentage of such cases result in a modification or reversal of the prior stand. Only those with evident merit can survive the elimination process, and there is a constant and understandable tendency on the part of judges—re-enforced by the inadequacy of the petitions themselves—to blend the question of granting rehearing with the question of correctness of the prior decision. Almost all denials represent, in varying degrees, conclusions upon the merits.

F.

Repeated and Renewed Petitions

The kind of persistence which prompted a first petition for rehearing will, with some frequency, produce a second when the first has been denied.

certiorari jurisdiction that 4 of the 9 justices in favor of granting the writ will suffice. See Robertson and Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States 592–600 (2d ed., Wolfson and Kurland 1951). A source of intra-court controversy has been the occasional decision of a majority to vacate a writ on the ground that it was improvidently granted, creating the seeming anomaly that the concurrence of 4 is sufficient to get the grant, but the concurrence of 5 is necessary to keep it. See, e.g., Hammerstein v. Superior Court of California, 341 U.S. 491 (1951).

102 Letter from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Again, information must be treated with caution because it concerns the internal functioning of a court. Speculation on human nature seems here as informative as statistics.

103 N.C. Rule 44(3) provides, in essence, that the petition is not directed to the court but to two justices who did not dissent, or in the event three of the seven dissented, to only one concurring justice. The conclusion of those justices (or that justice) determines whether the case shall be docketed for rehearing. It would seem, under the rule, that two members of the court—and those two selected by the petitioner—may determine that a rehearing be held, even though the other five opposed.

104 "Rehear" may be a misnomer; some cases are resubmitted on briefs only.
Some courts do not permit the clerk to file a second petition. Where they are filed, and a few rules specifically contemplate them, they probably are perfunctorily denied in most cases, absent a clear showing of new developments. Rather more generosity is shown to a petition submitted by a party who, originally successful on appeal, has been reversed on rehearing. Incidence is so rare as to defy generalizations, but seemingly this type of petition should be necessary and permissible only in those circumstances in which a court has been so persuaded by the first petition that they have reversed out of hand without the benefit of a counter-argument by the original winning party. And what is true of second petitions is the case with third and subsequent ones—which, astonishingly, are not unknown.

A device which seeks to evade rules against second petitions for rehearing is to disguise that petition as something else or call it by a different name. The most common is a "motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing," which has a legitimate as well as an illegitimate function. It has in the past been the vehicle in the United States Supreme Court to present second petitions, as well as to present a first when the time provided by the rules has elapsed. Other variants are "motions to modify the mandate," to "cor-

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105 E.g., Alabama, ALA. SUP. CT. RULE 34, 261 Ala. xxxii. The rules of the United Supreme Court adopted April 12, 1954, 346 U.S. 951 (1954), RULE 58(4), contain a new provision: "Consecutive petitions for rehearing, and petitions for rehearing that are out of time under this rule, will not be received." But see Cahill v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 351 U.S. 183 (1956), in which the mandate was "recalled" because the court deemed the original order erroneous, both after the expiration of the ordinary time and after rehearing had once been denied.

106 New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-2-1 (1953); Oklahoma: OKLA. SUP. CT. RULE 29, 204 Okla. x (second petition may be made, but not filed except by leave of the court); and Tennessee: TENN. SUP. CT. RULE 32, 185 Tenn. 879, all provide by rule that a second petition may not be filed unless the court has granted special permission. Louisiana has a curious provision that a second petition may not be filed unless the court in its opinion reserves to the unsuccessful party the right to apply. LA. RULE XII(3). What might prompt the court to make such a reservation we are unable to imagine.

107 People v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 57 P.2d 894 (1936); Dumaine v. Gay, Sullivan & Co., 194 La. 177, 194 So. 779 (1940). What seems evident is stated in a letter from the Supreme Court of Montana: "Upon the modification of a decision on motion for rehearing, any further petition for rehearing shall be directed only to the modification."

108 We have argued above that this should never happen. See text following note 86 supra. Another innovation of the 1954 rules of the United States Supreme Court attempts to give assurance that it will not: "No petition for rehearing will be granted in the absence of such a request [by the Court for a reply to the petition] and an opportunity to submit a reply in response thereeto." RULE 58(3).

109 During the 1948-49 term the Supreme Court of the United States denied 7 motions for leave to file a second petition, 2 for leave to file a third, and 1 for leave to file a fourth. REEVES, THE WORK OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT FOR THE CURRENT TERM 1948-9, at 34 (Table 3) (1949).

Alabama Co. v. Brown, 207 Ala. 18, 92 So. 490 (1921), confirms what seems evident, that a second rehearing may be obtained on the initiative of a member of the court.
rect the mandate," or to modify the opinion. On the whole, they have received their practically inevitable fate.\textsuperscript{110}

IV

EN BANC REHEARINGS IN PANEL COURTS

In several instances we have referred to the peculiar problems presented by a court which consists in full of more judges than customarily sit in any one case. Two divergent patterns exist in the United States. The appellate courts of several of the states are authorized to sit in what are aptly called divisions or departments.\textsuperscript{111} When they do so, they are recognized as something less than the court, and provision is commonly made for review by the full body of the decision rendered by a department upon motion of the court or if there are dissenters in the department. Review by the full court may indeed be a "rehearing" by some of the justices involved, but the standards applied differ in some respects from the general standards discussed above. Perhaps that difference may best be stated by reference to the underlying theory: The review involved is regarded as an integral part of the system, although the majority of cases decided by a department will not be further reviewed. In California, for example, the judicial article of the constitution provides that no judgment shall be pronounced by the panel without the concurrence of the three sitting judges.\textsuperscript{112}

The other pattern is exemplified by the United States courts of appeals. Originally all of these courts consisted of three members. Because of the press of business and the increasing load in several of the circuits, new judges were added.\textsuperscript{113} But three judges still constitute a court, and rehear-


\textsuperscript{111} E.g., Cal. Const. art. VI, § 2 as to the supreme court (compare the organization of the district courts of appeal into two divisions in the First Appellate District and three divisions in the Second Appellate District, without provision for en banc hearings. The Third and Fourth Appellate Districts each have only one division. Cal. Const. art. VI, § 4a; Cal. Govt. Code §§ 69102, 69103; Mo. Const. art. V, § 7; Wash. Rev. Code § 2.04.120 (1951). A number of states provide authority by constitution or statute for sitting in divisions, but not all courts employ the authority. E.g., the California Supreme Court has not sat in departments for many years.

\textsuperscript{112} Cal. Const. art. VI, § 2. Wash. Rev. Code § 2.04.120 (1951) provides for panels of four, with the concurrence of three members necessary for a decision. If three do not concur, the case must be reheard or transferred. This may result in automatic rehearing by the full court. And this result is not wholly peculiar to panel courts. See Idaho Code Ann. § 1–207 (1947) and Utah Code Ann. § 78–2–3 (1953) which both require the concurrence of three justices to pronounce judgment.

\textsuperscript{113} 28 U.S.C. 44 (1952), as amended, 68 Stat. 8 (1954), provides three judges each for the first and fourth circuits; the others range up to nine each for the ninth and District of Columbia circuits.
ing by all of the members is the exceptional safety valve device we have been discussing. There are rare cases in which the entire membership may be convened for the original hearing of a case, which practice is recognized by the Supreme Court\textsuperscript{114} and authorized by the Judicial Code.\textsuperscript{115} This practice is invoked usually for cases involving issues of great moment; it is to be distinguished from rehearing although the considerations which warrant it largely resemble those which warrant rehearing en banc.\textsuperscript{116}

The genesis of the special characteristics of the type of "rehearing" now discussed is the circumstance that each panel of three is a "court" and that absent exceptional review by the Supreme Court, its decision is a final disposition of the case. It is unseemly that decisions on identical issues shall vary because the assignment pattern puts Judge Jones on the panel in case A and Judge Smith on the panel in case B. But however unseemly, it has happened.\textsuperscript{117} And the courts of appeals have taken quite different views about whether it should be permitted to happen. The practice varied from the position of the second circuit, which never convened en banc for any reason, to that of the third circuit and the court of appeals for the District of Columbia, who have been relatively free with the practice.\textsuperscript{118}

This in brief was the situation prior to 1953. Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.\textsuperscript{119} might be said to mark a turn, if only one could chart the direction. In that case petitioners asserted that a party defeated in a court of appeals has a vested right to petition for a rehearing en banc and that the court of appeals as a whole must act on such a petition. The United States Supreme Court's rejection of this contention produced three opinions. The Court's opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson leaves to each circuit the discretion to control the manner in which the power to sit en banc is to be invoked, subject only to the minimum requirement that "so necessary and useful" a power cannot be ignored. "A court

\textsuperscript{114} Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
\textsuperscript{115} 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1952).
\textsuperscript{116} See Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment in Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 345 U.S. 247, 270 (1953): "Rehearings en banc by these courts, . . . are to some extent necessary in order to resolve conflicts between panels. This is the dominant concern. Moreover, the most constructive way of resolving conflicts is to avoid them. Hence, insofar as possible, determinations en banc are indicated whenever it seems likely that a majority of all the active judges would reach a different result than the panel assigned to hear a case or which has heard it."
\textsuperscript{117} E.g., P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951), where Frank, J., voted against his expressed convictions, partly to create an intra-circuit conflict and provoke a grant of certiorari. See concurring opinion of Clark, J., in Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems, 194 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1951).
\textsuperscript{118} See Maris, Hearing and Rehearing Cases in Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91 (1953); Comment, 5 STAN. L. REV. 332 (1953).
may take steps to use the en banc power sparingly, but it may not take steps to curtail its use indiscriminately." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, proceeding from the premise that "rehearings are not a healthy step in the judicial process; surely they ought not to be deemed a normal procedure," although concurring in the judgment, disagreed with so much of the majority's rationale as would permit a full court of appeals to delegate to a panel authority to dispose finally of petitions for rehearing en banc.  

In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson, who thought that initiative for en banc rehearing should be reserved to the Court, said, "If I were to predict, I would guess that today's decision will either be ignored or it will be regretted." The former seems to be the case to date. The only noticeable response to the opinion was the adoption of new rules by several courts in compliance with the admonition that the procedures contemplated, whatever they might be, be known to the lawyers affected thereby. Perhaps experience yet to come will tell whether or not the decision will be regretted.

To the extent that the practice develops, the principal grounds must be the resolution of intra-circuit conflicts and consideration of issues of great importance. Intra-circuit conflict is apt to be the most important since this is an area in which the Supreme Court has been noticeably reluctant to exercise its discretionary power of review—even refusing on the express ground that the matter could be returned to the court of appeals so that they might, if they thought it wise, rehear the decision en banc and thereby resolve the conflict. In the "great issue" case, convening the full roster of judges may involve waste motion since many such cases are destined to be resolved in the Supreme Court in any event, as one judge of the court of appeals for the District of Columbia is reported to have said in describing their en banc consideration of the Steel Seizure Cases as a "dress rehearsal."

V
A SUGGESTED RESOLUTION OF CERTAIN PROBLEMS

Two possible extremes suggest themselves in the matter of rehearing: it should be available automatically on application by counsel, or it should be

120 Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 345 U.S. 247, 261 (1953).
121 Id. at 270.
123 Id. at 273.
124 Id. at 274.
125 8th Cm. R= 15(e); 9th Cir. Rule 23; see Herzog v. United States, 235 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1956).
abolished altogether. The former has nothing to commend it; lawyers, like shepherds, will be ignored if they cry "Wolf!" too often. The latter is not at all impossible; it is the present rule of the Court of Appeal in England, a court which is as final for most purposes as is the highest court of any of the United States. And an unpublished study by Charles E. Cropley, late Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, finds that Canada is alone among the Commonwealth nations in making provision for rehearing. But neither of these two extremes is likely to be accepted in the United States or Canada; tradition alone would compel some middle course.

To some extent the character of that middle course will vary from court to court. The form of rehearing traditional in a particular jurisdiction will influence, as will such practical and imponderable matters as the press of business and the disposition of individual judges. But the similarities of problem and practice on the appellate level submerge the differences, and the same basic questions about rehearing should be answered in substantially the same way throughout the United States. First and foremost in determining the role and conduct of rehearing is the requirement of a basic theory and a comprehensive scheme.

The basic postulate we have already noted: A court which is final must be careful, but not so careful that its judgments never become final. The range between may be bracketed by two recent statements on rehearing by Justice Frankfurter. The first is from the Western Pacific case:

Rehearings are not a healthy step in the judicial process; surely they ought not to be deemed a normal procedure. . . . If petitions for rehearing were justified, except in rare instances, it would bespeak serious defects in the work of the courts of appeals, an assumption which must be rejected.

Doubtless the Justice would reject the same assumption about the work of the Supreme Court itself. In Flynn v. United States he said:

A petition for rehearing of a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari is part of the appellate procedure authorized by the Rules of this Court, subject to the requirements of Rule 58. The right to such a consideration is not to be deemed an empty formality as though such petitions will as a matter of course be denied.

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128 Flower v. Lloyd, 6 Ch. D. 297 (1876). Some caution about the history of rehearing is suggested by an apparent paradox here. In the English Court of Appeal all appeals are "by way of rehearing." Order 58, Rule 1. But they do not permit rehearing in the sense that it is discussed in this article. All but one of the United States appellate courts studied do employ "rehearing," although the writ of error rather than equity rehearing is the base upon which their practice is built. See text at note 13 supra.


First among the requirements in charting a way down the narrow defile bounded by these expressions is the problem of grounds: If the factors which will move a court to reconsider can be isolated, an attorney deciding whether or not to petition for rehearing can make a rational estimate of his prospects and phrase his petition in such form as to present succinctly and squarely his claim for rehearing. It is easier to describe grounds than it is to itemize them; the New Mexico rule set out earlier\(^{131}\) may be as satisfactory as can practicably be attained. But it must be conceded that the New Mexico rule invites petitions when the only ground is that the opinion of the court has neglected to respond directly to some point raised by the attorneys. An experienced appellate judge once suggested to the writers that a major reason for the deplorable length of many modern opinions is that the court desires to ward off in advance petitions complaining that the court has ignored one of the points of counsel. The problem of course is the duality of function of the appellate opinion: to build for the future, and to satisfy the parties that they truly have had their day in court.

Second only to an explication of grounds for rehearing, and closely allied to it, is the question of the form of petition. It should be brief and it should not be argumentative; it should point to the conflict created or the "controlling" matter overlooked in the original decision. It should not be expected to also serve the role of persuading the court how the conflict or error should be resolved. That is the object of resubmission. The object of the petition is only to show that the petitioner is entitled to a rehearing, not that he is entitled to a different decision on the merits.

How this limitation is to be enforced is not easily answered. The following sentences from the Colorado rule might accomplish the purpose:\(^{133}\)

Such petition shall be mimeographed or typewritten or reproduced by some other [sic] method other than printing, in conformity with [rule governing briefs] . . . and shall not contain more than three pages without consent of the court . . . . In no case will any argument be permitted in support of such petition. If argumentative matter is contained therein, the petition may be stricken.

Page limitations are arbitrary, but they will be more effective to prevent argument than any mere rule against argument can ever be.

We have already indicated\(^{133}\) that we doubt both the practicability and the wisdom of what we have labeled "screening devices" to eliminate frivolous petitions. It is not cynicism to say that the certificate of the attorney is wholly useless; certification by an impartial member of the

\(^{131}\) See text at note 32 supra.


\(^{133}\) See text at note 57 supra.
bar is little if any better. Taxation of costs and other penalty provisions
doubtless are more potent—if provision apart from the general strictures
against dilatory practices are thought necessary. Such provisions might
be included or omitted as tradition or local inclination dictate. They do
no real good, but probably they do little harm.

Rules about responses to petitions for rehearing are presently con-
fused. It is undoubtedly true that most lawyers present them at great
waste of time, effort, and money. Because most applications are thrown
out on the petition alone, the answers seldom are read by the judges. But
those cases in which the petitioner and the court blend the separate ques-
tions of rehearing and change of decision are a potent threat against the
attorney who wonders whether he should respond. If, in addition to the
requirement that the petition be non-argumentative, there were at least
assurance that the court would not change its decision out-of-hand, a great
mass of useless answers would be avoided. Again the Colorado rule, as
well as others of recent adoption, gives this assurance:184

No answer will be permitted and no action will be taken save to grant or
deny the rehearing.

Time is an important matter. In those states in which the petition is
really a petition-plus and includes argument on the merits, much time
must be allowed. As every attorney knows, preparing and printing the
argument takes time. Thirty days or more is not too much when the
procedure contemplates argument on the merits at the petition stage. But
it is wholly excessive when it becomes clear that allowing thirty days in
every case prolongs the 99 per cent of cases in which rehearing is not had
for the benefit of the 1 per cent or less in which rehearing is had.185 The
solution, we think, is clear. A three page non-argumentative petition can
be prepared for submission in not more than a full working day by an
attorney who is familiar with the case and has the opinion of the court
before him. Allowing for mailing, press of work and other routine delays,
surely ten days from the time the decision is mailed to the parties by the
clerk is adequate. Extensions for extraordinary causes might continue to
be available as they have been generally. Waiving printing of the petition
not only would expedite but would accord with the modern tendency to
economize on mechanical costs of appeals.

184 Colo. R. Crv. Proc. 118(c). U.S. Supr. Ct. Rule 58(c) provides: “No reply to a peti-
tion for rehearing will be received unless requested by the court. No petition will be granted
in the absence of such a request and the opportunity to submit a reply in response thereto.”
Cf. Miss. Rule 14(3), which blends the two questions, but guarantees opportunity to argue
on the merits.
185 Letter from the Supreme Court of Iowa: “In practice it seems to merely delay the
procedendo in by far the majority of cases.”
Another question of time is presented: What rules shall apply to briefs and arguments on the rehearing or resubmission? This is largely a local matter to be resolved in accord with the general appellate practice of the state, although time at this stage might be more restricted than for the original presentation because the issues presumably will be both narrower and sharper the second time around. In any event, more generosity with time can be allowed than presently is. The reason is that we are now dealing with allowance of time in a case where it has already been determined that deserving questions are presented, rather than practicing that most false economy of all: allowing a short period of time for all cases because less than 1 of each 100 may deserve some extra time. Continued existence or expiration of the term of court is, of course, irrelevant.

Whether the mandate shall be stayed by the filing of a petition for rehearing is another matter to be resolved partly by considerations extrinsic to rehearing proper. Most court rules provide for some delay, whether or not a petition is filed. If a short, non-argumentative petition is filed within ten days, it can be disposed of so quickly that the question of delay of mandate because a petition has been filed will largely be obviated. An express stay until the petition is acted upon normally would be wise. When the petition is granted, a stay should ensue until final disposition.

Problems about processing within the court—whether resubmission shall be by oral argument or on briefs or both, assignment to judges, and the number of votes required to obtain a grant of rehearing—are the type of thing which, while appropriately the subject of court rules, are not fundamental to the pattern or the underlying theory of rehearing. One jurisdiction might require a simple majority, another might think that deference to the desires of a substantial minority could be profitable to the system as a whole. We do not mean that we are indifferent to the resolution of such questions, but we think that the resolution, however reached, will not deny workability to the standards we have set out above as the essentials of a sensible and functioning procedure for rehearing in a modern appellate court.

But whatever the reforms, the problem of rehearing will always present a dilemma. For the goals of accurate adjudication and finality are often necessarily at opposite poles. The United States Supreme Court recently has demonstrated this once again in a dramatic and tragic context. Less than two years ago that Court, with the services of an advisory committee of experts and after benefit of intensive study, adopted its Revised Rules.138

Whatever the shortcomings of its Revised Rule 58 on Rehearings, certainly paragraph 4 of that Rule accords with the felt necessities of modern appellate practice. It provides simply:

Consecutive petitions for rehearings, and petitions for rehearings that are out of time under this rule, will not be received.

Yet in the teeth of that explicit limitation, the Supreme Court by a five to four vote in Cahill v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. "in the interests of fairness" granted, after time to petition for rehearing had expired, under the guise of a "motion to recall and amend the judgment," what was in substance a second petition for rehearing after the first petition, seasonably filed, had been denied. Four justices vigorously dissented, pointing out that the "motion to recall" presented precisely the same contention which was raised in the petition for rehearing. Grant of the "motion to recall" prompted widespread and sensational press attention because the judgment for a large sum to a laborer in impecunious circumstances had already been paid and in large part spent. It is hard to escape the conclusion that in the laity's psychology the Court’s action at least evidenced serious inefficiency in the judicial process. Perhaps it only truly evidences the inevitability of some escape hatches from the rigidity of absolute limitations in procedural law. But the escape hatch, if justified at all in this case, might better have taken the form of candid dispensation from the rule rather than subtle evasion of it.

CONCLUSION

Rehearing in theory is a conscientious judicial effort to make the appellate process as good as it can be. It thus constitutes another laudable Anglo-American attempt practically to realize the great social and moral

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137 Admittedly the Supreme Court faces problems not precisely parallel to state rehearing problems.
140 E.g., Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, July 8, 1956, 8B, col. 1. A part of an Associated Press story is reproduced in the Canadian Bar Review version of this article. See introductory footnote supra marked †.
141 E.g., Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, July 8, 1956, 8B, col. 1. A part of an Associated Press story is reproduced in the Canadian Bar Review version of this article. See introductory footnote supra marked †.
142 The judicial history of the Cahill case is as follows: judgment on jury verdict for plaintiff against defendant railroad was reversed for insufficiency of the evidence, 224 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1955); certiorari granted and court of appeals judgment reversed, reinstating the award to plaintiff, 350 U.S. 898 (1955); defendant railroad's petition for rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 943 (1956); defendant railroad's motion to recall judgment granted, and judgment amended so as to provide for a remand to the court of appeals for further proceedings, namely consideration of the evidence question pretermitted by the court of appeals when it reversed for insufficiency of the evidence, 351 U.S. 183 (1956).
importance of sound judicial administration, which pervasively and vitally affects the well-being of the people. The shortcomings of rehearing are those largely inherent in all efforts to modify the universality of a rule of law by devices which ultimately invoke the varying value judgments of individual men. The real quality of rehearing is thus a function of the quality of the judges. There is no panacea for the shortcomings. But we urge consideration of the changes proposed in the preceding section for such help as the improvement of formal rules may afford.