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Holly Doremus
Berkeley Law

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ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AS AN INFORMATION PROBLEM

HOLLY DOREMUS

Enthusiasm for adaptive management has outrun evaluation of its usefulness as a natural resource management tool. Policymakers routinely endorse, and frequently require, it. Managers and academic observers alike have tended to assume that adaptive management is uniformly the best strategy. Little has been said, particularly in the policy literature, about how to decide whether an adaptive management approach makes sense. Looking at adaptive management as an information problem, this Article argues that adaptive management should be used only when it promises to improve management outcomes sufficiently to justify the additional costs it imposes. An explicit formal analysis of the prospects for learning and the value of learning for management should precede any decision to engage in adaptive management. For large-scale, long-term, or high-profile adaptive management programs, that analysis should be reviewed by outside experts and periodically reexamined. The type of analysis recommended here would help limit the use of adaptive management to appropriate circumstances, improve implementation when adaptive management is adopted, and enhance accountability. It would also highlight situations in which learning would be valuable for managers but appears too costly or difficult. The analysis should highlight barriers to learning. Many will be context specific, but others are systematic. This Article offers suggestions for addressing some of the most common systematic impediments to learning.

INTRODUCTION

I. EVALUATING ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN CONTEXT

A. Prerequisites for Successful Adaptive Management
   1. Information Gaps
   2. Good Prospects for Learning
INTRODUCTION

This symposium broadly considers the ability of law to change in response to changing circumstances and knowledge (adaptive capacity), and to retain its fundamental form in the face of exogenous challenges (resilience). In the natural resource management context, the current interest in resilience and adaptability is largely driven by climate change, which raises questions about whether law can keep up with an environment whose rate of change exceeds that for which human institutions were designed, and whether existing law can withstand the new stresses it is beginning to encounter. This Article approaches those questions through the lens of adaptive management, a strategy that theoretically promotes both adaptation and resilience. I argue that, despite its theoretical appeal, adaptive management is not useful for all management problems and should not be adopted without an explicit evaluation of its benefits and costs.

Adaptive management arouses both much enthusiasm and much skepticism. The theory is an attractive one, promising a way to make decisions in the face of current uncertainty while also reducing...
uncertainty over time. The core concept of adaptive management is that the management process should incorporate, rather than follow, learning about the managed system. An adaptive management framework explicitly builds in opportunities for learning and adjustment. Ideally, that creates a resilient institutional structure for adapting to change.

Enthusiasm has spilled over to the policy arena, where adaptive management is now routinely endorsed, and even mandated. When it comes to implementation, however, skepticism becomes the rule. Documented instances of successful adaptive management are rare, and many touted examples diverge significantly from the theoretical ideal. Furthermore, adaptive management can create a new type of accountability problem, providing cover that allows resource management agencies to put off imposing politically controversial limits on economic activity.

I share the skepticism about the politics of adaptive management, but I also share the sense that it is both inevitable and in some contexts desirable. That makes it important to examine and

4. See, e.g., James E. Lyons et al., Monitoring in the Context of Structured Decision-Making and Adaptive Management, 72 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1683, 1691 (2008) ("Adaptive management has been widely recognized as having tremendous potential to solve problems in natural resource management, and calls for implementation of adaptive management are becoming more common. . . .").
6. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 85308(f) (Deering 2010) (mandating that a management plan, to be prepared by the newly established Delta Stewardship Council, include "a science-based, transparent, and formal adaptive management strategy for ongoing ecosystem restoration and water management decisions"); Chesapeake Bay Protection and Restoration, Exec. Order No. 13,508, § 203(e), 74 Fed. Reg. 23,099, 23,100 (May 12, 2009) (requiring that federal agencies develop a Chesapeake Bay strategy that, among other things, "describe[s] a process for the implementation of adaptive management principles, including a periodic evaluation of protection and restoration activities"); Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring Problem, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680000 (noting that agencies have embraced adaptive management); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424, 424 (2010) (explaining that adaptive management "has become infused into the natural resources policy world to the point of ubiquity").
8. Gregory et al., supra note 3, at 2411.
deal with its challenges. And that, in turn, is a tall order. Adaptive management is like the elephant being examined by the blind men in the well-known tale: every different aspect explored reveals a new challenge.

Several of the challenges have been recognized and are being addressed from both scientific and policy perspectives. Without denigrating their importance, therefore, I set them aside here. There is no question that adaptive management poses incentives problems, accountability problems, and flexibility problems. In this Article, however, I choose to focus on a different part of the elephant, one that has been less explored by policy wonks. Adaptive management is, in important ways, an information problem. It depends on the ability to fill information gaps over time under challenging conditions. It cannot be used appropriately or effectively without confronting that piece of the puzzle. I make no claim that information is the entire elephant—of course it is not. What I do claim, though, is that information is an important part of the elephant, one that deserves more of our attention.

I focus on information for three reasons. First, the information problem inherent in adaptive management is logically prior to the incentives, accountability, and flexibility problems when deciding whether to use adaptive management in a specific context. Only if learning is feasible does it make sense to worry about whether managers want to learn, can be forced to learn, or can use knowledge they acquire. Asking the information question is therefore a way of asking whether adaptive management can succeed under a best-case scenario. If the answer is yes, additional questions must still be asked about how close we can come to that best case. But if the answer is no, those other problems are irrelevant; adaptive management simply is not a useful choice.

Second, there is good reason to think that the information problem will frequently be a difficult one. Adaptive management poses an underappreciated information conundrum. It is needed only when lack of information undermines confidence in management


decisions. It is substantively (as opposed to politically) useful, however, only if that inadequate information base can and will be supplemented over time in a way that increases confidence in future decisions. The learning needed to make adaptive management successful will often be difficult, even with the right motivation. It will typically be costly, requiring added modeling, monitoring, and data evaluation. The extra resources adaptive management requires will not be well spent unless they produce useful information.

Finally, the information problem represents a gap in the literature. Although some ecologists and economists have recognized the information problem and begun to develop decision support tools to address it, other thoughtful commentators still leave it out of their descriptions of the prerequisites for adaptive management, and policy scholars seem not yet to have given it much thought. Perhaps that is because solutions to the information problem seem, at least at first glance, to lie peculiarly within the expertise of natural scientists. Certainly natural science has a crucial role to play, providing tools and techniques for undertaking and interpreting experiments or other information-gathering efforts. But factors within the realm of law and policy are also important because they can facilitate or complicate data generation, sharing, interpretation, and use.

This Article explores the policy and institutional context for the acquisition and use of information in the course of adaptive management. The analysis builds on my earlier work on the "information supply pipeline," the sequence of steps needed to take information from the discovery phase to use in decisionmaking. I assume for purposes of this analysis that managers are making good faith efforts to achieve the goals set out by their governing statutes.


13. See, e.g., Lyons et al., supra note 4, at 1691 (describing adaptive management as "the most effective and efficient way to achieve management objectives" when the basic conditions of a series of sequential decisions, uncertainty, and the ability to adjust are met, with no mention of the ability to learn).

and regulations.\textsuperscript{15} I am under no illusion that this assumption is always (or even generally) correct. Indeed, the conviction that managers cannot be trusted surely motivates much of the work on the need to build accountability into adaptive management efforts.\textsuperscript{16} But making this assumption allows me to highlight challenges distinct from the motivations of resource managers, challenges which must be dealt with even if the incentives and accountability problems are solved.

Analyzing adaptive management as an information problem produces two pragmatically useful results. First, and perhaps most important, it encourages recognition that adaptive management is not always a desirable strategy and points to ways to determine whether adaptive management will be helpful in specific contexts. The current enthusiasm for adaptive management in the policy sector seems to ignore this step. There is debate about how to do adaptive management and a fair amount of handwringing about why it is not more fully pursued,\textsuperscript{17} but not enough discussion about whether it ought to be used.\textsuperscript{18}

That needs to change. Adaptive management is not an end in itself, nor is it always useful. It is a tool that can improve management outcomes over time in some contexts. It does not come free, however. Both the decision to employ adaptive management and decisions about how to implement it involve tradeoffs. Adaptive management increases the costs of management, complicates oversight, imposes

\textsuperscript{15} I also assume that managers have as much access to information as the regulated community. Because my focus here is on public resource management, that is often, although not always, a good assumption. To the extent that actions affecting managed resources require government approval, it will generally be legally possible to require that those seeking approval provide needed information.


\textsuperscript{17} See, e.g., Carl Walters, Challenges in Adaptive Management of Riparian and Coastal Ecosystems, CONSERVATION ECOLOGY (June 1997), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol1/iss2/art1/ (evaluating the “low success rates in implementing adaptive management”).

\textsuperscript{18} For an exception, see Gregory et al., supra note 3, at 2414 (offering four criteria for deciding whether the use of adaptive management is appropriate). Their analysis, however, ends up focusing as much on the details of implementing adaptive management as on the choice of whether to implement it.
added institutional demands, and is subject to misuse for political ends. It requires striking a balance between short-term management objectives and long-term learning, between devoting resources to management and to monitoring, and between finality and endless political squabbling. It should only be used when the benefits of learning exceed those costs over the relevant time frame.

In order to make sure that adaptive management is employed only where it should be, and before deciding to implement it, resource managers should undertake, and policymakers should require, an explicit, formalized analysis of the prospects for learning and its expected value for management. That analysis, which ideally should be reviewed by leading technical experts outside the management agency and periodically reexamined, can serve valuable internal and external ends. Internally, it can force managers to confront their assumptions about the system and their information needs, providing a kind of intellectual discipline that prepares the groundwork for learning. A thorough pre-adoption review of the prospects for adaptive management improves any adaptive management program ultimately adopted. Externally, it can provide a different kind of discipline, enhancing accountability to management goals by forcing managers to explain how they expect adaptive management to help them achieve those goals.

Second, approaching adaptive management as an information problem highlights systematic barriers to learning which can be reduced by changes in law, policy, or institutional structure. While a formal evaluation of the tradeoffs should be a prerequisite to adaptive management, it is important to recognize that the calculus of learning is not fixed. If the evaluation suggests that learning will be difficult or costly, that need not be the end of the matter. Recognizing barriers to gathering, exchanging, or using information is the first step in reducing those barriers. It may turn out that some are illusory, or at least not as high as they appear, while others can be reduced through targeted or general policy choices.

Of course, many information challenges are context-specific and cannot be resolved or even recognized outside that context. There are some, however, which occur across a range of management contexts. At least some of these systematic challenges can be proactively addressed. Rapid diffusion of data, analytic tools, and theoretical

19. See infra text accompanying notes 91–95.
20. See infra text accompanying note 95.
21. See infra text accompanying note 94.
insights is one recurring problem. There are relatively straightforward (though not necessarily easy) ways to encourage better movement of information through the system. Other recurring challenges may require deeper policy and institutional changes that are not likely to occur unless their potential to improve management outcomes is recognized. Information generation can be promoted by designating areas for experimentation and crafting general rules specifying the conditions under which management experiments can be conducted. Information utilization can be promoted through employee selection and training, institutional design, and building more effective connections between academic and applied scientists.

The argument proceeds in two major Parts. The first sets out a framework for evaluating the usefulness of adaptive management. It begins by reviewing the elements that must be present before adaptive management should even be considered. It then considers in more detail how the most challenging of those elements, the costs and benefits (broadly defined) of learning, should be evaluated and proposes a formal analytic approach. The second Part takes up the question of what to do when the benefits of learning appear high but are matched or exceeded by the costs. It contends that some systematic barriers to learning can be addressed through policy measures and offers recommendations. Finally, the Conclusion briefly recaps the argument and key recommendations.

I. EVALUATING ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN CONTEXT

It is common ground at this point that natural resource management decisions must typically be made in the face of incomplete knowledge about the systems being managed. Knowledge gaps impede management success in a variety of ways. Most obviously, they undermine confidence in management decisions, because actions taken under uncertainty might move the system away from rather than toward the desired outcome. In


23. I use the terms “natural resource management” and “natural resource managers” in this Article inclusively, to refer to those responsible for managing public natural resources, such as the U.S. Forest Service (“USFS”) and National Park Service, to those responsible for managing built systems that use or impinge on public resources, such as officials at the Bureau of Reclamation and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and also to regulators responsible for setting limits on resource extraction and use, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”).

addition to raising the risk of management failure, knowledge gaps can be paralyzing if managers are risk averse, preferring passivity to taking the chance that their actions will make the situation worse.\(^2\) That sort of passivity might be desirable from a conservation perspective where the relevant decision is whether or not to permit new environmental impacts, but it is problematic where the status quo itself is harmful to the environment, as is often the case for managed natural systems.\(^2\)

Knowledge gaps also can interfere with political and judicial accountability. Uncertainty leaves managers free to make interpretive judgments. They can often conceal those judgments, and the reasons for the specific choices made, from public oversight with claims that they are simply following the science.\(^2\) Uncertainty therefore makes it difficult for the public to discern whether managers are doing their best to follow legislative direction or instead bowing to political pressure. It also complicates judicial oversight. Federal courts must be at their "most deferential" when reviewing scientific determinations.\(^2\)

They generally will not disturb an agency's interpretation of limited or conflicting data.\(^2\) Uncertainty may, therefore, in effect, maximize management discretion.\(^3\)

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25. My view that many managers are risk averse in precisely this way may require some explanation. While I agree that resource management agencies often seem to bow to political pressures in ways that put the resources under their supervision at risk, that's a different problem. Recall that for purposes of this Article I assume that managers are pursuing applicable statutory and regulatory goals in good faith. That assumption is, at a minimum, not universally false; although their urge to act protectively surely can be overcome by political pressures, often managers do try to protect the resources they are charged with overseeing. In that context, I think there is good evidence that at least some managers show risk aversion with respect to the tradeoffs between learning and risks to the resource, and there is little evidence that any are prone to risk-taking. Examples of risk aversion potentially inhibiting learning come from the reluctance of FWS to authorize experimental high flows on the Colorado River because of possible impacts on the Kanab ambersnail, Doremus, supra note 9, at 78–79, and the reluctance of water managers to expend the resources of the Environmental Water Account created by the federal-state CalFed program lest they be caught without water later when the fish could need it more, ENVTL. WATER ACCOUNT REVIEW PANEL, FIRST ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL WATER ACCOUNT FOR THE CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM 16 (2001), available at http://www.science.calwater.ca.gov/pdf/2001_EWA_Science_Review _Workshop.pdf.

26. Doremus, supra note 24, at 555.

27. See Doremus, supra note 16, at 145–47.


30. Biber, supra note 6, at 46–47; Doremus, supra note 24, at 574–77.
Adaptive management has been touted as a way to deal with the information deficit, allowing action in the face of uncertainty in the short run while information gaps are filled in over the longer term.\(^3\) The concept was developed before large-scale anthropogenic climate disruption was widely recognized as a problem,\(^3\) but climate change makes it seem even more vital to effective resource management.\(^3\)

There is no universal definition of the term “adaptive management.” It has been used to describe a range of management strategies, but fundamentally any adaptive strategy must include at least two key features: iterative decisionmaking and a commitment to learning over time.\(^3\) As originally envisioned by its primary architects, adaptive management was a reaction to the perceived inadequacies of management based on pre-decision comprehensive analysis.\(^3\)

31. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Restoring the Environment and Restoring Democracy: Lessons from the Colorado River, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 102 (2007) ("The science community first embraced adaptive management as a way to address the immense gaps in our scientific knowledge and understanding of how ecosystems might respond to various changes in conditions, whether natural or artificial."); A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 249 (2004) ("Adaptive management is designed to close the gap between the available information and the information needed to make sound environmental decisions.").

32. The foundational works on adaptive management are ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978) and CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986).

33. See, e.g., Joshua J. Lawler, Climate Change Adaptation Strategies for Resource Management and Conservation Planning, 1162 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 79, 86 (2009) (noting that for all its challenges, adaptive management "is still likely to be one of the best tools managers and scientists have to address climate change and to learn about its effects").

34. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR WATER RESOURCES PLANNING 2 (2004) ("There are multiple views and definitions regarding adaptive management, but elements that have been identified in theory and in practice are: management objectives that are regularly revisited and accordingly revised, a model(s) of the system being managed, a range of management options, monitoring and evaluating outcomes of management actions, mechanisms for incorporating learning into future decisions, and a collaborative structure for stakeholder participation and learning."). Unlike some adaptive management proponents, I do not include collaborative decisionmaking as a fundamental element. Adaptive management is a learning approach to management. Collaboration is one possible method for making management decisions, but it is not essential to learning, and in some circumstances might even be an impediment. Whether and in what circumstances collaborative management might be appropriate is a distinct question from whether adaptive management is appropriate, and the two are best addressed separately.

35. Brad Karkkainen traces the roots of adaptive management much further back than the work of Walters and Holling, locating them in the pragmatism of John Dewey. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 957–59 (2003). Others have made the same connection. See, e.g., KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE—
In fact, many natural resource decisions need not be made once and for all at the "front end." For large managed systems, like the Florida Everglades, Chesapeake Bay, California Bay-Delta, national forests, and national parks, decision points recur over time, providing repeated opportunities for reconsideration and adjustment. In other contexts, such as permits to fill wetlands or even permits to bury streams with the waste from mountaintop removal mining, individual decisions are made only once but the same type of decision is confronted repeatedly. Although individual decisions cannot be reversed, the effects of those decisions can inform later ones. Where either direct or indirect opportunities exist for "back end" adjustment, management can be designed as a learning strategy.

Early proponents of adaptive management suggested that the most efficient path to increased knowledge would be to design management actions as deliberate and, to the extent possible, controlled experiments to test explicit hypotheses about the system. That strategy has come to be known as "active adaptive management." Another version, known as "passive adaptive management," however, has been more commonly implemented. Passive adaptive management involves structured learning in the absence of deliberate management experimentation. It relies on monitoring the outcomes of management and using the information gained to update beliefs about how the system operates. In either form, adaptive management implies a humble attitude, anticipating the possibility of surprise and being prepared to detect and correct management shortfalls.

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36. On the "front end/back end" distinction and the need to be able to adjust policies based on new information, see SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 177 (2003).


38. Allan & Curtis, supra note 7, at 415.

39. Walters, supra note 32, at 248-52. Brad Karkkainen has provided an excellent, concise explanation of the difference between active and passive adaptive management. Karkkainen, supra note 35, at 950.

Currently, policymakers seem uniformly excited about adaptive management. It has been mandated by federal and state legislation, adopted by regulation, and applied through guidance and informal mechanisms.\textsuperscript{41} Scholars are less sanguine. There is much enthusiasm for the concept; indeed, given the shortage of front-end knowledge about ecosystems and species, most observers agree that some form of adaptive management is a necessity in many systems.\textsuperscript{42} Nonetheless, questions remain about both its feasibility and its potential political pitfalls. On the feasibility side, it is not clear that the law always does, or even should, offer enough flexibility to make adaptive management possible.\textsuperscript{43} On the political side, claims of adaptive management have been criticized as a false front, allowing agencies to authorize environmental harm when it is uncertain whether the extent of harm will exceed applicable legal limits.\textsuperscript{44}

Neither of those challenges are my concern here. Instead, I start at the logical beginning. The first question to be asked is what advantages, if any, adaptive management offers in any particular natural resource management context. As explained in the next section, adaptive management should be considered only if, at a minimum, three conditions are met: there must be information gaps; learning must be feasible; and there must be opportunities for adjustment. Any decision to employ adaptive management should be supported by an explicit analysis of all three questions. Although that analysis need not be precise or quantitative, it should be sufficiently

\textsuperscript{41} In addition to the sources cited supra note 6, a few examples include 32 C.F.R. § 651.4(f)(3) (2010) (requiring that the Army's director of environmental programs “[m]onitor proposed Army policy and program documents that have environmental implications to determine compliance with National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requirements and ensure integration of environmental considerations into decision-making and adaptive management processes”); 33 C.F.R. § 332.4(c)(12) (2010) (requiring that mitigation plan employ adaptive management to “guide decisions for revising compensatory mitigation plans and implementing measures to address both foreseeable and unforeseen circumstances that adversely affect compensatory mitigation success”); and 36 C.F.R. § 219.3(d)(8) (2010) (including “[m]onitoring and evaluation for adaptive management” among the key elements of USFS planning). As Professors Ruhl and Fischman explain, “With its core idea of ‘learning while doing,’” adaptive management “has become infused into the natural resources policy world to the point of ubiquity, surfacing in everything from mundane agency permits to grand presidential proclamations. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to suggest that these days adaptive management is natural resources policy.” Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 424–25 (citation omitted).

\textsuperscript{42} As J.B. Ruhl has pointed out, for example, “No serious assessment of the [Endangered Species Act] fails to conclude that adaptive management ... is the preferred method of implementation.” J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249, 1284 (2004).

\textsuperscript{43} Ruhl, supra note 10, at 31.

\textsuperscript{44} Doremus, supra note 9, at 52.
detailed to support the conclusion that the learning adaptive management is expected to generate will justify its costs. Requiring such an analysis at the outset would reduce the ability of policymakers or managers to use adaptive management as a tool for delaying or avoiding difficult decisions, counter temptations to convert management into a research exercise in which learning is pursued for its own sake or uncertainty becomes an endless excuse for inaction, and improve the effectiveness of adaptive management when its use is appropriate.

A. Prerequisites for Successful Adaptive Management

Adaptive management is premised on the assumption that learning is both plausible and valuable. It makes logical sense only if three conditions are satisfied. First, there must be an information gap that is important to management choices. Second, it must seem possible to fill that gap on a management-relevant time scale. Third, it must seem possible to adjust the initial decision over time in response to new information.

1. Information Gaps

Adaptive resource management necessarily begins with an information problem. The very premise of adaptive management is that it will promote learning. It is only useful if learning is needed, that is, if information gaps limit resource managers' ability to evaluate, at the initial time point, the likelihood that their choices will achieve management goals. Absent such uncertainties, managers

45. See Fred A. Johnson et al., Conditions and Limitations on Learning in the Adaptive Management of Mallard Harvests, 30 WILDLIFE SOC'Y BULL. 176, 182 (2002) ("[M]anagers must be careful not to turn large-scale management into a research endeavor.").

46. See, e.g., Gregory et al., supra note 3, at 2412 ("The generally stated goal of [adaptive management] is to improve managers' knowledge . . . . ").

47. I am concerned here only with technical uncertainties, primarily natural science uncertainties about the functioning of a species or ecological system and social science uncertainties about changes in human pressures on systems. For purposes of this Article, I put aside issues of "normative uncertainty," lack of knowledge about the values people place on managed resources, and the potential for changes in those values. See Maris & Béchet, supra note 40, at 966. I recognize the importance of that type of uncertainty and unpredictability, particularly in the context of the massive reshuffling of the earth's systems that greenhouse gas accumulation is causing. Certainly we need measures for exploring societal conservation values and for adjusting management efforts in response to durable value changes. But that is a set of issues for another article. Here I follow the lead of early scientific advocates of adaptive management, who assumed that management goals are exogenously fixed. See, e.g., Byron K. Williams et al., Uncertainty and the Adaptive Management of Waterfowl Harvests, 60 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 223, 224 (1996)
could confidently act on the basis of front-end knowledge. They would not need adaptive management to facilitate later adjustment.

Because there is so much we don’t know about the systems we try to manage, uncertainty is nearly always great enough to justify invoking adaptive management. Natural systems are not static; they change over time in ways that are difficult to predict. 48 Climate change exacerbates the prediction challenge, increasing the probability that managed systems will change rapidly, in unexpected ways, and outside known historical boundaries. 49 But the move toward adaptive management predates widespread concern about climate change because there is more to the information challenge than instability. The complex connections among biotic and abiotic elements of ecosystems are often poorly understood, as are responses to management actions. 50 Even far less esoteric knowledge, such as population sizes and trends, habitat requirements, and basic life history information is frequently lacking. Finally, the control of managed systems is always less than perfect. Rules do not


50. On the complexity of environmental systems and the difficulties that complexity poses, see Bryant, supra note 7, at 175–76 (explaining that at least nine theories have been offered to explain the decline of the Stellar sea lion); Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 148–55 (2003); Stephanie Tai, When Natural Science Meets the Dismal Science, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949, 958–59 (2010). Lack of knowledge about underlying biological mechanisms, and the corresponding lack of ability to predict responses to management, has been called “structural uncertainty.” Williams et al., supra note 47, at 225. Structural uncertainty may be rampant even in systems with a long history of management. See id. As an example, although migratory waterfowl harvest has long been regulated, the relationship between harvest levels and population changes has been obscured by uncertainty about whether harvest adds another source of mortality or simply replaces other causes of death. Id. at 225–26.
automatically generate absolute compliance, tracking of resource use may be poor, and it may not be possible to keep the system within desired management parameters. Under the circumstances, the only real surprise for managers would be if they weren’t surprised by the way the system reacts to their efforts and outside events over the course of time.

Although this requirement will rarely turn us away from adaptive management, directly confronting it is an important prerequisite to undertaking effective adaptive management. For one thing, it emphasizes the need for clear goals set exogenously to the adaptive management process. Without identified management goals, it is impossible to understand what relevant information is missing. Looking for information gaps, therefore, necessarily forces managers to identify their goals and to seek clarification if those goals are inadequately defined.

Surprisingly, a substantial portion of the adaptive management literature rejects the idea that goals are exogenous to the adaptive management process. Although there are those who contend that clear goals are a necessary starting point for adaptive management, others, including some leading adaptive management theorists, argue that management goals themselves should be evaluated and reconsidered as part of the adaptive management cycle. That view is mistaken; it seeks to sweep too much into a process with important limitations. Management goals for public and quasi-public natural resources are, and should be, politically determined. What resources society should protect, and what tradeoffs it should make between conservation and other values are not scientific questions. The

51. Williams et al., supra note 47, at 225.
52. In California, for example, where limited water resources are the subject of constant conflict, many diversions are still not directly monitored. Elliot Rector, From Paper to the Real World: Stopping Illegal Water Diversions in California, ENVT. DEF. FUND (Aug. 4, 2010), http://blogs.edf.org/waterfront/2010/08/04/from-paper-to-the-real-world-stopping-illegal-water-diversions-in-california/. Although diverters are required to file statements of diversion, enforcement has been weak. Id. Last year a bill that would have strengthened enforcement and monitoring measures stalled because of opposition from water users. S.B. 565, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_05510600/sb_565_bill_20100816_amended_asmv92.pdf; Dan Bacher, Delta Advocates Oppose Fran Pavley’s SB 565, INDYBAY (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2010/08/25/18656797.php; Rector, supra.
53. See, e.g., Lyons et al., supra note 4, at 1684 (“A clear statement of objectives is essential.”).
answers are a function of social values rather than of technical understanding. Surely those values shift over time, and goals must periodically be reexamined and adjusted. But adaptive management as it is conventionally practiced does not provide the right forum for making such adjustments.

Adaptive management structures typically require periodic meetings of a select group to review data and technical documents. Those meetings are effectively inaccessible to most members of the public. Only those with enough of a stake in the outcome to devote large amounts of time to it will even bother, and only technical experts or those who can afford to hire experts will be comfortable with the discussion. Furthermore, management quickly becomes unwieldy as the size of the group increases; as a practical matter, adaptive management is incompatible with a large-scale, generalized, open-invitation political process. It is not, therefore, the right place to make decisions which should take account of all views.

A second benefit of explicitly identifying information gaps is that it would focus the attention of managers on areas where learning would be most helpful and encourage them to identify uncertainties that may be hidden within their assumptions. Forcing people to explain and justify their understanding of a system sometimes leads to the discovery that they do not understand parts of it as well as they thought. Simply going through the exercise of drafting a model of the system and thinking through the various factors that might affect the ability to achieve management goals can help raise awareness of possibilities that might otherwise not be considered until much later.

Finally, an explicit information gap analysis is the first step in identifying why information is missing and how it might be obtained. As discussed in more detail below, there are many potential sources of uncertainty, and distinguishing between them is crucial to understanding how likely it is that learning will occur, at what cost, and by what pathways.

2. Good Prospects for Learning

The second requirement for successful adaptive management is the ability to learn. Adaptive management will not improve


management outcomes unless important information gaps are narrowed over time. But therein lies a conundrum. If we know so little at the outset that we feel the need for adaptive management, why should we believe that we can learn rapidly enough to be able to correct management mistakes? The answer turns on the sources of initial uncertainty and the relevant management timeframe.

If the source of key information gaps is simply that it is difficult to predict exogenous future changes to a managed system, then opportunities for learning should be plentiful and relatively inexpensive. As the future unfolds, some things will become apparent. For example, there is currently considerable uncertainty about how global warming will affect precipitation in California. That makes it difficult for those who manage the state's water system to plan for the future, and in turn for those responsible for the conservation of aquatic ecosystems to evaluate the effects of water management on their charges. There is nothing conceptually difficult, however, about learning over time how precipitation patterns are changing. It requires only regular observation coupled with regular updating of the climate models. That sort of learning does not seem to require any special efforts, and we can have high confidence that it will occur.

That does not automatically mean that adaptive management will always be useful where uncertainty is primarily a matter of seeing how the future develops. That depends not only on the ability to fill information gaps but on the speed with which learning will occur. Although we can be confident that we will learn over time about altered precipitation regimes, we cannot be as confident that we will learn quickly. Because California's annual rainfall is already highly variable, and it is expected to become more so, it may take many years before the new regime is well enough understood to support confident management decisions. Furthermore, because change will continue for decades or centuries, the process of updating our understanding will have to continue as well.

57. For the Sacramento region, for example, six global climate models project that precipitation may decrease by nearly twenty percent or increase slightly by the end of this century. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., USING FUTURE CLIMATE PROJECTIONS TO SUPPORT WATER RESOURCES DECISION MAKING IN CALIFORNIA 8 (2009), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CEC-500-2009-052/CEC-500-2009-052-F.PDF.


59. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP 1 TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
Another common source of uncertainty is lack of knowledge about how potential management actions will change the system. Like uncertainty about the future, this type of uncertainty will sometimes be conceptually easy to address. Trial and observation may be all we need to reduce it. But observation is sometimes difficult, and again this sort of learning may take a long time by management standards. The Chesapeake Bay, for example, is impacted by nutrient pollution from many sources, including runoff from agricultural lands. Although it is widely agreed that dealing with the Bay’s pollution problem will require some changes to management of those lands, the learning curve will not be rapid. Scientists working on water quality in the region believe it will take at least nine years to recognize how changes in agricultural practices affect water quality in the Bay. Nutrient pollution from farming practices also affects the Gulf of Mexico; runoff conveyed via the Mississippi River system is believed to be largely responsible for the low-oxygen “dead zone” which develops in the Gulf every summer. Given the larger size of the watershed and greater distance from the estuary, connecting changes in agricultural practices to water quality in the Gulf with any degree of confidence could take decades.

Other uncertainties carry a time lag for institutional rather than scientific reasons. In the Gulf of Mexico, for example, nutrient loading does not come entirely from nonpoint sources. The precise contribution of point sources such as wastewater treatment plants is not known, however, because few sources directly monitor their effluent for nutrients. In theory, monitoring could be instituted immediately and would immediately provide useful information. There is even a ready-made institutional hook for imposing nutrient monitoring requirements: point sources must have discharge

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CLIMATE CHANGE 1–18 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007); Susan Solomon et al., Persistence of Climate Changes Due to a Range of Greenhouse Gases, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18,354, 18,354–55 (2010).


62. Id.
63. Id. at 18, 21.
64. Id. at 21.
65. Id. at 15.
permits, and those permits must require monitoring and reporting of discharges. Regulators can require point sources which discharge nutrients into impaired waterways to monitor and report the nutrient content of their effluent. But that can’t be done overnight. Regulators must wait until permits are renewed to impose new conditions. That should not introduce a lengthy lag; under the federal Clean Water Act, discharge permits have a nominal five-year life span. In practice, however, many permits are allowed to run much longer than five years. Regulatory agencies simply do not have the resources to review and revise each of the hundreds of thousands of discharge permits nationwide every five years.

Learning about changes wrought by management actions is also conceptually straightforward, but the practical challenges quickly become steep. At the outset, we may have little confidence in our predictions about, for example, how restoring a seasonal floodplain will affect the population of an endangered fish that used to spawn on the site. Monitoring population size and breeding success following restoration efforts should help us figure out how the fish have responded. The data are not likely to be as clearcut or easy to acquire as temperature and precipitation data, however. Many species are

69. Permits are administratively continued if the permittee timely files for renewal. Permits which are continued pending renewal are described as “backlogged.” *NPDES Permit Program Basics*, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/home.cfm?program_id=45 (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). The Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) most recent backlog report shows that between ten and twenty percent of permits (depending on the region) are backlogged. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PERMIT STATUS REPORT FOR NON-TRIBAL MAJOR INDIVIDUAL, MINOR INDIVIDUAL, AND NON-STORMWATER GENERAL PERMIT COVERED FACILITIES—DECEMBER 2009 (1), at 1–2, available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/grade.all.pdf.
70. As of 2001, EPA reported that more than 400,000 facilities nationwide were required to have National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permits, and that number was growing. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING THE NATION’S WATERS THROUGH EFFECTIVE NPDES PERMITS: A STRATEGIC PLAN, FY 2001 AND BEYOND 1 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/strategicplan.pdf. There are over 33,000 point source permits in the Mississippi watershed alone. NUTRIENT CONTROL ACTIONS, supra note 61, at 15.
71. The efficacy of flood plain restoration for Delta smelt is one of many questions dogging efforts to improve the ecological health of California’s Bay-Delta. A recent National Research Council report concluded that the relationship is still poorly understood and there is scant scientific justification for a regulatory requirement to create or restore habitat. COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE WATER & ENVTL. MGMT. IN THE CAL. BAY-DELTA, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES FOR REDUCING WATER MANAGEMENT EFFECTS ON THREATENED AND ENDANGERED FISHES IN CALIFORNIA’S BAY-DELTA 54-55 (2010).
difficult to census accurately, even with considerable effort. Furthermore, trends may be difficult to interpret. Natural variability in population size, breeding success, habitat usage, and other factors may be so high that it masks changes, positive or negative, caused by management actions.

Confounding environmental variables add yet another layer of complexity. Pacific salmon offer a familiar example. Seeking to reverse the salmon's decline, resource managers have ordered reductions in irrigation deliveries and changes in the operation of hydropower dams. But shifts in ocean conditions can mask the effect of those steps, so that managers may not be able to tell whether their efforts are helping or not. Another example comes from the Colorado River system, where experimental releases from Glen Canyon Dam were instituted in the 1990s in the hope of promoting...
recovery of downstream aquatic ecosystems. Populations of the native humpback chub rebounded somewhat after the experimental releases, but given the wealth of other factors, managers could not say with confidence that the rebound was directly linked to the releases, or determine exactly what their influence was.

Controlled experiments potentially offer one way out of this type of indeterminacy. Indeed, the purpose of controlled experimentation is to sort among possible causes of an effect, distinguishing the most important factors from others or identifying the roles of multiple factors. The potential informational power of experiments explains the emphasis of early adaptive management theorists on management experiments. But the ability to experiment may be, or at least appears to be, limited in managed systems. The potential for and limits of experimentation are considered in more detail in the next Part.

Two other sets of information gaps are more difficult to recognize and very challenging to fill. First, there is often a dearth of background information about managed systems. For many species and ecosystems it is literally true, as Joni Mitchell sang, that "you don’t know what you've got till it’s gone." Research science is skewed toward subjects that are charismatic, economically valuable, or easy to study. Often we don’t realize how much we don’t know about a system and its components until it hits a crisis point. At that point, it is too late to go back and generate historic data. The lack of such baseline information can pose a serious problem for adaptive management because some types of learning cannot be rushed. Years of data are required to understand the extent of natural variability in

77. Susskind et al., supra note 55, at 28–29.
80. See, e.g., Berta Martín-López et al., What Drives Policy Decision-Making Related to Species Conservation?, 142 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1370, 1379 (2009) ("Research goals, therefore, tend to focus on those species that have direct economic impacts or are considered 'cute' or 'charismatic' by society . . . ."); John R.U. Wilson et al., The (Bio)Diversity of Science Reflects the Interests of Society, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV'T 409, 411 (2007) (finding that invasive vertebrates are more studied than invertebrates or plants).
81. In many cases, for example, little is known about an endangered species before it is proposed for protected status. Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 297–98 (2005); Dale D. Goble, The Endangered Species Act: What We Talk About When We Talk About Recovery, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 16 (2009).
some populations and habitat conditions, for example, and that understanding in turn may be crucial to interpreting population fluctuations.

Finally, there are what Donald Rumsfeld famously called the "unknown unknowns," the things we don't even realize that we don't know. They include facts or behaviors we could have discovered but hadn't thought to look for because we were focused on other aspects of the system. For example, protection of the marbled murrelet, a small Pacific coast bird listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act, has focused on restricting timber harvests in the bird's nesting areas. That is necessary, but it turns out that it may not be sufficient to protect the bird. Several years ago, a university research group decided to investigate whether changes in foraging conditions might also be contributing to the species' decline. They found that the amount of krill and small prey species in murrelet diets had increased over the past century relative to sardines and other larger predatory fish. This avian version of "fishing down the food web," they speculated, might be reducing the energy gain per amount of fishing effort, contributing to reduced reproductive success. That discovery has led to increased attention to the potential effects of commercial and recreational fishing on murrelets.

82. Rumsfeld tied himself in verbal knots trying to explain to the press the various kinds of uncertainty. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Defense, U.S. Dep't of Def., Department of Defense News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636 ("[A]s we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones."). Although his syntax was inelegant, the point is a good one; if you don't know what to look for, you are not likely to find it.
83. REGION 1, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE MARBLED MURRELET (WASHINGTON, OREGON, AND CALIFORNIA POPULATIONS) 79-111 (1997) (detailing regulatory protections implemented for the murrelet, almost entirely focused on protecting forest nesting habitat).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Other "unknown unknowns" may include surprises in the form of unanticipated changes in the system, like the encroachment of the barred owl into the range of the threatened spotted owl, a stress which has interacted with others, including logging, to contribute to the owl's decline. The relative contributions of logging and invasive species became a topic of controversy in 2008, when the FWS issued a revised recovery plan for the threatened northern spotted owl which emphasized the contribution of the barred owl
We cannot specifically identify unknown unknowns at the outset of a management program. As discussed in the next Part, however, it is possible to structure management and monitoring efforts, and to coordinate them with outside research, in ways that enhance the likelihood that unknown unknowns will be sought and found.

3. Opportunities for Adjustment

The third prerequisite for adaptive management to be useful is that there must be opportunities to adjust management efforts over time. That means that initial management steps must not become immediately locked in, either formally by law or informally by reason of their practical effect. Adaptive management cannot help when there is no way to correct an initial mistake, as for example when the decision in question is to allow irreversible alteration of the environment. Even in that context, however, a form of adaptive management or progressive “learning while doing” can be helpful when managers face many similar decisions over time, such as evaluating permits to fill wetlands or take endangered species.88

It also means that managers must periodically reconsider and reevaluate their management decisions in light of their improved or revised understanding of the system. New institutional structures and legal mandates may be needed to make reconsideration both mandatory and transparent enough to allow effective public oversight, because management revisions are a notorious point of slippage between the theory and practice of adaptive management.89

88. Doremus, supra note 24, at 557.
89. See, e.g., April Reese, Colorado River Adaptive Management Program Needs Overhaul, Critics Say, LAND LETTER (May 7, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/public/Landletter/2009/05/07/01 (noting that despite thirteen years of evidence gathering,
Finally, it means that there must actually be alternative policy choices. Carl Walters, one of the fathers of the concept of adaptive resource management, once described a rich set of policy alternatives as the critical factor in the success of adaptive management.\footnote{90. CARL WALTERS, SRP REVIEW OF PATH PRELIMINARY DECISION ANALYSIS REPORT ON SNAKE RIVER SPRING/SUMMER CHINOOK 1 (1998), available at http://efw.bpa.gov/Environment/PATH/reports/pdar/index.html. Noting the tendency for scientists charged with developing adaptive management programs to develop multiple hypotheses but gloss over policy alternatives, Walters pointed out that “the few adaptive management success stories have involved the opposite: relatively few response hypotheses, but a very rich set of policy alternatives.” Id.}

**B. Doing the Math**

Even if all of the required elements are in place, adaptive management is not necessarily the right strategy. A rough calculation is needed to determine if its benefits justify its costs. Adaptive management should not be undertaken lightly. It requires more resources than conventional management\footnote{91. Carolyn Brickey et al., *How to Take Climate Change into Account: A Guidance Document for Judges Adjudicating Water Disputes*, 40 *Envtl. L. Rep.* 11,215, 11,227 (2010).} because doing it right requires taking the time to carefully analyze the system at the outset, monitoring the results, and periodically reassessing and revising.\footnote{92. See, e.g., Biber, supra note 6, at 29 (noting costs of monitoring); Walters, supra note 17 (noting that costs of modeling, monitoring, and experimentation often stand in the way of implementing adaptive management).} It imposes unfamiliar demands on management institutions for long-term commitment of human and financial resources.\footnote{93. See Camacho, supra note 49, at 74 (noting the importance of sustained funding for successful adaptive management); Holly Doremus et al., *Making Good Use of Adaptive Management* 13 (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White Paper No. 1104, 2011), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Adaptive_Management_1104.pdf (“[A]daptive management cannot succeed without funding that is both stable and sufficient.”).} In addition to using government resources, adaptive management may impose greater demands on stakeholders, who must monitor decisions and the decisionmaking process not just at one point in time but continually. Because it implies that decisions are always tentative, it may also increase or extend controversy and conflict,\footnote{94. Doremus, supra note 9, at 55; Sandra Zellmer & Lance Gunderson, *Why Resilience May Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades*, 87 *Neb. L. Rev.* 893, 945 (2009).} despite claims to the contrary. Finally, it may require trading the anticipated best
outcome in the short-term for long-term learning and improvement.\textsuperscript{95} Adaptive management should be used only if the tradeoffs appear to offer a net benefit, measured in terms of improved likelihood of meeting management goals.

Unless the three factors discussed above—significant information gaps, opportunities for learning, and opportunities for adjustment—are all present to some degree, adaptive management is a nonstarter. But the analysis is more nuanced than that, particularly with respect to the prospects for learning, which is never a simple yes or no question. What is needed is a kind of broad-brush cost-benefit analysis evaluating the tradeoffs inherent in choosing an adaptive approach. In most cases, that will boil down to estimating the expected value of learning for achieving management objectives, and comparing that added value to the costs and complications it will impose. That is not an easy task, and we should not expect anything like precise quantification. The analysis itself will, of course, consume agency resources. But I am convinced it will be worth it, leading to more self-conscious management even if the choice is not to undertake an adaptive approach. And although it imposes significant costs at the beginning of a management program, it could save resources down the line by making it clearer what needs to be periodically evaluated and how that evaluation should be done.

The analysis I envision begins by setting out the applicable management goals. As discussed above, management goals should be exogenous to the adaptive management process. To the extent that statutory goals are, as is so often the case, vague or conflicting, they should be clarified at the outset. In other words, an agency planning to undertake adaptive management (or considering whether to undertake it) should identify what it views as its management goals as well as metrics believed to indicate achievement of those goals.\textsuperscript{96}

The next step is articulation of a model of the managed system. An explicit model is generally recognized as a core element of adaptive management.\textsuperscript{97} It is also essential to making an informed

\textsuperscript{95} See Lyons et al., supra note 4, at 1691; see, e.g., Gretchen J. A. Hansen & Michael L. Jones, The Value of Information in Fishery Management, 33 FISHERIES 340, 340 (2008); Michael A. McCarthy & Hugh P. Possingham, Active Adaptive Management for Conservation, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 956, 963 (2007).

\textsuperscript{96} The metrics, unlike the goals, are appropriately, even necessarily, subject to reevaluation within the adaptive management process. Technical experts must periodically reevaluate whether the selected metrics accurately represent achievement of the relevant management goals.

\textsuperscript{97} See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 24–25.
decision on whether or not to undertake adaptive management. The model need not be elaborate. Depending upon the management goals and level of knowledge at the start, it can be as simple as a schematic diagram or brief narrative, or as elaborate as a detailed computer model. Its function is both to discipline managers' thinking and to make that thinking accessible to stakeholders. It should highlight key elements of the system for management purposes, their interconnections, their relationship to the management goals, and their expected response to management alternatives. It should explicitly acknowledge uncertainty and competing hypotheses.

Comparing the model to management objectives should highlight what managers hope to learn through adaptive management. In particular, it should make apparent the "known unknowns," areas of uncertainty or competing hypotheses that are important to achieving the desired management outcomes. The regulation of duck hunting in the United States, a longstanding and relatively successful example of adaptive management, provides a good example. The management goal is sustainable harvest; therefore, the key management question is how hunting mortality will affect population abundance and productivity. The key uncertainties are whether most of the birds killed by hunters would have died from other causes anyway or whether instead their deaths must be added on to natural mortality, and the extent to which reproduction declines with increasing population density.

Using mathematical models groundtruthed by comparison to monitoring data, researchers showed in 1996 that harvest levels could be deliberately varied to distinguish between the two possibilities, accelerating learning. There are often tradeoffs between learning and resource protection, however; in the waterfowl example, the authors noted that "the most informative harvest strategy is also the most extreme." Those tradeoffs must be evaluated in context; the more irreplaceable the managed resources, the more conservative we may want to be in pursuing learning. On the other hand, the greater

98. The FWS, which regulates hunting of migratory waterfowl, has used a strategy it calls adaptive harvest management since 1995. See Johnson et al., supra note 45, at 176. That strategy has produced significant learning in the form of updated probabilities assigned to the four competing models employed. Id. at 180.

99. Id.

100. The competing mortality models are generally referred to as additive or compensatory mortality, respectively. See, e.g., id. at 177.

101. Id. at 177–78.

102. Williams et al., supra note 47, at 228–29, 231.

103. Id. at 230.
the economic consequences of the decision, that is, the greater the economic value of resource exploitation, the more important learning may become.

Economic analysis,104 structured decisionmaking,105 and other tools106 have been proposed for evaluating the tradeoffs. Notably, in some cases, running the analysis reveals that learning overall is less valuable than managers had expected,107 or that "active" adaptive management, involving deliberate management experiments, adds little to simple observation of the results of more conventional management choices.108 For our purposes, the precise tool employed is not crucial. What is important is that the analysis be done explicitly and transparently, that it consider the available avenues for investigation, observation, and hypothesis testing, and that managers explain and justify their choice of analytic tools. Undertaking this analysis will also require managers to reveal the extent to which they believe their mandated goals require or permit discounting of future benefits. The value of learning in relation to its costs will depend critically on the extent to which long-term conservation is valued over the short-term economic consequences of experimentation or intervention.109

In cases of very high value resources, very high uncertainty, or very sharp political conflict over management choices, it may be useful to invoke peer review of the model and the prospects for learning.110 This is the sort of setting in which peer review can be most helpful, sharpening the agency's attention to gaps in its knowledge, unrecognized assumptions, and new or emerging methodologies.111

104. See, e.g., Fenichel & Hansen, supra note 12, at 209.
105. Martin et al., supra note 12, at 1079.
106. Rout et al., supra note 12, at 515.
107. RAY HILBORN & CARL G. WALTERS, QUANTITATIVE FISHERIES STOCK ASSESSMENT: CHOICE, DYNAMICS AND UNCERTAINTY 494 (1992) ("Often this step in the analysis reveals that there is a 'robust' policy that should do very well, no matter which model is correct, so that only minor gains would be expected from having better information.").
108. Johnson et al., supra note 45, at 182.
110. Because it carries its own significant costs, peer review should not be applied to all management decisions. See J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing the Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered Species Act, 83 NEB. L. REV. 398, 422-25 (2004) (noting that peer review mandates might do more to smother than to improve agency decisions).
111. For contrasting views on the role of peer review, see Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB.
Peer review at this stage is less likely to become a political football or to be perceived as a threat to agency autonomy or authority than review of individual regulatory decisions. Peer review of this sort is likely to be most effective if it is conducted by outsiders with strong inside support and a medium- to long-term commitment. Outsiders should have independence from the agency’s mission, culture, and process, so that they are able to take a fresh look and to demand a clear explanation. Inside support, from the head of the agency or equivalent, can ensure that agency personnel take the peer review process and resulting critiques seriously, but can also provide a check on unrealistic reviewer assumptions. A long- or at least medium-term commitment means that the review process, like the management process, is ongoing. Managers who must report every year to the same review committee are more likely to seriously address that committee’s concerns than those who receive a one-time report but will never be faced with tough follow-up questions.

In sum, resource managers and policymakers should not blindly assume that adaptive management is the best strategy. Before committing to it, they should undertake an explicit, structured analysis of its benefits and costs. That analysis should clearly set out management goals, articulate an initial model of the system, identify important data gaps, and evaluate the prospects of filling those gaps. Such a structured analysis is essential for making a reasoned decision to use or eschew adaptive management, but it will be useful beyond that gateway decision. It will provide a starting point for choosing initial management actions and drawing up a monitoring strategy. It should also set the stage for periodic reevaluation by clearly setting out the assumptions to be tested and reconsidered.

One shortcoming of this sort of analysis, however, is that it invites a static approach, taking as given the perceived limits on learning, such as restrictions on experimentation. It ought to highlight those constraints, but it is not likely to question them. Nor is it likely to address overarching features of a learning-friendly environment. In other words, by its very nature this sort of individual, project-specific approach is likely to treat the learning equation as fixed.

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112. See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 111, at 33.

113. Although detailed monitoring is often assumed to be a necessary component of adaptive management, it is not always the best use of limited resources. Alana L. Moore & Michael A. McCarthy, On Valuing Information in Adaptive-Management Models, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 984, 991 (2010).
The costs of learning, however, are not necessarily fixed. They can be altered by a variety of policy measures independent of any individual management effort. So while this sort of specific analysis is needed to make informed choices about specific uses of adaptive management, it is not the end of the story. At a broader level, we need to look at and address how learning occurs in natural resource management agencies and why it does not, with the aim of reducing the costs of learning and the time it takes.

II. REWRITING THE LEARNING EQUATION

The structured analysis recommended above may conclude, for a particular resource problem, that learning would improve management but also that learning will be costly and challenging. That result, when it occurs, presents a dilemma: will it be worth investing in adaptive management or not? Managers could try to duck that question by adopting a less information-intensive strategy, such as technology-based or best-management-practices mandates, or a precautionary approach. For reasons I have previously articulated, I believe reducing information demands will often not be practical or politically palatable. It therefore becomes important not only to evaluate the relative costs and benefits of information, but to shift that equation where feasible by increasing the availability of useful information.

Whether, to what extent, and how the costs of learning can be reduced of course varies with the specific context. But there are some general policy steps that can improve the prospects for learning by natural resource managers. They fall in two categories: improving information production and improving information diffusion.

A. Facilitating Information Production

Often, management-relevant learning requires the generation of new information. In some cases, that may mean that new tools for inquiry or methods for interpreting existing data need to be developed. Those are matters for the natural scientists to tackle. But in other cases, there are policy barriers, or at least apparent policy barriers, to inquiry or learning. Those are for the policy wonks to deal with. Policy barriers may be context-specific, but some, such as impediments to experimentation and funding challenges, are general and can be addressed by general policy steps.

114. See Doremus, supra note 14, at 410–11.
1. Experiments and Experiment Substitutes

There are often serious barriers to conducting experiments in managed natural systems. Some of the limits are technical; for example there may be so many confounding, uncontrollable factors that experiments would not generate useful information. Others are practical; for example, the value of infrastructure like large dams to human populations, coupled with the expense and time needed to rebuild them, precludes taking one out even if we thought we could thereby gain useful information about threats to imperiled salmon populations. Still others are policy-mediated; for example, laws like the Endangered Species Act impose substantive limits on the risks to which some managed resources can be subjected, and environmental analysis and planning laws may require that the impacts of management be articulated in advance and in detail.

All of these barriers to effective experimentation, even those which do not originate from the legal or institutional regime, can be addressed to some extent by policy and institutional changes. Requiring the explicit analysis of the prospects for and costs of learning advocated above would improve information production. Where learning is necessary and likely, but experiments seem too risky or impractical, managers can look for substitutes for direct, controlled experimentation. Model runs can sometimes stand in for active manipulation, although it may be difficult to gain enough confidence in the model without the ability to perform on-the-ground experiments, and modeling can itself become an excuse for an infinite search for perfect understanding prior to taking action.

Models can serve another function, though, helping managers evaluate and limit the potential negative impacts of experiments. Simulating an experiment before actually attempting it, using a range of inputs reflecting the competing hypotheses, should signal the extent to which the experiment poses risks of disastrous impacts. Managers can then plan for those risks, developing monitoring plans to detect adverse effects and planning to end the experiment if the effects exceed predetermined acceptable levels. Medical trials offer a useful analogy. The medical community understands the value of such trials, but is also sensitive to the twin risks that the experimental treatment may prove harmful or that it may prove so much more

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115. On the ESA and experimentation, see Doremus, supra note 9, at 79–80.
116. On the NEPA as a barrier to experimentation, see Doremus, supra note 14, at 454–55.
117. Walters, supra note 17.
effective that the placebo or control treatment appears harmful by comparison. Ethical considerations require that the perils such trials pose be justified at the outset by the learning they promise, that outcomes be monitored on an ongoing basis, and that they be halted if new information shows that the risk-benefit balance is outside the acceptable range.

Of course those decisions are not easy, and they depend on the relative value decision makers assign to learning and protecting resources. But articulating and justifying sideboards in advance would allow stakeholders to have their say about the value of learning and acceptability of risk. It also could solve a potential legal problem. Under the Endangered Species Act, federal actors must insure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species. The Act allows federal authorities to issue permits for actions undertaken "for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected species," provided the jeopardy threshold is not crossed. Scientists sometimes complain that research permit requirements stand in the way of needed studies. Those complaints should be taken seriously, but they need not be blindly accepted given the very high importance research scientists tend automatically to assign to learning. They should instead be examined in light of societal judgments about the risks and value of learning. Sideboards that limit risk could help reduce permit paralysis is an extraordinarily difficult question, as scientists will differ in their assessment of both how much we have learned and how much we need to learn. There is no clear ethical guidance on the matter; a utilitarian perspective will put more weight on the fate of future patients, whereas ethical theories that place more value on obligations and individual dignity will favor the interests of patients in the trial.

Id.; see also Mueller et al., supra note 118, at 878–79 (warning against trial-stopping rules that allow a trial to be terminated too easily based on the perceived benefits of the treatment because investigators may be biased in favor of overestimating benefits and underestimating adverse effects).

118. See Paul S. Mueller et al., Ethical Issues in Stopping Randomized Trials Early Because of Apparent Benefit, 146 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 878, 878 (2007).


120. Clinical trials pose exactly the same dilemma. Whether and when to stop them is an extraordinarily difficult question, as scientists will differ in their assessment of both how much we have learned and how much we need to learn. There is no clear ethical guidance on the matter; a utilitarian perspective will put more weight on the fate of future patients, whereas ethical theories that place more value on obligations and individual dignity will favor the interests of patients in the trial.


122. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(A).

(to the extent it exists) by making it easier to demonstrate at the outset that the jeopardy standard is satisfied, and reassuring managers, wildlife agencies, and environmental interests that experiments will remain within acceptable bounds.\textsuperscript{124}

Another potential strategy is to conduct experiments in limited portions of a system. For large systems, that may be practical even if the experiments pose a risk of local harm to the managed resource or the economy. A National Research Council ("NRC") committee recently proposed such a strategy to test the effectiveness of nutrient pollution control actions for reducing the Gulf of Mexico's hypoxic "dead zone" and the social and economic effects of those actions.\textsuperscript{125} The committee suggested a set of pilot projects which could generate information needed to guide larger-scale control efforts.\textsuperscript{126} Pilot projects are always vulnerable to the criticism that they are simply delaying tactics; if they seem promising, advocates might ask why not launch them at a large scale immediately. That question reinforces the importance of the analysis recommended in the first Part of this Article. A clear explanation of the extent to which pilot projects will provide needed information, and the potential costs if they were undertaken more broadly but turned out not to be as effective as hoped, could help reassure a variety of publics about the need for and value of experiments.

Small-scale experiments also can provide useful information about management actions taken in several locations. Salvage logging, the controversial practice of rapidly harvesting timber after a fire, is a good example. Timber-dependent communities object to the time necessary for detailed environmental study because lumber value rapidly deteriorates once trees have been killed.\textsuperscript{127} Environmental interests, by contrast, see salvage logging as an excuse to harvest trees that may not in fact be dead, and believe it harms wildlife and slows forest regeneration.\textsuperscript{128} Fierce disagreement about the desirability of salvage logging has produced a flood of litigation. "The courts have been barraged with lawsuits by environmental groups over allegedly ill-conceived post-fire salvage logging

\textsuperscript{124} See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{125} NUTRIENT CONTROL ACTIONS, supra note 61, at 28.
\textsuperscript{126} Id.
\textsuperscript{128} Reed F. Noss et al., Managing Fire-Prone Forests in the Western United States, 4 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV'T 481, 485 (2006); Durbin, supra note 127.
projects."\textsuperscript{129} In 2005, a Ninth Circuit panel chastised the U.S. Forest Service ("USFS" or "Service") for ignoring opportunities to study and learn from salvage logging operations,\textsuperscript{130} but later the full court decided that it owed the Service more deference.\textsuperscript{131}

Alternatively, it might be possible to carry out experiments in analogous systems where environmental or economic risks are lower. Networks of lands designated for experimental purposes could provide useful study sites. The USFS already has a system of eighty experimental forests and ranges scattered across the country.\textsuperscript{132} Originally established in 1908, the system has grown in a fairly ad hoc manner, but it contains representatives of the majority of U.S. forest cover types and a broad range of environmental conditions.\textsuperscript{133} The experimental forest system hosts a number of long-term studies with both management and basic science implications.\textsuperscript{134} It could be put to better use to serve current management priorities, however, through better networking, more centralized management and oversight, and addition of new sites which provide good models for key management issues. Moreover, the system could be expanded to include federal lands beyond the national forests.

Finally, natural resource agencies should be prepared in advance to take advantage of learning opportunities offered by unplanned "experiments" like the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, and by management actions which are likely to have later analogues, such as dam removals.\textsuperscript{135} Some federal researchers should always be "on call" for reassignment to unexpected or rapid developments, and federal research units should plan studies of potentially precedent-setting events. A discretionary pot of rapidly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{130} Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled by Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
\item \textsuperscript{131} Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 992–94 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
\item \textsuperscript{133} Ariel E. Lugo et al., \textit{Long-Term Research at the USDA Forest Service’s Experimental Forests and Ranges}, 56 BIOSCIENCE 39, 43 (2006); Experimental Forests and Ranges, supra note 132.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Lugo et al., supra note 133, at 44–45.
\end{itemize}
mobilizable grant funds should also be maintained for such contingencies.

2. Budgeting for Learning

The salvage logging and hypoxia examples mentioned above lead to another topic—budget structuring—which may unintentionally limit the ability to experiment. In federal natural resource agencies, research and management work is generally the province of distinct divisions; although budgeting practices vary, research and management budgets are sometimes also separated.\textsuperscript{136} If researchers and managers jointly agree to conduct management experiments, there may be difficult issues about who should bear the costs. Research budgets may be too small to support large-scale management experiments, but managers may resist experiments if they have to pay the costs.\textsuperscript{137}

A better architecture for learning could include research funding dedicated to projects jointly conceived and executed by research and management personnel. Management incentives could more strongly encourage research. Evaluation of managers for career advancement could consider the extent to which they have made progress in addressing key knowledge gaps. Researchers, at least those who control funding decisions, could be provided similar incentives by explicitly evaluating them on the extent to which they have helped resolve management uncertainties.

The federal research budget in a global sense also needs to better support indirect learning through studies related to managed systems but not tied directly to short-term management issues. A portion of federal research funding should be more closely coordinated with management priorities, but with a long-term focus. Such studies may


\textsuperscript{137} Such budget issues reportedly doomed a proposed USFS large-scale salvage logging study. Interview with Ann Bartuska, Deputy Under Sec'y for Research, Educ., & Econ., U.S. Dep't of Agric., in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8, 2010).
be the best way to attack the "unknown unknowns." This sort of work can probably best be done in the academic world, where freewheeling inquiry is rewarded and failure is more likely to be tolerated. Admittedly, it will be tricky to distribute this sort of funding effectively because the incentives are not well calibrated either for those who might distribute the funds or for those who seek funding. Managers typically want to emphasize short-term results, while research scientists are very good at claiming that their pet project fits whatever real-world priorities funders articulate. Perhaps the best way to distribute such funds would be through an advisory body with long-term ties both to management agencies and to academic researchers.

A potential model is EPA's Science to Achieve Results ("STAR") program, which provides funding for "targeted research that complements" research done at federal laboratories. The STAR program funds work EPA views as important to its mission, but does not have the capacity to carry out at its own research facilities. EPA aspires to "focus STAR research on gaps in knowledge related to EPA's mission, its high-priority research needs, and subjects with the greatest uncertainty and potential impact." Toward that end, review of STAR proposals includes a novel step; proposals rated as eligible for funding on the basis of scientific merit are then separately evaluated for relevance to the agency's mission. It is not clear, however, that the STAR program has found the right balance between highly focused, short-term research and longer-term exploration. In a 2003 review, the NRC noted that the program had moved to a greater emphasis on solicitation of focused research as opposed to exploratory work. The NRC also recommended that EPA engage outsiders in identifying research priorities, perhaps beginning with a "state of the science" review of key areas to identify potential for high-impact research. That outside perspective could also be a valuable counterweight to the natural agency tendency to emphasize quick results.

140. Id. at 48-49.
141. Id. at 24.
142. Id. at 6-7.
B. Improving Information Diffusion

The production of information is only the first step in the information pipeline. Much data and information simply sits in reports or journal articles. It is not useful for management efforts unless it reaches the people who must make management decisions and reaches them in a form they can use. Information diffusion is therefore a key step in learning. It is also one where bottlenecks are common. Two major sets of policy efforts could reduce barriers to effective information diffusion: improvements in data architecture and the creation or improvement of intermediaries who can more effectively link information producers with information users.

1. Data Architecture and Information Flow

One of the most frustrating impediments to learning in federal resource management agencies is lack of information sharing. It is widely recognized that data, including basic environmental documents like Environmental Impact Statements ("EIS") and Endangered Species Act biological opinions, are not archived in ways that facilitate sharing within agencies, between agencies, and with the larger research community. Nor are they produced in a common format that would facilitate data exchange and synthesis. Even within a single agency, data may be collected and compiled at many different offices, in ways that make meaningful aggregation impossible. Modernizing environmental information architecture will impose some short-term costs, but could be accomplished in any administration willing to make it a priority.

Two key steps could make information more accessible and useful. First, the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") should establish uniform standards for natural resource information

146. The CEQ, established by NEPA, is the environmental arm of the Executive Office of the President. Council on Envtl. Quality, About, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/about (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). It is, therefore, the office in the best position to centralize administration environmental policy.
formatting, presentation, and archiving, to facilitate aggregation, comparison, and cross-agency use. Second, individual agencies which generate or use classes of environmental analyses should make them available in searchable database form. So, for example, the various regional offices of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and National Marine Fisheries Service should digitize all their Endangered Species Act biological opinions (in a format established by CEQ) and make them available through a centralized access point with search capabilities. EPA, which is statutorily required to review all federal EISs, could host an EIS database. USFS, Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and FWS land management planning documents could form another database. Modern information tools could do much more, of course, such as linking geographically related documents with geographic information system ("GIS") tags. However, the first step, which would be enormously helpful in facilitating the kind of learning needed for effective adaptive management, would be simply to create digital databases.

Such a step is conceptually simple, but of course more difficult in practice. It will impose short-term resource costs, while the payoff will be slower to materialize. It will require commitment and leadership from the White House and sustained funding from Congress. But if we are to make learning-based management strategies effective, it is the sort of infrastructure investment we need to make.

2. Trusted Intermediaries as Information Diffusion Agents

The question of how managers seeking to implement adaptive management or other information-intensive strategies obtain useful information is one that has not received enough attention in the policy literature. Natural resource managers are, I believe, systematically risk-averse in the sense that they do not want the resources under their supervision to be harmed by their management choices and, perhaps even more strongly, they do not want to be blamed for any harm the resources suffer. They are also typically resource-limited, understaffed, and overcommitted. They do not have a lot of time to keep up on the latest literature and ideas or to consider how ideas developed in other contexts might help them in their tasks. Their staff, which is often heavy on bachelors- and

148. See Farber, supra note 144, at 10,610-11.
149. See supra note 25.
masters-level expertise, may not have the background or training to make those judgments effectively or with confidence. Resource management agencies may, therefore, fall behind on awareness of both data and new techniques that could be helpful in achieving their goals.

One way to read the much-criticized opinion of the Seventh Circuit in *Sierra Club v. Marita* is as a cautionary tale about knowledge diffusion. The *Marita* decision dealt with management of lands within the national forest system. Plaintiff environmental groups asserted that the USFS had ignored the theory of island biogeography and its lessons for the size of reserves needed to protect native species. They contended that the Service had ignored well-established scientific principles, submitting more than 100 published articles in support of their position. The Service responded that, although the theory of island biogeography was “of interest,” it had not yet been applied to forest management in the region. In essence, the Service argued that it was not sure how to apply the theory to its work, and was not required to make figuring that out a priority. To the horror of conservation biologists, the court sided

151. *Marita*, 46 F.3d at 608.
152. *Id.* at 617–18.
153. *Id.* at 618.
154. *Id.* at 618–19.
155. *See id.*
156. Both the Society for Conservation Biology and the American Institute of Biological Sciences appeared as amici in support of the Sierra Club. *Id.* at 621. Shortly after the decision was issued, for example, a letter to the editor in the Society for Conservation Biology newsletter called for members to write to the chief of the USFS, urging greater use of conservation biology in forest management decisions. Randy Webb, *Letter to the Editor, SOCY FOR CONSERVATION BIOLOGY NEWSL.* (Feb. 2, 1997), http://www.conbio.org/Publications/Newsletter/Archives/1997-5-May/nl-su018.cfm.
with the USFS, deferring to its determination that application of the theory was uncertain. \(^{157}\)

Of course it may be that the USFS rejected the Sierra Club's suggestions simply because it wanted to get out the cut. But in this and other situations it may also be true that information, and an understanding of the potential implications of new information or methodologies for management, is limiting. It is difficult for resource managers like the USFS to keep up with the latest developments, especially if their application to management problems is indirect or unclear. Courts, which are especially deferential to methodological choices and decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty, \(^{158}\) are not well-suited to police that sort of ignorance. Improved knowledge diffusion would both provide tools for managers who are genuinely committed to their assigned tasks and reduce the availability of uncertainty as an excuse.

Efficient and effective knowledge diffusion often depends on the availability of intermediaries who have the trust of the parties to whom they are bringing knowledge as well as the expertise and resources needed to get that knowledge. One possible model would be an academic corps modeled on the Cooperative Extension Service ("CES"), which was launched in 1914 to help bring the agricultural research being produced in the land-grant colleges to farmers. \(^{159}\) Its statutory purpose is explicitly one of knowledge diffusion: "to aid in diffusing among the people of the United States useful and practical information on subjects relating to agriculture... and to encourage

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\(^{157}\) *Marita*, 46 F.3d at 621. Of course there was more to *Marita* than the question of how specifically the plaintiffs' preferred scientific methodology had been articulated with respect to the lands in question. Doremus, supra note 24, at 577 ("*Marita* is a difficult case to parse, in part because the opinion wanders back and forth between disagreements about goals and disagreements about methods of ensuring that those goals are achieved."). At a minimum, the decision was motivated in part by the idea that the governing statutes required the USFS to consider values other than preservation and the court's belief that, even with respect to preservation, the USFS was entitled to some deference to its understanding of what elements it was mandated to preserve.

\(^{158}\) In *Marita*, the USFS argued that the theory in question "had been developed as a result of research on actual islands or in the predominantly old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest and therefore did not necessarily lend itself to application in the forests of Wisconsin." *Marita*, 46 F.3d at 622. That may have been just an attempt to justify a management decision reached for other reasons, but it is not implausible that something like that reasoning may have been part of the decisionmaking process. In either case, the court agreed, ruling that "however valid a general theory may be, it does not translate into a management tool unless one can apply it to a concrete situation." *Id.* at 623.

\(^{159}\) David W. Cash, "*In Order to Aid in Diffusing Useful and Practical Information*": *Agricultural Extension and Boundary Organizations*, 26 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 431, 433-34 (2001).
the application of the same." \textsuperscript{160} CES, which includes specialist researchers based at the land-grant universities and their experiment stations and county agents with offices in rural areas, seems to successfully mediate both the transfer of knowledge from the universities to farmers and communication in the other direction regarding issues farmers regard as research priorities. \textsuperscript{161} It transfers not only data but methods, such as up-to-date models, to diffuse users. \textsuperscript{162}

Crucial to the transfer function is that extension agents enjoy the trust of farmers and have regular opportunities to interact with them both formally at conferences and informally based on relationships built over the years. The trust of researchers is also important. In the case of CES, much of the applied research is carried out by extension specialists based at universities and agricultural experiment stations. \textsuperscript{163} Those researchers may themselves regularly meet with their agricultural constituents, or they may interact primarily with county agents who then interact with the farmers. \textsuperscript{164} The key point is that there needs to be an intermediary organization which enjoys the trust, respect, and attention of both knowledge producers and knowledge consumers.

In the resource management context, that role seems to be limiting. There certainly are extension agents and researchers who focus on the intersection between agriculture and resource conservation, but their association with agriculture can lead to distrust by environmental interests and resource managers who view their mission as conservation. There also are research arms of federal resource management agencies, such as the USFS’ Research and Development unit, whose mission is “to develop and deliver knowledge and innovative technology to improve the health and use of the Nation’s forests and grasslands—both public and private.” \textsuperscript{165} But something seems not to be going as well as it could in the delivery phase. Curiously, of all its various constituencies, the one least satisfied with the USFS’s research and development operations is the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{161} Cash, \textit{supra} note 159, at 439–40.
\bibitem{162} \textit{Id.} at 439–41.
\bibitem{163} \textit{Id.} at 433–34.
\bibitem{164} \textit{Id.} at 439–40.
\end{thebibliography}
USFS itself. Federal information users have little confidence that products of the research and development operation will provide feasible solutions to their problems or help them anticipate emerging problems. The high rate of litigation focused on the science of USFS management decisions suggests that external stakeholders are also unsatisfied with the way science is making its way into the management process, though they blame managers rather than agency researchers.

To the extent that entities with a resource management knowledge translation mission already exist, perhaps they simply need more funding or a renewed focus on delivering useful information to resource managers in a timely fashion. I believe, however, that some structural and cultural changes would also be useful. There should be more opportunities for research and management personnel within agencies to work together on designing and implementing studies to address management needs. Performance measures for research units should explicitly include the development and provision of management-relevant information, in conjunction with managers. In addition, more emphasis should be put on synthesis and on conveying information not generated by the intermediary organization. Resource managers do not need to learn of every individual study relevant to their work in isolation. Indeed, paying too much attention to individual study relevant to their work in isolation. Indeed, paying too much attention to individual study relevant to their work in isolation.


167. Id. at 18–19.

168. For a review of this litigation in the Ninth Circuit and the difficulties it has caused that court, see generally Sara A. Clark, Taking a Hard Look at Agency Science: Can the Courts Ever Succeed?, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317 (2009).


context can increase confusion, leaving resource managers uncertain whether they should recast their management efforts every time a new study comes out.\textsuperscript{171} What is needed instead is periodic updating of the overall state of the field and interpretation and synthesis of the totality of knowledge by those with knowledge both of the relevant science and of management needs. Unfortunately, that sort of synthetic work generally falls between the cracks. Researchers tend not to be rewarded for it, while managers tend not to have the time or expertise to do it well.

Although some of the needed entities, or similar entities which could be converted to a diffusion function, already exist within the federal government, there is no reason why this role needs to be confined to government entities. It is essential only that intermediaries have the trust of both researchers and managers. In the resource management world, there may be nongovernmental organizations, such as The Nature Conservancy, which are well-positioned to fulfill that role.

CONCLUSION

Adaptive management subsumes many different challenges. It is an incentives problem, an accountability problem, and a flexibility problem. But it is also an information policy problem, and that aspect has been underappreciated. Before deciding to employ, or to continue to employ, an adaptive approach to management, and before determining the parameters of such an approach, managers should undertake an explicit, structured analysis of the need for and practicality of learning.

This is not a new or radical idea; Hilborn and Walters, who are among the leading scientific proponents of adaptive management, called for it nearly twenty years ago in the context of fisheries management:

Once a clear set of alternative hypotheses or stock response models is available, it is worth doing a simple calculation of the expected value of perfect information . . . in order to determine whether further adaptive policy analysis is worthwhile. The essential idea behind this calculation is to find the policy option

\textsuperscript{171} Health care providers and consumers suffer this sort of confusion when they are buffered by unfiltered news of, for example, every major study on the efficacy of mammograms for breast cancer detection and treatment. \textit{See, e.g., Sorting Through Mammogram Confusion, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130569731.}
that would be best if there is no future learning . . . , then to see how much improvement could be obtained from that nonadaptive baseline if it were known for certain which model is correct, that is, if perfect information were suddenly available.172

Yet many policymakers and public resource managers still have not learned this important lesson. As a result, adaptive management, which is a form of structured decisionmaking,173 is frequently required or adopted without any structured analysis of the benefits it is expected to produce or the tradeoffs inherent in realizing those benefits. That in turn leads to the cynical (but not necessarily false) assumption that the purpose of adaptive management is to reduce political pressures or evade oversight, rather than to improve management outcomes. If adaptive management is truly necessary, the ongoing confidence of stakeholders as well as policymakers will be needed to sustain it. If it is not truly necessary, it should not be employed. Either way, a formal, structured analysis at the point of deciding whether and how to use it will be helpful.

In some crucial cases, that analysis will show that learning, although valuable, would be costly or difficult. All is not necessarily lost in those cases. Some barriers to learning are the result of policy choices. The right policy steps might be able to reduce those barriers sufficiently to make important learning practicable. There are systematic steps that can encourage the production of relevant information and facilitate its diffusion to managers in a form they can trust and use. Those steps are not costless in the short run, but they should pay dividends over time.

Sometimes, though, the conclusion will simply be that adaptive management is not the right choice. Perhaps the costs of learning are too high and cannot be lowered through any feasible measures. Perhaps the opportunities to adjust management efforts are too limited. In those cases, the structured analysis recommended here can provide a needed reality check, reminding managers and policymakers not to count on adaptive management to justify action in the face of important uncertainties or to prevent or correct management errors. Faced with the reality that adaptive management is not a panacea, policymakers may have to directly confront difficult questions about the relative costs of different sorts of errors and

172. HILBORN & WALTERS, supra note 107, at 493.
173. Lyons et al., supra note 4, at 1684.
develop forthright approaches to making decisions in light of uncertainty.