ARTICLES

Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers without Workplaces and Employees without Employers

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Professor Stone examines the legal consequences of the changing nature of employment relationships for the growing number of American workers who do not have traditional employment relationships or workplaces: temporary workers, independent contractors, and homeworkers. The Article provides an authoritative overview of the application to these kinds of workers of minimum wage and maximum hour protection, occupational health and safety protection, anti-discrimination, family and medical leave, unemployment insurance, compensation for work-related injuries, collective bargaining rights, and retirement security. Professor Stone demonstrates that these laws and courts' interpretations of them are based on workplaces and employment relationships that, in many cases, no longer exist, thus leaving workers without basic workplace protections. Finally, Professor Stone lays out an agenda for reform to provide all workers, particularly those workers without workplaces and employees without employers, with the protections they need to withstand the challenges of modern work.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the past two decades, many U.S. corporations have restructured their internal organizations in a movement away from centralized decision-making toward decentralized structures and production networks. Vertical disintegration and production decentralization have enabled firms in both the manufacturing and service sectors to make their operations leaner, more flexible, less top-heavy, and better adapted to global competition. Many large firms in the United States have achieved a more decentralized structure by dispersing their production facilities. For example, firms in the electronics and apparel industries have subcontracted major parts of their operations to smaller supplier firms, often abroad. Large automotive manufacturers, such as General Motors and Ford Motor Company, have created spin-offs such as Delphi and Visitron that are semi-autonomous parts firms informally controlled by their creators, to perform core auto-making functions. Other firms increasingly have turned to contract manufacturing, using contracting partners who have their own facilities, rather than an in-house workforce. Yet others have abandoned or downsized their large U.S.-based facilities and relocated entire production operations to overseas locations. Others, such as film production companies, utilize overseas labor and facilities for particular projects while maintaining a skeleton headquarters staff in the United States.¹

The trend toward decentralized production has developed at the same time that an important change has occurred in firms' employment practices. In the past two decades, many firms have departed from a system that offered long-term stable employment and adopted instead a free agency model of employment. One feature of this new employment relationship is that firms use a large number of workers who are explicitly denoted as "temporary."² According to the Department of Labor, in 2005, nearly 4.5


². In the United States most workers are at-will and hence can be fired at any time for any reason. In this respect, all workers are formally "temporary." See Katherine V.W. Stone, Rethinking Labor Law: Employment Protection for Boundaryless Workers, in BOUNDARIES AND BORDERS: DEFINING THE SCOPE OF LABOUR LAW (G. Da vidov & B. Languille eds.) (forthcoming 2006). Yet the term "temporary worker" applies to those workers who are told at the outset that their job assignment is temporary rather than open-ended.
million employees in the United States—a full 3.6% of the work force—were engaged in temporary work.\(^3\) In addition, firms are subcontracting tasks not only to other firms, but also to "independent contractors"—who are often the same individuals who formerly did the same tasks in an employment relationship. Some of those termed independent contractors work on the firms' premises, but many others work at home, akin to nineteenth century home-based piece-workers. As of 2005, there were over ten million independent contractors, comprising 8.4% of the labor force.\(^4\) Furthermore, firms are shifting long-term employees to spin-off firms, which often lack unions and do not have a history and culture of fostering long-term jobs. In addition, firms have been changing the nature of the employment relationship of their regular workforce—those who remain with the core firm—so to extinguish any expectation of a long-term relationship.\(^5\)

The process of production decentralization and the concomitant changing nature of employment relationships raise numerous issues for U.S. labor and employment laws. As I have argued at length elsewhere, these laws were built upon the assumption of long-term employment relationships between employees and firms.\(^6\) The legal rules governing collective bargaining and individual employment rights, as well as the provision of social welfare benefits all assumed the existence of a stable, on-going relationship between an individual and a firm. Now, as firms are breaking apart, downsizing, rearranging their functions, and dispersing their facilities, they no longer offer the kind of stable long-term relationship upon which our legal rules depend. Further, as they repudiate any commitment to career-long relationships, employees often are left to fend for themselves without a safety net to protect them.\(^7\)

The legal consequences of the changing nature of the employment relationship in light of the decentralization of production are numerous and varied. In this article, I examine those consequences for three categories of workers: temporary workers, homeworkers, and independent contractors. I explore the eligibility of each type of atypical work for minimum wage and maximum hour protection, occupational health and safety protection, anti-discrimination, family and medical leave, unemployment insurance, compensation for work-related injuries, collective bargaining rights, and retirement security. I show how the labor and employment laws do not give


\(^4\) Id.

\(^5\) These trends are described in KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004).

\(^6\) Id. at 119-126.

\(^7\) Id. at 67-86.
full protection to atypical workers. I then argue that the changing nature of work is blurring the distinctions between temporary and permanent employees and between workers and independent contractors. Finally, I make a series of proposals that would help give employment protections to all employees in order to address the vulnerabilities of the workforce today.

II. TEMPORARY WORK

A. Introduction and Definitions

Since the 1980s, temporary employment has been the fastest growing portion of the labor market in the United States. According to the Department of Labor, between 1982 and 1998, the number of jobs in the temporary help industry grew 577%, compared to a forty-one percent increase in jobs in the labor force generally. In 2005, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that over two million employees worked for temporary-help agencies or contract labor provider firms and another 2.5 million workers were on call.

There are many types of temporary work utilized by firms in the United States. Some of the most common forms of temporary work are as follows:

1. Agency Work

Agency work occurs when a temporary work agency dispatches temporary workers from one firm to another for what are usually short-term assignments. The work may be overseen by a supervisor at the job site or by a supervisor at the temporary work agency. Firms have expanded their use of temporary help agencies exponentially in recent years. Whereas temporary work at one time involved hiring a clerical worker to fill in during a permanent employee’s sick leave or vacation, today temporary work includes highly skilled workers who perform work that is central to a firm’s mission.

2. Employee Leasing

Employee leasing is when employees work for a leasing firm that supplies a group of workers, typically an entire department, to a client

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9. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 3, Table 8.
company known as the user firm. Leased employees must follow the work rules and regulations stipulated by the user company for which services are being provided. Even though the leased employees report directly to the user firm, they receive their paychecks and benefits from the leasing firm. Leased employees do not typically work at one job site for more than a fixed time period because once a specific job is done, they are assigned to work at another client company.

3. In-House Temps

Some firms have established their own in-house temporary work agencies to provide temporary workers to their numerous divisions on an as-needed basis. For example, some insurance companies maintain in-house temporary departments that can dispatch clerical personnel throughout their operations when there are unexpected vacancies or unusually high work volume. These temporary workers work for the firm that both employs them and utilizes their services but they are designated "temporary" and expected to be available for multiple job assignments.

4. On-Call Workers

On-call workers work only on an as-needed basis. They form a reserve pool and typically are required to be available during certain on-call periods. On-call workers can be either retained by a specific employer to work on an as-needed basis or placed on call by a temporary help agency. On-call workers are required to be available for work without knowing where and when their next place or hours of work will be.10

In this Article, the aforementioned categories of temporary work will be discussed together except when there are significant differences for purposes of legal rights and obligations.

B. Minimum Wage and Maximum Hour Protection

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) establishes a federal minimum wage and sets a statutory maximum number of hours that must be worked before an overtime premium must be paid.11 The minimum wage is currently set at $5.15 an hour and overtime pay is time and a half of the regular hourly rate after forty hours in a week. The FLSA applies to employer-employee relationships so that to be covered, a worker must be an "employee" as defined

10. Some on-call workers are regular employees who are required to spend off-duty time on call and available for unscheduled assignments in case they are needed. See, e.g., Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass'n of W. Pulp & Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 348 (9th Cir. 1992); Rousseau v. Teledyne Movable Offshore, Inc., 805 F.2d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir. 1986).

by the Act. That is, to be covered, a temporary worker has to prove she is an
employee and not an independent contractor.

The Act defines an “employee” as “any individual employed by an
employer.” It defines “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly
in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” It states that
“employ” is meant to include “to suffer or permit to work.” Despite the
linguistic circularity, the Supreme Court has stated that definitions under the
FLSA are to be construed broadly and that employee status is determined by
an “economic reality test” rather than the narrower common law master-
servant test. Specifically, courts look beyond the question, central to the
common law agency test, of who controls the employee’s work, and looks
instead to whether, as a matter of economic reality, the individual is dependent
on the entity.

In applying the “economic reality test,” courts have stated that the
following factors are relevant to determine whether an employment
relationship exists for purposes of the FLSA:

- whether the putative employer has the right to hire, fire and set daily
  working conditions;

- whether the worker is paid by the hour, week, or month, instead of a set
  amount for completing a specific job;

- whether the worker receives benefits;

- the extent to which the work was a part of an integrated process;

- the degree of skill required to perform the work;

- the permanence of the working relationship;

- whether the worker has invested in the business;

- whether the putative employer owned the premises and equipment

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12. Id. § 203(e)(1).
13. Id. § 202(d).
14. Id. § 203(g).
   Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (recognizing the “striking breadth” of definition of
   “employ” under Fair Labor Standards Act). For a discussion of the common law agency test, see infra,
   Part IV.
   economic realities test for determining employee status); accord United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716
   (1947).
where the work was performed;

- whether the services are integral to the business;

- the putative employer’s amount and degree of control over the work process;

- the employee’s liability for loss or profit;

- the employee’s initiative, judgment, or foresight in open market competition; and

- the degree to which the work is an independent operation.  

No one factor is dispositive—the totality of the circumstances is considered and courts must engage in a “particularized inquiry into the facts of each case.”

Given the breadth of the test, many temporary employees are covered under the FLSA while they are on the job. However, on-call employees are not always covered. In an early decision under the Act, the Supreme Court held that waiting time is compensable if it is “primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.” Since then, most lower courts have found that when an on-call worker is free to engage in personal activities, such as watching television, going out to movies, exercising, attending church, or running errands during waiting times, then the time spent on call is not compensable under the FLSA. The fact that a worker has considerable restrictions placed on his geographic mobility and activities while on call will not render the time compensable for purposes of the FLSA. One court held that an employee who was required by his employer to remain on the employer’s premises was not engaged in compensable time because he was “free to sleep, eat, watch television, watch VCR movies, play ping-pong or

17. Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 729-30; Baker v. Flint Engineering & Const. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs., Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (adopting a four-factor economic reality test).


21. Some courts have found that when the restrictions are too extreme and the employees are frequently called in to work, the time is compensable. See, e.g., Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir. 1991).
cards, read, listen to music . . . "22 Hence, on-call workers get the benefit of the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA when they are actually working but not for the time spent on call.

In addition to meeting the test of "employee," an employer is only covered by the FLSA if the employer is an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce and has a gross volume of business of at least $500,000 per year.23 Employees in small firms are not covered. However, under the Act, it is the temporary agency, not the user firm, that is the statutory employer for purposes of ascertaining employee eligibility and determining whether the proper wage was paid.

The proposition that the temporary agency rather than the user firm is the statutory employer of a temporary worker is based on a legal fiction. After all, it is the user firm that has the most control over the employee on a day-to-day basis. This legal fiction is the result of concerted efforts by the temporary staffing industry in the 1960s to be designated the statutory employer for purposes of labor law obligations. The industry, organized as the National Association of Temporary Services, waged intense lobbying campaigns in the state legislatures to persuade them to enact statutes proclaiming temporary agencies were the employers of record for purposes of state labor law obligations. The industry succeeded, so that by 1971, all but two states had complied.24

As a result of the temporary staffing industry’s legislative strategy, employees of small temporary agencies are often not covered by the minimum wage. Temporary agencies are often unstable business entities, so that employees of fly-by-night temporary agencies can be left with unpaid minimum wages and no one to sue.

Temporary workers who are dispatched by small agencies, or agencies that have gone out of business without paying wages, can try to prove there is a "joint employer" relationship between the user and leasing firm so that the user firm is responsible for their minimum wages and overtime pay. In 1973, the Supreme Court held that an employee can have more than one employer under the FLSA.25 As later explained, a joint employment arises where

the facts establish that the employee is employed jointly by two or more employers, i.e., that employment by one employer is not completely disassociated from employment by the other employer(s). 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a). In such situations, all of the employee’s work for all of the joint employers during the workweek is considered as one employment for

purposes of the [FLSA] . . . [and] all joint employers are responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the [FLSA], including the overtime provisions.\textsuperscript{26}

To determine whether joint employment exists, the agency looks at the extent to which both employers are involved with the employment activities. When the court finds a joint employment, both the user firm and the leasing firm are jointly and severally liable for any FLSA violations.\textsuperscript{27}

Because the Supreme Court has interpreted the FLSA coverage broadly, it gives temporary workers more protection than most labor statutes. Despite the breadth of the definition of "employee" for purposes of the FLSA, there remains considerable uncertainty in individual cases. The Second Circuit, for example, has warned that the multiple factors have to be weighed anew in each case.\textsuperscript{28} With a multi-factor test, the factors can be weighed and clustered differently in each case, resulting in unpredictable results in borderline cases—the cases in which many temporary workers are most likely to fall.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{C. Health and Safety Protections}

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) was enacted in 1970 with the express purpose of ensuring "so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions."\textsuperscript{30} OSHA authorizes the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSH Administration) to establish occupational safety and health standards for workplaces and to issue citations for violations against employers who do not adhere to the standards. If the Administration issues a citation, the employer may appeal it to an administrative law judge, then to the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), then to a federal court of appeals, and ultimately to the Supreme Court. There is no private right of action under OSHA. The Administration also conducts periodic inspections of workplaces for compliance with OSHA standards.

OSHA covers all workplaces and all employees in interstate commerce, regardless of the number of employees in a workplace or how many hours a particular employee works. Hence it covers both temporary and part-time workers so long as they are "employees" for purposes of the statute. The Supreme Court has not yet directly ruled on what the definition of an employment relationship is under OSHA. Moreover, OSHA does not contain

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
  \item \textsuperscript{27} \textit{Falk}, 414 U.S. at 195; Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996); Lopez, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (holding garment industry jobber and its production sub-contractor to be joint employer for purposes of FLSA).
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Brock v. Superior Care Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988).
  \item \textsuperscript{29} See, \textit{e.g.}, Lopez, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405; Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1997); Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1557 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that workfare workers do not fall under FLSA's employment definition, with no analysis).
  \item \textsuperscript{30} 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2000).
\end{itemize}
a definition of an "employment relationship." It defines "employer" as a "person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees . . ."³¹ The term "employee" is defined as "an employee of an employer who is employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce."³² In determining whether an employment relationship exists, OSHRC has emphasized that the primary factors are control over the work environment and who has the ability to prevent or abate occupational hazards.³³

In 1992, the Supreme Court held in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden that the common law agency test rather than the broader economic realities test should govern the determination of employee status for purposes of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA).³⁴ The Court stated, "In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished."³⁵ Soon after the decision in Darden, OSHRC indicated that it will follow Darden for purposes of determining who is an "employee" under OSHA.³⁶ Hence OSHA does not apply the expansive definition of "employee" found in the FLSA.

Protection for temporary employees under OSHA depends not only on the definition of employee but also upon who is the "employer" for purposes of the Act. When a temporary employee is injured at a jobsite due to unsafe conditions, the OSH Administration must decide which company (or companies) was the "employer." It treats the entity that has control over the temporary worker's day-to-day activities as the one responsible for reporting an incident to the OSH Administration office.³⁷ Hence, in one case, employer status was assigned to the user firm on the grounds that it was the entity most directly in charge of the job site and most capable of abating the hazard, even though the leasing company recruited, hired, and paid the workers.³⁸ Under OSHA, courts have also held that more than one entity may be the employer of a single worker and thus may be individually or jointly responsible for

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³¹. Id. 652(5).
³². Id. § 652(6).
³³. See, e.g., MLB Indus., Inc., 12 OSHC (BNA) 1525, 1985 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 27,408 (No. 83-231, 1985) (placing primary reliance on who controls the work environment in determining whether an employment relationship exists); Froedert Mem'l Lutheran Hosp., Inc., 20 OSHC (BNA) 1500, 1999 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 31,865 (No. 97-1839, 1999) (holding that hospital, rather than temporary agency that supplied housekeeping services, was the employer for purposes of OSHA because the hospital exercised a high degree of control over temporary employees).
³⁵. Id. at 323.
³⁶. Loomis Cabinet Co., 15 OSHC (BNA) 1635, 1992 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 29,775 (No. 88-2012, 1992); Loomis Cabinet Co. v. OSH Review Commission, 20 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 1994).
³⁷. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.31 (2005).
³⁸. CNG Transmission Corp., 1994 OSAHRC Lexis 12 (No. 93-152, 1994); Union Drilling, 1994 WL 86002 (No. 93-154, 1994) (considering client company, not the leasing company, to be the employer).
compliance with a safety standard. While an employer can delegate its OSHA compliance obligations, it cannot discharge its obligation to maintain a safe workplace by contractual agreement.

D. Employment Discrimination

Discrimination in employment is prohibited by a number of federal statutes. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 requires employers to pay men and women the same wages for the same work. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, color, religion, and sex. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived disability. Under these statutes, temporary workers have the same rights as permanent employees to be free from discrimination in the workplace because of race, sex, religion, color, national origin, age or disability, so long as they meet the eligibility requirements.

Each of the anti-discrimination statutes sets a minimum establishment size for its coverage. For example, Title VII covers employers who employ a minimum of fifteen employees in twenty weeks in the previous year. The ADEA covers employers who employ at least twenty persons.

For purposes of the anti-discrimination statutes, the statutory employer is not necessarily the temporary agency—it is the party who exercises control over the worker. Sometimes employers attempt to avoid coverage by classifying their workers as independent contractors or by utilizing subcontractors to keep down their official number of employees.

When a temporary employee suffers discrimination on a job assignment, that employee can, in theory, sue both the user firm and the temporary agency. However, each putative employer must exert some control over the employment relationship. Also, courts have held that the employee must

39. See, e.g., Sam Hall & Sons, Inc., 8 OSHC (BNA) 2176, 1980 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 24, 927 (No. 76-4988, 1980) (finding leasing company to be employer, because client company and leasing company shared control over the employees, such that either could have prevented the employees from harm).
40. See also Baker Tank Co./Altech, 17 OSHC (BNA) 1177, 1995 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 30,734 (No. 90-1786-S, 1995); Bayside Pipe Coaters, Inc., 2 OSHC (BNA) 1206, 1974-75 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 18,677 (No. 1953, 1974).
show that the agency knew of the discrimination before it can be found liable. As one court explained:

It is only fair to require the plaintiff show that each defendant she contends committed unlawful discrimination knew of the discriminatory conduct or, at a minimum, should have known of it . . . [t]oday's workforce is composed of increasingly large numbers of part-time employees provided by temporary employment agencies. Discrimination of some form among some of these temporary employment relationships will inevitably occur. Workplace discrimination will most likely come from the employer where a person works, not the temporary agency. As in the instant case, the temporary agency often will have little to no daily contact with the employee. In such a setting, a temporary employment agency would have no indication of any workplace discrimination without notice from the employee. It would be grossly inequitable to hold such an agency liable for discrimination that it was not aware of, had no reason to know was taking place, and of which it had no control.47

Hence a temporary worker has protection against employment discrimination but must complain to the temporary agency as well as the user firm if it wants to get the benefit of suing both entities.

E. Family and Medical Leave

The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) requires employers to grant employees unpaid leave for up to twelve weeks for the birth or adoption of a child, the care of a sick spouse, parent, child, or illness.48 The Act does not require an employer to pay an employee's wages during the leave period but it requires an employer to continue coverage under the employer’s health plan, if it has one.

The FMLA has strict eligibility requirements that exclude many temporary workers. To be eligible, an employer has to employ fifty or more employees during a twenty-week period. In addition, the employee must have worked for the employer for at least twelve months and for at least 1250 hours during the preceding twelve months. Temporary workers often cannot satisfy the eligibility requirement and hence often are not eligible for coverage under the Act.49 However, if a joint employer relationship is found, the temporary worker's user firm, as the secondary employer, may have an obligation to comply with FMLA.50


Unemployment insurance is provided as the result of a partnership between the federal and state governments. The Federal Unemployment Compensation Act establishes a framework within which states have great latitude to determine their own programs. In particular, states determine individual qualification requirements, disqualification provisions, eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, and maximum weeks of benefits. In most states, employers pay an unemployment compensation tax that goes into a fund from which unemployed workers can draw benefits. The taxes are experienced-rated, so that employers who frequently lay off employees are required to pay higher taxes.

In all states, employees' benefit levels are a percentage of their past earnings but they are capped at a fixed amount and given only for a determinate time period. The percentages, caps, and time periods vary from state to state. Most states have a maximum of twenty-six weeks and provide between fifty and seventy percent of earnings up to a statutory maximum. The weekly maximum benefits range from $133 in Puerto Rico to $646 in Massachusetts.

State laws also determine eligibility requirements that can be difficult for temporary workers to satisfy. To be eligible, an applicant must have been employed in covered employment for a minimum period of time and have earned above a set minimum amount from a covered employer. On average, workers must have worked in two quarters and earned $1734 to qualify for a minimum monthly benefit. However, there is wide variation between states. To qualify for the minimum benefit, a worker must have had annual wages ranging from $130 in Hawaii to $3,400 in Florida. To qualify for the maximum weekly benefit level, a worker must have earned $5,450 in Nebraska and $29,432 in Colorado. Temporary workers often lack the hours or wages necessary for eligibility.

Another problem that arises when temporary workers attempt to receive unemployment compensation after separating from temporary work is determining who is the employer. Because the employer is responsible for paying the temporary worker's unemployment taxes, both the temporary agency and the client firm have an incentive to claim that the other is the employer. Some states have statutes that identify temporary agencies as the

53. Id.
54. Id.
"employer" and thus the party responsible for tax payments. In general, these statutes are of three types. Some state laws classify the temporary agency as the employer. For example, Oklahoma states, "[T]he temporary help firm is deemed to be the employer of the temporary employee." This gives temporary agencies the ability to advertise and provide to a client firm a workforce that is almost guaranteed not to lead to unemployment tax liability. Other states specify factors used to determine which firm is to be designated the employer. For example, California law designates the temporary agency as the employer if it performs all of the following functions:

(a) negotiates with clients regarding time, place, type of work and working conditions;
(b) determines assignments and reassignments of workers;
(c) retains the authority to assign or reassign workers to other clients when a worker is determined unacceptable;
(d) assigns or reassigns the workers to perform services for a client;
(e) sets the rate of pay;
(f) pays the worker from its own account; and
(g) retains the right to fire and hire workers.

Still other states treat temporary agencies and user firms as co-employers for purposes of unemployment compensation.

In most states, workers who voluntarily quit their jobs are not eligible for unemployment compensation. Different states interpret the voluntary quit disqualification differently. For example, some do not disqualify a worker who quits for "good cause" and each state has its own definition of what constitutes "good cause." Approximately two-thirds of the states require good cause to be "connected to the work" or attributable to the employer. If a worker knowingly takes a temporary job, this raises the question whether the employee has quit voluntarily when the job ends. States differ as to how they treat temporary workers for purposes of the voluntary quit disqualification. For example, Delaware's relevant statute provides that

[a]n individual who becomes unemployed solely as the result of completing a period of employment that was of a... temporary or casual duration will not be considered as a matter of law to have left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work solely on the basis of the duration of such employment.

In a similar vein, the Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation Act provides:

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56. 40 OKLA STAT. § 2-404A(C) (2005).
57. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 606.5(b) (Deering's 2006).
A temporary employee of a temporary help firm will be deemed to have left his or her last work voluntarily without good cause connected with the work if the temporary employee does not contact the temporary help firm for reassignment. A temporary employee will not be deemed to have left work voluntarily without good cause connected with the work unless the temporary employee has been advised of the obligation to contact the temporary help firm on completion of assignments and that unemployment benefits may be denied for failure to do so.

Alternatively, some states maintain that when work is temporary due to the employee's preference, the cessation of the work term constitutes a voluntary quit. For example, the Vermont Supreme Court held that "an employee who accepts a temporary position does not leave that position involuntarily at the end of the agreed period if it is shown that the employee requested temporary employment in light of his or her needs or availability." The Vermont court added that the issue of voluntariness needed to be decided on a case-by-case basis and that no inference should be made from the fact that the employee agreed to temporary employment at the outset.

In sum, temporary workers have obstacles to collecting unemployment insurance, but they are not universally ineligible. Rather, they must meet the eligibility requirements of their particular state and be able to show that they have not left their former employment voluntarily.

G. Compensation for Workplace Injuries

Workers' compensation laws in every state provide compensation for workers injured on their jobs. These laws were passed in the first half of the twentieth century and they all have a similar structure. They provide an exclusive remedy for injured workers so that they do not have a right to sue their employer for common law tort. Compensation is available regardless of fault and notwithstanding contributory negligence. Forty-two states and the District of Columbia require that, to be covered by workers' compensation, an injury must "arise out of" and "in the course of" employment. Other states use functionally equivalent language.

Injured workers who lose time from work are entitled to receive a set fraction of their pre-injury wage, up to a statutory maximum. Permanent injuries, such as loss of limb, are compensable according to a set schedule of benefits. The amounts of benefits and wage substitution vary greatly from state to state. Each state system is administered by a state workers'
compensation board and employers are required to maintain insurance or to self-insure to cover their workers’ compensation exposure.

Temporary workers who are injured in the course of their employment are entitled to workers’ compensation under their states’ law. However, when an employee works for a temporary or leasing agency and is placed with a user firm, questions arise as to which employer’s workers’ compensation insurer has responsibility for a workplace injury. Each one has an interest in being deemed the employer for purposes of workers’ compensation because they then get the advantage of the exclusive remedy provision in the law and avoid the prospect of a much more costly judgment in tort. At the same time, the injured worker is likely to sue the user firm, claiming that it is not the employer and hence cannot take advantage of the workers’ compensation shield. Many courts, when confronting this problem, have looked to which employer had control over the worker at the time of the injury. Some have held that both the user firm and the temporary agency are the “employer” for purposes of the exclusive remedy of workers’ compensation. Some use a multi-factor test to determine which employer, or both, has the most significant control over the worker at the time of the injury. For example, Michigan courts have stated that the employer, for purposes of workers’ compensation, is determined by looking at which employer had “(1) control of the worker’s duties; (2) payment of wages; (3) the right to hire, fire, and discipline; and (4) [whether the employee’s] performance of the duties was an integral part of the employer’s business toward the accomplishment of a common goal.”

Although temporary workers have the same rights to workers’ compensation as other workers, there is one difference that pertains to on-call workers. It is the general rule that employees are not covered for injuries under workers’ compensation that occur commuting to or from work. However, on-call workers who are injured when traveling in response to a call have been found to be covered by workers’ compensation. The rationale is that on-call employees remain under their employer’s control when they are on call, and that their very availability provides a benefit to the employer.

H. Collective Bargaining

The National Labor Relations Act gives employees a right to organize unions of their own choosing and bargain collectively with their employer.


When a group of workers wants to form a union, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determines the appropriate unit for collective bargaining and conducts an election to determine whether a majority of the employees in the unit want to be represented by the union. In 1990, the NLRB ruled that long-term temporary employees could not be included in a bargaining unit with a user-employer's regular employees unless both the provider-agency employer and the user-employer consented.\(^7\) Thereafter, the Board refused to consider any unit that combined temporary and regular employees, absent consent of both employers.\(^7\) Because it is highly unusual for an employer to consent to its employees forming a union, the dual consent requirement made it virtually impossible for temporary workers to unionize.

In 2000, in *Sturgis, Inc.*, the NLRB reversed its former position and held that regular employees and temporary employees could be in the same bargaining unit so long as they shared a community of interest.\(^7\) The Board also stated that temporary employees could unionize in a bargaining unit of all the employees of a single temporary work agency. As a result, the NLRB permitted temporary employees to form bargaining units comprised of temporary and regular employees of a single employer or of all employees of a single temporary agency. This ruling greatly expanded the possibilities for temporary workers to claim the protection of the labor law.

However, in 2004, the NLRB again reversed itself in the case of *Oakwood Care Center & N&W Agency, Inc.* and reinstated the dual consent requirement for temporary worker organizing efforts.\(^7\) As a result, temporary workers are not able to organize in units with the permanent workers they work alongside. Rather, if they want to unionize, they must do so together with the other workers employed by their temporary agency. Agency temporary workers are dispersed and have little contact with each other. Thus, as a practical matter, temporary workers lack representation or a collective voice.

I. Retirement Security

1. Private Pensions

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, known as ERISA, establishes eligibility standards and funding requirements for private pension plans.\(^7\) The Act requires that employees who work 1000 hours in a pension plan year must be included in all appropriate company pension plans that are

offered to other similar workers. An employer cannot discriminate on the basis of age or length of service in determining eligibility for pension coverage, nor may it reserve its pensions for highly paid employees. However, ERISA permits employers to determine who is included in its pension plan, so long as they do so in accordance with the terms of their plan. Hence employers may elect to exclude temporary workers from their pension plans.

ERISA permits employers to determine when an employee’s benefits under a pension plan vest within certain statutory limits. Under ERISA, an employer can elect to have benefits vest all at once after five years of service or to have benefits vest gradually over a seven-year period. In either case, a short-term temporary employee, like any other short-term employee, can find that their pension benefits never fully vest.

2. Social Security

Social Security provides monthly benefits for workers who retire upon reaching the normal retirement age of sixty-five or reduced benefits for workers who retire at age sixty-two. It is financed by a tax paid by both employers and employees and the amount of benefits is determined by an employee’s prior contributions. An employer is required to make Social Security payments on a worker’s behalf if the worker earns more than $500 a quarter. Temporary employees are employees of either an agency, a user firm, or an in-house temporary work department and hence are covered by Social Security.

J. Summary

Temporary workers have great difficulties obtaining the protections and benefits under most employment law statutes. While the Fair Labor Standards Act uses a broad “economic realities” test to determine who is an “employee,” ERISA and OSHA use the narrower common law agency test that treats many temporary employees as independent contractors and hence ineligible for protection. In addition, most states’ laws define the statutory employer as the temporary agency rather than the user firm, potentially restricting temporary workers’ access to unemployment and workers’ compensation benefits. In addition, temporary workers often work for more than one employer at a time but are dependent upon and subject to the supervision of each employer for the time they are at work. Yet when a worker has multiple employers, often each employer will claim that the worker is an independent contractor rather than an employee. Courts frequently defer to the employer’s own definition of a

75. Id. §§ 1052(a)(1), 1052(a)(3)(A).
76. Steven J. Aresenault, et. al., An Employee By Any Other Name Does Not Smell as Sweet: A Continuing Drama, 16 LAB. LAW. 285, 294-305 (2000).
temporary worker’s status, thereby excluding a fast-growing portion of the workforce from unionization altogether. Finally, in recent years, temporary workers ability to unionize has been severely restricted.

III.
HOMEWORKERS

A. Introduction

1. Definitions

In an industrial economy, most employees work at a centralized worksite. However, there is a growing class of non-traditional workers known as homeworkers. Homeworkers are employees who perform their work at home but are not self-employed. There are two terms for homeworkers that have somewhat different but overlapping meanings. “Industrial homeworker” is an older term that denotes an employee who works at home to produce a good. The newer term, “telecommuter,” refers to an employee who works at home using telecommunications devices to provide a service. This article refers to both groups collectively as “homeworkers” and, unless otherwise indicated, the legal regimes discussed apply to both groups equally.

2. Demographics

According to the Department of Labor, approximately 2.4% of U.S. workers are homeworkers. Women are slightly more likely than men to be homeworkers—2.7% of women in the workforce are paid to work at home, while 2.2% of men are paid to work at home. By race and ethnicity, whites are most likely to be homeworkers (2.7%), followed by Asians (1.8%), Latinos (1.4%), and blacks (1.1%). Homeworking increases with education: Workers without a high school diploma are unlikely to work at home (0.8%); those with only a high school education are slightly more likely (1.2%); those with some college are more likely (2.7%), and college graduates are most likely (4.7%).

Homework is more prevalent in white-collar than blue-collar occupations. The percentage of workers engaged in homework is highest in

78. See, e.g., Clark v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 105 F.3d 646 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Abraham v. Exxon Corp., 85 F.3d 1126, 1132 (5th Cir. 1996). But see Vizcaino v. United States Dist. Ct., 173 F.3d 713, 724–25 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an employer’s assertion that employees are independent contractors for purposes of eligibility for a stock purchase plan).


80. Id.

81. Id.
the information-related industries (5.4% of workers in the industry), financial services (4.8%), professional and business services (4.3%), and other service industries (2.9%). The vast majority of homeworkers use a computer (84.8%), a telephone (84.6%) and have access to the internet and e-mail (78.3%).

Most homeworkers do not work at home full time. Only half work over eight hours per week at home and only 14.8% of homeworkers work thirty-five hours or more per week at home (i.e., full-time). Workers without a high-school diploma are more than twice as likely as all others to work full-time at home.

These statistics suggest that most homeworkers are telecommuters who are well educated and work in a service industry. However, these homeworkers are also likely to split time between working at home and working in a traditional office worksite. Full-time homeworkers are likely to be uneducated.

B. Minimum Wage and Overtime

For purposes of coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the location of the worksite is irrelevant. The Department of Labor has concluded that “[p]eople who perform work at their own home are often improperly considered as independent contractors. [The FLSA] covers such homeworkers as employees and they are entitled to all benefits of the law.”

The coverage of homeworkers is implied by a statutory grant of authority to regulate industrial homeworkers. The FLSA provides:

The Administrator is authorized to make such regulations and orders regulating, restricting, or prohibiting industrial homework as are necessary or appropriate to prevent the circumvention or evasion of and to safeguard the minimum wage rate prescribed in this chapter, and all existing regulations or orders of the Administrator relating to industrial homework are continued in full force and effect.

The Department of Labor has promulgated regulations to enforce the FLSA with regard to homeworkers; however, the regulations are limited to industrial homeworkers. According to the regulations, industrial homework “means the production . . . of goods for an employer who suffers or permits such

82. See id. Table 1.
83. Id. Table 6.
84. Id. Table 3.
production." Importantly, the definition only includes goods. Modern telecommuters, who are most likely to provide services and not produce goods, are not covered by this regulation. Therefore, the following specific protections only apply to industrial homeworkers although the FLSA's general coverage does extend to telecommuters.

Employers of industrial homeworkers are required to "maintain and preserve payroll or other records . . . with respect to each and every industrial homeworker employed." In addition, the employer is required to provide a handbook for every employee. The handbook is essentially a timesheet. The employee returns the handbook to the employer as proof of the time worked. The Act requires the employer to preserve the handbook for at least two years and make it available for inspection by the Wage and Hour Division on request.

The other relevant aspect of the FLSA as applied to industrial homework is the requirement of certification for certain types of homework. Due to the potential for abuse, seven industries were previously forbidden from employing homeworkers. They were: jewelry manufacturing, knitted outerwear, gloves and mittens, buttons and buckles, handkerchief manufacturing, embroideries, and women's apparel. The ban has been replaced by a highly regulated certification system. Once an employer receives certification, the employer is permitted to hire homeworkers pursuant to the aforementioned provisions.

C. Health and Safety

The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act requires employers to provide "employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm." The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has issued conflicting interpretations of how this statute applies to homeworkers' worksites because these worksites are the homeworkers' individual homes, leaving it unclear how OSHA protects homeworkers. In November 1999, the OSH Administration sent an advisory letter stating that OSHA covers

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87. 29 C.F.R. § 516.31(a)(2) (2005). The definition of employment as "suffer[ing] or permit[ting] production" reinforces the economic reality test described above.
88. Id. § 516.31(b).
89. Id. § 516.31(b) & (c).
91. 29 C.F.R. § 516.31(c) (2005).
93. 29 C.F.R. § 525.15 (2005); see also 29 C.F.R. § 530.1 et seq. (2005).
homeworkers. The OSH Administration came under public and political criticism and rescinded the letter. Then, on February 25, 2000, the OSH Administration released a directive that essentially balances individuals’ privacy concerns, employers’ compliance concerns, and the mandates of OSHA. The directive distinguishes between white-collar telecommuters and blue-collar industrial homeworkers. It stated that the OSH Administration will not inspect white-collar “home offices,” which are defined as worksites using electronic office equipment for office work activities. Similarly, the Administration will not hold employers responsible for inspecting such offices and will not hold employers liable for accidents occurring in such offices.

Blue-collar home worksites do not always fit the home office definition. They are likely to be manufacturing operations. In contrast to “home offices,” if the OSH Administration receives a complaint or referral indicating that there is a violation, it will inspect blue-collar home worksites. Employers are liable for conditions caused by materials provided or required by the employer. In practice, the OSH Administration has only investigated two home worksites and both of those investigations involved lead contamination.

Under OSHA, when a work-related injury or illness occurs, employers are required to report the incident, regardless of the type of worksite. According to the OSH Administration’s regulations, an incident is work-related “if the injury or illness occurs while the employee is performing work for pay or compensation in the home, and the injury or illness is directly related to the performance of work rather than to the general home environment or setting.” The regulation illustrates the rule with a series of examples. One, a white-collar example, stated that an employer must report an injury caused by a box of work files. A blue-collar example stated that an employer must report an injury caused by a sewing machine. It also gave two home-related examples of injuries that are not covered: It stated that an employer need not report injuries caused by the family dog or faulty home wiring. These examples indicate that the Act regulates the homework

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96. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DIRECTIVE CPL 02-00-125, (February 25, 2000), http://www.osha.gov (follow the link for “directives”) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE].
98. DIRECTIVE, supra note 96.
99. Id.
102. Id.
environment; however, for political reasons, the Administration has adopted a policy of non-enforcement for white-collar home work environments.

In 2000, two bills were proposed in Congress regarding OSHA coverage of homeworkers. One proposal would have removed white-collar home offices from the OSH Administrations’s jurisdiction and the other would have removed all home worksites. Both bills languished in subcommittee.

D. Employment Discrimination

1. Title VII

There is no statutory reason to exclude homeworkers from nondiscrimination laws. When sexual harassment is present, an employee who works at home can bring both quid pro quo and hostile environment claims. In the Farragher decision in 1998, the Supreme Court made it clear, however, that in a hostile environment claim, an employer can raise an affirmative defense that it is not vicariously liable for a supervisor’s harassment if (1) it had procedures in place to prevent or correct the harassing behavior and (2) the employee did not reasonably take advantage of the employer’s preventive or corrective opportunities. A homeworker cannot avoid the second prong of this test by claiming that geographic isolation made it difficult to take advantage of the employer’s corrective opportunities.

2. The Americans with Disabilities Act

Federal courts are divided as to whether telecommuting is a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Two circuit courts have found that telecommuting is almost never a reasonable accommodation. One circuit court and various district courts have come to the opposite conclusion and permit telecommuting as a reasonable accommodation. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has

103. Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 100, at 264.
104. Id. at 245 (“Congress’ efforts to curb discrimination should apply regardless of whether a workplace has moved into cyberspace. Gender discrimination and, in particular, sexual harassment, are ripe for expansion in cyberspace.”).
105. Id. at 245-53.
107. Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1999).
108. Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213-14 (4th Cir. 1994) (telecommuting is permissible only if the employee can perform all work-related duties from home); Vande Zande v. Wisc. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544-45 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (commenting that because of the necessity of teamwork, a very extraordinary case would be required to find telecommuting a reasonable accommodation).
109. Langdon v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (permitting computer programmer to telecommute would not impose undue hardship); Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 132 (D. Conn. 1997) (telecommuting can be reasonable under a
indicated that telecommuting, like other accommodations, is reasonable unless it imposes an undue hardship.\(^{110}\)

**E. Family and Medical Leave**

The Family and Medical Leave Act applies to employees whose employers employ fifty employees within seventy-five miles of the worksite where the employee requesting leave is employed.\(^{111}\) The Department of Labor issued a regulation to reduce the ambiguity in defining a homeworker's worksite. The regulation states that "[f]or employees with no fixed worksite . . . the 'worksite' is the site to which they are assigned as their home base, from which their work is assigned, or to which they report."\(^{112}\) Thus, many homeworkers are covered by the FMLA. There is no coverage, however, for homeworkers who work for a geographically dispersed cyberspace-based business. Similarly, an employee may not be covered if there is no fixed worksite to which the employee reports.\(^{113}\)

**F. Unemployment Compensation**

Forty-six states and the District of Columbia share a common definition of employment for their unemployment compensation schemes. Employment is defined as service for remuneration or under a contract for hire.\(^{114}\) Homeworkers, therefore, are in an employment relationship with their employers for purposes of unemployment compensation.

A frequent issue arises concerning which state's unemployment law covers a homeworker's employment when the worker and the employer are located in different states. There are four tests for determining which state's scheme applies and the four tests are applied successively until a single state can properly assert jurisdiction. The first test, localization, requires that an employee work in only one state; alternatively, if work in a second state is merely incidental to work in the primary state, then the primary state has jurisdiction.\(^{115}\) If the localization test does not yield a definitive answer, then a court asks if there is a fixed base of operations to which the employee reports. If there is still no clear determination, then a court asks whether the employer directs and controls the employee from a single state. If none of these tests can resolve the issue, then the employee's state of residence asserts case-by-case analysis); Young v. Sprint Corp., 173 F.R.D. 309, 310 (D. Kan. 1997) (allegation that telecommuting is a reasonable accommodation is not futile as a matter of law).

110. Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 100, at 255.
113. Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 100, at 256-57.
115. Id. at 791.
jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{116} For example, if an employee splits time between worksites in two different states and receives assignments from two different states, then the first three tests would all fail and the employee’s state of residence would control.

Even with the four-part test, telecommuters may find themselves without coverage. Different states may have differing conceptions of where a telecommuter’s work is located. For example, in a recent case, an individual telecommuting from Florida to offices in New York was denied benefits in both states.\textsuperscript{117} The Florida court held that the work was not localized in Florida because the work product was received in New York and thus the base of operations test would require New York to provide benefits.\textsuperscript{118} Conversely, the New York court held that the work was localized in Florida because the telecommuter worked exclusively in Florida.\textsuperscript{119} Thus, telecommuters may find themselves without coverage until state courts adopt a unified approach to telecommuting.

\textbf{G. Workers’ Compensation}

As discussed above, workers’ compensation provides coverage for workplace accidents, regardless of fault, and notwithstanding the existence of a worker’s contributory negligence or the negligence of a fellow worker. To be compensable, an injury must arise “out of or in the course of employment.” In practice this means that the employment increased the risk of injury, actually caused the injury, or placed the employee in a position to be injured. An injury occurred “in the course of employment” if there is the requisite connection between the injury and the time, place and activity of employment. The injury must be on the employer’s premises or the employee must be engaged in an activity consented to and controlled by the employer.\textsuperscript{120}

When homeworkers are injured performing an employment-related task at home, the injury is in the course of employment, especially if the employer specifically requested the task. However, when a homeworker is injured at home, a court must determine whether the injury is more closely related to work or to the natural home environment.\textsuperscript{121} Each injury must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. If the homeworker is actively engaged in work when the injury occurs, then it is more likely workers’ compensation will apply.\textsuperscript{122} It has been argued that because ordinary workers are covered for accidents occurring during unpaid meal breaks, homeworkers should be covered for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{116} \textit{Id.} at 791-93.
\item \textsuperscript{117} \textit{In re Allen}, 100 N.Y.2d 282, 284-86 (2003).
\item \textsuperscript{118} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{119} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{120} Duckworth, supra note 64, at 409-17.
\item \textsuperscript{121} See \textit{id.} at 419.
\end{itemize}
accidents occurring in their kitchens or dining rooms during meal breaks.\textsuperscript{123} Also, under a doctrine known as the “personal comfort doctrine,” homeworkers should be covered for purely personal acts if they increase efficiency.\textsuperscript{124}

Ordinarily, an employee is barred from receiving benefits from injuries occurring while commuting to work by the “going and coming” rule. However, homeworkers can sometimes satisfy the “traveling employee” exception. This exception applies when the employment requires work outside the employer’s premises. The two main factors are (1) the reasonableness of the employee’s conduct and (2) whether the travel is normally foreseen by the employer.\textsuperscript{125} Thus, when a homeworker leaves the home and travels to the employer’s premises, the exception will usually apply. If, however, the employee travels spontaneously and without a valid employment-related reason, then the exception will not apply.\textsuperscript{126}

Additionally, some states cover homeworkers for accidents under the “dual-purpose doctrine.” This doctrine imposes liability when a homeworker makes a trip that includes both business and personal purposes so long as the business purpose alone would have compelled the trip.\textsuperscript{127} This doctrine is available in a number of states, including Minnesota and New York.\textsuperscript{128}

\textbf{H. Collective Bargaining}

Homeworkers have the same rights as other workers to organize and bargain under the National Labor Relations Act. There are, however, practical difficulties in organizing homeworkers because they are dispersed and there is no central place to reach them for the purposes of organizing. It is important to note that some nontraditional employees, such as home health care workers, have their collective bargaining rights protected by state constitutions or statutes.\textsuperscript{129}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{123} \textit{Id.} at 882.
  \item \textsuperscript{124} \textit{Id.} at 883-84.
  \item \textsuperscript{125} \textit{Id.} at 876.
  \item \textsuperscript{126} \textit{Id.} at 875-76.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Rau v. Crest Fiberglass Indus., 148 N.W.2d 149, 150-51 (Minn. 1967) (holding injury covered when claimant bought a sandwich and brandy, transacted business at the bank, and was injured after leaving the bank while on her way to buy food for her family).
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Swink, \textit{supra} note 122, at 877.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} See, e.g., OR. CONST. ART. XV, § 11(3)(f); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12306.1-.5 (Deering’s 2006).
\end{itemize}
I. Retirement Security

1. Private Pensions

Insofar as homeworkers satisfy the test for employee status, they are treated the same as other workers for purposes of ERISA.

2. Social Security

Both conventional employees and homeworkers are considered employees for the purposes of Social Security coverage if they pass the traditional common law test. Of the eight factors indicating common-law employment, only two could potentially disqualify homeworkers: First, the employer does not provide a place to work (although this only applies to full-time homeworkers); second, the employer might not control the hours of work and restrict other employment. The other six factors are: the employer’s ability to fire the employee, training provided by the employer, performing the work individually, not hiring assistants (except for managers), business and travel expenses are paid by the employer, and payment is received on a regular cycle. All of these are typical of both industrial and telecommuting forms of homework.

Industrial homeworkers receive additional protection through the Social Security regulations, which expressly provide:

If you are a home worker and you work according to the instructions of the person you work for, on material or goods furnished by that person, and are required to return the finished product to that person (or another person whom he or she designates), you are an employee.

All homeworkers, therefore, should receive Social Security protections.

J. Summary

Homeworkers receive the protections of minimum wage and overtime laws. Occupational safety and health laws theoretically apply to all homeworkers, but as a practical matter, the OSH Administration only applies it to industrial homeworkers. Homeworkers are as entitled as traditional employees to be free from discrimination. Despite the increasing popularity and feasibility of working at home, the courts are split as to whether homeworking is a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Unemployment compensation laws cover homeworkers but the discrepancy between a telecommuting location and a physical worksite can cause jurisdictional issues. Workers’ compensation benefits apply broadly to

131. Id. § 404.1007(b) (2005).
132. Id. § 404.1008(d) (2005).
homeworkers, covering accidents occurring in the home and while commuting from home to the employer's worksite. Finally, homeworkers are considered employees eligible for Social Security benefits.

IV. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

Independent contractors are a bi-modal group. Some are highly skilled professionals or craftspeople who work for multiple customers using their own tools and deploying their talents and their entrepreneurial abilities. Others are low skilled individuals who work as essentially day laborers, usually for a single employer on whom they are dependent for work. It is difficult to tell from the available data how many of the 10.3 million independent contractors in the United States are of each group. However, the industry breakdown gives some indication. It shows that almost forty percent of independent contractors are in the financial, professional, business, education and health services industries. These individuals are likely to be of the first type of independent contractors—skilled professionals who operate what are essentially small businesses selling their own services. Another nearly thirty-two percent, or 3.3 million individuals, are in construction, agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation. These are likely to be what are termed “dependent independent contractors”—those who have little independence or autonomy and depend upon another business for their livelihood.

In contrast to temporary and other types of atypical employees, independent contractors are not eligible for any of the protections provided by the employment law statutes because they are not considered “employees.” Unlike Europe and Canada, in the United States there have not been legislative efforts to create an intermediate category between “employee” and “independent contractor” that would give atypical workers some of the employment protections available for standard workers. Rather in the United States there are only two categories—employee and independent contractor—where the former receives some employment law protections and the latter does not. Increasingly, employers attempt to reclassify employees and to vary their employment practices to transform their former “employees” into “independent contractors.” Hence, many low-paid employees such as

133. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 3, Table 8.
134. Id.
janitors, truck loaders, typists, and building cleaners have been classified as independent contractors even when they are retained by large companies to work on a regular basis. Independent contractors are not covered by the minimum wage, workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, occupational safety and health laws, collective bargaining laws, Social Security, disability, anti-discrimination laws, or any of the other employment protections discussed above.\textsuperscript{137}

There has been a great deal of litigation in recent years about whether particular individuals should be classified as employees or independent contractors.\textsuperscript{138} Two different tests have been used for distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor. Under the National Labor Relations Act, courts use a restrictive common law agency test that focuses primarily on the employer's right to control the work tasks of the putative contractor.\textsuperscript{139} Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the courts use a broader "economic realities" test that looks at numerous factors to determine whether the individual is in fact dependent upon the employer.\textsuperscript{140} For other purposes, some courts developed a hybrid of the two tests that uses a multi-factored economic realities test but gives particular weight to the employer's right to control the employee's work.\textsuperscript{141}

In 1992, however, the Supreme Court in \textit{Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden} rejected the hybrid test and insisted that for ERISA, and by implication for all the employment statutes other than the Fair Labor Standards Act, the common law agency test should be applied.\textsuperscript{142} The Court explained that the employer's right to control the work was paramount. It enumerated thirteen factors to use to determine the application of test in any given case. The factors are:

1. the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished; 2. the skill required; 3. the source of the instrumentalities and tools; 4. the location of the work; 5. the duration of the relationship between the parties; 6. whether the hiring party has the...


\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., Inc.}, 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 1979).


right to assign additional projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the
hiring party's discretion over when and how long to work; (8) the method of
payment; (9) the worker's role in hiring and paying assistants; (10) whether
the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; (11) whether the
hiring party is in business; (12) the provisions of employee benefits; and
(13) the tax treatment of the hired party.143

None of these factors looks to the individual's economic dependency on the
employing firm. The Ninth Circuit recently applied these factors in Vizcaino
v. Microsoft to find that Microsoft had deprived numerous individuals of
benefits because it had misclassified them as independent contractors when
they were, in fact, employees.144 The large judgment in this case has led many
large companies to be careful to avoid misclassifying employees.

V.
COLLAPSING THE DISTINCTIONS

The decentralization of production has fostered the growth of many
types of atypical employment, most notably temporary employment,
homework, and dependent independent contractors. We have seen that the
labor and employment laws in the United States were designed for long-
term employees, so that criteria for eligibility and schedules of benefits
assume an on-going employment relationship with a single employer. As
the numbers of atypical employees grows, more and more individuals find
themselves lacking basic protection for minimum wage, health and safety,
retirement security, industrial injury, and collective bargaining rights. The
foregoing survey of employment laws demonstrates that temporary
workers, homeworkers, and independent contractors face practical as well
as legal barriers that prevent them from getting full coverage under existing
labor and employment laws.

Yet in today's workplace, it is often difficult to distinguish between
regular and temporary employees and between employees and independent
contractors. Regular employees today exhibit the same lack of long-term
attachment that is characteristic of temporary employees. For much of the
twentieth century, the prevailing employment paradigm was that employees
had a long-term relationship with a firm and enjoyed de facto long-term job
security. Their firm provided job security, training, social insurance, and
orderly advancement opportunities and obtained a loyal and knowledgeable
work force in return. The longer employees stayed on the job, the more their
wages rose and their benefits vested, giving them a greater stake in the firms
over time. While not all employees had the secure and comfortable work life

144. 120 F.3d 1006, 1009-1010 (9th Cir. 1997).
that the model envisioned, many did, particularly blue-collar men in basic
industry after the great union drives of the 1930s.145

The twentieth century ideal of work has come and gone. Job security in
the private sector, in the form of long-term attachment between a worker and a
single firm for the duration of the worker’s career, is a vestige of the past.
New ideas about how to organize work have generated new work practices
that are proliferating throughout American enterprises.146 Today “regular”
workers expect to change jobs frequently and employers engage in regular
churning of their workplaces, combining layoffs with new hiring as production
demands and skill requirements shift. No longer is employment centered on a
single, primary employer. Instead, employees now expect to change jobs
frequently. At the same time, firms encourage employees to manage their
own careers and not to expect career-long job security. Indeed, the very
concepts of the workplace as a place and of employment as involving an
employer are becoming outdated. Employers no longer give implicit or
explicit promises of job security and employees no longer expect to work at
the same firm for their working careers. Rather, employees expect to, and do,
change jobs frequently.147 At the same time, temporary employees often work
alongside regular employees, doing the same tasks in the same location under
the same supervision. Hence the distinction between a regular and temporary
employee increasingly rest on the narrow thread of who said, “You’re hired,”
and who signs the paycheck.

Similarly, in today’s workplace, the distinction between employees and
independent contractors is becoming blurred. Both are expected to use
discretion, to manage their own careers, and to move from job to job and
project to project. Under the right to control test, “employees” are defined as
those whose work tasks the employer controls and “independent contractors”
are those whose work tasks are not controlled by the employer. Yet in the new
employment relationship, employers grant more and more discretion to lower
level employees and attempt to give even the lowest level of employee
considerable control over their day-to-day work tasks. Indeed, the wisdom of
modern managerial theories such as total quality management, competency-
based organization theory, and other high performance work approaches is
that when employees are given discretion to use their judgment, creativity, and
knowledge, they develop organizational citizenship behavior and add value to
the firm.148 These approaches attempt to encourage employees to innovate and
to have an ownership attitude toward the work process. The trend toward
granting discretion to employees collapses the distinction between employees
and independent contractors under the right to control test. Not only are

145. See STONE, supra note 5, at 51-63.
146. Id. at 87-116.
147. RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER 22 (1998); PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW
148. STONE, supra note 5, at 87-116.
employers restructuring tasks to turn employees into independent contractors, they are also making the distinction between the two groups almost meaningless. Just as the atrophy of the long-term employment system makes all workers "temporary" in a real sense, so too does the employer's quest for employees' innovation and creativity render all workers "independent contractors."

As employment tasks are revised and employment relationships are redefined in order to transform more and more employees into independent contractors, more and more individuals are left without the protections of the labor and employment laws. Yet many of these individuals share the vulnerabilities of regular and atypical employees. Their jobs are insecure, their incomes fluctuate, they lack reliable and affordable benefits, and they need to constantly upgrade their skills. Hence any reform in labor law has to include these dependent independent contractors if it is to address the problems of the new workplace.

VI.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM

The employment laws need to be revised in many ways if we are going to address the vulnerabilities of both regular and atypical employees. As I have tried to show, the two groups are quickly becoming indistinguishable and hence it is necessary to think about legal reforms that do not distinguish between regular and atypical workers, be they temporary workers, part-time workers, independent contractors, or others in dependent employment relationships. I describe some of the reforms that will be required below.

A. Expanding Collective Bargaining Rights

The labor laws need to be reformed so that workers can organize across employer units without limitation by narrow notions of bargaining units and so that they can assert economic pressure on both temporary agencies and user employers, without constraint by secondary boycott laws. Labor laws also need to permit or even promote a form of organization that includes atypical together with regular, employed together with unemployed, part time as well as full time, and independent contractors as well as employees. Such an organization might play a representational function in a particular workplace, but it will also function as a political and economic force that can protect workers interests and rights on a regional or local basis.149

149. I describe this type of unionism in detail in STONE, supra note 5, at 217-239.
B. Employment Rights for All Employees

Individual employment laws, such as unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, minimum wage, family and medical leave, and discrimination protection must be interpreted to apply to all workers, be they regular, temporary, or dependent independent contractors. Thus courts should look to both the temporary agency and the user firm to determine eligibility under the employment laws and they should adopt an expansive definition of "employee."

C. Protection for Independent Contractors

It is necessary to revise the test for independent contractor status so that dependent independent contractors come under the labor law protections. One way to accomplish this would be to return to the economic realities test that looks to the degree of dependency of the worker. However, simply instituting the economic realities test is not enough because there is a danger that workers who have several employers will be deprived of protection. A better approach is to base employee status on the individual’s vulnerability and relative power vis a vis the party who pays for her services. The relevant question to ask is whether individuals are so situated that they require the protections the law provides.

D. Shoring up the Social Safety Net

For individuals to survive and thrive in the new decentralized labor market, they need more protections, not fewer. They need childcare for young children and after-school care programs for school age children. Individuals also need affordable and reliable health insurance, disability insurance, and old age assistance. These could be provided by the state and available to everyone. If national insurance is not politically feasible, however, then employers should be encouraged or required to form multi-employer plans that enable workers to keep their benefits as they move amongst employers in a given locality. The state should also require employers to expand eligibility to all who work for them, in any capacity.

E. Transition Assistance

In the current era, it is inevitable that many will have periods in which they are not in the labor force. Sometimes these will be periods of involuntary unemployment between jobs. Sometimes individuals voluntarily take time out of the workforce to care for a young child or an elderly dependent. Other times, workers will need to retool, learn new skills, or reposition themselves in relation to the changing requirements of work. Thus one of the most pressing needs of workers today is to have income support for these times of transition. To design meaningful employment protections we need to design ways to support workers as they move in and out of the changing, boundaryless
workplace. That is, we need to find a way to provide everyone with transition assistance.

There are various approaches we could take to the problem of transition assistance. One would be to expand the welfare system by eliminating the work requirement and time limits. However, given the intense opposition to welfare in any form in the United States, this approach is politically inconceivable. Alternatively, we might consider a proposal that has been much discussed in Europe—social drawing rights.

The concept of social drawing rights grew out of a 1999 study sponsored by the European Commission and conducted by a group of labor relations experts under the chairmanship of Professor Alain Supiot. The group was charged with considering the impact of changes in the workplace on labor regulation in Europe. In 2000 it issued a report, known as the Supiot Report. The Report describes a changing employment landscape in Europe that mirrors changes that have occurred in the United States—a movement away from internal labor markets toward more flexible industrial relations practices. It found that the new work practices have entailed a loss of job and income security for European workers. The Report called for new mechanisms to provide workers with “active security” to equip individuals to move from one job to another.150

The Supiot Report contained a number of suggestions for changes in the institutions regulating work to provide active security. Their most visionary proposal was for the creation of “social drawing rights” to facilitate worker mobility and to enable workers to weather transitions. Under the proposal, an individual would accumulate social drawing rights on the basis of time spent at work. The drawing rights could be used for paid leave for purposes of obtaining training, working in the family sphere, or performing charitable or public service work. It would be a right that the individual could invoke on an optional basis to navigate career transitions, thereby giving flexibility and security in an era of uncertainty. As Supiot writes, “They are drawing rights as they can be brought into effect on two conditions: establishment of sufficient reserve and the decision of the holder to make use of that reserve. They are social drawing rights as they are social both in the way they are established...and in their aims (social usefulness).”151

The Report explained that the concept of social drawing rights is derived from existing arrangements in which workers have rights to time off from work for specified purposes such as union representation, maternity leave, and so forth. It makes an analogy to sabbatical leaves, maternity leaves, time off

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151. SUPIOT, ET. AL., supra note 150, at 56.
for union representatives and training vouchers to observe that “we are surely witnessing here the emergence of a new type of social right, related to work in general.” Social drawing rights would smooth these transitions and give individuals the resources to retool and to weather the unpredictable cycles of today’s workplace.

In the United States, we have precedents for the concept of paid time off with re-employment rights to facilitate career transitions or life emergencies. There are well-established precedents for paid leaves for military service, jury duty, union business, and other socially valuable activities. Some occupations also offer periodic sabbatical leaves. The concept is also built into the idea of temporary disability in state workers’ compensation and other insurance programs, which provide compensation and guarantee re-employment after for temporary absences. The Family and Medical Leave Act extends the concept of leave time to parenting obligations, although it does not mandate that such leave time be compensated. These programs all reflect and acknowledge the importance of subsidized time away from the workplace to facilitate greater contribution to the workplace. They could serve as the basis for developing a more generalized concept of career transition leave or a workplace sabbatical.

VII.
CONCLUSION

The workplace is changing and the employment laws must change as well. Workers today are forced to bear many new risks in the labor market: risks of job loss, wage variability, benefit gaps, skill obsolescence, and intermittent prolonged periods of unemployment. Our labor laws do not address these problems, either for regular or for atypical workers. The changing nature of work creates new opportunities for workers, but also new types of vulnerabilities. As employer-employee attachment becomes episodic rather than long term, the problem of transitions has risen to the fore. The challenge for regulation today is not to recreate the era of worker-employer attachment, but to find a means to provide workers with support structures to enable them to weather career transitions.

This article has made some proposals for reform that are designed primarily to provide livelihood security and ease transitions as workers move around in the boundaryless labor market. The proposals only scratch the surface of the profound changes in our labor laws that are made necessary by the changing workplace. Simply enumerating these proposals demonstrates both how far-reaching change must be and how difficult it will be to attain. Yet if we are going to formulate policy that is relevant to the present era, it is necessary to think broadly, no matter how quixotic it may seem.