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Recommended Citation

Link to publisher version (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38K96S

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E-COMMERCE: DIGITAL SIGNATURES: FEDERAL LEGISLATION

THE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT

By Jonathan E. Stern

Electronic commerce is rapidly redefining this nation's economy. This past year's revenues amounted to about $490 billion in United States online purchases. By 2004, the United States will transact online sales reaching an estimated $3.2 trillion. The Internet boom motivated the Clinton Administration to publish a July 1997 report encouraging the private sector to respond to the public's "wariness of conducting extensive business over the Internet because of the lack of a predictable legal environment governing transactions" and to help create "a uniform commercial legal framework that recognizes, facilitates, and enforces electronic transactions worldwide."4

The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ("E-Sign" or the "Act"),5 which took effect on October 1, 2000,6 responds to this challenge by authorizing legally enforceable electronic signatures, contracts, and other electronic records that affect interstate or foreign commerce.7 E-Sign is significant for commerce in general and electronic commerce in particular because it provides equal legal validity for electronic and paper-based agreements. Since "[l]egal uncertainty is the antithesis of strong and efficient markets," it is believed that E-Sign will revolutionize businesses in the United States by providing a basis for legal confidence in an area where lawful certainty has been glaringly absent.8

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2. Id.
4. Id.
6. Section 107 of E-Sign provides certain exceptions to the requirement that E-Sign take effect on October 1, 2000. For example, all requirements by federal or state statute, regulation or other law that records be retained take effect on March 1, 2001. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7007(b)(1)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 2001).
7. Id. § 7001(a)(1)-(2).
Although E-Sign is certain to increase business and consumer trust in creating electronic contracts, the Internet continues to be an environment where individuals can anonymously penetrate into computers and databases, causing companies and individuals great financial harm. Computer hackers\(^9\) have regularly stolen private identifying information such as private keys and passwords, in order to purchase goods and commit crimes in other people’s names.\(^11\) Because of the Internet’s porous security protection, members of the digital community have been exploring how to allocate risk in the event of a security breach. Through this inquiry, three core issues have been identified as security risks: authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation.\(^12\)

\(^9\) In the past year, for instance, hackers have penetrated into and attacked prominent websites such as Amazon.com, Yahoo, and eBay. M.J. Zuckerman, Hackers, Security Pros Call Web Attacks Vandalism: Consultants Ponder Motive, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2000, at 13A. Computer-savvy criminals have also appropriated personal information contained on large computer databases and then sold that data for a profit. See Ann Cavoukian, Identity Theft: Who’s Using Your Name, at http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/pubpres/sum_pap/papers/ident-e.htm (June 1997). Moreover, private information has even been uploaded from individuals’ personal computers. In 1999, for instance, a flaw in Microsoft’s Excel spreadsheet program was detected, which permitted computer hackers to copy private files from a person’s home computer without his knowledge. Martha Mendoza, Warning for Web Surfers: Hackers Able to Steal Off PCs with Excel, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 6, 1999, at A7. More recently, hackers broke into Microsoft’s computer systems and may have stolen source code to newer versions of its Windows operating system as well as portions of Word and Excel. Janet Rae-Dupree, Windows Hack Attack: Worming into Microsoft, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 6, 2000, at 44.


\(^11\) See Cavoukian, supra note 9. In light of these recent security breaches, the results of a study conducted by the Information Technology Association of America in April 1999 should come as no surprise. See Millennium Digital Commerce Act of 1999: Hearing on S.761 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Harris N. Miller, President, Information Technology Association of America) [hereinafter Statement of Harris N. Miller]. Measuring the perceptions of top executives and their customers from across the information technology industry, the study found that 62% of respondents believed lack of trust was the primary barrier to e-commerce and that specific obstacles included privacy protection (60%), authentication (56%), and security (56%). Id. Results like these support the White House’s belief that the public is “wary of conducting extensive business over the Internet.” Clinton & Gore, supra note 3.

\(^12\) E.g., Amelia H. Boss, Searching for Security in the Law of Electronic Commerce, 588 PLI/PAT 401, 416 (2000); C. Bradford Biddle, Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability Allocation in a Public Key Infrastructure, 33
This Note focuses on the element of authentication in electronic transactions and examines which party should bear the risk of financial loss when the authenticity of a signature is raised. Part I provides a brief overview of state legislation prior to E-Sign's enactment, as well as the various types of electronic signatures that can be used to create an electronic contract. Part II then describes E-Sign's most important provisions, including its scope, federal preemption clauses, and consumer protection provisions. Part III discusses E-Sign's approach and two other approaches to authenticating electronic signatures. Part IV illustrates the insufficiency of each model in fairly allocating risk to either the merchant or the unsophisticated consumer. Finally, this Note reviews these regimes and suggests which features of these different plans should be incorporated to create a law that provides consumer protections while also promoting the growth of e-commerce.

I. CREATING AN ELECTRONIC CONTRACT AND SIGNATURE

Electronic signatures can be created in a variety of ways. Prior to E-Sign's enactment, states were inconsistent in defining which methods could create an authentic electronic signature. This Part describes those state provisions that preceded E-Sign's enactment as well as the range of electronic signatures that the Act currently permits.

A. Electronic Signatures Prior to E-Sign

Before E-Sign became law, legislation differed on what would constitute a valid electronic signature. Originally, digital signatures were the favored technology in electronic signatures statutes, as they supposedly offered "a technology-based cure for many of the security risks encour-

SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1143, 1146 (1996). Authentication addresses the issue of locating the source or sender of a message and verifying that it actually came from the sender. Integrity relates to the problem of proving that a message is complete and has not been distorted. Non-repudiation relates to the risk that a sender may disclaim a record after another party receives it. Id.

13. Note that the authentication element was identified by 56% of the respondents in the ITAA survey as an obstacle to e-commerce's development. Statement of Harris N. Miller, supra note 11.

14. See generally Biddle, supra note 12 (critiquing various model for allocating risk when privacy is compromised). The security risks of authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation are often inseparable. Therefore, much of the following discussion is equally relevant to the other categories as well.

15. See infra text accompanying notes 33-40.
tered in online commerce.”16 For example, in 1995, Utah17 (followed by Minnesota18 and Washington19) became the first state to enact an electronic signature statute setting forth specific rules governing digital signatures and public key infrastructures (“PKIs”).20 By 1999, the popularity of digital signature statutes had waned significantly, and a technology-neutral approach became increasingly popular.21 Just prior to October 1, 2000, when E-Sign went into effect, eighteen states, including Utah and Minnesota, had already adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”), which permits any form of electronic symbol or message to qualify as a signature.22 Under UETA, these signatures are valid whenever an electronic symbol or message is coupled with the signer’s intent to authenticate the contract.23

Although most states that had adopted an electronic signature statute eventually implemented a technology-neutral approach, businesses wishing to execute electronic contracts continued to lack certainty that their contracts would be recognized nationwide.24 As a result, E-Sign was enacted to create greater uniformity and bolster the public’s confidence in the legal validity of electronic contracts throughout the nation.

B. Variety of Electronic Signatures Permitted by E-Sign

E-Sign defines an electronic signature as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the re-

18. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325K (West 1997).
20. A public key infrastructure is a system consisting of “digital certificates, Certification Authorities, and other registration authorities that verify and authenticate the validity of each party involved” in an online transaction. Currently, there is no existing uniform standard for constructing a PKI. Webopedia, at http://webopedia.internet.com/Term/P/PKI.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2001).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 49-55.
cord."25 Perhaps the easiest way to create a binding electronic signature under this provision would be to accept a contract by clicking "yes" on an icon on a computer screen.26 An individual could also bind himself to a contract by signing an e-mail with his name or by typing an "X."27 Currently, many commercial transactions are effected using more advanced technological approaches. One common method of creating a valid signature is the "shared secrets" method. This process involves the use of passwords or credit card numbers to establish the necessary intent to conclude a transaction.28 For example, one might purchase a novel by selecting the desired publication and then entering a credit card number to both pay for a book and manifest intent to be bound by the sale.

A more complex method of signing a contract is through biometric authentication.29 Biometric authentication operates by sampling and electronically retaining a physiological characteristic of a user (such as a fingerprint) in that individual's user profile. When the user invokes the authentication procedure, the characteristic is measured again and compared with the reference profile. Whenever an individual successfully replicates the previously stored physiological characteristic, the signature and identity of the individual is authenticated.30 Biometric technology can identify

26. Harris Ominsky, Oops! I Just Clicked My Life Away, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 26, 2000, at 7. While it is true that companies such as Amazon.com did permit click-through shopping prior to E-Sign, the Act formalizes the validity of these contracts. Until E-Sign, Amazon was forced to either rely on conflicting state laws that had enacted electronic or digital signature statutes or assume the risk that federal or state courts would enforce these contracts. In other words, Amazon did not have any clear indication that a consumer's click on the "I Agree" or "yes" icon would necessarily bind either Amazon or the consumer to fulfill the terms of a contract.
27. David W. Carstens, Contracts Have a New Look Thanks to E-Signature Act, TEX. LAW., July 31, 2000, at 54. It has also been suggested that an individual could accept an offer by producing an electronic sound such as a musical note. Ominsky, supra note 26, at 7.
an individual through recognition of a fingerprint, signature, voice, or iris. Therefore, to bind oneself to a contract, one might place one's hand on a specially designed platform. When one's handprint matches the previously stored print identifying the user, a binding electronic signature is immediately created.

The digital signature is another significant means of creating an electronic signature. As discussed above, its initial popularity led some states, prior to the enactment of E-Sign, to confine legally cognizable electronic signatures narrowly to digital signatures. Digital signatures involve the use of a private and public key pair that are usually purchased by a sender and issued by a Certification Authority ("CA"). A CA, which can be created through a PKI, is a trusted third party who checks and verifies the identity of the person requesting the key pair. The private key that an individual receives is to remain secret and is not to be distributed to anyone other than the key owner. The public key, on the other hand, can be made widely available and can be found by accessing a CA's public database. The public-private key pairs are mathematically related such that a message encrypted with a private key can only be decrypted with a public key. Therefore, if a sender signs a document with his private key, the recipient can use the sender's public key and signature to confirm the authenticity of the document.

32. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
35. See Boss, supra note 12, at 416-17.
36. See supra note 20; infra text accompanying notes 104-06.
37. See Boss, supra note 12, at 417.
38. One article has explained that the public-private key set is similar to secret decoder rings that are found in boxes of cereal in that "each ring only fits into its companion ring and no other." Daniel J. Greenwood & Ray A. Campbell, Electronic Commerce Legislation: From Written On Paper And Signed In Ink To Electronic Records And Online Authentication, 53 BUS. LAW. 307, 311 (1997).
39. See Boss, supra note 12, at 416.
40. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 38, at 311. The technology operates in the following way. If Alice wishes to send secure information to Bob, Alice performs a mathematical computation on her document, known as a "hash" function, which creates a
II. IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF E-SIGN

A. Electronic Contract Defined

E-Sign’s terms provide a basis for creating legally valid documents that are electronically signed, recorded, and available for future reference. It therefore allows parties to bind themselves contractually by means other than the traditional pen and paper. For instance, by clicking “I Agree” on an online purchase form for the casebook *Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age*, one has simultaneously created a legally binding electronic signature and electronic record.

A significant distinction between electronic commerce and paper-based commerce is that electronic transactions can be executed instantly between computers. E-Sign facilitates this ease in consummating transactions by broadly defining the term “electronic signature.” The speed with which contracts can be given effect is similarly enhanced by E-Sign’s effort to promote the freedom of contract between parties. To this end, E-Sign requires that consent to create an electronic contract is voluntary.

unique string of code called a “message digest.” Biddle, supra note 12, at 1149. Because the message digest is based on the specific content of Alice’s original document, any changes to the document would yield a different message digest. Alice then encrypts this message digest using her private key, attaches this digital signature to the end of the document, and sends the document to Bob. When Bob receives Alice’s message, he can independently run the same hash function on the original message to determine what the content of the original message digest should be. He then decrypts Alice’s digital signature, using Alice’s public key. If Bob sees that the message digest in Alice’s decrypted digital signature matches the message digest that Bob calculated from the message of his own, then Bob knows that the information has not been altered and that the message could only have been sent using Alice’s private key. If, on the other hand, the digests do not match, then the authenticity of the message is instantly called into question.

41. See supra Part I.B. An electronic signature is broadly defined as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.” 15 U.S.C.A § 7006 (West Supp. 2001). The term electronic record “means a contract or other record created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.” Id. Finally, the term “electronic” means “relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.” Id.

42. See supra text accompanying notes 26-40.

43. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (2d ed. 2000).

44. Boss, supra note 12, at 404.


and that interested parties define what procedures will create an authentic signature or contract.\textsuperscript{47} These provisions help to permit the application of an array of technologies that can bind parties to a contract through means such as click-through provisions, digital signatures, and biometrics.\textsuperscript{48}

B. Preemption

E-Sign provides that all state laws related to electronic signatures and contracts are preempted unless they constitute an adoption of UETA\textsuperscript{49} or specify alternative procedures that are technologically neutral\textsuperscript{50} and consistent with Titles I and II of the Act.\textsuperscript{51} The principle underlying this provision is the presumed importance of uniformity among the states.\textsuperscript{52} Proponents of E-Sign argue that states’ differences in electronic signature laws impede the growth of e-commerce because parties are unwilling to

\textsuperscript{47} Id. § 7001(c)(1)(A) (An electronic record satisfies the requirement that information be in writing if “the consumer has affirmatively consented to such use and has not withdrawn such consent.”).

\textsuperscript{48} See supra Part I.B.


\textsuperscript{50} States acting as market participants are exempted from having to take a technology-neutral stance. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(b) (West Supp. 2001). It stands to reason that this exception was instituted because a state engaged in an electronic transaction is inevitably forced to select a particular technology in conducting its transaction. See Allowing Use of Electronic Signatures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Andy Pincus, General Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Commerce) [hereinafter Statement of Andy Pincus] (explaining that an earlier version of the Electronic Signatures bill that did not contain the above provision compelled the government to undermine its technology neutrality when having to choose one among competing authentication providers).

\textsuperscript{51} 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a)(2) (West Supp. 2001). Titles I and II present the key provisions related to the creation and enforceability of electronic signatures. Meanwhile, the Act’s other Titles, III and IV, respectively address the responsibilities of the Secretary of Commerce in promoting electronic signatures and the authority of the Commission on Child Online Protection to accept gifts.

risk entering into an online contract without certainty regarding its legality nationwide.\(^{53}\) Indeed, should conflicting state laws exist, companies would be forced to customize their services to meet the requirements of each state.\(^{54}\) This, in turn, could disproportionately harm businesses by raising costs and making it difficult to serve customers cost-effectively.\(^{55}\)

E-Sign’s advocates also point out that, barring preemption, it could take many years before states independently enact uniform laws. For instance, it took nine years for the Uniform Commercial Code to be adopted, and even then, Louisiana and the District of Columbia did not adopt it entirely.\(^{56}\) Similarly, the Uniform Securities Act, which was first proposed in the 1950s and was revised in the 1980s, still has failed to provide uniform state securities laws.\(^{57}\) Thus, history has demonstrated that it is unwise to simply wait for the nation to uniformly enact UETA.\(^{58}\) Instead, by requiring states to adopt either UETA or legislation that is significantly, if not entirely, similar to E-Sign, the United States immediately provides nationwide uniformity regarding the legal validity of an electronic contract.\(^{59}\)


\(^{54}\) Id.

\(^{55}\) Id.


\(^{57}\) Id.

\(^{58}\) Recent developments appear to undermine this claim. Indeed, it appears that UETA has swiftly gained nationwide recognition. In addition to the eighteen states that have already adopted UETA, as of August 2000, ten other states and the District of Columbia were considering its adoption. See Beard, supra note 22, at 139.

\(^{59}\) Opponents to the preemption clauses contained in E-Sign argue that the Act unnecessarily infringes upon states’ rights. They argue that since the federal government is responsible in determining whether a state has complied with the statute, every contract case involving uncertainty as to the validity or legal effect of an electronic signature could possibly contain a federal question. This would necessarily result in federal involvement in areas of contract law that have traditionally been reserved to the states. Second, since E-Sign was partly motivated by a desire to respond to changing market conditions, preemption should be discouraged because states are more capable than the federal government in making swift adjustments to shifts in the market. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce (E-Sign) Act: Hearing on H.R. 1714 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judi-
C. Consumer Protections

E-Sign appears to provide extensive consumer protections against unintentionally entering into an electronic contract; however, these provisions can be misleading. E-Sign mandates that if a statute, law, or regulation requires that information be provided or made available in writing to a consumer, the use of electronic records is permitted upon compliance with detailed specifications and disclosures.\(^{60}\) In this case, the consumer must not only formally consent to receive records in electronic form,\(^{61}\) but the party required to furnish the information must also:

1) inform the consumer of any right or option to receive a record in nonelectronic form;\(^{62}\)

2) inform the consumer of the right to withdraw consent to receive electronic notice and explain any consequences or fees upon termination;\(^{63}\)

3) inform the consumer whether the consent is to a particular transaction or to a category of notices made available during the course of the parties' relationship;\(^{64}\)

4) describe the procedures for withdrawal of consent and for updating information that is needed to contact the consumer electronically;\(^{65}\)

5) inform the consumer on how to obtain a paper-based copy of an electronic record and whether a fee will be charged;\(^{66}\)

6) notify the consumer of the necessary hardware and software requirements for access to and retention of records;\(^{67}\) and

7) ensure that the consumer consents electronically or confirms electronically in a manner that confirms that the consumer can access information in the necessary electronic form.\(^{68}\)


\(^{61}\) Id. § 7001(c)(1)(A).

\(^{62}\) Id. § 7001(c)(1)(B)(i)(I).

\(^{63}\) Id. § 7001(c)(1)(B)(i)(II).

\(^{64}\) Id. § 7001(c)(1)(B)(ii).

\(^{65}\) Id. § 7001(c)(1)(B)(iii).

\(^{66}\) Id. § 7001(c)(1)(B)(iv).

\(^{67}\) Id. § 7001(c)(1)(C)(i).

\(^{68}\) Id. § 7001(c)(1)(C)(ii).
Although these requirements appear extensive, the Act limits their reach with a provision holding that a failure to obtain electronic consent or confirmation of consent does not immediately deny the legal effectiveness, validity, or enforceability of any contract entered into with the consumer. It is therefore unclear whether a contract is valid when a business that is statutorily required to make information available in writing fails to do so. Should a court find such contracts to be enforceable, all of the above provisions would effectively be rendered moot. Furthermore, these provisions do not require consumer consent before all electronic dealings. Rather, these clauses only apply when an existing law requires that information be provided or made available in writing to a consumer. This means that e-businesses that are not currently required to provide paper-based records, such as Amazon.com, are not obligated to abide by any of these provisions.

Even though the sections described above only apply to a small class of consumers, E-Sign also contains provisions that benefit all individuals who fall outside of these clauses. For instance, due to the loss of “ceremonial psychology” that is involved when an individual signs a document while sitting in the presence of a notary who affixes a seal to verify the signer, E-Sign requires that certain writings remain paper-based so that contractual parties can maintain awareness regarding the gravity of their signing. Therefore, court orders, notices regarding utility termination, and regulations governing adoption, divorce, or other matters of family law are all still processed through physical, nonelectronic documentation. E-Sign also calls for a federal study of the extent to which the provisions of the law benefit or burden electronic commerce while charging the Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission to recommend how the Act should be altered in order to protect consumers better. Lastly, the Act permits any federal regulatory agency, following notice to the public and an opportunity for public comment, to exempt a

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69. *Id.* § 7001(c)(3).
70. *Id.* § 7001(c)(1).
71. See Ominsky, *supra* note 26, at 7.
72. Much of this ceremony is lost on the Internet since individuals can now create valid contracts by simply clicking “yes” on an icon on their computer screens. *Id.*
74. *Id.* § 7003(b)(2)(A).
75. *Id.* § 7003(a)(2).
76. Uniform Commercial Code sections 1-207 and 1-206 and Articles 2 and 2A are also exempted from the electronic record provisions. *Id.* § 7003(a)(3).
77. *Id.* § 7005(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2001).
78. *Id.* § 7005(b).
category or type of record from requirements relating to consumer consent to the use of electronic records.\footnote{79} This exemption, however, can only be effected when it will not materially harm consumers and is necessary to eliminate a significant burden on electronic commerce.\footnote{80}

III. THREE LEGISLATIVE MODELS FOR AUTHENTICATION

Although E-Sign makes significant strides in creating a national standard for forming electronic contracts, the Act does not explicitly address the problem of who should be responsible for proving the authenticity of a signature.\footnote{81} Consequently, E-Sign creates the possibility that consumers will be liable when their secret passwords and codes are stolen and fraudulently used.\footnote{82} Given the increasing difficulties in providing a safe environment in which to transact online business,\footnote{83} it is worthwhile to examine E-Sign and other models that contain elements that can help generate greater consumer confidence and security protection. This Part provides a description of the different models and Part IV analyzes the success and failure of each proposal in safeguarding the consumer while stimulating the growth of the digital economy.

A. E-Sign and UETA’s Technology-Neutral Approach

E-Sign forbids any state or federal statute from requiring a specific technology for electronic transactions.\footnote{84} This technology-neutral approach instead allows the market to decide which technologies will best facilitate electronic commerce.\footnote{85} Naturally, this is a position that most businesses gladly embrace.\footnote{86} Without the hindrance of any specific technologies,
businesses are free to construct their own methods and security procedures to transact business with customers.\textsuperscript{87}

In addition to its promotion of technology-neutrality, E-Sign does not enumerate any standards for attributing responsibility in the event that an electronic signature is forged or stolen. Instead, E-Sign presumably relies on existing laws or future litigation to determine who will carry the evidentiary burden of proving the inauthenticity of a signature. UETA,\textsuperscript{88} on the other hand, also adopts a technology-neutral regime but creates a framework for attributing an electronic signature. It states that "[a]n electronic record or signature is to be attributed to a person if it was the act of the person."\textsuperscript{89} Relevant evidence in establishing this fact includes any "showing of the efficacy of any security procedure" that helps to establish who attached the signature.\textsuperscript{90} UETA also clarifies that the effect of a record or signature on the person to whom it is attributed is to be determined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of the creation, execution, or adoption of the record.\textsuperscript{91} These provisions inform the individual that, in the absence of any identifiable abnormalities in the transmission of a signature, a consumer will likely have the burden of proving that a fraudulent signature does not belong to her.\textsuperscript{92}

B. The Credit Card and Automatic Teller Machine Model

The liability allocations and evidentiary burdens contained in the Truth in Lending Act\textsuperscript{93} and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ("EFTA")\textsuperscript{94} are "among the most radical, and successful, consumer protection initiatives of the 1970s."\textsuperscript{95} Both Acts place significant limitations on the liability of consumer credit cardholders for unauthorized transactions. Regulation Z issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System\textsuperscript{96} mandates that a cardholder will not be held responsible for more than $50 or

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{87} As discussed in Part IV however, though this is beneficial for merchants, it is unclear that this approach adequately protects consumers.
  \item \textsuperscript{88} See supra text accompanying note 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{89} \textsc{Unif. Elec. Transactions Act} § 9 (a), 7A U.L.A. 32 (Supp. 2000).
  \item \textsuperscript{90} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{91} Id. § 9(b).
  \item \textsuperscript{92} Id. § 9 cmt. 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{95} Winn, \textit{supra} note 93, at 1235.
  \item \textsuperscript{96} 12 C.F.R. § 226.1.
\end{itemize}
the actual amount of unauthorized charges, whichever is less.\textsuperscript{97} Even this small sum may not be charged to a cardholder unless the following requirements have been met:

1) the card was accepted by the consumer;
2) the card issuer provided the consumer with adequate notice of his or her personal liability;
3) the issuer provided the consumer with an adequate means of notifying the issuer in the event the card is lost or stolen;
4) the issuer provided a means of identifying the authorized user of the card; and
5) the unauthorized use occurred prior to notification by the cardholder to the issuer of the loss or theft of the card.\textsuperscript{98}

This loss allocation rule places the risk of unauthorized use chiefly on the financial institutions responsible for issuing and processing the credit cards.\textsuperscript{99} As a result of this loss allocation rule, credit card companies have invested large sums of money to reduce the incidence of credit card losses.\textsuperscript{100}

With regard to Electronic Fund Transfers ("EFTs"), such as the use of an Automatic Teller Machine ("ATM") for transfers or direct deposits from a consumer account, the provisions of Regulation E are similar to those of Regulation Z, except that under Regulation E consumer protections decrease when the consumer does not take immediate action to report a loss or theft.\textsuperscript{101} As a result, Regulation E provides protection for the

\textsuperscript{97} Id. § 226.12.
\textsuperscript{98} 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(2)-(3).
\textsuperscript{100} Fraud loss prevention techniques include the placement of photographs on credit cards to make it more difficult to replicate them and data mining techniques that allow the card issuer to locate usage patterns that are associated with theft or fraudulent credit card use before the cardholder may even realize that her credit card has been compromised. See Winn, supra note 93, at 1235.
\textsuperscript{101} 12 C.F.R. § 205.6. The consumer who promptly reports the loss or theft of an "access device"—that is, a card, code, or other means of accessing a consumer’s account for the purposes of effecting an EFT—is liable for the lesser of $50 or the amount of the unauthorized EFTs. Id. But a consumer who fails to notify a financial institution within two days of learning of the loss or theft may be liable for up to $500. Id. Meanwhile, a consumer who fails to report the loss or theft of the access device within sixty days of the account statement being transmitted to the consumer may be liable for the entire amount of unauthorized charges that occur after the sixty days and before the consumer finally
conscientious EFT user but requires that the consumer assume liability for failing to report a genuine theft in a timely manner.

C. Digital Signature Laws and the Open PKI System

In 1995, Utah became the first state to adopt a full-fledged digital signatures statute\textsuperscript{102} that supported a public key infrastructure.\textsuperscript{103} The Utah legislation was based on the efforts of the American Bar Association’s Information Security Committee, which, following a four-year collaborative effort between attorneys and technologists, published a set of Digital Signature Guidelines.\textsuperscript{104} The model presented by the Utah statute and the American Bar Association is referred to as the “open PKI” business model.

An open PKI model assumes that subscribers obtain a digital certificate from a certification authority that will securely link their identity to their public key for use in creating electronic contracts. Generally, “the certificate issued by the CA has no boundaries upon the class or set of relying parties . . . entitled to rely upon it.”\textsuperscript{105} Thus, an open PKI environment permits an individual to acquire a digital certificate and then enter into transactions that require a digital signature, such as the ordering of products online, signing contracts, and submitting papers to a government office.\textsuperscript{106} Under the Utah Act, the state acts as the root certification authority and provides for the licensing of certification authorities.

In creating its PKI, the Utah law attempted to provide greater certainty as to the authenticity of an electronic signature. The Utah Act provides that if a digital signature is verified by the public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a licensed CA, it is established that (1) the subscriber has accepted the corresponding certificate and thereby assumed the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the key, (2) the digital signature is that of the subscriber listed in the certificate, and (3) the digital signature was affixed with the intention of signing the message.\textsuperscript{107} These provisions in-
form us that there is a presumption that a digital signature contained in a
contract belongs to the signature owner. Table 1 in the appendix summa-
rizes the key provisions of each of the four models discussed above.

IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
MODELS

A. Technology Neutrality under E-Sign and UETA

One justification for E-Sign’s technology-neutral approach\(^{108}\) is the
concern that technology can easily become obsolete, thereby rendering a
technology-specific approach unsafe or inefficient.\(^{109}\) Some academics
argue that it is imprudent to require a specific technology when conduct-
ing electronic transactions before more is known about the actual practices
of merchants and consumers in the e-commerce marketplace.\(^{110}\) Moreover,
requiring a particular technology can result in the consumer’s use of tech-

ology that is relatively easy for a hacker to manipulate in order to steal an
individual’s identity and commit fraud. However, while the technology-
neutral approach creates room for improvements in technology, E-Sign
also permits the continuation of insecure electronic commercial transac-
tions even when inexpensive and easily accessible alternatives are avail-
able.\(^{111}\)

Perhaps the most pressing problem with E-Sign is that it mandates
technology-neutrality without creating guidelines for attributing responsi-
bility when the authenticity of a signature is called into question. Pres-
ently, current legislation and common law tort principles can be relied on
when a consumer is found to have protected confidential information or
passwords negligently. For instance, if Alice negligently types her secret
password in a chat room and an individual discovers it and conducts trans-
actions totaling $25,000, current law mandates that Alice is liable for her
irresponsible behavior.\(^{112}\) However, existing case law has not yet deter-
mained whether Alice would be held liable in the event that she exercised
reasonable care and her password was nevertheless stolen from her com-

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108. See supra Part III.A.
109. See Boss, supra note 12, at 441.
110. See Winn, supra note 93, at 1183.
111. An argument has also been made that it should be against public policy to allow
large commercial transactions to take place without a minimum technology-specific
threshold requirement. See Statement of Andy Pincus, supra note 50.
112. See C. Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners: Digital Signature Laws
puter.\textsuperscript{113} Today, hackers can break into an individual’s computer with almost complete anonymity, and oftentimes, with impunity.\textsuperscript{114} Consequently, not only will it be very difficult for Alice to locate the elusive password-snatcher, but she will also be forced to prove to the court that she indeed behaved with reasonable care.\textsuperscript{115} Moreover, given that the thief will almost never be found, there are no specific provisions that dictate who should be held liable for the loss: Alice, the business who accepted her stolen password, or perhaps the company who originally issued Alice her password.

Although UETA does contain a framework for attributing responsibility, its provisions effectively guarantee the same result that could occur under E-Sign. By requiring the sender to prove the inauthenticity of a signature,\textsuperscript{116} UETA formally establishes that, in the above scenarios, Alice would have the burden of proof in showing that she was not responsible for a stolen signature or password.\textsuperscript{117} As in E-Sign, not only may she not be able to prove her innocence, but she may also lack the resources with which to hire competent counsel. Thus, regardless of whether states adopt UETA or accept E-Sign, consumers will often not have any legal protection when contracts are made using their stolen signatures.

In sum, the technology-neutral approach of both E-Sign and UETA can create a dangerous environment for consumers entering contracts using inferior technology. The laws also shift an inordinate amount of risk onto the unsophisticated consumer. Although UETA initially appears to be more valuable to the consumer by presenting a framework for attributing

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{113} For example, a corrupt computer repairman might search Alice’s files and copy her personal codes in the process of repairing her broken computer. There are also many other ways that a private key can be stolen: one can steal another’s identity and receive a digital certificate in that person’s name; an employee of a CA responsible for issuing certificates can be bribed; a disgruntled employee can steal a key and enter into beneficial commercial transactions; or a criminal could break the underlying algorithm to discover a CA’s private key by analyzing the CA’s public key. See, e.g., Biddle supra note 12, at 1189; Michael J. Osty & Michael J. Pulcanio, \textit{The Liability of Certification Authorities to Relying Third Parties}, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 961, 967-68 (1999).
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Gaining anonymity on the Internet is frightfully easy. For instance, Anonymizer.com provides a free service whereby anyone accessing its website can anonymously surf other webpages. See http://www.anonymizer.com (last visited Feb. 9, 2001). This reality has also been captured poignantly by a \textit{New Yorker} cartoon featuring a conversation between two dogs seated next to a computer. The caption reads: “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.” Peter Steiner, \textit{NEW YORKER}, July 5, 1993, at 61.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} See Biddle, supra note 112, at 1236.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9 cmt. 2, 7A U.L.A. 32 (Supp. 2000).
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Note that under E-Sign Alice will most probably have the burden of proof, whereas UETA explicitly states that the burden is on her.
\end{itemize}
the authenticity of a signature, in practice UETA will tend to favor businesses at the expense of consumers.

B. The Credit Card Model

Currently, both merchants and consumers are protected from liability in credit card transactions. However, if Regulations Z or E were applied to non-credit-card transactions, the burden of proving the authenticity of a signature would unfairly shift to the merchant, who would be required to assume all responsibility for negligent or fraudulent losses in excess of $50. By virtually eliminating consumer responsibility in the event of consumer negligence or fraud, the consumer would be well protected in the digital economy. Yet, just as consumers are severely limited in their ability to prove that a fraudulent signature does not belong to them, merchants have little ability to detect whether an individual is providing passwords or digital signatures that do not belong to her.

Regulation Z and E-type legislation in non-credit-card transactions is also less practical in a technology-neutral digital economy. Unlike the credit card system, where a company is secure in the knowledge that consumer transactions can only be effected through limited, specific means—such as providing a credit card number or personal identification number—electronic signature transactions involve a great variety of devices and methods. It would not be fair, for example, to apply the same $50

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118. Many credit card companies including American Express, Visa, and MasterCard have waived the $50 liability limit in an effort to convince consumers to continue to use credit cards online. See Andrea Bennett, The Best Ways to Pay Online, MONEY MAG., Oct. 15, 2000, at 106 (discussing the “zero liability” programs offered by American Express, Visa, and MasterCard).

119. While it is true that consumers and merchants are usually protected from liability since most electronic transactions are effected using credit cards, the growing popularity of cybercash and other non-credit card means to pay for goods requires this examination of alternative means to protect the parties involved. See, e.g., Paul D. Glenn, The Law of E-Commerce in the Financial Services Sector, 1156 PLI/CORP 771, 787-88 (1999); Cymonie Rowe, Technological Advances in Banking: A Move to a Global Economy, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1303, 1304-05 (1998) (describing the growing importance of cybercash and other internet payment schemes).

120. Barring statutory obligations, merchants would be reluctant to accept the scheme voluntarily. For instance, our heroine Alice would certainly be pleased to only have to pay $50 when a stolen password results in a $25,000 loss, but there is no reason to assume that merchants or other contracting parties would be willing to assume the risk of loss. Instead, merchants are apt to require consumers to accept a merchant’s disclaimer denying responsibility in the event of fraud or misappropriation. Currently, both UETA and the former Utah statute explicitly side with merchants in these scenarios when stating that a signature is considered authentic unless proven otherwise. See UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9 cmt. 2, 7A U.L.A. 32 (Supp. 2000).
limit to both a situation where the merchant demands that signatures be
effected through biometrics and a situation where a merchant allows any
form of technology to constitute a signature. The level of risk is calcul-
ated differently based on the technology used. In the credit card regime,
however, credit card companies can structure how they issue credit cards
or permit ATM transfers based on a uniform set of procedures. As a result,
the ease with which Regulations Z or E can be applied to e-commerce
transactions is limited.

C. The Utah Act

Although the Utah Act ensures that a minimum technology threshold
will govern all electronic transactions, the act functions in a similar way to
E-Sign by shifting an inordinate amount of risk onto the consumer. For
instance, a hacker who succeeds in identifying the methods used to control
Alice’s private key could forge her signature with great ease, potentially
caus[ing Alice significant financial hardship. By requiring the sender to
prove the inauthenticity of a signature, Utah’s provisions indicate that,
in this scenario, it will be up to Alice to provide evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption that she authenticated the signature. Because the statute concen-
trates risk on the original holder of the private key, consumers will often
have to pay for the loss.

The Utah law’s state-sanctioned licensing of Certification Authorities
arguably creates greater assurances as to the validity of an electronic sig-
nature. However, since the drafters of the Utah Act limited the liability of
CAs in order to foster development of a certification authority industry,
the cap on CA liability inappropriately shifts too much risk onto the con-
sumer. First, by permitting only digital signatures to authenticate con-
tracts, the statute runs the risk that the technology will become easier to
steal or imitate, as hackers will focus solely on cracking this one type of

121. It is also unadvisable to promote such legislation in a technology-specific re-
gime since technology is liable to become obsolete and, over time, will become more
susceptible to manipulation and fraud. In addition, it is impractical to require that, to pre-
vent fraud, consumers purchase expensive and more secure technology such as biomet-
rics since its cost would be prohibitive to many and would effectively bar millions from
contracting on-line.

122. Given recent events, this process should not be as difficult as it seems. For in-
stance, in as early as 1994, a Russian computer programmer removed $10 million from
Citibank customer accounts after discovering the code that authorizes fund transfers. See
David Gow & Richard Norton-Taylor, Surfing Superhighwaymen: Banks Have Good
Reason to Fear Thieves Who Hack Into their Secret Files, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 7, 1996,
at 28.

124. Biddle, supra note 12, at 1192.
technology. Second, not only may digital signatures become obsolete,\textsuperscript{125} digital signatures are already less reliable and more subject to fraud than signatures created through biometric technology.\textsuperscript{126} Third, the Act does not create incentives for CAs to take adequate precautions to protect their private keys from fraudulent use. A more concerned CA, such as one facing financial liability, would be stimulated to take extensive safety measures, such as creating complex digital signature algorithms that are difficult for hackers to crack, or limiting the types of transactions for which an electronic signature can be used.\textsuperscript{127}

The Utah statute is also unfair because a CA that negligently distributes an individual’s electronic signature can externalize the cost of its negligence onto otherwise defrauded subscribers. Meanwhile, since the Utah Act assumes that a digital signature verified by a public key belongs to the certificate holder, the consumer is likely to be held completely liable for all fraudulent uses of her signature, regardless of whether it was stolen or negligently distributed by a third party.\textsuperscript{128}

The presumption that a digital signature is signed by the owner of a private key also destroys a merchant’s incentive to gather or consider any evidence other than the digital signature when he evaluates whether to hold a consumer responsible for a document.\textsuperscript{129} It also allows a merchant to forgo the trouble of establishing a relationship with a consumer in order to confirm her responsibility.\textsuperscript{130} As a result, even though the Utah Act tends to provide more security than E-Sign’s approach, it suffers from the danger that digital signatures will become obsolete and that, similar to E-

\textsuperscript{125} Note that consumer risks related to the use of inferior technology in the marketplace absent guidelines for protecting the non-negligent consumer have already been discussed above. \textit{See supra} text accompanying notes 111-12.


\textsuperscript{127} It is also worth noting that even if the market will ultimately eliminate a particular negligent CA that does not mean that the market will succeed in significantly eliminating the problem of CA negligence altogether. That is because it can conceivably take many months to identify a negligent party. Even after that party has been identified, the CA-owner can easily reinvent the company by shutting down the website and reopening under a different name. Moreover, even though the Utah statute requires state approval for CAs, it does not require the state to conduct any policing efforts that would deny negligent CAs from re-registering. Lastly, such a scheme is particularly easy on the Internet where the start-up costs of an e-business are small relative to most brick-and-mortar companies.

\textsuperscript{128} It is conceivable that comparative negligence rules may apply in those states that have enacted comparative negligence statutes.

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{See} Wright, \textit{supra} note 30, at 68.

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Id.}
Sign, the consumer will bear the bulk of the risk. Table 2 in the appendix summarizes the relative risks of the four models for electronic signatures discussed above.

V. CONCLUSION: SEARCHING FOR A PRACTICAL SOLUTION

As Table 2 indicates, all of the above proposals contain distinct advantages and disadvantages. A technology-neutral regime such as E-Sign avoids the risk that outdated and increasingly insecure technology will be required in creating electronic contracts. However, technology neutrality also creates the likelihood that inferior and insecure technology may be applied when concluding contracts. The Utah statute remedies this difficulty by requiring the use of digital signatures, thereby guaranteeing that, in the immediate future at least, contracts will not be made with significantly inferior technology. At the same time, however, both E-Sign and the Utah law run the risk of making the consumer liable for both negligent and nonnegligent behavior. If Regulations Z or E were applied to the digital economy, the consumer would obtain significant protections, but the regulations would also result in the merchant's assumption of an inordinate amount of risk.

Clearly, none of the above proposals can perfectly address the liability concerns of authentication in e-commerce. Nevertheless, these schemes suggest the components that are needed to construct a fair system for authenticating electronic signatures. The historic success of the credit card and ATM schemes\(^\text{131}\) demonstrates that one economically efficient solution to the problems of authentication is to allocate the risk of loss to a third party such as a Certification Authority. Since there does not appear to be any just way to allocate risk to either the consumer or the merchant, such a scheme would have the immediate effect of relieving both parties from the burdensome evidentiary requirements of proving the (in)authenticity of an electronic signature. In addition, since the CAs will be the parties assuming the risk, they should be allowed to determine the type of technology to be applied when using their certificates to authenticate a signer. Should this type of proposal be adopted, the key challenge for future legislators would be to create an economic model that aids in the profitability of CAs while shielding the consumer from having to prove fraud or nonnegligence. Otherwise, rather than promoting the growth of

electronic commerce, E-Sign and its progeny may instead become a great impediment.
## APPENDIX

### Table 1: Summary of Major Electronic Signature Provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Permissible Technologies</th>
<th>Parties Involved</th>
<th>Presumption of Liability/ Evidentiary Burden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-Sign/UETA</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Merchant and Consumer</td>
<td>Signature Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation Z</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Merchant, Consumer, and Credit Card Company</td>
<td>Consumer and Merchant do not have any evidentiary burdens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation E</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Merchant, Consumer, and Credit Card Company</td>
<td>The Credit Card Company is responsible for proving that a consumer failed to report fraud or negligence in a timely manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah’s Digital Signature Act</td>
<td>Digital Signatures</td>
<td>Merchant, Consumer, and Certification Authority</td>
<td>Owner of Private Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Neutrality Under E-Sign &amp; UETA</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah Digital Signature Statute</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation Z (in the digital economy)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High (in non-credit-card transactions)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation E (in the digital economy)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High (in non-credit-card transactions)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a This column applies only to credit card and ATM card related transactions.*