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Attorney Liability under the State Securities Laws: Landscapes and Minefields

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# Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws:

**Landscapes and Minefields**

Marc I. Steinberg† and Chris Claassen††

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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, the United States Supreme Court has limited liability for attorneys under the federal securities acts. Prior to restrictive Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s, attorneys regularly were sued as aiders and abettors under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder and as sellers under section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933. Supreme Court decisions limiting the scope of these sections


2. 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (2005); see, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 1104 (1989). Section 10(b) provides:
   (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). Rule 10b-5 provides:
   (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
   (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
   (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

4. 15 U.S.C. § 77l (2005); see, e.g., Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980). Section 12(a) provides:
   (a) Any person who—
   (1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 5, or
   (2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 3, other than paragraphs (2) and (14) of subsection (a) thereof), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails,
have effectively precluded both avenues for attorney liability in private actions.\(^5\) For example, in *Pinter v. Dahl*,\(^6\) the Court held that, for purposes of section 12(a)(1), apart from the vendor of the security and its agent, a "seller" is one "who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner."\(^7\) This definition, which does not encompass attorneys rendering customary legal services,\(^8\) has been adopted as well in the section 12(a)(2) context.\(^9\) Additionally, as a result of *Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver*,\(^10\) attorneys no longer face secondary liability as "aiders and abettors" in section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 private actions.\(^11\) However, depending on the nature and extent of services performed, attorneys may face primary liability exposure under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.\(^12\)

Moreover, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) restricts the reach of state law.\(^13\) SLUSA preempts, with certain exceptions, recourse in state law for class actions involving nationally-traded securities.\(^14\)
The potential effect of SLUSA is that, outside of the derivative suit and merger and acquisition settings, complainants in class actions cannot invoke state securities and common law remedies. Hence, the parameters of federal laws normally confine attorney liability exposure in class actions involving nationally-traded securities.

Nevertheless, unless preempted by SLUSA, plaintiffs frequently prefer the state court forum. While attorney liability under the federal securities laws has received close attention in both the courts and legal literature, attorneys’ exposure under the state securities laws remains relatively uncertain. Consequently, the limited but significant risks that attorneys face when complainants seek to invoke the state securities laws warrant an examination of counsel’s liability under these state regimes.

This article surveys and analyzes attorney liability under state securities law. After presenting a succinct overview of applicable state law in Part II, the article then provides a more in-depth analysis of attorney liability exposure under these state statutes in Part III. The article concludes in Part IV with separate treatment of two frequently invoked state statutes—those of California and Texas.

II. OVERVIEW OF ATTORNEY LIABILITY UNDER STATE SECURITIES LAW

Perhaps surprisingly, the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 (USA) as interpreted creates a “liability gap” whereby attorneys may not be held liable in...
private actions under the USA even when they knowingly assist their clients in committing illegal conduct.\textsuperscript{23} As such, the scope of "seller" liability is often construed in accordance with the \textit{Pinter} test for "sellers," thereby ordinarily precluding attorneys from being saddled with primary liability.\textsuperscript{24} While the USA expressly provides secondary liability for certain enumerated groups, including "agents,"\textsuperscript{25} attorneys are not \textit{per se} included within these categories. Under this interpretative framework, as long as counsel's conduct is not such that he could be said to be "soliciting" or "effecting" the transaction, liability would not attach under the USA for a client's securities law violation even if the attorney knew of, and assisted in, the client's violation of the state's securities act.\textsuperscript{26} Nevertheless, attorneys may expose themselves to "seller" status under the state securities acts when they take an active role in the enterprise or transaction. As a generality, primary liability as a seller under state securities law may attach where the subject attorney would be considered a seller under the \textit{Pinter} test.\textsuperscript{27} Hence, circumstances may arise where attorneys may be primarily liable under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, while neither primarily nor secondarily liable under the USA.\textsuperscript{28}

Secondary liability for attorneys under the USA can arise in a number of situations. While the USA expressly provides secondary liability for certain enumerated groups, including "agents,"\textsuperscript{29} it does not include attorneys \textit{per se} within these categories. Under this interpretative framework, as long as counsel's conduct is not that of "soliciting" or "effecting" the transaction,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} See infra notes 24, 28, 30, 64, 69-71 and accompanying text; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.1 (West 2005) (a non-Uniform Securities Act provision):
Any person who materially assists in any violation of Section 25110, 25120, 25130, 25133, or 25401, or a condition of qualification under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 25110) of Part 2 of this division imposed pursuant to Section 25141, or a condition of qualification under Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 25120) of Part 2 of this division imposed pursuant to Section 25141, or an order suspending trading issued pursuant to Section 25219, with intent to deceive or defraud, is jointly and severally liable with any other person liable under this chapter for such violation.
\item \textsuperscript{24} See infra note 62.
\item \textsuperscript{25} \textsc{Uniform Securities Act} § 410(b) (1956).
\item \textsuperscript{26} See infra notes 61-64, 69-76 and accompanying text. Depending on the applicable state, liability under the common law (such as for aiding and abetting the primary violator's breach of fiduciary duty) may attach. See Laventhal, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168, 170 (Del. 1976).
\item \textsuperscript{28} \textsc{Uniform Securities Act} § 410(b) (1956).
\item \textsuperscript{29} See, e.g., CFT Seaside Inv. L.P. v. Hammet, 868 F. Supp. 836 (D.S.C. 1994) (denying attorney defendant's motion for summary judgment on § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 claims and granting attorney defendant's motion for summary judgment on state securities law claims under South Carolina Uniform Securities Act, § 35-1-1490 (primary liability provision; attorneys not sellers), and § 35-1-1500 (secondary liability provision; attorneys not "employees" or "agents"); see also Wennenman v. Brown 49 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1291 (Utah 1999) (interpreting control person status under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Utah § 61-1-22(4)(a) (similar to USA § 410(b)) and allowing motion to dismiss attorneys as control persons, but denying motion to dismiss attorneys as primarily liable under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5).
\end{itemize}
Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws

liability would not attach under the USA for a client's securities law violation—even if the attorney knew of, and assisted in, the client's violation of the state's securities act. When an attorney does become involved in a client's business enterprise, state securities acts provide "status" liability—liability for partners, officers, and directors. An attorney involved in a client's enterprise as a partner, officer, or director is exposed to liability, not as a result of the attorney's status as counsel, but as a result of the attorney's role as a partner, officer, or director of the subject enterprise. Moreover, if an attorney becomes so involved in a client's enterprise that the attorney is deemed a "control person," the attorney faces liability exposure as a result of that involvement. On another front, an attorney working as in-house counsel has potential liability due to the attorney's status as an "employee" of the corporate primary violator. While the USA also provides potential liability for "every . . . agent who materially aids in the sale," attorneys generally are not held to be agents for purposes of the USA, unless they do "something more" to "effect" the sale. Conceivably, a law firm under the USA could face secondary liability as a "control person" of an affiliated attorney's primary liability, and law firm members could also be subject to secondary liability by virtue of being "partners" with the violative lawyer.

Significantly, several states have not adopted the USA or have modified its provisions. In these states, attorney liability exposure often depends on more flexible "materially participating or aiding" language contained in the applicable statute. Under these statutes, secondary liability premised on aider principles may be imposed irrespective of the attorney's relationship with the primary violator.

30. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
31. Many state securities acts are based on the USA which provides such liability. State courts often have interpreted this liability to be "strict" based on status. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
32. "Status" liability does not generally per se include attorneys as an enumerated class of persons subject to liability. However, one can argue that attorneys are subject to status liability as "agents." This argument has received mixed reactions. See infra notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
33. The USA provides for "control person" liability in section 410(b). However, the Act does not define "control person." State courts generally have applied the federal test for "control person" liability. See infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 106.
35. The USA provides secondary liability for employees who provide material aid. See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(b). Courts have held that the determinative test for whether one is an employee is by reference to common law. See infra notes 118-20. As to whether the employee's aid is material, see infra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
36. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(b).
38. See infra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 52-59, 116-17, 148-60, 166, 184-94, 210-13 and accompanying text.
41. Id.
III. ATTORNEY LIABILITY UNDER THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT

A. Primary Liability—Uniform Securities Act

1. Statutory Scheme

The federal securities acts heavily influenced the Uniform Securities Act, which, in turn, laid the foundation for many of the current state securities acts. One of the main goals of the USA is to provide uniformity between state and federal securities laws. Currently, there are three Uniform Securities Acts (collectively referred to herein as the USA). The most widely adopted is the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 (USA), which thirty-seven jurisdictions have adopted "at one time or another, in whole or in part." Nine jurisdictions have adopted the Revised Uniform Securities Act of 1985 (RUSA), in whole or in part. Seven jurisdictions have enacted the most recent Uniform Securities Act of 2002 (2002 Act), in whole or in part, and several other states are considering its adoption. Because some jurisdictions have replaced former adoptions with later versions, some version of the USA is in effect in approximately forty states. States that have not adopted some version of the USA include: Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas.

Civil liability is express under the USA, RUSA, and 2002 Act. While the

42. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(a)(2) cmt. (noting that the clause was nearly identical to § 12(2) [now § 12(a)(2)] of the Securities Act of 1933).

43. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 608 (2002); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT §§ 704, 803 (1985); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 415 (1956). The introductory comments to the 2002 Act state that it has three overarching themes:

First, Section 608 articulates in greater detail than the 1956 Act Section 415 the objectives of uniformity, cooperation among relevant state and federal governments and self-regulatory organizations, investor protection and, to the extent practicable, capital formation. Section 608 is the reciprocal of the instruction on these subjects given by Congress in 1996 to the Securities and Exchange Commission in Section 19(c) of the Securities Act of 1933. The theme of uniformity and the aspiration of coordination of federal and state securities law is particularly stressed in the Act and Official Comments. Section 602(f), consistent with the Federal Securities Litigation Uniform Standard Act of 1998, is a new provision encouraging reciprocal state enforcement assistance.

44. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 608 introductory cmt. (2002).

45. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT prefatory cmt. at 1 (2002).


47. For states that have adopted the 1956 Uniform Securities Act and the 1985 Revised Uniform Securities Act, see Legal Information Institute, Uniform Securities Act, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol7.html#secur (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).

48. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(h) (1956) (the official comments to this section and to § 101 make it clear that it was not intended to create private civil liability for § 101). In the event a particular jurisdiction has not enacted section 410(h), "the courts are split as to whether there is an implied cause of action under Section 101." LONG, supra note 21, at 1:74 n.7 (citing cases). Courts may be influenced
USA and the 2002 Act contain a provision similar to rule 10b-5, neither Act provides private civil remedies for its violation. Fundamentally different, RUSA provides primary liability in private actions based on a violation of a provision substantially similar to rule 10b-5.

Some states that have based their securities acts on the USA have modified the USA’s liability provisions. For example, some states provide express civil liability for violation of a provision similar to rule 10b-5. Moreover, a number of states subject “every person who participates or materially aids in the sale” giving rise to primary liability to secondary liability exposure. For states that impose civil liability based on a provision that is rule 10b-5’s counterpart, a key question is whether the provision is construed similarly to Securities Act section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3), with respect to which negligence is to imply a private right of action to protect defrauded sellers, as section 410 only protects defrauded buyers. Some states have modified this language to include defrauded sellers or have added an additional provision. See Carothers v. Rice, 633 F.2d 7, 10-12 (6th Cir. 1980) (implying a private right of action for defrauded sellers under Kentucky Securities Act, KRS § 292.320(1), Kentucky’s version of USA § 101); see also Martin C. McWilliams, Thoughts on Borrowing Federal Securities Jurisprudence Under the Uniform Securities Act, 38 S.C.L. Rev. 243, 270 (discussing the drafter’s intent).

Section 509(m) of the 2002 Act expressly states that the Act “does not create a cause of action not specified in this section or Section 411(e).” UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT (2002). Comment 7 to section 501 of the 2002 Act states: “There is no private cause of action, express or implied, under Section 501. Section 509(m) expressly provides that only Section 509 provides a private cause of action for conduct that could violate Section 501.” UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 501 cmt. 7 (2002).

49. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 101 (1956); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 501 (1985); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 501 (2002):

It is unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security, directly or indirectly:

(1) to employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) to make an untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in an act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon another person.


51. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 605(a) (1985); see supra note 49.

52. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-12(a)(2) (2004) (similar to rule 10b-5); civil liability in § 10-5-14(a). Section 10-15-14(c) is substantially similar to USA § 410(b) (providing joint and several secondary liability). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (2005) (similar to rule 10b-5), civil liability is provided in § 21.20.430 (includes primary and secondary liability for purchasers and sellers). Section 21.20.430(3) is substantially similar to USA §410(b) (providing joint and several secondary liability).

53. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2002); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon 2005).

54. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)-(3) (2005). Section 17(a) provides:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities or any security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly—

(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
the requisite mental state for liability, or interpreted similar to Exchange Act section 10(b) which requires scienter for liability.

The civil liability provisions contained in the USA only protect buyers; however, the 2002 Act has a parallel provision providing relief to sellers. In accordance with this change, some states have modified the language of the USA’s primary liability provision to apply to both sellers and buyers, and some states have enacted parallel provisions protecting buyers as well as sellers.

The USA sets forth civil liabilities and remedies in section 410. Section 410(a)(1), similar to Securities Act section 12(a)(1), applies when the offer or sale of a security results in a registration violation. Section 410(a)(2) is nearly identical to Securities Act section 12(a)(2) but is more expansive in that it has no prospectus limitation. Significantly, courts have refused to read such a

operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

55. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). For cases interpreting state law, see, for example, In re Sahlen & Associates, Inc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342, 371 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (interpreting Florida Securities Investors Protection Act (F.S.I.P.A.), Fla. Stat. § 517.211 (providing violations, similar to rule 10b-5) and 517.301 (providing civil remedies for a breach of § 517.211)) ("Stating a cause of action under the F.S.I.P.A. or Florida common law fraud is virtually identical to stating a claim under Rule 10b-5 except that the scienter requirement under Florida law is satisfied by a showing of mere negligence, whereas the minimum showing under Rule 10b-5 is recklessness.""); Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah 1996) (refusing to require a reliance element in actions brought under Utah Uniform Securities Act, § 61-1-22 (similar to USA § 410(a)), and making actionable a violation of § 61-1-22 (similar to rule 10b-5) because, as opposed to the federal implied cause of action "a cause of action under the Utah Act's antifraud provisions has express elements. Consequently, this court has no need to define these elements. Indeed, it would be inappropriate to so do so when the legislature has already done so.""); See generally Keith A. Rowley, Muddy Waters, Blue Skies: Civil Liability Under the Mississippi Securities Act, 70 MISS. L.J. 683 (2000) (analyzing civil liability provisions under the Mississippi Securities Act); Comment., Proof of Fault in Actions for Securities Fraud: A Cloud in Pennsylvania's Blue Sky, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 1083 (1985) (arguing that the Pennsylvania's Securities Act does not require scienter in a civil action brought under a provision similar to rule 10b-5; rather the provision should be interpreted in line with Securities Act § 17(a)).


58. Id. The 2002 Act also provides secondary liability for violations of this provision in section 509(g): (g)(1) control person, (g)(2) "managing partner, executive officer, or director of a person liable," (g)(3) "employee of or associated with a person liable," and (g)(4) "broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser, or investment adviser representative that materially aids the conduct giving rise to the liability." § 509(g).

59. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-501(a) (2005) (seller liable to purchaser), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-501(b) (2005) (purchaser liable to seller); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(1)-(2) (Vernon 2005) (seller liable to purchaser), and 581-33B (Vernon 2005) (purchaser liable to seller).

60. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(a) official cmts. (2002). Section 410(a)(2) provides:
(a) Any Person who . . .
(2) offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
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limitation into the respective state securities acts. 61

2. Post-Pinter Sellers

State courts often follow federal interpretations of similarly worded statutes. 62 Since the USA was based on the federal securities acts, and USA section 410(a)(2) significantly parallels Securities Act section 12(a)(2), 63 state courts generally have found the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Pinter persuasive in defining the term "seller" and have rejected more expansive standards, including the "substantial factor" test. 64 Some state courts, however,

light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission), and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or omission, is liable to the person buying the security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with interest at six percent per year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender of the security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security. Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and interest at six percent per year from the date of disposition.

62. See, e.g., Biales v. Young, 432 S.E.2d 482, 484 (S.C. 1993) (adopting the Pinter test for sellers: "Section 35-1-1490(2) [of the South Carolina Securities Act, S.C. Code 1976 § 35-1-1490(2)] is substantially similar to section 12 of the Federal Securities Act. Accordingly, federal precedent, although not binding, may be applied as guidance in interpretation."); In re Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1364-65 (attorneys are not liable as sellers under North Carolina Securities Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-56(a)(2) because it "closely resembles Section 12 of the 1933 Securities Act" so the Pinter test applies; attorneys are also not liable as "employees" or "agents" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-56(c)).
63. See supra note 62.

have embraced broader interpretations. For instance, the Washington Supreme Court declined to adhere to the *Pinter* test for purposes of the Washington Securities Act, opting for a “substantial contributive factor” test.

For jurisdictions that have adopted the *Pinter* test for sellers, activities that do not expose attorneys to liability as a “seller” under the Securities Act section 12 generally do not subject attorneys to “seller” status under the state securities acts. Just as in the federal cases, state courts have generally not considered attorneys who solely provide legal services to be sellers. Thus, for example, *Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984); *Croy v. Campbell*, 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980).

Adoption by state courts of the *Pinter* test may represent the current prevailing view. See, e.g., *In re Infocure Sec. Litig.*, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (applying *Pinter* test to South Carolina, North Carolina, Michigan, and Florida); *Meyers v. Lott*, 993 P.2d 609, 613 (Idaho 2000) (adopting the “financial benefit test” of *Pinter*); *Wilson v. Misko*, 508 N.W.2d 238, 248 (Neb. 1993) (“Following *Pinter*, we hold that liability under the Securities Act of Nebraska...extends only to a person who successfully solicits [the] purchase of securities, motivated at least in part by desire to serve his or her own financial interests or those of the securities owner.”); *Biales*, 432 S.E.2d at 169 (adopting *Pinter* approach and stating: “Section 35-1-1490(2) is substantially similar to section 12 of the Federal Securities Act. Accordingly, federal precedent, although not binding, may be applied as guidance in interpretation.”); *Gohler v. Wood*, 919 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah 1996) (stating that *UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(1)(a)* requires privity, that no reliance is required, without discussing *Pinter*); *Shavin v. Commonwealth*, 437 S.E.2d 411 (Va. 1993) (applying *Pinter* test for sellers under the Virginia Securities Act); see also *Long, supra* note 27, at 44-46 (discussing acceptance of *Pinter*).


Factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant's conduct is a substantial contributive factor in the sales transaction include: (1) the number of other factors which contribute to the sale and the extent of the effect which they have in producing it; (2) whether the defendant's conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in continuous and active operation up to the time of the sale, or has created a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible; and (3) lapse of time.


A law firm representing a securities issuer has no liability if it provides only legal services. If it solicits the sale for its client, it may. The Supreme Court in *Pinter* did not exempt lawyers from liability if they are motivated to serve the financial interests of the issuer of the securities. A law firm representing a securities issuer is vulnerable to allegations of solicitation when it allows its partners to mix their personal interests with their professional...
lawyers have not been deemed sellers for the preparation of offering documents that contained disclosure deficiencies. Likewise, courts normally do not impose seller status on counsel based on the rendering of legal advice or the issuance of opinion letters.

Even under the "substantial contributive factor" test to ascertain "seller" status, "something more" must be established than counsel's performance of routine advisory drafting and related services. Accordingly, courts draw a distinction between rendering routine professional services with respect to an offering and actively participating in sale transactions. Applying this standard, the Washington Supreme Court held that advice rendered by counsel regarding the materiality of a contemplated disclosure constituted routine legal services. Because counsel's services thus were customary professional services and no evidence suggested that counsel participated in the solicitation process, the subject attorneys were not a "substantial contributive factor" and were therefore not deemed "sellers."

B. Secondary Liability (Status, Control Person, and Aider Liability)—Uniform Securities Acts

The USA provides secondary liability for an enumerated list of persons responsibilities to the client. When such a law firm goes further and represents both sides of a securities transaction, it makes itself a most tempting target for a former client whose investment has become worthless. Federal courts likewise hold that attorneys performing their professional services are not liable as "sellers." See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

70. See, e.g., Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993). Applying the Pinter test to the Maryland Securities Act, Md. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703(a) (1993), the court held that the defendant law firm's "preparation of the offering memorandum and [its] fees for services rendered" did not bring the firm within the Pinter test for sellers; the law firm did nothing "more than perform its their professional services." Id. at 375. The plaintiff (Baker Watts) brought the action for contribution against its attorneys. Baker Watts had earlier been found liable to investors who "alleged that the Confidential Offering Memorandum contained material omissions in violation of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and § 11-703(a)(1)(ii) of the Maryland Securities Act." Id. at 362.

71. See, e.g., In re Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1363-64 (applying Pinter test for sellers under the South Carolina Uniform Security Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1490(2)). In this case, [the defendant law firm] did not sell or offer to sell Infocure's stock to the Medfax Plaintiffs. Although it may have prepared certain documents and even provided an opinion as to facts relevant to the transaction, settled law shows that these acts are insufficient to create liability under Section 1490. To hold otherwise would impose possible liability for every professional in a transactional setting. See Ackerman v. Schwartz, 733 F. Supp. 1231, 1245 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (applying Pinter test to for sellers) ("The court believes liability under Section 12 generally requires more active participation in the solicitation than the mere drafting of an opinion letter." (citing Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1986))), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991); see also, Allyn v. Wortman, 725 So. 2d 94 (Miss. 1998) (construing California, Florida, Mississippi, and Utah law).

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under subsection (a), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller, unless the non-seller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so liable.\footnote{76}

The USA thus sets forth exposure to secondary liability for five groups: (1) control persons; (2) partners, officers, and directors; (3) persons performing similar functions; (4) employees who materially aid; and (5) broker-dealers or agents who materially aid.\footnote{77} These five groups have a "quasi due diligence"\footnote{78} affirmative defense—that they could not have known of "the existence of the facts by which liability" arose if they had exercised reasonable care.\footnote{79} For liability to attach to the first three groups, there is no condition that they provide material aid or otherwise participate in the transaction.\footnote{80}

RUSA's secondary liability provision is similar to that of the USA, except RUSA replaces the term "agent" with "sales representative."\footnote{81} By comparison,
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the 2002 Act contains four separate provisions setting forth secondary liability exposure for different groups: (1) control persons; (2) “managing partner[s], executive officer[s], or director[s] of a person liable;” (3) “employee[s] of or associated with a person liable . . . who materially aid[ ] the conduct giving rise to the liability;” and (4) “broker-dealer[s], agent[s], investment adviser[s], or investment adviser representative[s] that materially aid[s] the conduct giving rise to the liability.”

Secondary liability under the state securities acts is derivative: if the seller cannot be held liable, then the non-seller is not liable. Consequently,

in the act, omission, or transaction constituting the violation, and a broker-dealer or sales representative who materially aids in the act, omission, or transaction constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the other person, but it is a defense that the person did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by which the liability is alleged to exist. With respect to a person who, directly or indirectly, controls another person who is liable under subsection (c), it is also a defense that the controlling person acted in good faith and did not, directly or indirectly, induce the act, omission, or transaction constituting the violation. Contribution among the several persons liable is the same as in cases arising out of breach of contract.

Secondary liability under the state securities acts is derivative: if the seller cannot be held liable, then the non-seller is not liable. 83 Consequently, in the act, omission, or transaction constituting the violation, and a broker-dealer or sales representative who materially aids in the act, omission, or transaction constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the other person, but it is a defense that the person did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by which the liability is alleged to exist. With respect to a person who, directly or indirectly, controls another person who is liable under subsection (c), it is also a defense that the controlling person acted in good faith and did not, directly or indirectly, induce the act, omission, or transaction constituting the violation. Contribution among the several persons liable is the same as in cases arising out of breach of contract.

82. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 509(g) (2002) (§ 509(b) is the primary liability provision providing liability for a material misrepresentation or half-truth in the sale of securities, and § 509(c) is a parallel provision providing liability for purchasers):

We find material participants are jointly and severally liable with the seller under the terms of § 408(b) and that “primary liability” need not be adjudged by a court before bringing an action against the material participant or aider. Rather, we conclude that a plaintiff need only show that seller committed the prohibited acts of § 408(a) in its action against the material participant or aider, and may recover damages from the material participant without obtaining a judgment from seller or recovering from seller.

See Summers v. Welltech, 935 S.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Tex. 1996) (It is “[u]nnecessary to join the seller as a party as long as the evidence showed the defendant's control over the seller and a violation of the Securities Act by the seller.”); Daniel Boone Area Sch. Dist. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 400, 410 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that for a secondary actor to be liable under 70 PA. CONS. STAT.
secondary actors can be liable to the same extent as the primary violator. As secondary liability is predicated on the existence of a primary violation, non-sellers should arguably be able to assert both the statutory defenses available to non-sellers as well as those provided to sellers.

1. No Participation Required for Liability

a. Status Liability—Partners, Officers, and Directors

Courts have interpreted the USA as imposing liability on partners, officers, and directors, including attorneys who serve as directors, unless they satisfy the burden of an affirmative defense. Control person status or the degree of participation does not determine liability for such persons; rather, status as a

b. Control Person Liability

While both the federal securities acts\(^93\) and the USA expressly define

the specific language in question, the courts of several other states with Blue Sky laws substantially identical to Washington's have addressed this precise question and have concluded that the plain language should be given its obvious meaning.

90. See Hines, 787 P.2d at 16-17; Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 879 (Utah 1995) (applying Utah Uniform Securities Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(2)) ("Ignorance of a particular transaction is not exculpatory because officers and directors are liable if, in the exercise of reasonable care, they could have known."); sources cited supra note 89. The Official Comments to the 2002 Act indicate a continuation of status liability, without a requirement of participation. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 509 cmt. 10 (2002):

Under Section 509(g)(2) partners, officers, and directors are liable, subject to the defense afforded by that subsection, without proof that they aided in the sale. In Section 509(g)(2), the term "partner" is intended to be limited to partners with management responsibilities, rather than a partner with a passive investment.


After stating that every sale of securities made in violation of the Act is voidable at the election of the purchaser, the Act provides, "The person making such sale . . . and every director, officer, salesman or agent of or for such seller who participated or aided in any way in making such sale, shall be jointly and severally liable to such purchaser . . . " There may be sound policy reasons for interpreting the words "participated or aided in any way" broadly in favor of liability. But those words would be deprived of meaning if we held that every director and officer, solely by reason of his or her position, is liable under this provision.  

The current version of this provision in the New Mexico Securities Act contains different language not limiting liability for directors and officers by participation. As such it would likely render a different result: A person who directly or indirectly controls another person who is liable under Subsection A, B, C, D or E of this section, a partner, officer or director of the person liable, a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, any agent of the person liable, a employee of the person liable if the employee materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation and a broker-dealer or sales representative who materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the other person, but it is a defense that they did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by which the liability exists. Contribution among the several persons liable is the same as in cases arising out of breach of contract. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-40(F) (West 2003).

92. North Dakota Securities Act, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17 (2005): "[E]very director, officer, or agent of or for such seller who shall have participated or aided in any way in making such sale . . . ". See Narum v. Faxx Foods, Inc., 590 N.W.2d 454, 459 (N.D. 1999) ("If corporate securities are sold in violation of the [North Dakota] Securities Act, the corporate directors may incur liability to the purchasers of the securities, irrespective of the care and diligence they exercised, if they participated or aided in any way in making the illegal sales.").


Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.


Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to
control person liability, none define the term "control." Federal courts generally interpret the different language of the Securities Act's and the Exchange Act's control person provisions identically. Likewise, federal courts normally construe state securities control person provisions in conformity with the federal interpretations. Similarly, when the state courts define the term "control," they generally refer to federal court interpretations. While these interpretations may differ from the language of the applicable statutes, they promote the coordination of the federal and state securities laws.

Under the USA, a control person carries the burden to establish a "good faith" defense. For example, in construing the statutory language for control person liability under that state's securities act, the Washington Supreme Court opined:

[T]he investors need show only that the defendant "directly or indirectly control[led] [the] seller." The statute does not require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant "culpably participated" in the alleged violation. Instead, the statute clearly shifts the burden onto the defendant to prove that "he or she did not know,

or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 11 or 12 [15 U.S.C. § 77k or 77l of this title], shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.

See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(b) (1956); supra note 76 and accompanying text.

Federal and state courts have referred to the definition of "control" used by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). See, e.g., Neely v. Bar Harbor Bankshares, 270 F. Supp. 2d 50, 53 (D. Me. 2003) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) ("control" means "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or to cause the direction of the management and policies of [an entity], whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise."); Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356, 371 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 230.405). The SEC defines "control" as:

The term "control" (including the terms "controlling," "controlled by" and "under common control with") means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.


Federal courts are apt to do so as well. See Neely, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (defending "good faith" for Revised Maine Securities Act, 32 ME. REV. STAT. § 10605(3)); Stat-Tech Liquidating Trust v. Fenster, 981 F. Supp. 1325, 1337 (D. Colo. 1997) ("Although § 15 [of the Securities Act] is not identical to § 20(a) [of the Exchange Act], the controlling person analysis is the same.").

94. See supra note 62.

95. See supra note 43.

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and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known” of the liability-producing facts.102

c. Attorney Liability Due to Status

An attorney becoming involved in a client’s enterprise as a partner, officer, or director is exposed to liability under the Uniform Securities Act not as a result of the attorney’s status as an attorney but as a result of the attorney’s status as a partner, officer, or director. In this context, attorneys and law firms face potential secondary liability on two different fronts as a result of being a partner, officer, or director of a primary violator, being a control person, or under the doctrine of respondeat superior.103 The first situation arises when a


In order to establish a prima facie case of control person liability, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that (a) a primary violation of the securities laws occurred; and (b) the defendant controlled the person or entity committing the primary violation. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of control person liability, the defendant has the burden of showing that it acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.

103. A law firm potentially faces imputed liability under respondeat superior as a result of a securities law violation committed by its attorney in the ordinary course of business. Note that where a partner of a law firm also serves as an officer or director of a company, the partner “may be acting in both capacities simultaneously where certain business transactions are being conducted.” Schneider v. CTI Indus. Corp., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5022, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 1987) (denying defendant law firm’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for law firm’s “vicarious” liability); In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 1991 WL 671073, at *2-3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 1991) (denying defendant law firm’s motion to dismiss as there is a factual question whether [a partner], in acting as a director, was acting in the ordinary course of [the law firm’s] business or with the authority of his copartners”).

Based on the Exchange Act’s express secondary liability in the form of control person liability, section 20(a), lower federal courts have addressed whether that provision supplants or supplements the doctrine of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576-78 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“[W]e now join several other circuits in holding that § 20(a) was intended to supplement, and not to supplant, the common law theory of respondeat superior as a basis for vicarious liability in securities cases.”). This same issue could emerge in the context of the USA, which provides express secondary liability in greater detail; however, the 2002 Act, for instance, has a “saving provision.” UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 509(m) (2002) (“The rights and remedies provided by this [Act] are in addition to any other rights or remedies that may exist, but this [Act] does not create a cause of action not specified in this section or Section 411(e).”). Furthermore, respondeat superior may be viewed as qualitatively different than the statutory liability: respondeat superior holds “principals or employers vicariously liable for acts of their agents or employees in the scope of their authority or employment.” Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003); accord FDIC v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 937 F. Supp. 1461, 1471 (D. Colo. 1996):

Principles of respondeat superior impose liability on a corporation as employer for the acts of an employee which have been assigned to her by the employer or if she is doing what is necessarily incidental to her assigned work. Under respondeat superior, an employee's actions are imputed to the employer.

See also id. at 1473 (holding respondeat superior applicable under Colorado Securities Act).

Without directly addressing the issue, the Supreme Court arguably assumed the application of respondeat superior in federal securities cases. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972) (“The liability of the bank, of course, is coextensive with that of [the bank employees]”); see also Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and Implementing the Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat Superior Liability Under Section 10(b), 58 OHIO
client allegedly is primarily liable either for selling unregistered securities or for selling securities based on a material misrepresentation or half-truth. Client’s counsel faces control person liability exposure because counsel allegedly has the ability to ensure that the registration requirements are adhered to and can control the veracity of statements made in the offering document. Accordingly, if the primary violator fails to comply with the registration mandates or to truthfully disclose material information in the offering document, counsel ostensibly has the ability to control such a deficiency. The Washington Supreme Court refused to find attorneys liable as control persons under this rationale. 104 Likewise, federal courts generally decline to hold attorneys liable under this approach for the purposes of the control person provisions of the federal securities laws. 105 However, depending on the circumstances, a law firm may be deemed a controlling person based on its heavy involvement in the corporation’s affairs, including law firm counsel serving on the alleged primary violator’s board of directors. 106

The second situation in which control person liability exposure arises for a law firm is when an alleged primary violator is a member of the firm. When a law firm attorney commits a primary securities law violation during the course of representing a subject client, the firm is likewise subject to liability

St. L.J. 1325, 1357 (1997) (“More importantly, the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly decided Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases where the defendants were entities that could be held liable only on agency principles.”) (discussing cases). However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank called into question the continued viability of respondeat superior liability in cases brought under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 thereunder. Justice Stevens’s dissent noted that the majority’s approach “at the very least casts serious doubt . . . on other forms of secondary liability” and lower court decisions that “controlling person” liability supplemented rather than supplanted “respondeat superior and other common-law agency principles . . . .” Id. at 201 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Despite this, respondeat superior continues to be applied in federal securities cases. See, e.g., Seolas v. Bilzerian, 951 F. Supp. 978 (D. Utah 1997).


105. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying control person provisions of federal securities acts, the law firm’s “ability to persuade and give counsel is not the same thing as ‘control,’ which almost always means the practical ability to direct the actions of the people who issue or sell the securities.”). But see Seidel v. Pub. Serv. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1342, 1362 (D.N.H. 1985) (rejecting law firm’s motion to dismiss and allowing claims under the federal securities acts control person provisions to proceed: “Attorneys fall within the ambit of ‘controlling persons’ when they are in some sense culpable participants in the acts perpetrated by the controlled persons.”) (citing Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337, 349 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Felts v. Nat'l Account Sys. Assoc., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 54, 68 (N.D. Miss. 1978)). It is difficult to perceive that a corporation and its board of directors would not follow the advice of counsel in situations concerning documents to be issued for examination by prospective investors, particularly where such documents bear the imprimatur of expertise on the part of such counsel.

106. See In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that, where a managing partner was on the board of directors and his law firm “was heavily involved” in the corporation’s affairs, the managing partner and law firm had “substantial power to influence” the primary violator and could be control persons for purposes of the federal securities laws); In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,939 at 93,981 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (“A jury could reasonably conclude that [the law firm and managing partner] in their role as lawyers exercised effective control of [defendant corporation] for purposes of Section 20.”).
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exposure.\textsuperscript{107} A different issue arises when a member of a law firm engages in business dealings with the subject client. Such business relationships may be viewed as both outside the ordinary course of business of the law firm and not done on behalf of the firm.\textsuperscript{108} As such, as a generalization, it should not be sufficient in this setting that a law firm merely controlled a member’s practice to impose control person liability on that firm.\textsuperscript{109} For instance, in \textit{Semrad v. Edina Realty, Inc.},\textsuperscript{110} a real estate broker had an extensive side business dealing in unregistered mortgage-based securities. Absolving the real estate brokerage from liability as a control person for the broker’s primary liability under the Minnesota Uniform Securities Act, the court opined: “[W]here the employer is not in the securities business, it would seem inappropriate to find the requisite control based only on the employer’s supervision of the employee in carrying out the employer’s business.”\textsuperscript{111} Another court similarly held that, absent evidence that the defendant law firm “knew or should have known that [the former partner] was selling securities, [the law firm] cannot be held to have ‘directly or indirectly control[led]’ his actions within the meaning of the statute.”\textsuperscript{112}

2. Participation Required For Liability—Material Aiders

The USA sets forth secondary liability exposure for employees of the seller, broker-dealers, and agents if they materially aid in the sale.\textsuperscript{113} For an attorney to be liable under USA section 410(b), an attorney must be a member of these enumerated groups and be deemed to have “materially aid[ed] in the sale.”\textsuperscript{114} In jurisdictions that have adopted this provision without modification,
an attorney who serves as in-house counsel is subject to liability risk.\textsuperscript{115}

Another key issue is whether attorneys may be liable as “agents” under USA section 410(b). Moreover, in certain states such as Oregon, where the secondary liability provision deviates from the USA by providing liability for “every person who participates or materially aids in the sale,”\textsuperscript{116} attention may focus on whether an attorney’s normal professional services constitute material aid.\textsuperscript{117}

a. Attorneys Potentially Liable for Providing Material Aid

Attorneys are potentially liable under the USA as material aiders when they, like anyone else, fall into one of the three statutory categories. Section 410(b) provides for secondary liability exposure for employees of the seller, broker-dealers, and agents if they “materially aid” in the sale. Broker-dealers and agents are defined groups under the USA. Status as an employee is determined by reference to common law.\textsuperscript{118} Normally, in-house counsel is deemed an employee,\textsuperscript{119} and outside counsel is viewed as an independent contractor, not an employee.\textsuperscript{120}

Of these three categories, outside counsel faces the greatest likelihood of

\textsuperscript{115} Certainly, inside counsel normally are employees of the subject corporation. See Marc I. Steinberg, \textit{The Role of Inside Counsel in the 1990s: A View from Outside}, 49 SMU L. REV. 483, 484-85 (1996).

\textsuperscript{116} OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2005): Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under subsection (1) of this section, every partner, limited liability company manager, including a member who is a manager, officer or director of such seller, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, and every person who participates or materially aids in the sale is also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller, unless the nonseller sustains the burden of proof that the nonseller did not know, and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known, of the existence of facts on which the liability is based. Any person held liable under this section shall be entitled to contribution from those jointly and severally liable with that person.

\textsuperscript{117} See Prince, 764 P.2d at 1371; infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{118} See \textit{LONG}, supra note 21, § 9.88, at 449 (citing \textit{Kirchoff}, 703 N.E.2d 644) (defining employee by reference to common law).

\textsuperscript{119} By reference to common law, in-house counsel, as opposed to outside counsel, would likely be deemed an employee rather than an independent contractor. See supra note 120.

\textsuperscript{120} See CFT Seaside Inv. L.P. v. Hammet, 868 F. Supp. 836 (D.S.C. 1994) (granting motion for summary judgment against outside attorney defendants under South Carolina Uniform Securities Act, § 35-1-1500); Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356, 373 (Md. App. 1993) (holding defendant law firm was an independent contractor and not an “employee” under the Maryland Securities Act, § 11-703(c)); Allen v. Columbia Fin. Mgmt., Ltd., 377 S.E.2d 352, 356-357 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (determining outside attorneys were not “employees” under South Carolina provision similar to USA § 410(b), stating “[t]he principal factor that makes one an employee, or servant, rather than an independent contractor is the right of the employer, or master, to control and direct the particular work or undertaking as to the means or manner of its accomplishment”).
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being considered an agent. Whether attorneys are “agents” per se for purposes of the statute is a matter of some dispute. “Agents” are a defined group in the USA—individuals who effect or attempt to effect securities transactions. The prevailing view is that counsel does not meet this definition because counsel does not “effect” the purchase or sale. Thus, under this approach, attorneys are not “agents” under the USA for drafting disclosures in offering documents or rendering opinion letters.

Two lines of reasoning support the prevailing view that attorneys who provide their normal professional services are not “agents” under the USA.

121. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
122. See discussion infra notes 127-38 and accompanying text. Compare Powell v. H.E.F. P'ship, 835 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Vt. 1993) (“For purposes of the Vermont Securities Act ‘agent’ is defined as ‘salesman,’ in addition to its ordinary meaning. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202(1). Plaintiffs are correct in asserting that an attorney acting on behalf of a client does so as the client's agent.”), with Arthur Young & Co. v. Mariner Corp., 630 So. 2d 1199, 1204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“In light of both the legislative purpose and the context of the surrounding body of law into which section 517.211 and ‘agent’ must be integrated, we conclude that its use in this section means to incorporate the common law definition of agency.”).
123. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 401(b) (1956).
124. See Baker, 620 A.2d at 368: Although the definition of “agent” in the state securities laws may vary to differing degrees from the definition in § 11-101(b), they each have one thing in common: they do not impose liability upon an attorney who merely provides legal services or prepares documents for his or her client. To impose liability, the attorney must do something more than act as legal counsel. See In re Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (“[I]t is my opinion that attorneys for the seller, who perform duties within the normal ambit of transactional professionals, may not be held liable as an ‘employee’ or ‘agent’ of the seller who materially aided in the sale of securities.” (interpreting secondary liability provision of Michigan Securities Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.810(b) as similar to USA § 410(b)).
125. See Baker, 620 A.2d at 368:
Therefore, we hold that an attorney could conceivably be considered an agent if he or she “represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect the purchase or sale of securities.” In order to be considered an “agent,” an attorney must act in a manner that goes beyond legal representation. The definition of “agent” in § 11-101(b) does not include attorneys who merely provide legal services, draft documents for use in the purchase or sale of securities, or engage in their profession's traditional advisory functions. To rise to the level of effecting the purchase or sale of securities, the attorney must actively assist in offering securities for sale, solicit offers to buy, or actually perform the sale.
126. See Ackerman v. Schwartz, 733 F. Supp. 1231, 1252 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991) (interpreting secondary liability provision of Indiana Securities Act, IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19(b), attorney and law firm not liable as “agent” as “no evidence suggests that [the attorney] or his firm personally and actively employed the opinion letter to solicit investors. In other words, [the attorney] and his firm cannot be said to have effected or attempted to effect the sale of a security. Liability under the Indiana Securities Act requires something more than the mere drafting of an opinion letter.”).
127. Criticisms of the two approaches include that the first rationale is contrary to the drafters’ intent—the implication of the prefatory phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” to the definitional sections of the three acts. Arthur Young & Co., 630 So. 2d at 1202 (concluding that this prefatory language permits the court to consider the context of the use of the word ‘agent’ and to reject the statutory definition if it does not fit the context.”); Long, supra note 27, at 466 n.157. As to the second analytical approach, it has been noted that it is not entirely inconsistent to apply the common law definition to section 410(b) while not to the section requiring agents to be registered. See Baker, 620 A.2d at 167-68, 171. In further support of that proposition could be noted the prefatory phrase to the definitional section, “unless the context otherwise requires,” which would allow flexibility in
The first approach posits that the statutory definition of "agent" controls. Therefore, for an attorney to be an "agent" under the statute, the attorney must "effect" the purchase or sale.\footnote{128} Hence, the scope of the term "agent" encompasses "any individual other than a broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities. . ."\footnote{129} For example, in Johnson v. Colip,\footnote{130} the court addressed the definition of "agent" in the state's securities act, reasoning:

[W]hile one must be a common law agent to be an ‘agent’ under the Act, we perceive the Act as containing additional requirements as well. That is, whether [an attorney] is an agent within the meaning of the Act turns on whether he effected or attempted to effect purchases or sales of securities.\footnote{131}

applying the definitions in different parts of the Act.\footnote{id.}

\footnote{128. See, e.g., In re Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1364: As to the agency argument, the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act provides its own definition for the term "agent" as: [A]ny individual, other than a broker-dealer, who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities . . . . A partner, officer or director of a broker-dealer or issuer, or a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, is an agent if he or she is within this definition.}

S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-20(2). The district court in CFT Seaside held that this definition does not cover professionals such as attorneys engaged in their traditional advisory functions. CFT Seaside, 868 F. Supp. at 844. The definition, instead, "covers persons who assist directly in offering securities for sale, soliciting offers to buy, or performing the sale, but who do not fit the definition of broker-dealer."\footnote{id.} Nothing in the record here suggests that MM & M stepped outside the bounds of attorneys in a run-of-the-mill merger transaction. It is clear to me that MM & M is not subject to liability under the provisions of Section 1500. The Plaintiffs' request for summary judgment is denied as to the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act, and the Defendant's motion is granted.

\footnote{See also Kirchoff v. Selby, 703 N.E.2d 644, 651 (Ind. 1998): Whether a person is an officer or director, a controlling person, or an employee is a question of fact governed by common law. In contrast, 'agent' and 'broker-dealer' are defined terms, and the determination of who is an agent or broker-dealer is governed by the statute . . . . Accordingly, common law agents for some purposes are not necessarily 'agents' as used in the statute.}

\footnote{129. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 401(b) (1956); see also CFT Seaside Inv. L.P. v. Hammet, 868 F. Supp. 836 (D.S.C. 1994) (denying motion for summary judgment on § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 claims against attorney defendants; granting motion for summary judgment against attorney defendants under South Carolina Uniform Securities Act, § 35-1-1490 (attorneys not sellers) and § 35-1-1500 (attorneys not "employees" or "agents"); sources cited supra note 128; infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.}

\footnote{130. 658 N.E.2d 575, 577 (Ind. 1995).}

\footnote{131. Id. "At issue is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether [the attorney] was an agent of the other defendants and, if so, whether he "materially aided in the sale of securities herein and was, therefore, liable to plaintiffs under the Act." Id. at 576 (quoting IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19 (2005) (based on USA § 410(b)). The issue arose in the context of an attorney who participated in meetings with prospective investors, and although he drafted the prospectuses alleged to contain material misstatements or omissions, his potential liability arose from his alleged acts to effect sales during the meetings and not his legal work. Id. at 576. In affirming the reversal of summary judgment for the defendant-attorney, the court held for purposes of Indiana Code section 410(b):

[An attorney is an agent if [his] or her affirmative conduct or failure to act when reasonably expected to do so at a meeting of prospective investors made it more likely than not that the investors would purchase the securities than they would have been without such conduct or failure to act.] Id. at 578. Applying this standard, the Indiana Supreme Court viewed whether the attorney was an agent as "a genuine issue of fact" based on the primary purpose of such attorney's role:

For example, if when called upon at the meetings, [the attorney Colip] primarily reassured investors that risks about which they expressed concern were unlikely to materialize, such
The second approach is premised on statutory construction. Since the USA requires "agents," but not attorneys, to be registered, attorneys cannot be "agents" within the scope of the USA. \(^{132}\) Courts sometimes apply both analytical approaches. For instance, in *CFT Seaside Inv. Ltd. Partnership v. Hammet*, \(^{133}\) the court opined:

The definition of "agent" in [South Carolina Uniform Securities Act] § 35-1-20(2) does not include attorneys who merely render legal advice or draft documents for use in securities transactions. The definition covers persons who assist directly in offering securities for sale, soliciting offers to buy, or performing the sale, but who do not fit the definition of broker-dealer. It is not intended to cover professionals such as attorneys engaging in their traditional advisory functions. This is shown by § 35-1-410 which provides: "It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state as a broker-dealer or agent unless so licensed under this chapter."

Nowhere does Title 35 require attorneys who merely advise persons involved in a securities transaction to be licensed before providing that advice. Nor do the regulations of the South Carolina Secretary of State, Securities Division. . . .

Therefore, Defendants are not liable as "agents" under § 35-1-1500.\(^{134}\)

Substantively consistent with the courts' use of the statutory definition for behavior made it more likely than not that the investors would purchase the securities and constituted an attempt to effect a purchase or sale. On the other hand, if Colip's principal function at the meeting was to either temper the exuberance of the principal promoters (a frequent reason why lawyers are asked to accompany "road shows" promoting new securities' offerings) or to discuss the technical aspects of the partnership agreement or its tax consequences with counsel for prospective investors (much as would occur in the negotiations in any reasonably sophisticated business transaction), we think these facts are not susceptible to the inference that an attempt to effect the purchase or sale of a security occurred. We hold that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Colip's affirmative conduct or failure to act when reasonably expected to do so at a meeting with prospective investors made it more likely than not that the investors would purchase the securities and therefore constituted an attempt to effect the purchase or sale of the securities.

*Id.* at 578-79.

\(^{132}\) See, e.g., Rendler v. Markos, 453 N.W.2d 202, 206-07 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting "agent" under the Wisconsin Securities Act, which adopted the USA).

\(^{133}\) 868 F. Supp. at 844.

\(^{134}\) *Id.; see also* Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356, 368 (Md. App. 1993) (construing "agent" within Maryland's version of § 410(b) of the USA, for attorneys (citing MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS § 11-101(b) (West 2003))) (the operative definition is identical to that of the USA, § 401(a)):

> We hold that an attorney could conceivably be considered an agent if he or she "represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect the purchase or sale of securities."

In order to be considered an "agent," an attorney must act in a manner that goes beyond legal representation. The definition of "agent" in § 11-101(b) does not include attorneys who merely provide legal services, draft documents for use in the purchase or sale of securities, or engage in their profession's traditional advisory functions. To rise to the level of "effecting" the purchase or sale of securities, the attorney must actively assist in offering securities for sale, solicit offers to buy, or actually perform the sale.

*Id.* The court reviewed cases construing "agent" in other jurisdictions and found the following:

Although the definition of "agent" in the state securities laws discussed above may vary to differing degrees from the definition in § 11-101(b), they each have one thing in common: they do not impose liability upon an attorney who merely provides legal services or prepares documents for his or her client. To impose liability, the attorney must do something more than act as legal counsel.

*Id.*
"agent," RUSA replaces the term "agent" with "sales representative." \(^{135}\) RUSA's definition of "sales representative" is identical to the USA's definition of "agent." \(^{136}\) The 2002 Act reverts to the use of the term "agent" \(^{137}\) rather than "sales representative." \(^{138}\) Nonetheless, the 2002 Act contains a provision which may encompass outside attorneys. The 2002 Act subjects not only employees to secondary liability exposure but also individuals who are "associated with a person liable." \(^{139}\) It can be argued that the language "an individual who is an employee of or associated with a person liable" \(^{140}\) covers employees as well as independent contractors. Interestingly, neither the comments nor the definitions of the 2002 Act provide interpretative guidance with respect to this subject. Therefore, attorney liability under this provision remains possible.

b. What Can Be Material Aid?

Reference may be made to the former "substantial factor" test \(^{141}\) under Securities Act section 12. In Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Securities Co., \(^{142}\) the Eleventh Circuit certified questions to the Alabama Supreme Court regarding Alabama's blue sky law, including a question regarding the standard for "material aid" in a provision "based almost verbatim on § 410(b) of the

136. § 101(14).
137. "Agent" is defined in section 102(2) of the 2002 Act similarly to its definition in the USA, except that the 2002 Act no longer provides exclusions in the definition as did the USA. The 2002 Act adds eight exemptions from registration for "agents" while the USA has none. The term "agent" is defined in the 2002 Act as follows:

"Agent" means an individual, other than a broker-dealer, who represents a broker-dealer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities or represents an issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of the issuer's securities. But a partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer or issuer, or an individual having a similar status or performing similar functions is an agent only if the individual otherwise comes within the term. The term does not include an individual excluded by rule adopted or order issued under this Act.

Uniform Securities Act § 102(2) (2002); see Official Comment to the definition of Agent, § 102(2), which states: "An individual whose acts are solely clerical or ministerial would not be an agent under Section 102(2). Cf. Section 402(b)(8). Ministerial or clerical acts might include preparing written communications or responding to inquiries." § 102(2), official cmt.

138. See supra note 82; Uniform Securities Act § 509(g)(4) (2002):

(4) a person that is a broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser, or investment adviser representative that materially aids the conduct giving rise to the liability under subsections (b) through (f), unless the person sustains the burden of proof that the person did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of conduct by reason of which liability is alleged to exist.

139. Uniform Securities Act § 509(g)(3) (2002):

(3) an individual who is an employee of or associated with a person liable under subsections (b) through (f) and who materially aids the conduct giving rise to the liability, unless the individual sustains the burden of proof that the individual did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of conduct by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.

140. Id.
141. See discussion supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
142. 482 So. 2d 1201, 1207 (Ala. 1986).
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Uniform Securities Act." The Alabama Supreme Court held that "material aid" is a lower standard than the former "substantial factor" test under Securities Act section 12. Although state courts generally find federal court interpretations to be reliable guides when construing similarly worded statutes, the USA specifies who should be held liable and under what conditions liability should attach. Since the federal acts do not define the term "materially aids," it does not necessarily follow that the federal courts' usage of the "substantial assistance" or "substantial factor" test should be persuasive to state courts.

According to a number of state courts, an attorney's normal professional services constitute "material aid." For example, under an Oregon statute

143. Id.
144. Id. at 1207-08:
Jesp & Lamont's argument to the effect that its activities must be a "substantial factor" in the sale to Foster is misplaced. It is true that the Eleventh Circuit has held that one may be liable under § 12 of the Securities Act as a seller if his activities are a substantial factor in the sale. It is also true that the Eleventh Circuit here held as a matter of law that Jesup & Lamont's activities were not a substantial factor in the sale to Foster. That, however, casts no light on the question of whether Jesup & Lamont materially aided the sale within the meaning of the Alabama Act.

Our response to the first question is affirmative. Under the facts of this case, a jury was justified in finding that Jesup & Lamont materially aided the sale to Foster, and it is, therefore, secondarily liable under § 8-6-16.19(b), ALA. CODE 1975 [(current version at ALA CODE § 8-16-19(c) (Ala. Code 1975))]. See also Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101, 122 (Conn. 1997) (interpreting "material aid" within the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act, to have "a natural tendency to influence, or [being] capable of influencing the decision of the purchaser") (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. to 1993) § 36-498(c) (Rev. to 1995), current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36b-29(c)). For another case interpreting the term "materially aid," see Kirchoff v. Selby, 703 N.E.2d 644, 653 n.7 (Ind. 1998):

The standard for "materially aids" under state securities laws has been found by some courts to be different from federal aider and abettor liability. Compare Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1978) (Federal aider and abettor liability requires a showing of (1) existence of a securities law violation by the primary party; (2) knowledge of that violation by the aider and abettor; and (3) substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in the achievement of that violation. Substantial assistance is determined by: (a) the amount of assistance given by the person; (b) the person's presence or absence at the time of the violation; (c) the person's relation to the person committing the violation; and (d) the person's state of mind., and Saltzman v. Zern, 407 F. Supp. 49, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (applying three prong test for federal aider and abettor liability), with Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101, 121-122 (Conn. 1997) (Violation of "materially aids" provision requires showing of (1) violation of securities act and (2) material assistance by aider and abettor. Material assistance is aid that has a natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing the decision of the purchaser., Foley v. Allard, 427 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Minn. 1988) (adopting three-prong federal test for aider and abettor liability but defining substantial assistance in prong three as a substantial causal connection between the culpable conduct of the alleged aider and abettor and the harm to the plaintiff), and Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (applying substantial causal connection standard to state aider and abettor violation).

145. See supra note 62.
146. See supra note 48; see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581 § 33 cmts. (Vernon 2005).
147. See cases cited supra note 65.
148. See generally cases cited supra note 122 (inferring attorney's normal professional services constitute material aid); infra note 151.
where "every person who participates or materially aids in the sale" may be secondarily liable, counsel’s normal services constitute material aid. Federal case law provides further support in the construction of aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) prior to Central Bank.

The Oregon Supreme Court in Prince v. Brydon distinguished "participates" from "materially aids," asserting they "are separate concepts, not synonyms." A person may participate without materially aiding or materially aid without participating. Essentially, “material aid” encompasses aid that may not “effect” the sale but that makes the sale possible. The court in Prince implied that "aids" has the broadest scope practicable and the limitation on a potential aider’s liability is whether the assistance is “material.”

"Typing, reproducing, and delivering sales documents may all be essential to a sale, but they could be performed by anyone; it is a drafter’s knowledge, judgment, and assertions reflected in the contents of the documents that are ‘material’ to the sale.” In giving the term “aids” a broad scope and then limiting it with the concept “material,” the Prince court rejected the argument that a lawyer is a mere “scrivener.”

In this regard, Oregon law normally deems attorneys providing their customary professional services within the

149. See OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2003); see supra note 116.
150. See generally infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
151. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1126-28 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing jury verdict that law firm aided and abetted § 10(b) violation), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 1104 (1989); Powell v. H.E.F. P’ship, 835 F. Supp. 762, 768 (D. Vt. 1993) (denying law firm’s motion to dismiss because firm provided “substantial assistance” in drafting materially misleading documents for purposes of aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act). The Powell court also held that the law firm was also an “agent” within the secondary liability provisions of Vermont’s Securities Act and provided “aid” by drafting documents. Even if “material aid” is held to be “substantial assistance,” the court found the standard to be satisfied within aiding and abetting analysis under § 10(b). Id. at 765. See Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624-30 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying former aider and abettor liability under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986). See generally ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD §§ 7:319-7:323 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the former “substantial assistance” test in private actions under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5).
152. 764 P.2d at 1371.
153. Id.; see Long, supra note 27, at 462.
154. See Filippone, supra note 50, at 1353 (arguing that “material aid” is broader than the substantial factor test for “sellers”); see also Long, supra note 27, at 461 (stating the substantial factor test “focuses on the sales activities causing the sale” whereas, aiding “focuses upon activities which do not directly lead to the sale, but make it possible”).
156. Prince, 764 P.2d at 1371.
scope of the provision. Interestingly, comparing a state statute, such as Oregon's, that has a broad secondary liability provision to a state statute that employs a "substantial contributive factor" test to broadly define "seller," the same actions by an

158. Prince, 764 P.2d at 1371. Aid or participation may be determined by a factual inquiry; see Luallin v. Koehler, 644 N.W.2d 591, 596 (N.D. 2002) ("What constitutes participation or aid in any way in making a sale of securities is determined upon the facts of each case and not by a fixed rule of law."); see also North Dakota Securities Act Civil Remedies, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17 (2005): Every sale or contract for sale made in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, or of any rule or order issued by the commissioner under any provisions of this chapter, shall be voidable at the election of the purchaser. The person making such sale or contract for sale, and every director, officer, or agent of or for such seller who shall have participated or aided in any way in making such sale shall be jointly and severally liable to such purchaser.

Prince, 764 P.2d at 1371 (Aid or participation may be determined by a factual inquiry); Luallin, 644 N.W.2d at 596 ("What constitutes participation or aid in any way in making a sale of securities is determined upon the facts of each case and not by a fixed rule of law."); Hogg v. Jerry, 773 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Ark. 1989) (holding material aid is a question of fact); Michelson v. Voison, 658 N.W.2d 188, 192 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding defendant named as the purchase administrator of unregistered securities provided "material aid" under Michigan Uniform Securities Act, M.C.L. § 451.810(b) (based on USA § 410(b)); Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D. Or. 1997) (citations omitted):

A person need not have actual knowledge of an illegal securities transaction in order to become a "participant" in such sale. The fact that a defendant did not know, and could not have known, of the illegal quality of a securities transaction, while relevant to the issue of his liability, is not relevant to the issue of his participation. Further, a person may be a "participant" in an illegal securities transaction without having communicated with the purchaser.

It is not disputed that defendant Barton of the Nossaman firm prepared the legal papers necessary for Nova-Tech to complete the sale of its securities. Even if Barton did not know and could not have known of Nova-Tech's failure to register the securities, he was a participant in the sale because, without his assistance, the sale would not have been accomplished.

The other Nossaman defendants argue that they did not have a hand in the preparation of documents, but it is undisputed that the Nossaman firm authorized Nova-Tech to include its name as corporate counsel on Nova-Tech's 1968 and 1969 annual reports. In line with the Oregon court's broad construction of the Blue Sky Law in Adamson, I hold that the Nossaman firm's designation on Nova-Tech's published reports as Nova-Tech's corporate counsel is enough, for purposes of ORS 59.115(3) and 59.155, to make the firm's partners "participants" in any unlawful securities transaction in which the annual reports were used for promotional purposes.


Our research of interpretations of other jurisdictions' codifications of § 410 of the Uniform Act leads us to two conclusions: First, those courts interpreting § 410 of the Uniform Act have not applied liability for "materially aiding" to one who merely performed "ministerial functions.") See, e.g., Robertson v. White, 635 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (interpreting precursor to Arkansas Code § 23-42-10); Denson v. Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., 682 So. 2d 69, 71 (Ala. 1996) (interpreting Alabama Code § 8-6-19(b)); Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Or. 1988) (interpreting Oregon Code § 59.115(3)). Second, the question of whether a party has "materially aided" in a violation of the security code is a question of fact properly to be considered once the parties have had an opportunity to adduce their evidence. See Denson, 682 So. 2d at 71; Hogg v. Jerry, 773 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Ark. 1989); Titan Oil & Gas v. Shipley, 257 Ark. 278, 517 S.W.2d 210, 222 (Ark. 1974); Metal Tech. Corp. v. Metal Technikes Co., 703 P.2d 237, 245 (Or. App. 1985). These two principles do not define all the contours of "material aid" under the Indiana statute, but they suffice to resolve the pending motion.

See also Black & Co., 333 F. Supp. at 472.

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attorney may not incur liability in both states. The “substantial contributive factor” test rests largely on tort concepts of causation, while the “materiality” of aid standard focuses more on the nature of the aid. \(^{159}\) Hence, while routine legal services may not be a “substantial contributive factor,” they may constitute “material aid” as “it is a drafter’s knowledge, judgment, and assertions reflected in the contents of the documents that are ‘material’ to the sale.” \(^{160}\)

This position is eminently sensible. Offering and related disclosure documents normally are essential for inducing investor comfort and closing of transactions. In this context, the attorney is not a mere scrivener. Rather, as a gatekeeper to the consummation of deals, counsel plays an integral role in effectuating adequate disclosure. \(^{161}\)

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\(^{159}\) See supra note 154.

\(^{160}\) Prince, 764 P.2d at 1371; see also Excalibur Oil v. Sullivan, 616 F. Supp. 458, 467 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Hogg, 773 S.W.2d at 88; Young v. Kwock, 474 P.2d 285, 287 (Haw. 1970). In Young, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated:

[Corporate officer] argues that “aids” means inducing the purchaser to buy and that the facts indicate that she took no part in the “selling” effort. Though some jurisdictions have followed such reasoning, no such restricted interpretation on the liability section seems warranted. The plaintiffs did not allege fraud in the inducement, but rather the sale of unregistered securities. Therefore, not merely the salesmen who induced the purchase but all officers, directors and agents who in any way contributed to the disposition of the securities are liable.

\(^{474}\) P.2d at 287. HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-20 (2003) provides:

Every sale made in violation of this chapter shall be voidable at the election of the purchaser; and the person making the sale and every director, officer, or agent or for the seller, if the director, officer, or agent has personally participated or aided in any way in making the sale, shall be jointly and severally liable ....

Within the Chapter, HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-25(a)(1)-(3), is modeled on section 101 of the USA, which in turn is modeled on rule 10b-5. Interestingly, the definition section of HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-1 (2003) does not include a definition of the term “agent.”

In Hines v. Data Line Systems, Inc., 787 P.2d 8 (Wash. 1990), the investors appealed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorneys which the court of appeals had upheld. The investors brought the action against the attorney defendants under WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430 for a violation of WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010, a provision similar to SEC rule 10b-5. The civil liability provision, section 21.20.430(1), provides primary liability for sellers, and section 21.20.430(3) provides secondary liability for:

Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer [that is primarily liable], every partner, officer, director or person who occupies a similar status or performs a similar function of such seller or buyer, every employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the transaction, and every broker-dealer, salesperson, or person exempt [from registration] who materially aids in the transaction ....

Id.; § 21.20.430(3).

The Washington State Supreme Court upheld the summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants on the basis that the attorney defendants’ advice was insufficient “participation in the sales transaction” to rise to the level of being a “substantial contributive factor” sufficient to hold them liable as sellers. Hines, 787 P.2d at 19-21. The court further upheld the summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants with respect to secondary liability on the basis that no issue of material fact was presented that the attorney defendants fit one of the categories necessary for secondary liability. Id.

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3. Statutory Havens For Attorneys

By statute, a few states have excluded attorneys who provide their normal professional services from liability as aiders. The Arizona and Ohio statutes, for example, encompass every person who "participated in" the subject transaction but contain language that excludes from liability attorneys who render traditional legal services. The Florida statute as construed constricts the liability of secondary actors by requiring proof that such persons solicited the transaction. Doing so significantly alleviates secondary liability for attorneys because secondary actors appear to be liable only under circumstances that would cause them to be primarily liable as sellers under the Pinter test.

prospectuses, proxy statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our staff, the financial community, and the investing public must take on faith.").

162. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003(A) (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43(A) (West 2003) (cited in Riedel v. Acutote of Colorado, 773 F. Supp. 1055, 1066 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd 947 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1991)) (stating that "every person that has participated in or aided the seller in any way in making such sale or contract for sale, are jointly and severally liable to the purchaser").


164. Florida provides secondary liability for "[a]ny person . . . selling a security in violation of § 517.301 and every other director, officer, partner, or agent of or for the seller, if the director, officer, partner, or agent has personally participated or aided in making the sale." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.211(2) (West 2004). Note that an attorney can lose the statutory immunity by participating in the sales transaction. See, e.g., Gerlach v. Wergowski, 584 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Perkowski v. Megas Corp., 563 N.E. 2d 378, 379-80 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). See generally Thomas E. Geyer, Michael P. Miglets, & Keith A. Rowley, Civil Liability and Remedies in Ohio Securities Transactions, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 939 (2002).

165. See cases cited supra note 164.
IV. ATTORNEY LIABILITY UNDER MORE "FLEXIBLE" STATE SECURITIES STATUTES

As discussed above, several states have departed from the parameters of the USA with respect to "aider" liability. Pursuant to these statutes, an attorney may be held liable for materially participating in or aiding the primary violation even if the attorney is not an agent, control person, director, employee, officer, or partner of the subject primary violator. Hence, under these statutes, secondary liability based on aider principles may arise regardless of counsel's relationship with a primary violator.\footnote{166}

The following discussion covers two such states, California and Texas. In these states, attorney liability exposure departs from the USA, leaving for exploration some significant issues.

A. Texas

Similar to the USA and the federal Securities Act, the Texas Securities Act (TSA) imposes primary liability exposure upon sellers, who sell a security in violation of the TSA's registration requirements or by means of a material misrepresentation or half-truth.\footnote{167} The Act also provides for primary liability exposure for purchasers who buy a security by means of a material misstatement or half-truth.\footnote{168} The TSA contains secondary liability provisions for control persons and for material aiders.\footnote{169}

1. Attorney Liability as "Seller"

Since the 1977 enactment of the current TSA, the Texas Supreme Court has not interpreted the term "seller." In a decision predating the current statute, the Texas Supreme Court in Brown v. Cole interpreted the term "seller" to

\footnote{166. See supra notes 40-41, 52-59, 116-17, 148-60 and accompanying text; infra notes 185-94, 210-13 and accompanying text. Other than California and Texas, examples include IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.503 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(b) (repealed 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1-509G(5) (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2004).


169. Art. 581-33F(1)-(2) (F(1) for control person, and F(2) for material aiders). With respect to Texas' enactment of securities legislation since 1913, see Bromberg, Article in Tribute: Texas Business Organization and Commercial Law—Two Centuries of Development, 55 SMU L. Rev. 83, 99 (2001). The statute was enacted "because 'numerous corporations . . . are selling . . . stocks throughout this State, many of which are worthless, and . . . the people of this State are being imposed upon by unscrupulous persons selling such worthless stocks. . . .'" (quoting 1912 Tex. Gen. Laws 66, 71). Or, as stated by Professor Bromberg: "The greedy or crooked sold to the greedy or gullible." Id.}
include persons who served as "any link in the chain of the selling process." It is open to debate whether this expansive definition, which by its terms may encompass attorneys rendering traditional services, retains validity under the TSA.

In one restrictive decision a Texas appellate court held that the seller provision in the TSA requires privity. On the other hand, a number of Texas appellate courts have indicated a continued acceptance of the Brown v. Cole "link in the chain" test. Still, the "link in the chain" standard may be no broader than the "substantial contributive factor" test since its scope may be limited by notions of "but for" causation.

For example, in Lutheran Brotherhood v. Kidder Peabody & Co., the court applied Brown v. Cole and held that the subject underwriter was a seller. However, the court ruled on the basis of the underwriter's role in the preparation of the private placement memorandum and its active solicitation and placement of the securities. Joachim v. Magids is the only reported Texas appellate case applying the "link in the chain" test to an attorney draftsman. The court's decision may be read to exclude an attorney providing customary professional services from being a "link in the chain," and thereby avoiding seller status because of the application of causation principles. However, the court also may have based its decision on the

170. 291 S.W.2d 704, 708 (Tex. 1956).
173. See Brown, 291 S.W.2d at 709 (Tex. 1956) ("It is clear that but for Brown's activities and repeated efforts the respondents would not have participated in the transaction.").
174. 829 S.W.2d at 300.
175. Id. at 306-37 ("The Texas Act defines 'sell' as any act by which a sale is made, including a solicitation to sell, an offer to sell, or an attempt to sell. Article 581-33A(2) applies to a person who 'offers or sells' a security. It is undisputed here that the defendant acted as AABC's agent in the preparation of the PPM's and in the placement and offering of the bonds. In doing so, it dealt directly with the plaintiffs and was a seller within the meaning of the Act.").
176. 737 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App. 1987).
177. Id. at 856. The court declined to hold the attorney-draftsman liable as a seller for participating "in the transaction by performing 'an act by which the sale is made,' and that he was therefore a 'link in
attorney defendant's satisfaction of the statutory defense for sellers—that the seller did not know about the disclosure deficiency and could not have known about it in the exercise of reasonable care. The court found no evidence or allegation that the attorney-draftsman was aware of the oral agreement containing the alleged misrepresentation.178 Furthermore, the court found that the alleged oral agreement was contrary to the advice that the attorney would have given to the seller; in fact, an integral aspect of the stock purchase agreement that the attorney-defendant had drafted contradicted the alleged misrepresentation.179

2. Attorney Secondary Liability as Aider

Significantly the Texas Securities Act (TSA) provides for secondary liability for control persons180 and material aiders.181 The TSA imposes secondary liability upon control persons who cannot sustain the burden of the "quasi due diligence" defense.182 Liability pursuant to the TSA also is incurred the chain of the selling process,' which made him responsible for his client's actions. . . . The evidence conclusively shows that the appellee acted solely as an attorney-draftsman in the preparation of the stock purchase documents." Id. (citation omitted).

178. Id. The facts of the case are as follows: the purchaser bought the company in reliance on an oral representation made by his selling brother, Mortimer, that conflicted with the terms of the stock purchase agreement. As part of the sale, the selling brother orally agreed to the purchasing brother that he would renew his personal guaranty on a line of credit for the business. This oral agreement was not in the stock purchase agreement. After the sale of the company, the selling brother did not renew his personal guaranty on the line of credit for the business. The purchasing brother brought a suit against his selling brother and against the selling brother's attorney as also being a seller. Id. at 853-54.

179. Id. at 854:
Appellee testified that he had never been told that Mortimer's guaranty was to continue after the sale of Mortimer's stock and that as Mortimer's counsel, appellee would have advised Mortimer against such action. Appellee testified that an "integral part of the agreement" was the understanding that Mortimer would not continue to guaranty the company's obligation at Houston National Bank.

180. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(1) (Vernon 2005):
A person who directly or indirectly controls a seller, buyer, or issuer of a security is liable under Section 33A, 33B, or 33C jointly and severally with the seller, buyer, or issuer, and to the same extent as if he were the seller, buyer, or issuer, unless the controlling person sustains the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. For case law on control person liability under the TSA, see Barnes v. Southwest Financial Servs., 97 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); Hagerty Partners P'ship v. Livingston, 128 S.W.3d 416, 421 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004); Texas Capital Securities Management, Inc. v. Sandefer, 80 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).

181. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon 2005):
A person who directly or indirectly with intent to deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially aids a seller, buyer, or issuer of a security is liable under Section 33A, 33B, or 33C jointly and severally with the seller, buyer, or issuer, and to the same extent as if he were the seller, buyer, or issuer. (stating that "§ 33F is new and derives in part from Uniform Securities Act § 410(b) and U.S. Securities Act § 15 U.S.C.A. § 77o. . . ." Section 33F(1) appears to be primarily derived from section 410(b) of the Uniform Securities Act and section 15 of the Securities Act. Section 33F(2) had no comparable statutory analogue in the federal securities acts and, while based on section 410(b) of the Uniform Securities Act, is broader in that it is not limited to specified persons who materially aid."), See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410 (2002).
by anyone who provides material aid with the requisite scienter—"intent to deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law." The ensuing discussion focuses on this latter provision.

The TSA departs from the USA regarding the scope of persons who can be held liable for providing material aid. The differences include: first, the TSA makes potentially liable anyone who provides material aid, as opposed to the enumerated persons set forth in section 410(b) of the USA; and second, the TSA requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant's scienter as opposed to the USA which gives the defendant an affirmative defense of inability to know about the violation through the exercise of reasonable care. The pertinent Texas statute provides:

A person who directly or indirectly with intent to deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially aids a seller, buyer, or issuer of a security is liable... jointly and severally with the seller, buyer, or issuer, and to the same extent as if he were the seller, buyer, or issuer.

Perhaps surprisingly, no Texas court decision has definitively settled whether the rendering of an attorney's normal services, such as the drafting of an offering document, constitutes "material aid." Due to the importance that offering and other disclosure documents have on investor decision-making and the closings of deals, attorneys who draft such documents should be deemed "material aiders" to the consummation of purchase and sale transactions given their gatekeeper role.

With respect to the requisite elements for aider liability that a plaintiff must establish, a number of Texas courts have adopted the elements of former aider and abettor private liability under Exchange Act section 10(b). Under this standard, a plaintiff must prove:

(1) that a primary violation of the securities laws occurred; (2) that the alleged aider had "general awareness" of its role in this violation; (3) that the actor rendered "substantial assistance" in this violation; and (4) that the alleged aider either a) intended to deceive [the] plaintiff or b) acted with reckless disregard for the truth of

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183. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon 2005).
184. Id.; see cases cited supra note 172.
185. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon 2005).
186. Id.
187. See sources cited supra note 161; Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2004) (opining that "[l]awyers are gatekeepers and always have been").
189. Frank v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); cases cited supra note 188; see also Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 532 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) (noting that that liability for material aiding under the TSA would not necessarily be commensurate with aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5: "The Texas Securities Act recognizes on its face, however, that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirements for aider and abettor liability. Section 33F(2) holds liable any person, jointly and severally with the buyer, seller, or issuer, who 'materially aids' with 'reckless disregard' a violation of Sections 33A, B, or C").
the representations made by the primary violator.\textsuperscript{190}

In \textit{Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley},\textsuperscript{191} the Texas Supreme Court examined the requisite intent to hold one who materially aids liable under the Texas Securities Act. The court held that the TSA’s requirement of “reckless disregard for the truth or law” signifies that an aider may be liable under that provision “only if it rendered assistance to the [defendant purchaser or] seller in the face of a perceived risk that its assistance would facilitate untruthful or illegal activity by the primary violator.”\textsuperscript{192} Pursuant to this standard, the plaintiff need not prove that the alleged aider knew of the precise misrepresentation or omission made by the primary violator.\textsuperscript{193} Rather, the aider’s subjective awareness of such a primary violator’s improper activity is deemed sufficient to establish the requisite intent for the imposition of liability.\textsuperscript{194}

\textbf{B. California}

California’s securities laws\textsuperscript{195} define prohibited transactions\textsuperscript{196} and provide for a three-tiered civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement system.\textsuperscript{197} The illegality of the subject misconduct is generally set forth in section 25401.\textsuperscript{198} Separate sections contain private causes of action for the misconduct: section 25501 provides for primary liability for a seller in privity with the buyer,\textsuperscript{199}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{190} Goldstein, 113 S.W.3d at 776 (citing Frank v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)).
\bibitem{191} 168 S.W.3d 837, 840-43 (Tex. 2005), \textit{rev’g and remanding} 119 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App. 2003).
\bibitem{192} \textit{Id.} at 837 (interpreting \textit{TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.} art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon 2005)).
\bibitem{193} \textit{Id.}
\bibitem{194} \textit{Id.} at 845:
\quad The investors acknowledge that [alleged aider] Sterling may not have known the exact misrepresentations that [the primary violator] Cornelius was making to the investors, but they argue that Cornelius was operating an illegal pyramid scheme. We agree that knowledge of such an illegal scheme, if proven, could support a finding that Sterling acted ‘with reckless disregard for the truth or the law’ even if Sterling could not have known of the particular misrepresentation made by Cornelius.
\bibitem{195} \textit{CAL. CORP. CODE} § 25000 (West 2005) (Corporate Securities Law of 1968).
\bibitem{196} \textit{Id.}
\bibitem{197} \textit{See} People v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271, 1285-86 (Cal. 1995); \textit{MARSH & VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAWS} § 14.02(1) (2d ed. 2003).
\bibitem{198} \textit{CAL. CORP. CODE} § 25401 (West 2005):
\quad It is unlawful for any purpose for any person to offer or sell a security in this state or buy or offer to buy a security in this state by means of any written or oral communication which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
\bibitem{199} Such liability also is imposed against a buyer in privity with the seller. \textit{Id.}:
\quad Any person who violates Section 25401 shall be liable to the person who purchases a security from him or sells a security to him, who may sue either for rescission or for damages (if the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be, no longer owns the security), unless the defendant proves that the plaintiff knew the facts concerning the untruth or omission or that the defendant exercised reasonable care and did not know (or if he had exercised reasonable care would not have known) of the untruth or omission. Upon rescission, a purchaser may
\end{thebibliography}
Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws

section 25504 imposes secondary liability upon certain persons,\(^\text{200}\) section 25504.1 provides for secondary liability for persons who materially assist with the intent to deceive,\(^\text{201}\) and section 25504.2 focuses on liability for professionals in certain situations involving expertised statements contained in offering materials.\(^\text{202}\)

1. Attorney Primary Liability as Seller

Section 25401 makes the use of a material misrepresentation or half-truth in the purchase or sale of a security illegal, and section 25501 provides primary civil liability for a breach of section 25401.\(^\text{203}\) Section 25501 also provides two statutory defenses: that the purchaser knew about the misstatement or half-truth, and that the defendant could not have ascertained the disclosure deficiency through the exercise of reasonable care.\(^\text{204}\) The provision thus far has been construed to require strict privity between the buyer and seller.\(^\text{205}\)

\(^{200}\) Id.
\(^{201}\) Id.
\(^{202}\) Id.
\(^{203}\) See, e.g., \textit{In re Activision Sec. Litig.}, 621 F. Supp. 415, 427 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("Section 25401 prohibits the offer or sale of a security by means of any oral or written communication which contains a materially false or misleading statement. Section 25501 creates the cause of action for a violation of § 25401.").
\(^{204}\) See supra note 195.
\(^{205}\) See, e.g., \textit{SEC v. Seaboard Corp.}, 677 F.2d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting that portion of
If a strict privity approach is applied for determining who is primarily liable as a seller, the scope of persons potentially liable as sellers under California law is narrower than that under the *Pinter* test. The U.S. Supreme Court in *Pinter* crafted a test that includes some non-privity participants within the definition of seller, such as those who solicit the transaction for the vendor's benefit or for their own pecuniary gain. Pursuant to a strict privity regimen, such persons are excluded from primary liability as sellers in California. Under *Pinter*, attorneys performing their customary professional services are not section 12 sellers. Additionally, since the California test seems to be even more restrictive than the *Pinter* test, it is unlikely that attorneys providing their traditional professional services will be deemed sellers.

**2. Attorney Secondary Liability as Material Aider**

In addition to control person and agent (and other status) liability exposure, California has broadened the scope of liability through legislative measures. Cal. Corp. Code § 25501 which reads: "Any person who violates Section 25401 shall be liable to the person who purchases a security from him or sells a security to him..." *Id.* The court concluded that the statute limits sellers to being the "actual seller" or, put another way by the court, "the literal seller."); *In re ZZZZ Best* Sec. Litig., No. CV 87-3574-RSWL, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8083 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 1989); *In re Dianonics Sec. Litig.*, 599 F. Supp. 447, 458-59 (N.D. Cal. 1984).

206. 486 U.S. at 655 (1988), discussed *supra* note 2 and accompanying text.

207.  *See Seaboard Corp.*, 677 F.2d at 1296 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982) (dismissing claim against attorney under § 25504.1 as it "was not in force at the time of the sale"); dismissing claim against attorney under section 25501 as the attorney was not the "actual seller"); *see also* People v. Yanez, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 876 (Cal. App. 1994) ("[O]f course, an attorney who participates in an illegal offering... in a role as offeror or seller, certainly should not be shielded from... liability.").


Section 25504 imposes liability on those who "control" primary violators of Section 25401 (liability for those who offer to sell securities using untrue statement or omission of fact). Like Section 25401 itself, liability under Section 25504 requires a showing of strict privity between the buyer/plaintiff and the controlled seller.

*See also* MATHIS & VOLK, *supra* note 197, at § 14.03(4)(c).

209. *See CAL. CORP. CODE* § 25504; *id.* § 25003(a) ("`Agent' means any individual, other than a broker-dealer or a partner of a licensed broker-dealer, who represents a broker-dealer or who for compensation represents an issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities in this state."); *Koehler v. Pulvers*, 614 F. Supp. 829, 844 (S.D. Cal. 1985):

Mr. Cheyne (an attorney) does not fall within the umbrella of § 25504. That section's standard of care extends to partners, officers, directors, employees, broker-dealers, or agents of an entity issuing nonexempt unqualified securities. As CSCC's attorney, Mr. Cheyne does not fit within the plain meaning of the listed categories.

*See also In re ZZZZ Best* Sec. Litig., No. CV 87-3574 RSWL, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at *72 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 1990) (allowing claim under CAL. CORP. CODE § 1507) (quoting 1 Witkin *California Procedure* § 53, at 73 (3d ed. 1985) ("An attorney will usually be the agent of his client in transactions in which he acts for him."). In dismissing the claim against the accountants under this same provision for failure to allege the accountants "represented the corporation in transactions with other parties" the court quoted CAL. CIV. CODE § 2295 definition of agent, "one who represents another, called the principal, in dealings with third persons," and said: "There does not appear to be a general presumption of agency for accountants as there is with attorneys probably because an attorney is more likely to represent a client in 'dealings with third persons.'" *In re ZZZZ Best* Sec. Litig., 1990 U.S. Dist.
action in sections 25504.1 and 25504.2. Section 25504.1, provides: “Any person who materially assists in any violation of Section ... 25401 ... with intent to deceive or defraud, is jointly and severally liable with any other person liable under this chapter for such violation.”210 Under this provision, an attorney may be held secondarily liable if she intentionally, or perhaps recklessly, “materially assists” a person who violates section 25401.211 As thus far interpreted, the section requires more than a showing of recklessness.212 Hence, as compared to other state statutes with similar provisions, a plaintiff has a more onerous task in proving liability under the California statute.213

3. Attorney Primary Liability as Expert

Liability exposure under section 25504.2 arises when a professional provides an opinion in a prospectus or offering circular used in the offer or sale of a security and that professional consents to be and has been named in such an offering document as having prepared or certified any part of the document, any written report, or any valuation used in connection therewith.214 As part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, both materiality and reliance must be proven.215

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LEXIS 11867, at *75.

210. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25501.1 (West 2005). Section 25504, which sets forth secondary liability upon certain persons, is contained in supra note 200. Note that an attorney who serves as in-house counsel generally is deemed an employee and, hence, may be subject to liability under section 25504. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.

211. See In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19784, at *43 (“Section 25504.1 imposes liability on those who aid and abet a primary Section 25401 violation (liability for those who offer to sell using untrue statements or omissions of fact).”); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at *52 (denying motion by law firm to dismiss claim under CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.1 to the extent the claims were for actions “undertaken with ‘the intent to deceive or defraud.’”).

212. See Orloff v. Altman, 819 F.2d 904, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1987) (allegations of recklessness not sufficient under § 25504.1); Lubin v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425, 1453 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (dismissing claim under § 25504.1 against attorneys for failure to plead “material assistance with intent to deceive or defraud”); maintaining the § 25504.2 claim against the attorneys because the plaintiff “alleged facts showing that [the attorneys] provided an offering document upon which the investors relied”); Bitter v. Borton, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8, at *4, *22 (Cal. App. Apr. 15, 2002) (dismissing claim under § 25504.1 against law firm for issuing a materially misleading opinion letter in an alleged “Ponzi Scheme” for failure to allege the opinion letter was issued “with the intent to deceive or defraud plaintiffs”).

213. See Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. at 844:

Liability for the qualification violation, however, does not extend to Mr. Cheyne. Aider and abettor liability under § 25504.1 requires material assistance of the violation “with intent to deceive or defraud.” Plaintiffs failed to prove requisite scienter as to Mr. Cheyne. Similarly, Mr. Cheyne does not fall within the umbrella of § 25504. That section’s standard of care extends to partners, officers, directors, employees, broker-dealers, or agents of an entity issuing nonexempt unqualified securities. As CSCC’s attorney, Mr. Cheyne does not fit within the plain meaning of the listed categories.

For state statutes that have a less stringent standard, see supra notes 52-59, 116-17, 148-60, 166, 185-94 and accompanying text.

214. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.2, quoted supra note 202; see MARSH & VOLK, supra note 197, at § 14.03(4A).

215. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.2(a)(2) (West 2005); see In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867 (granting motion to dismiss against accountants for failure to allege reliance); Lubin v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 1460, 1466 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (citing In re Rexplore, Inc.
Like Securities Act section 11, \textsuperscript{216} section 25504.2 provides the subject professional with a "reasonable investigation" (or due diligence) defense.\textsuperscript{217} Generally, the scope of liability under section 25504.2 extends only to situations where the California qualification rules require the subject professional’s consent.\textsuperscript{218} The effect is that experts in offerings that are not subject to the California qualification rules normally have no liability exposure under section 25504.2.\textsuperscript{219} Significantly, the statute extends liability only to expertised portions of the prospectus or offering circular. Thus, under California securities law, an attorney who drafts the prospectus or offering circular normally would face potential liability under section 25504.2 only for the attorney’s attributed expertised portions.\textsuperscript{220}

Regulations adopted by the California Commissioner of Corporations explicitly encompass attorneys as experts.\textsuperscript{221} The regulations, in fact, contain specific requirements for attorney experts.\textsuperscript{222} For example, the rules mandate

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  \item [\textsuperscript{217}] CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.2(b)(1) (West 2005). Another defense available is that what was used in the prospectus or offering statement "did not fairly represent such person's statement as an expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from such person's report or valuation as an expert." \textit{Id.} at 25504.2(b)(2). See \textit{supra} note 202.
  \item [\textsuperscript{218}] The Commissioner’s regulations define “written consent” as that required by section 260.504.2.2. That section requires consent when the qualification rules so provide. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 260.504.2.1(d), 260.504.2.2(a) (2004); MARSH & VOLK, \textit{supra} note 197, at § 14.03(4A)(a); see also \textit{Pulvers}, 614 F. Supp. at 846:
    \begin{itemize}
      \item In addition to imposing a standard of care . . . the statute limits potential exposure to the expert who "pursuant to rule of the commissioner [of Corporations] has given written consent to be and has been named in any prospectus." CAL. Corp. Code, subsection 25504.2(a). The Commissioner’s Rules require that such written consent be filed for any prospectus containing expertised material where the underlying offering is subject to qualification . . . .
      \item With Mr. Cheyne’s [the subject attorney’s] consent, his written opinion to the 21-31 limited partnership interests’ exempt status accompanied the private placement memorandum, and his name appeared in the offering prospectus, again, with his consent. No “written consent” was filed with the Commissioner of Corporations, however, precisely because Mr. Cheyne advised that the offering should issue without qualification in an alleged exempt private placement. The Commissioner’s Rules only require the filing of written consent for use of expertised material where the offering is subject to qualification . . . .
      \item Mr. Cheyne contends that because no written consent was filed, and because § 25504.2 limits exposure to instances where written consent is filed “pursuant to rule of the commissioner,” he is not liable under that section. His reasoning, however, advances a conclusion which the statute’s drafters did not likely intend. If it were followed, an attorney would never be liable under § 25504.2 where he negligently determined that a written consent need not be filed because he wrongly advised that an offering is exempt. This would preclude attorney liability where the public is most in need of protection.
    \end{itemize}
  \item [\textsuperscript{219}] \textit{See Pulvers}, 614 F. Supp. at 846-47; MARSH & VOLK, \textit{supra} note 197, at § 14.03(4A)(a); \textit{supra} note 218.
  \item [\textsuperscript{220}] CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.2(c) (West 1977); MARSH & VOLK, \textit{supra} note 197, at § 14.03(4A)(a).
  \item [\textsuperscript{221}] CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.504.2.1 (2004).
  \item [\textsuperscript{222}] \textit{Id.} § 260.504.2.2(c)(2); see Marsh & Volk, supra note 197, at § 14.03(4A)(b)(iv).
\end{itemize}
the naming and filing of consent from a subject attorney “[w]hen a prospectus or offering circular contains an opinion of counsel as to the legality of the issue,” 223 or when information is stated to be on “authority from an attorney,” 224 including title opinions. 225 The rules do not require the filing of a written consent on the basis of an attorney being named as representing “the underwriters or selling security holders.” 226

Section 25504.2 evidently is a primary liability provision under which a professional’s potential liability is not derivative of another’s actions but such professional’s own material disclosure inadequacies. Both section 25401 (the general prohibition against material misstatements and half-truths) and section 25504.2 prohibit the use of material misstatements and half-truths in a prospectus or offering circular. The liability provided by section 25504.2, however, is limited to expertised materials and provides its own defenses and standard of liability different than the other liability provisions. 227

V. CONCLUSION

Attorneys face significant liability exposure under the state securities laws. Attorneys can be held primarily liable when they are “sellers” of securities, or under some state statutes, like California, when they are experts. Depending on

224. Id. § 260.504.2.2(c)(2)(B).
225. Id. § 260.504.2.2(c)(2)(E).
226. Id. § 260.504.2.2(c)(2)(C). In its entirety, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 260.504.2.2(c)(2) provides:
   (2) Attorneys.
   (A) When a prospectus or offering circular contains an opinion of counsel as to the legality of the issue, the written consent of the attorney furnishing the opinion must be filed. If any other attorney is also named as having prepared an opinion as to the legality of the issue, the written consent of such other attorney must also be filed, even though the opinion of such attorney is not included in the prospectus or offering circular.
   (B) If any information contained in the prospectus, other than referred to above, is stated to be furnished upon the authority of an attorney, such attorney shall be named in the prospectus or offering circular and such attorney’s written consent to being so named shall be filed. Where the same attorney is named with respect to several parts of the prospectus, it is not necessary to file a separate written consent with respect to each such part but the consent filed must be broad enough to cover all matters with respect to which the attorney is named as having acted.
   (C) When an attorney is named in a prospectus or offering circular as having acted for the underwriters or selling security holders, no consent will be required by reason of such attorney being named as having acted in such capacity.
   (D) When the opinion of one attorney relies upon the opinion of another attorney, the written consent of the attorney who prepared the initial opinion must be filed if such attorney is named in the prospectus or offering circular.
   (E) When information, such as the nature of title to properties, is stated in a prospectus or offering circular to be based on an opinion of counsel, the name of the attorney must be disclosed in the prospectus or offering circular and such attorney’s written consent must also be filed. The name of such attorney need not be set forth at the particular place where the information based on his or her opinion is given, provided such attorney is otherwise identified and named elsewhere in the prospectus or offering circular.

227. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 197, at § 14.03(4A)(a); supra note 217 and accompanying text.
the applicable jurisdiction and counsel’s status relative to the subject client, secondary liability may be incurred. In a number of states, counsel has liability exposure based on materially aiding the primary violator with the requisite intent. In view of the increasing number of actions being instituted against corporate and securities attorneys, future decisions by state courts hopefully will clarify many of the murky issues that await resolution.