Winter 1-1-2007

The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation

Steven M. Davidoff Solomon

Berkeley Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs

Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation


This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact jcera@law.berkeley.edu.
I. INTRODUCTION

There is a belief that the federal government is on the march in the corporate law realm. The common wisdom is that a reengaged federal government will, at least in some measure, preempt or otherwise regulate corporate matters tradi-

* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Columbia Law School; M.S., Finance, London Business School. The author would like to thank Derek Bambauer, Jocelyn Benson, Bethany Berger, Susan Cancelosi, Lance Gable, Noah Hall, Peter Henning, and John Rothchild for their helpful comments and Celeste Pelzer for her invaluable research assistance.
tionally left to the states. It is evidenced by congressional action in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiatives. It has spurred some in academia to recast the seemingly eternal race-to-the-bottom/race-to-the-top state corporate law debate into a struggle between the federal government and Delaware. It has revealed itself in public hand-wringing by Delaware authorities over the possibility, and undesirability, of their reduced role in corporate regulation. In short, it is a viewpoint that has become pervasive and consequential.

This worldview is a myth—a bogeyman—when applied to the regulation of takeovers. Rather, since the late 1980s, the federal government has largely abandoned the takeover business. True, the SEC alone, and not Congress, has acted quite intermittently since that time to tweak and monitor existing laws and corporate conduct thereunder. But the SEC has not otherwise engaged in any significant rulemaking or otherwise involved itself in the takeover issues of the time. This is true of the periods both before and after the Enron/Worldcom scandals.

The states, led almost exclusively by Delaware, have filled the SEC void, proceeding to oversee, refine, and create new takeover law. Takeover structures, tactics, and strategy have also shifted in response to Delaware’s continuing regulation and other market developments. The SEC, however, has not acted to update the federal takeover rules to comport with this substantially altered landscape.


2. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (arguing that Delaware is the victor in the race for public corporate charters; its primary competition is now the federal government).


5. For purposes of this Article, the term takeover refers to a transfer of corporate control either by way of tender offer or merger in a transaction or series of related transactions.

6. The academic community has also largely lost interest in federal takeover regulation, and, since the late 1980s, writing on the subject has been limited and sporadic. Compare this to prior periods when it was the “must-write” topic in corporate law. See David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 154 (1986) (“The nearly obligatory observation commencing any writing on the subject of tender offers is that no machination of the corporate or financial world has ever attracted greater attention from lawyers, legal scholars, financial economists, or the lay press.”).

7. See infra Part III (surveying the post-1980s SEC failure to regulate takeovers).
The consequence, this Article argues, is that federal takeover law is currently outdated. It has become inapposite and unsuitable and otherwise fails to regulate today's prototypical takeover. Today we have a federal takeover code that was enacted for a different time and circumstance—an age when the tender offer was newfound, poison pills and other takeover defenses nonexistent, and other federal takeover regulation, such as antitrust and national security review and waiting periods, virtually absent. This world is lost to time. The current federal takeover code should therefore, at a minimum, be updated to meet this distinctly new takeover environment; but this Article argues for more. Mere tinkering and one-off rulemaking are insufficient. The magnitude of necessary revision, the piecemeal nature of the existent federal takeover regime, and the interconditionality and cross-dependency of takeover rules alone lead to the conclusion that a sweeping SEC-initiated review of federal takeover regulation is prudent if not essential. In arguing for this sea change, I do not advocate any particular federal takeover norm, merely the application of the SEC's active voice and resources. Historical precedent dictates that anything else should follow quite naturally.

But one should not stop there. This Article further argues for the SEC's return to its former role as the nation's primary takeover regulator. This is a throne currently occupied by the Delaware courts. Yet this Article finds substantial evidence to support the public choice scholarship of Professor Mark J. Roe and others who argue that the interests of Delaware are narrower and more manager-oriented than the federal government's. The takeover law produced by the Delaware courts in the SEC's absence consequently reflects the state's constricted interests; the code erected may be fine for Delaware but is not appropriate for the diversity of national interests, let alone stockholders. The result is that today we have a Delaware-promulgated takeover code which entrenches management and increases agency costs to the detriment of economic efficiency and stockholder decisional autonomy.

9. See infra Part V for further discussion of this temporal mismatch.
10. For a further discussion of the possible outcome of such a review, see infra Part VI.A.
11. Here I refer to both the Delaware Court of Chancery and its superior, the Delaware Supreme Court. The Delaware Supreme Court authored the majority of decisions discussed in this Article. But the Delaware Supreme Court reviews only a small number of the takeover-related cases decided in the Court of Chancery, and it almost always affirms its lower court brethren. See Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 Bus. Law. 1, 10 (2005) ("The decisions of the Court of Chancery, when reviewed by the Delaware Supreme Court, are most often affirmed."). Given the relative uniformity of decision-making, the two courts can effectively be considered a singular regulator, albeit with slight textual variance and occasional disagreement. They are treated as such in this Article, with any relevant divergence noted.
13. See infra notes 308-11 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this argument.
Although this Article's call for the federal takeover code's reform should substantially ameliorate these deficits, these failings will quickly reappear if the SEC thereafter remains absent. The Delaware courts will revert to form, again engendering a suboptimal national takeover code. A reengaged SEC will temper, if not stem, this consequence through the SEC's ability to trump, or threaten to trump, Delaware law. It will also bring to bear the SEC's resources and expertise, national rulemaking ability, congressional influence, and bully-pulpit position. These are valuable benefits which the Delaware courts simply cannot institutionally provide. The result will be a more economic, relevant, and coherent national takeover code.

This Article is organized as follows. Part II of this Article highlights the SEC's absence by delineating the SEC's pre-1990s activity in promulgating takeover law and supervising and regulating takeovers. Part III highlights the SEC's post-1989 disappearance as a takeover regulator. Part IV bookends this disappearing act by spelling out the continued rapid course of takeover regulation as the Delaware courts supplanted the SEC as the nation's primary takeover regulator. Part V then examines the failure of federal takeover law in light of the SEC's bowing-out, ongoing state conduct, and the continued evolution of takeovers.

Part VI concludes with a call for an SEC-initiated review of the federal takeover code and an active, engaged SEC as the principal regulator of takeover law. The Part also discusses the federalism issues raised by this proposal as well as its implications for the possibility and appropriateness of wholesale federalization of the nation's takeover code. Although myths can come true, this one should not come to pass. If the SEC is actively engaged, the Delaware courts and the SEC can together create and administer a synergistic national takeover code—one where each body regulates, administers, and collaborates on the takeover issues that correspond to their institutional strengths, albeit with the SEC in a de facto dominate position due to its preemptive ability.

Before beginning, an aside on what this Article does not address. This Article is principally occupied with the SEC's conduct, or lack thereof, and not Congress. Historically, Congress acted in corporate matters either at the SEC's behest or, more notably, when scandal hit. For a recent example, recall the congressional furor over the proposed Dubai Ports acquisition. The SEC is the

15. See infra Part VI.B for a detailed discussion of these comparative advantages.
16. Another myth is that the SEC was not an active participant in takeover regulation during this time period. See Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 589 (3d ed. 2003) (arguing that the SEC's contribution to 1980s takeover regulation was largely "technical").
18. The congressional intervention in the acquisition of Peninsular & Oriental Steam by Dubai Ports and the ensuing political brawl which lead to Dubai Ports terminating the
primary federal regulator of the public takeover market. It has a duty to maintain its current regulation, engage in debate of topical and other issues, and propose new legislation to Congress when and where necessary. Congress acts in corporate and securities regulation sporadically at best; the SEC is by design potentially omnipresent. Accordingly, this Article largely concerns SEC conduct, not that of Congress.

II. THE GOLDEN AGE OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION

This Part examines federal involvement in takeover regulation during the thirty-year period beginning in the 1960s. A well-respected commentator once described the SEC’s involvement in takeover regulation during this time as “quiescent.” This Part demonstrates that this is not the case. The SEC was instead a significant, and sometimes leading, regulator of the period’s consequential takeover issues. Moreover, federal takeover regulation during this era was largely enacted or promulgated piecemeal, tailored narrowly to address the perceived deficiencies of the time. These observations lay the bedrock for later analysis in this Article concerning the present-day efficacy of federal takeover regulation and the effect of the SEC’s subsequent disappearance.

A. The Williams Act (the 1960s)

Merger activity in the United States has historically occurred in waves. The “third wave” of U.S. merger activity transpired between 1960 and 1971 and was largely caused by that generation’s bubble, the conglomerate acquisition craze. At the wave’s height, from 1967-69, over 10,000 companies were acquired, with approximately 25,000 firms disappearing throughout the entire period. It...
was in response to this flurry of activity and the consequent emergence of the
cash tender offer that modern-day federal takeover regulation originated. Previ-
ously, takeovers were staid events conducted primarily through proxy solicita-
tions regulated by both state and federal proxy law.24 In the mid-1960s, how-
ever, at the crest of this third wave, there was a sharp comparative rise in unso-
licted or “hostile” takeover attempts.25 These unsolicited bidders typically pre-
ferred to evade the federal and state regulatory apparatus applicable to proxy
contests and instead often made their takeover attempts via cash tender offer.26
The rise of the tender offer is evidenced numerically: in 1966, there were over
100 tender offers involving companies listed on national securities exchanges as
contrasted with just eight in 1960.27

These early tender offers were largely unregulated affairs, and bidder con-
duct was often egregious.28 The “Saturday Night Special” was a favorite: in one
form, a bidder would embark on a pre-offer buying raid to establish a substan-
tial beachhead of ownership at a reduced price.29 This would be followed by a
short-period, first-come, first-served public tender offer.30 Disclosure by bidders
in these offers was also cramped: target stockholders oftentimes did not know
the bidder’s future intentions for the corporation, the source or availability of
the bidder’s capital, or even the bidder’s true identity.31 In the wake of these
new and unfamiliar tactics, stockholders and target corporations were relatively
helpless. Takeover defenses at the time were in their infancy and virtually non-

---

24. See generally Edward Ross Aranow & Herbert A. Einhorn, Proxy Contests
   for Corporate Control (2d ed. 1968).
25. There were 70 unsolicited takeover attempts in the period 1959-1962, compared to
26. There were 29 unsolicited tender offers in the period 1959-1962, compared to 41
   proxy contests during this time. In the period 1963-1966, the number of unsolicited tender
   offers rose substantially to 115 tender offers, compared to 63 proxy contests during this
   time. Id.
27. S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, Full Disclosure of Equity Ownership
   Report]. The total value of cash tender offers similarly jumped from $186 million in 1960
   to $951 million in 1965. See Samuel L. Hayes, III & Russell A. Taussig, Tactics of Cash
28. See Senate Report, supra note 27, at 2-4. See generally Arthur Fleischer, Jr. &
   Robert H. Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 317, 326-
   27 (1967).
29. The origin of the phrase “Saturday Night Special” is uncertain, but one version
   has it first employed in 1975, when a public relations executive used the term to malign
   Colt Industries’ unsolicited tender offer for Garlock. See Gaughan, supra note 22, at 42.
   An alternative account is that the term arose out of General Cable Corporation’s unsolic-
   ited offer for Microdot, Inc. See Raymond S. Troubh, Purchased Affection: A Primer on
30. See Hugh L. Sowards & James S. Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Fed-
   eral Securities Regulation, 41 St. John’s L. Rev. 499, 500-04 (1967) (describing the typical
   form and structure of a “Saturday Night Special” tender offer).
31. See 113 Cong. Rec. 859 (1967); Senate Report, supra note 27, at 2-6.
existent. Indeed, when surveying takeover manuals published during this time period, one marvels at the breadth of subsequent developments.

In light of the states' failure to respond, the SEC became the principal governmental actor in the drive to regulate cash tender offers. The SEC, led by its Chairman, Manuel F. Cohen, began a vocal campaign in favor of such regulation and to spotlight abuse. The first fruits of the SEC's labor were reaped in 1965, when Senator Harrison A. Williams introduced a bill to regulate tender offers. This first bill, however, headlined in the Congressional Record with the portentous title "Protection Against Corporate Raiders," had an avowedly anti-takeover slant. It would, among other things, have required a twenty-day notice period before bidder commencement of a tender offer. The SEC, maintaining its activist approach, consequently took a public stance in opposition to many of the provisions of the bill, including the notice period.

Largely because of this SEC opposition, in 1967 Senator Williams introduced a revised, more neutral bill. One of its stated main purposes was "to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."

---

32. Share repurchases and friendly share placements were the two prevalent takeover defenses. See generally David S. Bradshaw, Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1104 (1969) (describing various state-of-the-art takeover defenses circa 1969). In 1967, though, the Delaware courts circumscribed use of share placements by holding them invalid to the extent their primary purpose was to thwart an unsolicited offer. See Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967) (invalidating share issuance bestowing corporate control to one of the defendants where primary purpose was to prevent unsolicited tender offer). The Delaware courts were more tolerant of share repurchases, which were generally permissible under Delaware law at the time. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964) (applying business judgment rule to uphold stock repurchase so long as it was not "solely or primarily because of the desire to perpetuate [the directors] in office").


34. For example, Chairman Cohen, in the 1968 introduction to the second edition of a prominent treatise on proxy contests, publicly stated that unregulated cash tender offers were "getting away from us." Manuel F. Cohen, Introduction to PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 24, at xvii. See also Manuel F. Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 BUS. LAW. 149 (1966); Manuel F. Cohen, Takeover Bids, in 2 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 87 (1966); Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC, Address Before the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., on Proposed Legislation to Regulate Tender Offers (June 28, 1966), in WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE 1041-43 (5th ed. 2003). The SEC position was particularly noteworthy since there existed strong academic opinion in the period that tender offers were a beneficial force for corporate change and efficient allocation of resources and their regulation would be economically detrimental. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares—A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DUKE L.J. 231 (1967).


39. SENATE REPORT, supra note 27, at 3.
July 29, 1968, and known as the Williams Act, was almost entirely in the form recommended by the SEC.40

The Williams Act itself both substantively and procedurally regulated tender offers, and its terms were keyed specifically to respond to the perceived abuses of the time.41 First, new section 14(d) obligated bidders to file on Schedule 14D and circulate a disclosure document in connection with a tender offer.42 Second, new section 14D attempted to curb coercive practices in tender offers by spelling out substantive governing rules. More specifically, new section 14(d)(5) required a bidder to provide withdrawal rights during the first seven days of the offer and thereafter past the sixtyth day, effectively establishing a seven-day minimum offer period;43 new section 14(d)(6) required a bidder to accept shares tendered during the first ten days of a partial offer on a pro rata basis;44 and new section 14(d)(7) required a bidder to offer and pay the same consideration to all tendering stockholders.45 Finally, new section 14(e) prohibited misrepresentations, misleading omissions and "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices" in connection with a tender offer.46

The SEC had taken steps to regulate tender offers even before the adoption of the Williams Act. On May 28, 1968, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-4 prohibiting short tendering in connection with a partial tender offer.47 The SEC promulgated this rule after congressional statements in Williams Act hearings that the SEC had adequate authority to act.48 Thereafter, the SEC speedily moved to im-

40. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968). The SEC eventually had its way even with respect to points of initial divergence between it and Congress. For example, the SEC had recommended that the Williams Act require unlimited withdrawal rights prior to an offer's close. Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearing on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 23 (1967). In the Williams Act, Congress provided for withdrawal rights only during the first seven days of an offer and thereafter past the sixtyth day. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970). But the SEC later acted to steadily expand withdrawal rights to the entire tender offer period. See infra notes 84 and 153 and accompanying text. For a legislative history of the Williams Act, see Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1891-95 (1989).

41. Here, I dispute commentators who have termed the Williams Act a weak regulatory response. The Williams Act addressed and regulated the significant concerns of the era. If anything, the Williams Act was viewed by commentators of the time as too strong a medicine. See, e.g., Manne, supra note 34. It would only be later developments in takeovers that would recast the Williams Act as a relatively weak legislative act.

42. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970). Schedule 14D attempted to remedy the information gap in tender offer practice by mandating disclosure of, inter alia, the bidder's plans and proposals for the target, arrangements with any third party with respect to acquired target securities, source and amount of funds, background, and identity. Id.

43. Id. § 78n(d)(5).
44. Id. § 78n(d)(6).
45. Id. § 78n(d)(7).
46. Id. § 78(m)(e)(1).

47. Adoption of Rule 10b-4 under the Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 8321, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,588 (May 28, 1968). Short tendering is the tender of securities into a partial offer that the tendering stockholder borrows and does not own. As a result, the number of shares purchased from the stockholder will increase and the number of shares purchased from other investors will be correspondingly reduced. Id. at 83,185.

48. SENATE REPORT, supra note 27, at 5.
plement the Williams Act and assume its oversight role of takeovers; within a few months of passage, the SEC adopted and then revised emergency implementing Williams Act regulation.\footnote{49} In the revising release, the SEC also put forth an expansive position on the scope of the Williams Act definition of a "tender offer."\footnote{50} On October 8, 1969, the SEC also adopted Rule 10b-13, which prohibited bidders, from the time of announcement of a tender offer, from purchasing the security subject to the tender offer other than pursuant to that offer.\footnote{51} At the turn of the decade, and at the SEC's behest, the Williams Act was amended by Congress.\footnote{52} The amendments brought exchange offers within the Williams Act's regulatory compass and provided the SEC with rulemaking authority under section 14(e) "to deal with ... rapidly changing problems."\footnote{53} The amendments also lowered the triggering threshold for the Williams Act's substantive and procedural requirements from a tender offer for ten percent of a corporation's equity to five percent.\footnote{54}

The framework for future regulation had been set, and the SEC had dived head-first into the takeover regulation business.

\section*{B. Going-Privates (the 1970s)}

The third wave of merger activity subsided in the early 1970s with the popping of the conglomerate stock bubble and repeated U.S. economic recession.\footnote{55} These two events combined to birth the next major issue of takeover regulation: the abusive going-private.\footnote{56} These were largely "take 'em public high—buy 'em

\footnote{49. The issued rules more specifically delineated tender offer disclosure and filing requirements. Adoption of Temporary Rules and Regulations Under Sections 13(d) and (e) and Sections 14(d) and (f), Exchange Act Release No. 8370, [1967-1968 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) \$ 77,581 (July 30, 1968); Amendments to Temporary Rules and Regulations Under Sections 13(d) and (e) and 14(d), Exchange Act Release No. 8392, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) \$ 77,715 (Aug. 30, 1968) [hereinafter August 1968 Amendments].}

\footnote{50. The SEC stated that a special bid would thereafter be considered a tender offer subject to the Williams Act. August 1968 Amendments, supra note 49, at 83,638. A special bid was a procedure to permit the purchase of large blocks of stock through a fixed price bidding process. See Nathaniel B. Smith, Note, Defining "Tender Offer" Under the Williams Act, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 189, 198-99 (1987) (discussing special bids and their unregulated use prior to the SEC's application of the Williams Act).}


\footnote{54. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(1) (1971).}

\footnote{55. SALTER & WEINHOLD, supra note 22, at 18.}

\footnote{56. A going-private transaction, sometimes referred to as a freeze-out transaction, can be defined as a transaction where an affiliate of a publicly held corporation (for example, a member of management or a controlling or substantial stockholder) acquires, or causes to...
out low” affairs; controlling affiliates of corporations who had only recently engaged in initial public offerings when stock market prices were substantially higher offered to buy out their own publicly held stock at markedly lower prices. Because there was an inherently coercive element in these transactions and the opportune timing was at the affiliates’ discretion, these purchases engendered cries of fraud and unjust enrichment. The states’ response was, at least initially, relatively sluggish, and the SEC again took the wheel maintaining its role as the nation’s primary takeover regulator.

In 1975, the SEC launched a fact-finding investigation and simultaneously proposed rules to govern going-private transactions. One form of the proposed rule would have required that a price paid in such a transaction be no lower than “the consideration recommended jointly by two qualified independent persons.” Adoption of this rule was delayed, largely due to allegations that the SEC lacked rulemaking authority under the Williams Act.


59. The only state to take legislative action was Wisconsin. 13 Wis. Admin. Code SEC § 6.05(1)(a)1-3 (1978). The state court response was also tepid at first; these courts initially reviewed these transactions under a “business purpose” or a modified fairness test which often relegated minority stockholder claims to be remedied, if at all, through appraisal proceedings. This approach was deemed unsatisfactory by many critics. See generally Greene, supra note 58, at 496-506 (surveying the scope of state decisions prior to 1976 concerning going-private transactions). But see People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (enjoining going-private transaction under New York law).

60. In a polemical speech made at Notre Dame law school, SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., initiated the SEC charge against going-private transactions. He labeled them as “serious, unfair, and sometimes disgraceful, a perversion of the whole process of public financing. “Going-Private”: A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,010, at 84,695 (Nov. 20, 1974) (A. A. Sommer, Jr., SEC Commissioner, Address Before the Law Advisory Council Lecture at the Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 1974)).


62. Id. at 85,092.

63. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 59.
Supreme Court in *Santa Fe Industries v. Green* overruled the Second Circuit's holding that Rule 10b-5 constituted a basis to challenge a going-private decision on substantive grounds. This decision, and continued dissatisfaction with state regulation of going-privates—primarily the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in *Singer v. Magnavox Co.*—led the SEC to repose rules. These rules were finally adopted by the SEC in 1979, and, although not as far-reaching as originally proposed, established a new disclosure-based regime for going-privates. Most notably, the rules now obligated corporations in going-private transactions to express an opinion as to the "fairness" of the transaction to unaffiliated stockholders. The SEC conduct was particularly noteworthy given the view of many that it did not have the legal authority to adopt even this scaled-back regulation.

The other major takeover issue of this decade concerned the scope of the Williams Act. The Williams Act regulated tender offers, but intentionally did not define what constituted a tender offer triggering the Act's substantive and procedural requirements. Not surprisingly, in light of this uncertainty, bidders repeatedly structured their purchases so as to claim that they did not constitute tender offers. But the SEC was quite energetic in establishing an expansive view of this definition and consequent reach of the Williams Act. Immediately
upon passage of the Williams Act the SEC published its position on the definitional scope of a tender offer. Then in 1974, the SEC released a notice of a fact-finding investigation to consider issuance of a regulatory definition of a tender offer under the Williams Act.\textsuperscript{74} After hearings, the SEC announced that such a rule was neither “appropriate nor necessary” at that time; rather, abstention would preserve SEC flexibility to respond to developments in transaction types that are or should be encompassed by the term.\textsuperscript{75} For the remainder of the 1970s, the SEC largely pursued its quest in the courts, achieving a measure of success when its eight-factor broad definitional test for a tender offer was adopted in the 1979 case of \textit{Wellman v. Dickinson}.\textsuperscript{76} Shortly afterwards, the SEC attempted to capitalize on this victory by again proposing regulation and legislation further enlarging the tender offer definition to encompass unconventional purchases such as purchases outside the temporal offer period.\textsuperscript{77} None of these proposals, however, resulted in new regulation or law.

The SEC was also acting during this time to refine and broaden the requirements of the Williams Act. On September 9, 1974, the SEC initiated an investigatory proceeding “to develop a factual basis for determining whether it is necessary or appropriate . . . to adopt or amend rules . . . and/or to recommend further legislation” concerning takeovers and acquisitions.\textsuperscript{78} On August 2, 1976, the SEC proposed a wholesale revision to the takeover code based on the find-


\textsuperscript{76} 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982). \textit{Wellman} adopted a broad-based, eight-factor test proposed by the SEC itself to determine if a stock purchase or series of purchases constituted a tender offer. Id. at 823-24. The standard annunciated in \textit{Wellman} quickly became the judicial norm for determination of a tender offer under the Williams Act. \textit{See generally Smith, supra note 50, at 201-09 (discussing the \textit{Wellman} test and its adoption by courts in subsequent cases).}


\textsuperscript{78} 1974 Fact-Finding Release, supra note 74, at 84,461.
ings of this investigatory proceeding. These proposed rules would not be adopted, but would form the basis for later rulemaking. On July 21, 1977, the SEC finally adopted permanent disclosure requirements for Schedule 14D “to replace its emergency rules under the Williams Act” and as part of an effort to adopt a “comprehensive regulatory framework with respect to tender offers.”

In 1979, on the same day it adopted going-private rules, the SEC also promulgated rules for the governance of issuer tender offers similar to those for third party offers.

The SEC finished out the decade by substantially revising the Williams Act rules to principally adopt the 1976 proposed rules. The SEC changes effectively eliminated all vestiges of the old “Saturday Night Special” for any and all tender offers: new Rule 14e-1 lengthened the minimum offering period to twenty business days from the de facto seven calendar days required by old Rule 14d-5. Other rules set forth procedures for bidders to compel targets to mail the bidder’s tender offer materials to target stockholders or otherwise provide the necessary stockholder information for mailing by the bidder itself—an alternative to state statutes increasingly perceived as deficient.

Finally, reweighing the state/federal takeover regulatory scales, the SEC also promulgated Rule 14d-2, which required that an offer commence within five business days of announcement. This SEC action was telling; it directly and intentionally preempted emergent state regulation mandating conflicting pre-approval or waiting periods before commencement of a takeover bid. In this last deed, the SEC had taken steps to reassert definitively its authority over takeover regulation.

The SEC thus continued its heightened involvement in takeover regulation throughout the 1970s, acting vigorously during this time to preserve its position

---

79. 1976 Tender Offer Release, supra note 75.
80. 1979 Proposed Rules and Schedule Release, supra note 77, at 81,207 (withdrawing the 1976 Tender Offer Release and publishing for comment certain proposed rules and a related schedule pertaining to tender offers).
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1980). Under amended Rule 14d-7, withdrawal rights were extended to an initial fifteen business day period with an additional ten business day withdrawal period required if a competing offer was commenced under certain conditions. Id. § 240.14d-7. Rule 14d-8 now permitted bidders to vary the acceptance period for partial offers and extend withdrawal rights for a duration longer than the seven days required by Rule 14d-6. Id. § 240.14d-8.
85. 1979 Tender Offer Release, supra note 83, at 82,586-89. This rule was again an act by the SEC in the face of criticism that its rulemaking was beyond its authority. Id. at 82,587.
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2.
as the nation's regulator of takeovers and supplant state takeover law where it deemed appropriate.

C. Hostile Takeovers (the 1980s)

The fourth wave of takeover activity commenced in the late 1970s and early 1980s and ended in 1989 in the wake of the collapse of the high-yield bond market and the S&L scandal. The heightened activity was again quantitatively marked: the annual value of acquisition transactions rose from $43.5 billion in 1979 to a peak of $246.9 billion in 1988 before bottoming out at $71 billion in 1991. Unsolicited takeover activity, mainly cash tender offers, sharply increased from twelve contested tender offers in 1980 to forty-six such offers in 1988, the increase juiced by cheap financing in the form of high-yield bonds. But this wave was different in one significant respect: this time targets were equipped for defense. The fourth wave was notable for the wide-spread target resort to takeover defenses, including such colorfully named measures as poison pills, shark repellents, pac-mans, golden parachutes, and greenmail.

The renewed vigor of targets, as well as revised bidder tactics, would spur a revolution in takeover methodology, resulting in more extended public takeover battles and leading state courts, state legislatures, Congress, federal courts, and the SEC to confront this phenomenon. The SEC again particularly met this challenge. Although the SEC's involvement in takeover regulation during this period was extensive and reached high tide, the SEC arguably failed to meet many of its annunciated goals. The remainder of this Part illustrates the breadth of SEC involvement by briefly highlighting three of the main SEC efforts during this era.

88. SALTER & WEINHOLD, supra note 22, at 32.
89. GAUGHAN, supra note 22, at 42. The activity was also pervasive, and during this time period thirty percent of the corporations in the Fortune 500 were subject to unsolicited takeovers. See Gerald F. Davis & Suzanne K. Stout, Organization Theory and the Market for Corporate Control: A Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics of Large Takeover Targets, 1980-90, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 605, 608 (1992).
91. For definitions of each of these, see generally Richard S. Ruback, An Overview of Takeover Defenses, in MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 49 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
92. One could literally write a book, and quite a juicy one at that, on this period or even its individual events. See, e.g., BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (2003) (chronicling the takeover battle for RJR Nabisco in 1988); ALLAN SLOAN, THREE PLUS ONE EQUALS BILLIONS: THE BENDIX-MARTIN MARIETTA WAR (1983) (chronicling the takeover battle between Bendix and Martin-Marietta in 1982). But I have selected for discussion in this Part three of the more telling examples during the period of SEC takeover regulation and activity.
1. SEC Legislative and Regulatory Efforts

The first of these efforts was the SEC’s continued attempts to revise and expand the reach of the Williams Act. In 1983, the SEC formed an Advisory Committee on Tender Offers (Advisory Committee) comprised of eighteen prominent members of the takeover community. The Advisory Committee promptly reported fifty recommended revisions to federal takeover regulation in June of that year. In March of 1984, the SEC Commissioners considered the recommendations; the SEC Commissioners rejected the sweeping ones, including a prohibition on charter and bylaw amendments which erected “high barriers to change of control.” Nonetheless, the SEC Commissioners did accept the majority of recommendations. The rationale for the SEC Commissioners’ rejection of a bar on takeover defenses particularly was never explained. However, the Delaware and other state courts had not yet ruled on the validity of these defenses, and the SEC’s forbearance could be attributed to a wait-and-see approach with respect to this possible state action. In May of that year, the SEC proposed implementing legislation for the accepted recommendations, including legislative curbs on greenmail and golden parachutes.

But events of the fourth wave soon forced the SEC to refocus its modest legislative agenda. By 1985, the rise of unsolicited takeovers in the public consciousness, and the negative public perceptions thereof, led to active congressional interest. In that year alone, forty-one bills proposing to regulate takeovers were submitted to Congress. The SEC Commissioners stated that they shared the “serious concerns” of the Advisory Committee but were “not prepared at this time to concur in such a broad intrusion into state corporate law.”

---

94. See generally SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 584-85 (describing the history and composition of the committee).
96. See Statement of John S.R. Shad, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Concerning the Recommendation of the SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,511, at 86,681 (Mar. 28, 1984) [hereinafter SEC Advisory Committee Response]. For example, the SEC stated that it had serious reservations concerning Recommendation 14, which would require any acquisition of more than twenty percent of the voting power of a corporation be acquired from the corporation itself or pursuant to a tender offer. Id. at 86,679-81.
97. The SEC Commissioners proposed legislation for five of the recommendations, agreed to support pending congressional legislation on golden parachutes, and ordered the SEC staff to take rulemaking action with respect to fourteen other recommendations. Id. at 86,684. See generally Linda C. Quinn & David B.H. Martin, Jr., The SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers and Its Aftermath—A New Chapter in Change-of-Control Regulation, in TENDER OFFERS, supra note 95, at 21-25 (outlining the SEC’s response to the Advisory Committee Report).
98. The SEC Commissioners stated that they shared the “serious concerns” of the Advisory Committee but were “not prepared at this time to concur in such a broad intrusion into state corporate law.” SEC Advisory Committee Response, supra note 96, at 86,681.
100. See, e.g., Peter Behr, Inside the Economy, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1984, at D9 (discussing increasing public concern over unsolicited takeovers and consequent proposals for regulation).
overs were introduced in Congress—compared to one bill in 1980. These bills largely sought to tip takeover regulation in favor of targets by permitting takeover defenses and limiting bidder conduct. The SEC opposed these bills. Instead, the SEC favored minority legislation preserving a level playing field and stockholder choice, increasingly calling for limits or even preemption of certain antitakeover measures such as the poison pill. Even the SEC’s own 1984 bill became caught in the storm; in 1985 it was amended into its opposite, an antitakeover law. The SEC promptly committed filicide by issuing a public statement opposing these protarget amendments and killing its own proposed legislation. In the end, the SEC’s active energies would not produce passage of a takeover bill it favored, but, aided in large part by the Reagan Administration, the SEC would maintain the status quo and help defeat the proposed antitakeover legislation.

Legislative revision and initiative potential largely lost, the SEC attempted to respond and strengthen the Williams Act through regulatory action. In 1986, in retort to a number of adverse court decisions, the SEC issued a concept release concerning the definitional scope of a tender offer, namely “whether the Williams Act should apply whenever a person acquires a substantial percentage of a target company’s securities during or shortly after a tender offer.”

102. Id.
105. These amendments would have required a bidder to file a community impact statement, extended the minimum tender offer period to forty calendar days, and eliminated restrictions on management ability to take defensive action. See Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984, supra note 99.
106. See SEC Says It Opposes House Measure to Restrict Abusive Takeover Tactics, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1473-74 (Sept. 14, 1984). The Reagan Administration also came out in strong opposition to the bill. See Reagan Administration Formally Opposes House Bill to Limit Tender Offer Abuses, 16 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 1546 (Sept. 28, 1984). The Reagan Administration’s position was distinct from the SEC’s opposition. Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan objected to the Bill on deregulatory and federalism bases writing that the Bill “‘intrude[s] unnecessarily into state law and constitute[s] an unwarranted step toward imposition of a substantive federal corporation law.’” Id.
next year the SEC proposed rules to regulate such purchases, but, as with other regulatory initiatives on this issue, these rules were never adopted. Interestingly, in the concept release, the SEC for the first time contemplated economic deregulation of tender offers, requesting for comment upon but never responding to the question of whether the Commission should adopt "a self-governance exemption to . . . provisions of its tender offer regulations."111

Meanwhile, the SEC was also using its regulatory powers to reconsider existing rules. In 1984, the SEC Commission, after considering deregulation of short tendering, decided to amend Rule 10b-4, over one dissent, to wholly ban hedged tendering.112 In 1986, the SEC also amended the proxy disclosure rules to raise the disclosure obligations with respect to acquisition transactions.113 Finally and also in that year, the SEC amended the rules governing issuer tender offers to harmonize them with the third party tender offer rules and address certain controversial practices by targets in defensive buy-backs.114

2. Antitakeover Measures

The second mainstay SEC effort during this era was its increasing vocal and active opposition to the use of antitakeover measures. As the fourth wave progressed, states enacted antitakeover statutes and target corporations increasingly resorted to antitakeover defenses. In response, the SEC took a progressively more public position that corporate, judicial and legislative actions permitting or implementing antitakeover measures diminished stockholder choice and were therefore unacceptable.115

a. Poison Pills

The first prong of the SEC's campaign was its active opposition to the adoption of antitakeover devices by corporations. The SEC initially raised this issue in 1979; the SEC stated publicly that it "[was] becoming increasingly concerned by the effect of defensive corporate charter amendments on the interests of in-
vestors, particularly investors who are confronted with a tender offer.\textsuperscript{116} This concern transformed into active opposition as the decade progressed and their use became widespread. I have already noted the SEC's mid-1980s legislative proposals and support of congressional action to stem the use of greenmail and golden parachutes. But the SEC also pursued this cause through the regulatory process and the courts, particularly focusing on the \textit{bête noire} of the age, the poison pill invented by Marty Lipton in 1982.\textsuperscript{117}

The focus of the SEC's judicial strategy was primarily an argument to ban poison pills in Delaware state court in the 1985 case of \textit{Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.}\textsuperscript{118} The SEC effort, however, was unsuccessful, and the court in \textit{Moran} validated use of the poison pill as a proportional target defensive response.\textsuperscript{119}

Thereafter, the SEC unabashedly persisted in its campaign. In 1986, the SEC published a study of poison pills by its Chief Economist finding that "poison pills are harmful to target shareholders, on net [and there is] no statistical evidence that pills have systematically benefited target shareholders."\textsuperscript{120} Thereafter, the SEC requested public comment on a rule which would have required stockholder preapproval of poison pills.\textsuperscript{121} The SEC abandoned this proposed rule shortly thereafter. The SEC's stated reason was that, due to substantial resolution of investor concerns surrounding these defenses by the state courts, regulation was not appropriate at the time.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{116} 1979 Proposed Rules Release, supra note 77, at 82,614.

\textsuperscript{117} Lipton purportedly conceived of the poison pill to aid El Paso Railroad in fending off an unsolicited offer by Burlington & Northern Railroad. See Guhan Subramanian, \textit{A New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to the Poison Pill}, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 375, 397 n.128 (1998). The SEC during this time period also attempted to prohibit dual-class voting stock which was claimed to unduly infringe upon the fundamental corporate concept of one-share-one-vote and preclude takeovers. The SEC responded in 1988 by promulgating Rule 19C-4, which prohibited publicly listed corporations from maintaining dual-class stock. This rule was invalidated by the D.C. Circuit on the grounds that it was beyond the SEC's rulemaking authority under section 19(c) of the Exchange Act. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, \textit{The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4}, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565 (1991).

\textsuperscript{118} 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). The SEC filed an amicus brief in \textit{Moran}. \textit{Id}. at 1348. The SEC's decision to intervene was made on a three to two vote by the SEC Commissioners. \textit{Id}. at 1348 n.1. The SEC argued that a "[b]oard is unauthorized to usurp stockholders' rights to receive hostile tender offers" and "unauthorized to fundamentally restrict stockholders' rights to conduct a proxy contest." \textit{Id}. at 1351. See generally Martin M. Cohen, Note, "Poison Pills" as a Negotiating Tool: \textit{Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate Takeover Wars}, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 459, 471-77 (1987) (discussing the SEC's intervention in \textit{Moran}).

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Moran}, 500 A.2d at 1353-56.

\textsuperscript{120} OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, \textit{THE EFFECTS OF POISON PILLS ON THE WEALTH OF TARGET SHAREHOLDERS} 43 (1986). These results were consistent with an earlier study by the SEC Chief Economist. See A Study on the Economics of Poison Pills [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,971, at 88,044 (Mar. 5, 1986) (concluding that the "effect[a] of poison pills [in deterring] prospective hostile takeover bids out-weighs the beneficial effects that come from increased bargaining leverage of the target management").

\textsuperscript{121} 1986 Concept Release, supra note 109, at 88,206.

\textsuperscript{122} See Tender Offer Reform, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. (1987) (statement of
Here, the SEC was likely referring not to Moran but to two revolutionary Delaware Court decisions. In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings. Unocal and Revlon were uniquely consequential for holding that the takeover decision and the use of takeover defenses would now be reviewed by the Delaware courts under a higher standard than the business judgment rule. Though these decisions left undefined the initial parameters of this review and its limitations, they initially appeared to circumscribe the use of takeover defenses—hence, the SEC’s forbearance. For the remainder of the 1980s, the Delaware courts would be an active regulator of takeovers through exposition and application of these two decisions and their required standards of review.

b. State Takeover Legislation

The second prong of the SEC offense was its consistent opposition to state takeover legislation. In the mid-1970s, the states began to stir and legislate their own takeover laws. These first generation statutes were almost all patterned upon blue sky laws and went beyond the Williams Act. In their most common form, these laws subjected a takeover offer to a precommencement waiting pe-

David S. Ruder, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission). The SEC action was also likely causally related to congressional and even administration opposition to such a proposal. For example, the Reagan Administration’s Economic Policy Council came out forcefully during this time period against congressional action to prohibit takeover defenses. Administration Group Rejects Proposal to Enter Debate on Corporate Takeovers, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 819 (June 5, 1987).

123. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a target board decision to take defensive action in light of a threat to the corporation—in this case an unsolicited two-tiered takeover offer combined with the threat of greenmail—should not be reviewed under the business judgment rule but rather a higher, intermediate standard. Id. at 955. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. Law. 247 (1989) (reviewing the Unocal decision and Delaware courts’ subsequent interpretation thereof).

124. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The Revlon case is discussed further at infra Part V.A.


riod and approval by a state administrator.\textsuperscript{128} I have already noted that the SEC had acted in 1979 to preempt a number of these statutes.\textsuperscript{129} But, as the fourth wave gathered steam, the number of state legislatures adopting takeover statutes increased in response to heightened public hostility to takeovers mixed with opportune corporate lobbying.\textsuperscript{130} The SEC vocally and continually opposed this legislation as against its level-playing-field policy as well as on the grounds that these laws were either preempted or an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.\textsuperscript{131}

In the Supreme Court case \textit{Edgar v. MITE Corp.},\textsuperscript{132} the SEC succeeded: Illinois' first generation takeover statute was struck down as unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{133} However, the states quickly counterattacked, enacting modified and more limited second generation takeover statutes.\textsuperscript{134} The content of these statutes was less far-reaching than first generation laws; they purported to regulate corporate internal affairs, such as stockholder or board approval procedures, rather than the exogenous matter of the takeover process.\textsuperscript{135} In \textit{CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America},\textsuperscript{136} the Supreme Court set back this SEC effort by holding Indiana's second generation law to be constitutional.\textsuperscript{137} Within six months of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{129} See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{130} By 1982, thirty-seven states had adopted a form of takeover statute. These statutes are listed in Mark A. Sargent, \textit{On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell}, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981).
\item \textsuperscript{131} The SEC had consistently opposed this regulation since its first appearance in the 1970s. See Wilner & Landy, supra note 127 (reviewing early state takeover statutes and arguments that they "frustrated" the purposes of the Williams Act and "unconstitutionally" burdened interstate commerce).
\item \textsuperscript{132} 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
\item \textsuperscript{133} Id. at 646. The SEC filed an amicus brief in \textit{MITE} asserting that the statute was constitutionally infirm because it alternatively violated the commerce clause or was preempted by the Williams Act. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S 624 (1982) (No. 80-1188), 1981 WL 389721.
\item \textsuperscript{134} In the six-year period after \textit{MITE}, twenty states enacted takeover statutes. Romano, supra note 101, at 461. See also Allen D. Boyer, \textit{Federalism and Corporation Law: Drawing the Line in State Takeover Regulation}, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1062-65 (1986) (tracing state reactions to the decision in \textit{MITE} and their passage of second generation takeover laws).
\item \textsuperscript{135} Second generation statutes had a more confined jurisdictional scope: they limited their application to corporations organized within the state. In addition, they almost always had opt-out or opt-in provisions which permitted corporate choice as to whether to apply the statute. See generally Roberta Romano, \textit{The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes}, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 113-17 (1987) (describing the types of takeover statute and setting forth states adopting them).
\item \textsuperscript{136} 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
\item \textsuperscript{137} Id. at 94. The SEC also filed an amicus brief in \textit{CTS Corp}. In contrast to its amicus brief in \textit{MITE}, the SEC argued that the statute was constitutionally invalid under the commerce clause but did not reargue invalidity under preemption doctrine. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S 69 (1987) (Nos. 86-71 & 86-97), 1987 WL 880969.
\end{itemize}
CTS, fifteen states proceeded to enact some species of these laws.\textsuperscript{138} Importantly, the post-CTS wave included a second generation law enacted by Delaware which, over SEC public objection, passed a business combination statute modeled on New York's.\textsuperscript{139}

Nonetheless, the SEC continued its aggressive prosecution of its unconstitutionality claims \textit{vis-\-à-vis} these new second generation laws. The SEC attitude during this time was summed up by the SEC General Counsel Daniel Goelzer, who stated in 1988,

\begin{quote}
[T]he [C]ommission has instructed us to support challenges to the constitutionality of the Delaware [antitakeover] statute . . . . I identified that as a top priority because our success or failure in those challenges will have a far[-]reaching effect on tender offer practice and quite likely on what Congress does with respect to tender offer legislation.\textsuperscript{140}
\end{quote}

In line with this testimony, the SEC actively argued in amicus filings in state courts to declare state takeover statutes unconstitutional, including the Delaware law referred to in the quote above. These efforts were wholly unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{141} The SEC Chairman at the time, David S. Ruder, also went before Congress and futilely attempted to prod it into passing legislation providing the SEC with authority to preempt state takeover laws.\textsuperscript{142} While the SEC ultimately failed in its endeavor to restrict takeover defenses and preempt state takeover statutes, it could not be denied that the SEC had unreservedly made an attempt and, at least partially, succeeded in limiting the effects and scope of state takeover statutes.\textsuperscript{143}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[139] The Delaware law was a relatively modest version of takeover law, a fact possibly attributable to vocal SEC lobbying against Delaware's adoption of any takeover statute. See Romano, \textit{supra} note 101, at 463-65.
\item[141] For example, the SEC subsequently filed amicus briefs in three federal district court cases arguing that the takeover statutes before the court in each instance were unconstitutional on commerce clause and preemption grounds. See RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988); Salant Acquisition Corp. v. Manhattan Indus., 682 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Industries, 1988 WL 75453 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 1988). See also Johnson & Millon, \textit{supra} note 40, at 1882-86 (discussing the SEC amicus curiae briefs in these cases).
\item[142] The SEC's position was largely opposed by other members of the Reagan administration. See Witnesses at Takeover Bill Hearing Split on Preemption of State Regulation, 19 \textit{Sec. Reg. \& L. Rep.} (BNA) 851 (June 12, 1987).
\item[143] This failure with respect to takeover defenses, however, was complete. By the end of the 1980s, almost every publicly traded corporation had adopted one or more antitakeover devices. See \textsc{Investor Resp. Res. Ctr. Inc.}, \textsc{Corporate Takeover Defenses} 1989 (Virginia K. Rosenbaum ed., 1989).
\end{footnotes}
3. Specific SEC Action

The third of the SEC's efforts consisted of actions to address two of the more prevalent and problematic takeover tactics in the fourth wave—the two-tiered tender offer and the exclusionary self-tender. As the fourth wave continued, the SEC acted with respect to the two-tiered offer: on December 15, 1982, the SEC revised Rule 14d-8 to extend the minimum proration period for partial tender offers to twenty business days. This SEC action was again an aggressive one, illustrated by the dissent of the SEC Chairman and another commissioner who argued that the new rules were ultra vires since they conflicted with the plain language of section 14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (Exchange Act). The SEC subsequently and repeatedly acted to place the issue of two-tiered offers in the public realm by issuing a notice of possible commission action and then releasing a study by the Chief Economist of the SEC finding that two-tiered offers largely had no adverse effects. Ultimately, however, the SEC never attempted to further regulate two-

144. In its most common form, the front-loaded, two-tiered tender offer involved two steps. First, the bidder would initiate a tender offer to acquire a controlling interest in the target. The consideration in this first step would typically be cash. Thereafter, in the second step the bidder would "freeze-out" the minority interest and acquire the remaining target shares through a compulsory acquisition process. In this second step, the consideration would sometimes be securities with a lower value than the initial cash consideration offered. See generally Comment, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of Federal and State Law to an Innovative Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 389, 390-94 (1982) (describing a typical two-tiered offer in the context of the competitive bidding by U.S. Steel and Mobil for Marathon Oil). The coercive element is self-evident: in the absence of takeover defenses, stockholders are incentivized to tender into the offer so as to ensure receipt of the certain value of the cash consideration. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1717-35 (1985) (describing the coercive nature of two-tiered tender offers).

145. The exclusionary self-tender is a defensive tactic: the target launches a self-tender offer for its shares at a price that is a premium to market but which, by its terms, prohibits the hostile bidder from tendering into this offer. An exclusionary self-tender can be particularly effective in the face of a front-loaded, two-tiered tender offer because it provides an alternative to target stockholders and ostensibly compensates these stockholders for a lower back-end in the bidder's offer. See Kenneth B. Pollock, Note, Exclusionary Tender Offers: A Reasonably Formulated Takeover Defense or a Discriminatory Attempt to Retain Control?, 20 GA. L. REV. 627, 633-41 (1986) (describing the use of an exclusionary self-tender offer by Unocal in the face of an unsolicited offer by Mesa Petroleum).


147. Id. at 85,652 (dissent of SEC Commissioner John Shad). See also W. Brewster Lee, III, Note, SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules: Upsetting a Congressionally Selected Balance, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 914 (1983) (arguing that the SEC promulgation of Rule 14d-8 was beyond the scope of its statutory rulemaking authority).


tiered offers, as the rise of the poison pill anesthetized their coercive element and constrained their use by bidders.\textsuperscript{150}

In contrast, the SEC acted definitively with respect to the exclusionary self-tender. When the Delaware Supreme Court in \textit{Unocal} upheld an exclusionary self-tender in the face of an unsolicited bid for Unocal Corp. by the well-known corporate raider T. Boone Pickens, the SEC took direct action on the all-holders rule it had previously contemplated in 1979. In 1986, the SEC amended Rules 14d-10 and 13e-4 to include an all-holders rule and a revised best-price rule.\textsuperscript{151} The new all-holders rule was specifically enacted to overturn the Delaware ruling by prohibiting exclusionary issuer and third party tender offers of any nature.\textsuperscript{152} Notably, this release also amended Rule 14d-7 to provide for withdrawal rights throughout the entire tender offer period.\textsuperscript{153}

\section*{D. Federal Takeover Regulation Circa 1989}

Things were different as the sun set on the 1980s. The regulation of takeovers in the 1960s had been the SEC's untrammeled domain. In 1968, the year of the Williams Act, Virginia was the only state with a takeover statute.\textsuperscript{154} Additionally, state courts at that time only sporadically addressed takeover issues and treated them largely as if they were any other general corporate matter, typically applying the business judgment rule and its "hands off" imprimatur to scrutinize these takeover-related decisions.\textsuperscript{155} But by the close of the 1980s, takeover regulation in the United States was a duopoly of the states and the SEC. Interestingly, the state component was now principally the state courts rather than the legislatures. Although second and later generation takeover statutes had been enacted by the state legislatures,\textsuperscript{156} the substantive regulation and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{150} See Coates, \textit{supra} note 8, at 321.
  \item \textsuperscript{153} All-Holders Release, \textit{supra} note 151, at 88,196-97. The SEC also amended Rules 13e-4(f)(1)(ii) and 14e-1(b) to require that the tender offer period remain open for ten business days after the announcement of an increase or decrease in the percentage of securities sought or in the consideration offered. \textit{id.} at 88,195-96.
  \item \textsuperscript{154} The Virginia takeover statute was enacted shortly before the passage of the Williams Act on March 5, 1968. See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, \textit{Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson}, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 n.11 (2002).
  \item \textsuperscript{155} See \textit{generally} Edward F. Greene & James J. Junewicz, \textit{A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions}, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 711 (1984) (stating that "\textit{[s]tate regulation, however, is not likely to be effective [to regulate takeovers] because the business judgment rule is the method used to review those corporate actions}").
  \item \textsuperscript{156} See Arthur R. Pinto, \textit{The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State Takeover Statutes After CTS Corp.}, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 713-16 (1988) (discussing the states' adoption of takeover statutes post-CTS Corp.).
\end{itemize}
state administrative oversight embedded in first generation takeover statutes had been left by the wayside. These new statutes merely set forth procedural anti-takeover strictures to be adhered to by the takeover participants and enforced by the state courts.\footnote{157} The state courts, by weaving a web of heightened takeover standards, went much further—placing themselves in a permanent supervisory position over takeovers.\footnote{158} Accordingly, by the end of the 1980s, takeover regulation was largely the province of the SEC and the state courts, principally Delaware.\footnote{159}

This overlapping jurisdiction and regulation created an uneasy marriage. In broad terms, the SEC regulation primarily controlled disclosure and the substantive and procedural aspects of the tender offer process itself. Meanwhile, state law promulgated by the courts controlled the corporate decision-making process: the so-called internal affairs doctrine.\footnote{160} But, as discussed above, there was much conflict and overlap among the two. For example, both the SEC and state courts actively sought to regulate or considered regulation of takeover defenses, going-privates and exclusionary self-tenders.\footnote{161} Meanwhile, the interweave of state and federal regulation of proxy contests foreclosed categorization between the two.\footnote{162} In short, while the regulatory focus was divergent, there was no clear demarcation of role between the two actors, and, if anything, the federal component was dominant.\footnote{163} In light of this overlap, the 1980s finished with both the SEC and state courts actively competing to regulate almost every aspect of the takeover.

\footnote{157} See id. \footnote{158} See supra Part II.C.2. \footnote{159} Cf. Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 872-73 (1990) (“Therefore, not only has the task of speaking to the takeover phenomenon centered on state rather than federal forums, the true locus of power has shifted from the legislative branch to the Delaware judiciary.”). \footnote{160} The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle that leaves matters of internal corporate governance to be regulated by the state that charters the corporation. In the realm of takeovers, the application of the principle has always been on shaky doctrinal ground. Where internal affairs (to be regulated by the chartering state) and third party, extra-corporate affairs (to be regulated by other states and possibly the federal government) begin and end is murky. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, State Takeover Legislation and the Commerce Clause: The “Foreign” Corporations Problem, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 355, 379-80 (1988). The Supreme Court itself noted this problem in MITE, stating that “[the internal affairs] doctrine is of little use . . . in this context. Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company.” Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). \footnote{161} See supra Parts II.B & II.C. \footnote{162} State and federal law, as well as stock exchange rules, have historically combined without distinction to control both the substantive and procedural aspects of proxy contests. See generally RANDALL S. THOMAS ET AL., ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (3d ed. 1998). \footnote{163} See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15 (1999) (“Congress’s regulation of tender offers under the Williams Act represents the closest that it has come to encroaching on substantive corporate law . . . ”); Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 242 (1999) (“The relationship between shareholders and directors within a corporation, long thought to be within the domain of state law, now has a dominant federal aspect.”).
Moreover, the revolution in bidder and target tactics and accompanying market developments transformed the takeover. The takeover of the 1980s was a very different animal than that of the 1960s. Two-tiered and partial offers using differing mixes of securities and cash were common, in contrast to the almost uniform use of the cash tender offer in the 1960s. Unsolicited offers and leveraged structures utilizing high-yield financing also became prevalent. The big difference, however, was that targets could now respond with defensive measures and thereby inhibit, if not preclude, an unsolicited takeover. This was true despite the fact that targets were now subject to review under higher state court standards, leading many an unsolicited takeover to be decided in the courts. This state court review, which typically validated target defensive action, placed the state courts in the role of umpire in the takeover game and effectively further slowed the pace of takeovers.

Meanwhile, on the federal level, the SEC had erected a scaffold of rules generally applicable to takeover transactions and special regulation applicable to issuer tender offers and going-private transactions. These rules largely followed the long-held SEC positions of neutrality vis-à-vis targets and bidders and protection of the common stockholder. However, other congressional legislation in the 1970s was not so neutral in its effect. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 enacted an antitrust waiting and review period for acquisition transactions, including tender offers. The 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950 also established a timeline for review of acquisition transactions affecting national security. The result was to put a federal brake on the ability of many a bidder to swiftly consummate a tender offer or otherwise take preliminary acquisition measures.

Finally, the Williams Act marked the first and last coordinated piece of system-wide federal takeover regulation. Thereafter, the SEC promulgated takeover regulation largely in response to issues as they arose. The SEC did not, in this process, develop a principle-based approach to regulation—adopting general guidelines applicable to differing paradigms and unforeseen developments. Rather, the SEC issued regulation on a case-by-case basis keyed to specific

164. This was primarily due to the availability of the poison pill. See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 49 (2005) ("However, in practice, the poison pill makes board approval a prerequisite even for tender offers.").
165. Professor David Skeel has noted that Delaware, in its quest to maintain its role as the epicenter of takeover regulation, has "taken numerous steps" to encourage such litigation to be sited in Delaware. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127, 160 (1997).
167. The SEC has generally observed neutrality in this regard, but as Professor Donald Langevoort has observed, the SEC has above all favored the average stockholder in its takeover regulation, introducing a "primary objective of egalitarianism." Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 535 (1990).
problems. The federal takeover code was thus one cobbled together from various pieces.

The one constant through all of this was the SEC. During this period, the
SEC sometimes appeared schizophrenic in its regulatory goals and pronounce-
ments. The SEC also often failed to implement its legislative, regulatory, and
enforcement agenda. This is certain. But it is also clear that during this period
the SEC, although not omnipotent, was a principal, if not the primary, regulator
of takeovers.

III. THE WITHERING OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION

The dual SEC/state court arrangement that existed at the end of the 1980s
unexpectedly ended in the 1990s. The SEC largely abdicated its prior active
role in takeover regulation outlined in Part II. This silence has been extended
and significant. From 1989-2006, the SEC would only twice adopt new domes-
tic takeover rules. This compares to the SEC’s extensive domestic takeover-
related rulemaking during the period 1969-1989. Other hallmarks of SEC ac-
tivity also evaporated; no longer did the SEC seek to publicly comment on the
takeover issues of the day or otherwise strive to set takeover policy by propos-
ing takeover legislation and rules, initiating fact-finding investigations, issuing
concept releases, and conducting empirical and other research. In short, at the
decade’s turn, the SEC vanished from its role as an activist takeover regulator;
it became seemingly content to administer the current regulatory apparatus.

But in fairness, the SEC’s main foray into rulemaking during this period was
substantial. In October 1999 the SEC in the M&A Release promulgated whole-
sale revisions to the tender offer, proxy, and other merger and acquisition-
related rules. The M&A Release had the stated goal of raising the federal
takeover into the modern age, and it comprehensively revised the communica-
tion requirements for acquisition transactions, attempted to put stock and cash
tender offers on equal parity, eliminated the five business day commencement

170. See generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., Regulatory Intervention in the Market for Cor-
porate Control, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (stating that “[w]ith no central vision of an
appropriate regulatory scheme, [SEC takeover rules] often emerge in an effort to ame-
liorate a specific abuse or to provide shareholders with some added benefit”).

171. Two telling examples are, first, the SEC’s desultory contemplation of, attempts to
promulgate, and ultimate rejection of a rule to define “tender offers” to include unconven-
tional purchases, and, second, the SEC’s shifting position, contemplated rulemaking, and
legislative proposals concerning takeover defenses, particularly with respect to the poison
pill. See supra Parts II.B & II.C.

172. These were the rules promulgated and amended in the M&A Release discussed in-
fra at notes 175-77 and accompanying text and the amendment to the all-holders/best price
rule discussed infra at note 287. The SEC also adopted comprehensive regulation for cross-
border acquisitions. See generally Brett A. Carron & Steven M. Davidoff, Getting U.S. Se-
curity Holders to the Party: The SEC's Cross-Border Release Five Years On, 26 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 455 (2005) (describing and analyzing the SEC’s cross-border rules promul-
gated in 1999).

173. See supra Part II.

174. This observation has also been made by Professor Roe in his article Delaware's
Competition. Roe, supra note 2, at 630.

175. M&A Release, supra note 51.
rule for tender offers, and simplified and revised acquisition disclosure requirements. Although this regulatory action was undeniably important, it was designed to refine the SEC's own existing Exchange Act disclosure rules and update them for the technological age. The action was also within SEC and not state domain, did not break any new ground, and did not address the significant takeover issues of the day or update the federal takeover code to comport with the new playing field created by the third and fourth waves.

It also did not take into account the issues of the latest wave. The fifth wave started in the mid-1990s, and it still runs fast today. The fifth wave peaked initially in the technology bubble with over $1.7 trillion dollars in announced, domestic merger activity in 2000, paused slightly in 2001-2003 with the popping of that bubble and the events of September 11, but continues today with $1.6 trillion in completed domestic takeover activity in 2006. This wave, as with the third and fourth waves, engendered a transformation in deal structure and tactics. The majority of deals in the wave's first part, that is, until 2001, comprised stock rather than cash consideration and were structured as mergers rather than tender offers. And leveraged structures using high-yield financing were much less frequent. However, in the second part of the fifth wave, that is, after 2003, leveraged structures and all cash transactions have again become more common due to the emergence of private equity as a dominant force in takeovers. And throughout the entire wave, negotiated transactions became the norm and unsolicited or hostile offers, although still occurring, were less common than in the previous third and fourth waves.

176. Id. at 82,578-80.
177. Id. at 82,579 (stating that “[w]e believe these new rules and revisions should provide participants in the securities markets sufficient flexibility to accommodate changes in deal structure and advances in technology that continue to occur”).
179. A significant factor in the use of stock consideration during this time period was the inflated stock prices of corporations, particularly those in the technology sector, and the low relative cash-on-hand of these corporations illustrated by the all-time general low of dividend/price ratios. Not surprisingly, postboom there has been an observed proportional increase in cash deals. It is generally believed that this is also due to a trend towards more analytical and careful acquisition practices rather than other extrinsic factors such as the SEC's elimination of pooling accounting. See Joseph H. Flom, Mergers and Acquisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 753, 769-70 (2000). Nonetheless, some have predicted that the elimination of pooling accounting has spurred the increased use of combination cash and stock consideration. Id.
180. The ability to use high-yield bonds to finance takeovers was limited to some extent in the 1980s by a 1986 Federal Reserve Board Ruling which restricted the utility of controlled-shell corporations. See INV. RESP. RES. CTR. STUDY, JUNK BONDS AND TENDER OFFER FINANCING (1986). But leveraged structures have become commonplace again in the prior two to three years due to the private equity boom. In 2006, private equity leveraged buy-outs comprised approximately twenty-six and a half percent of the domestic takeover market. Thomson Financial, supra note 178.
181. GAUGHAN, supra note 22, at 50-53. According to one study, 4% percent of transactions in the 1990s were unsolicited, compared to 14.3% and 8.4% percent in the 1980s and 1970s respectively. Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 106 tbl.1 (2001).
The issues of both the third and the fourth waves, particularly those surrounding takeover defenses, going-privates, and applicable standards of review for takeover-related decisions, continued to percolate in the fifth one. But the fifth wave created its own unique issues. An issue at the forefront was parity between mergers and tender offers. The tendency of acquirers in the fifth wave to prefer mergers over tender offers was reinforced by internal biases in federal securities regulation, which often led acquirers to favor a merger structure. This is not to say that both these rules and state court regulation did not sometimes discriminate against mergers to the benefit of tender offers, for they did that too—just that the regulatory balance tilted in favor of mergers.

Another emergent issue was that of lock-ups: the rise in negotiated transactions led to repeated disputes surrounding transaction defenses in the form of lock-ups and claims that they forced board negotiated transactions onto stockholders. Alternatives were foreclosed or inhibited. Finally, the prevalence of leveraged private equity buy-outs and the tendency of these firms to partner with management to opportunistically time and advantage their acquisitions has reawakened concerns over going-privates. Yet the SEC slumbered on these fifth wave troubles as well as the old third and fourth wave ones; the SEC either did not even attempt to address them or took only limited action with respect thereto through the M&A Release.

Why did this happen? The SEC never provided an explanation. However, it can be surmised that it was in part due to the change in Presidential administrations. The first Bush Administration, unlike the Reagan one, did not express any particular interest in takeover regulation, and perhaps this was reflected in the SEC’s dormancy. In addition, the SEC Commissioners largely turned over at the time of the Bush Administration, and the new SEC Commissioners, in light of the issues raised by the crash of 1987, may not have been as concerned with takeovers as previous ones. This thesis finds support in the continuing inaction through the Clinton and second Bush Administrations. Perhaps it was a

182. See infra Part IV (discussing the Delaware court's continuing treatment of these issues).
183. For a further discussion of tender offer biases under the federal securities law, see infra Part V.B.2.
184. A "lock-up" in the takeover context can be defined as a transaction defense mechanism whereby an acquiree agrees to compensate an acquirer upon the nonconsummation or breach of an acquisition agreement. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1539, 1540 (1996). "Lock-ups" include break-up fees, termination fees, and stock and asset options. Id. The term also includes stockholder lock-ups—that is, agreements by stockholders to vote for or tender their shares in a takeover transaction.
185. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
186. The most prominent takeover regulatory act by the Bush administration was the order issued to China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation to divest its recently acquired holding in MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc. The Bush Administration issued this directive under the Exxon-Florio Amendments after a finding that the acquisition was a threat to national security. See generally Christopher R. Fenton, Note, U.S. Policy Towards Foreign Direct Investment Post-September 11: Exxon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security, 41 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 195, 209-11 (2002) (reviewing this Bush Administration action).
187. See also Roe, supra note 2, at 630.
product of the Reagan Administration’s antiregulatory bent; the active SEC involvement in takeover regulation in the fourth wave was itself directed largely towards curtailing state regulation.\footnote{188} This Article, however, is not concerned with the causes of this SEC withdrawal but with its consequences.

IV. THE TRIUMPH OF DELAWARE OVER FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION

Out of the SEC’s shadow, the Delaware courts emerged as the nation’s primary takeover regulator. Previously, as discussed above, the Delaware courts had a leading role—one founded on Delaware as the situs of incorporation for the majority of U.S. publicly traded companies. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, other state courts had notably and influentially acted with respect to takeover regulation.\footnote{189} This changed in the 1990s as the states largely began to toe the Delaware line on takeovers. Now, when other state courts acted, they largely followed existing takeover precedent established by the Delaware courts.\footnote{190} And Delaware was quite energetic in drawing and redrawing this line; during the fifth wave, the Delaware courts have repeatedly addressed new and old issues in response to developments. This has propelled the authority of the Delaware courts to new heights. The Delaware courts’ expansionary takeover platform is the real takeover regulation story of the 1990s through today.

This is not to say that the Delaware courts have not acted during this time period to deregulate or loosen regulation with respect to certain aspects of takeovers. In fact, as will be seen in this Part, much of the Delaware courts’ conduct was deregulatory, though the Delaware courts were careful to deregulate only in part, thereby maintaining a measure of oversight. Rather, the expansionary component referred to here is the Delaware courts’ increasingly active involvement in takeover regulation. This section examines four main Delaware forays into takeover regulation, with a goal of contraposing the rise of the Delaware courts against the SEC’s disappearance and setting forth the continued progress of takeover regulation despite the SEC’s absence. The consequence is an in-

\footnote{188} The SEC’s position was often at odds with other organs of the Reagan Administration, which preferred a more abstentionist path. See supra note 122.

\footnote{189} The regulation of going-privates, for example, was addressed by courts throughout the country. See Greene, supra note 58, at 496-506.

\footnote{190} See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon Transactions, 28 J. CORP. L. 691, 704 (2003) (stating that "most states outside Delaware follow Revlon [but] California, Indiana, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, and Virginia have explicitly rejected Revlon through a combination of statutory law and case law"). The state legislatures were similarly docile. Some, notably Pennsylvania and Michigan, occasionally attempted to legislatively—and some would argue egregiously— influence the outcome of takeovers of particular significance to their state. See Kathryn Tully, Pennsylvania Bails Out Sovereign Bancorp: US State’s Decision to Pass a Law Protecting a Bank from Shareholder Activists Is Seen as a Setback for Investors, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1, 2006, at 43 (reporting on a Pennsylvania law passed in 2006 and an amendment to a Michigan statute in 2003, both enacted to influence the outcome of a takeover involving a domestic corporation). But the state legislatures were more often content to tweak existing law, occasionally gathering enough energy to go a bit further and adopt new takeover statutes.
creasing disconnect between federal takeover regulation and the takeover conduct it today purports to regulate.

A. Takeover Standards

The Delaware courts in the fifth wave continued to address the appropriate standard governing an acquiree board’s takeover decision. The Delaware Supreme Court had first addressed this issue in 1985 in Revlon.191 The Revlon court held that, upon a board decision to effect a change of control or breakup of the corporation, a board’s fiduciary duties require it to obtain the highest price reasonably available for the corporation’s stockholders.192 Revlon was decided when the SEC was making a full-court press to regulate takeover defenses and could also be spun as an attempt to stave off SEC action.193 The SEC disappearance released this pressure valve, and it did not take long for the Delaware Supreme Court to act.

In the 1990 case of Paramount Communications v. Time Inc.194 and the 1994 case of Paramount Communications v. QVC Network Inc.195 the Delaware Supreme Court further defined the contours of and limited its previous holding in Revlon. The Delaware Supreme Court opinions in Time and QVC significantly weakened the Revlon decision by restricting Revlon’s application to a corporation’s breakup or change of control.196 Accordingly, in a post-Time/QVC world, except in a change of control context, antitakeover and transaction defenses do not implicate Revlon and are not subject to strict scrutiny.197 These decisions also eliminated stock-for-stock acquisition transactions from review under Revlon’s higher standard.198 In such transactions, both acquirer and acquiree shareholders share ownership of the merged entities and therefore control is almost always indeterminate. Revlon duties are accordingly inapplicable and the transaction subject to intermediate review under Unocal199 except in atypical circumstances.200 This exclusion heavily influenced the structure of fifth wave transactions and spurred the widespread use of stock consideration; participants could now characterize their stock-for-stock transactions as “mergers of equals” and avoid application of Revlon.201 More importantly, though, this pair of cases es-

192. Id. at 182.
193. See supra Part II.C.2.
194. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
195. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
196. See id. at 47; Time, 571 A.2d 1140.
197. See generally Marc I. Steinberg, Nightmare on Main Street: The Paramount Picture Horror Show®, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (1991) (reviewing the interplay of Time and Revlon and arguing that “[t]he Delaware Supreme Court ... narrowly construe[ed] Revlon’s scope”).
198. See, e.g., In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’tholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 70-71 (Del. 1995) (holding that Revlon duties do not apply where 67% of the corporation is acquired for stock and the remainder for cash).
199. The scope of intermediate review under Unocal is discussed infra at Part IV.B.
201. See generally James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 304-10 (2001) (surveying appli-
established the Delaware courts’ willingness to relax takeover standards in light of the SEC’s dormancy and, despite the deregulatory nature of its acts, the Delaware courts’ primacy as the arbiter of the takeover decision.\textsuperscript{202}

B. Takeover Defenses

The Delaware courts in the fifth wave also continued their active regulation of takeover defenses. Not surprisingly, given the SEC inattention, this regulation tended towards the permissive side while simultaneously preserving an oversight role for the Delaware courts. The first steps had been taken previously in the fourth wave in \textit{Unocal}, which held that a Delaware court should review a board’s defensive actions under an intermediate standard to ascertain whether they were “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”\textsuperscript{203} \textit{Unocal}, like \textit{Revlon}, could also be painted as a crafted response to the SEC’s protakeover stance: the Delaware court’s decision to regulate (and limit) takeover defenses an olive branch to account for the \textit{Unocal} court’s refusal, against SEC wishes, to find the exclusionary self-tender being considered therein as disproportional.\textsuperscript{204} It is therefore again not unexpected that, in the SEC’s absence, the Delaware courts would act to limit the \textit{Unocal} holding and expand a target board’s defensive arsenal.

The Delaware Supreme Court first struck in the \textit{Time} decision. The court not only restricted \textit{Revlon’s} scope but also interpreted \textit{Unocal’s} proportionality standard of review broadly by effectively upholding the “just-say-no” defense as a reasonable takeover response under \textit{Unocal}.\textsuperscript{205} The SEC’s fears in the fourth wave had now come to pass. Through use of the poison pill a target board could now, unless replaced, forestall a takeover by simply refusing to countenance an offer.\textsuperscript{206}

Then, in 1995 the Delaware Supreme Court further relaxed \textit{Unocal’s} structures on takeover defenses in \textit{Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.}\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Unitrin
even further broadened the concept of proportionality under *Unocal* to provide target boards wide latitude in their ability to adopt strong, potentially preclusive takeover defenses.\(^208\) Thereafter, many an academic asserted that *Unocal* was dead—a strictly procedural formality.\(^209\) This was hyperbolic. The Delaware courts did continue to pay *Unocal* sacrificial heed on at least some level, employing it as a backstop to ensure continued Delaware supervision of takeovers. Accordingly, on the edges of *Unocal*, the Delaware courts, acting in their takeover supervisory role, repeatedly punished target boards who completely shut off a bid’s potential for success, however remote, or who otherwise unfairly acted mid-contest to alter the rules of the game to the same effect.\(^210\) But these decisions were islands in a sea of permissiveness. The Delaware courts in the fifth wave largely upheld the vast majority of takeover defensive action while still maintaining enough discretion and the threat of action to preserve their oversight role.\(^211\)

---

\(^{208}\) See id. at 1387-90. See also Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1563 (D. Del. 1995) (holding board refusal to redeem a poison pill was “within a range of reasonableness” under *Unocal*).


\(^{210}\) Thus, in *Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems*, 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d sub nom., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998), the Delaware Court of Chancery struck down a poison pill as disproportionate under *Unocal*. Id. at 44-52. See generally Peter V. Letsou, *Are Dead Hand (and No Hand) Poison Pills Really Dead?*, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1101 (2000). Then, in *Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore*, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000), the Court of Chancery held that a bylaw provision adopted mid-takeover battle, which effectively frustrated an unsolicited bidder after its successful proxy battle, was not sustainable under *Unocal*. See id. at 342-44.

\(^{211}\) Since *Unitrin*, the Delaware courts have held four takeover defense responses to be disproportional under the *Unocal* standard. All except *Omnicare* were decided in the Court of Chancery. See *Omnicare* v. NCS Healthcare, 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); *Chesapeake Corp.*, 771 A.2d at 293; *Mentor Graphics*, 728 A.2d at 25; *Carmody v. Toll Bros.*, 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998). *Unitrin* itself overturned a finding by the Court of Chancery that the takeover defenses adopted therein were invalid under *Unocal*. See *In re Unitrin*, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A Nos. 13656 & 13699, 1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994). The Delaware courts also initiated periodic review of transactions under the holding of *Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.*, 564 A.2d 651, 659-61 (Del. Ch. 1988). The standard in *Blasius* is applied when “the primary purpose of the board’s action is to interfere with or impede exercise of the shareholder franchise and the stockholders are not given a full and fair opportunity to vote.” Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996) (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992)) (internal quotations omitted). There had been some debate in the 1990s concerning the continued existence of this standard and its fit with the *Unocal* standard. But the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed its validity in *MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.*, 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003), when the court applied a *Blasius* analysis within an application of the *Unocal* standard to overturn the Liquid Audio board’s expansion of itself from five to seven members, an action which effectively defeated a hostile proxy contest. *MM Cos.*, 813 A.2d at 1132. The interplay of *Unocal* and *Blasius* is discussed extensively in Harry G. Hutchison, *Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm*, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1111, 1172-86 (2005).
C. Transaction Defenses

The widespread use of the stock-for-stock merger structure in the fifth wave also heralded the increased use of the lock-up transaction defense. This trend was buoyed by the Delaware courts in 1997 in *Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp.* In *Brazen*, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of a $550 million termination fee agreed in the negotiated stock-for-stock merger-of-equals transaction between Bell Atlantic and NYNEX. The court refused to scrutinize under fiduciary duty principles the board decision to agree to the fee, instead applying a liquidated damages contractual analysis to uphold the fee under reasonableness grounds. Henceforth, acquirers agreeing to transactions without the specter of another bid would have wide latitude to agree to potentially preclusive lock-ups. The effect was to make intervening bids more difficult and costly. This also gave a substantial, potentially preclusive, head start to an acquiree board’s choice of acquirer.

Then, in *Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare*, the Delaware courts limited the ability of a majority stockholder to agree to a stock lock-up when the acquiree had agreed to a “force-the-vote” provision. The court held that, under

---

212. In their study of lock-ups, Professors John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian found that “[i]n friendly U.S. mergers greater than $50 million in value, lockups appeared in 80% of deals in 1998, compared to 40% of deals a decade ago.” See John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 310 (2000). They also found that “all-stock deals are much more likely to have stock lockups than cash deals (39% vs. 12%) or deals involving mixed consideration (18%), but are not more likely to have breakup fees than cash deals (46% vs. 47%) or mixed deals (55%).” Id. at 391-92.

213. 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).

214. Id. at 45. However, the supreme court’s holding was arguably at odds with its decision in *Time* which held that “structural safety devices” in non-*Revlon* transactions were to be reviewed under *Unocal’s* proportional standard. See Paramount Comm’ns v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1990).

215. See *Brazen*, 695 A.2d at 45.

216. See, e.g., In re IXC Comm’ns Inc. S’holders Litig., Nos. C.A. 17324 & C.A. 17334, 1999 WL 1009174, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (“[E]nhanced judicial scrutiny does not apply . . . [as] [n]either the termination fee, the stock option agreements nor the no-solicitation provisions are defensive mechanisms instituted to respond to a perceived threat to a potential acquirer.”). The Delaware courts were equally sanguine about transactions on the other end of the playing field, those in *Revlon*-land. In two decisions rendered in 2001 and 2004, respectively, In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 787 A.2d 691, 705-06 (Del. Ch. 2001), and In re MONY Group Shareholder Litigation, 852 A.2d 9, 18-24 (Del. Ch. 2004), the Delaware courts gave broad discretion to an acquiree’s ability to agree to lock-ups in a change of control context.

217. Professors Coates’ and Subramanian’s empirical research has led them to conclude that “when another bidder is present, a lockup more than doubles the likelihood of completion for the first bidder.” Coates & Subramanian, supra note 212, at 348. On this basis, they argue that “foreclosing lockups do exist, and, more generally, that lockups do influence bid outcomes.” Id. at 389.

218. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).

219. This provision, if agreed to by the acquiree, requires the target to hold a vote on the acquisition transaction even if the acquiree board of directors decides to withdraw its recommendation for the transaction. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(e) (2006). Meanwhile, the stockholder lock-up itself typically obligates the stockholder parties to irrevocably vote in favor of the acquisition. These two provisions interact to effectively sew up the acquisition
Unocal, this certainty was deficient; a contractually foreclosing lock-up was henceforth required to be subject to a “fiduciary-out” clause whereby the acquiree board could terminate the transaction and the lock-up if, in light of subsequent developments, including a competing offer, the board’s fiduciary duties required it to. Omnicare was yet another incursion; it now put another category of takeover-related conduct—stockholder lock-ups—under supervision of the Delaware courts. Omnicare was also the most significant and controversial Delaware court decision in favor of stockholder choice since the Revlon decision itself. In the end, though, the Delaware courts never addressed the fundamental question of stockholder lock-ups per se, and their use post-Omnicare remains widespread, albeit subject to the restrictions set forth in Omnicare and the oversight of the Delaware courts. Thus, the significance of Omnicare for this Article is another instance of the Delaware courts seizing the takeover regulator mantle. Their willingness to confront, regulate, and address the takeover issues of the day thereby redefined material elements of takeover law and influence takeover tactics and strategy.

D. Going-Privates

Going-private transactions also continued to prominently figure in the jurisprudence of the Delaware courts. The Delaware Supreme Court had previously, in the fourth wave, refined its holding in Singer to discard the “business purpose” test. The court held that going-private transactions should be reviewed solely under Singer’s “entire fairness” prong. This changed in the new millennium. In In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, the Court of Chancery, per Vice Chancellor Strine, held that the “entire fairness” standard was applicable only to merger transactions, not tender offers. Pure Resources

for an acquirer no matter the will of the other stockholders; there is no ability to escape. If the lock-up does not extend to a dispositive number of shares, it still tips the scales in favor of the acquiree transaction.

220. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 934-36.
221. The Court of Chancery strictly construed the scope of Omnicare in Orman v. Cullinan, No. Civ.A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004). Orman relied heavily on Brazen to hold that a stockholder lock-up can be used to reduce the stockholder choice to a binary one: either the transaction at hand or no transaction—even in light of Omnicare, a stockholder lock-up can still under Delaware law forestall other alternatives. Id. at *5.

222. See Tamara Loomis, Beware Delaware: The State’s Recent Supreme Court Decisions Make Waves, N.Y. L.J., May 15, 2003, at 5 (reporting prostockholder nature of the decision has “sent shock waves through the corporate legal community”).

223. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983). The abandonment of the business purpose test could also be viewed as a response to the implementation by the SEC of its own going-private rules; Delaware was now at liberty to relax its own standard. In Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), the Delaware Supreme Court further refined the Weinberger holding. It held that approval by an acquiree special committee did not obviate the Delaware court’s required entire fairness review but merely shifted the burden of proof from the acquirer to the challenging stockholders. Id. at 1117.

224. 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
225. Id. at 444.
held that, provided certain procedures were followed, going-private transactions effected via tender offer would be reviewed by the Delaware courts under the business judgment rule and not a higher standard. Moreover, approval by a special committee or entire board of the acquiree was not a requirement for this relaxed review. This was a significant side-step for the Delaware courts because it not only offered a path to deregulate going-private tender offer transactions but effectively removed the Delaware courts from supervision of such transactions. Going forward and until a Delaware Supreme Court decision to the contrary, rational acquirers in going-privates will preferentially escape Delaware court review of their transactions by employing a tender offer structure.

E. Federal Takeover Regulation Circa 2007

We continue to ride the fifth wave of takeover activity. During this time, the Delaware courts have emerged as the nation’s primary takeover regulator: actively involved, regulating almost every aspect of the takeover. Furthermore, while the Delaware courts sometimes acted to deregulate, they maintained their supervision of takeovers by resorting to another of the various skeins of height-

\[\text{226. Id. at 446.}\]
\[\text{227. Id. at 446-47. See also In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (stating that “unless coercion or disclosure violations can be shown, no defendant has the duty to demonstrate the entire fairness of this proposed tender transaction”). See generally Jason M. Quintana, Going Private Transactions: Delaware’s Race to the Bottom?, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 547 (analyzing recent developments in Delaware going-private jurisprudence through a state charter competition lens).}\]
\[\text{228. The path was hewn in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 243 (Del. 2001). In Glassman, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “absent fraud or illegality,” a short-form merger was subject to review under the business judgment rule, rather than an entire fairness standard, and specifically, the court held that “appraisal is the exclusive remedy available to a minority stockholder who objects to a short-form merger.” Id. at 248. See also In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S'holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329 (Del Ch. 2000) (holding entire-fairness review is not implicated in short-form mergers). In Delaware, once a stockholder acquires ninety percent or more of a corporation’s stock, it can cash out the remaining minority without a stockholder vote. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §253 (2006). Accordingly, Glassman and Pure Resources provide a clear way for a controlling stockholder to initiate a tender offer in a going-private, obtain ninety percent of a corporation's stock, and then cash out the minority without a stockholder vote and having to undergo substantive review for entire fairness.}\]
\[\text{229. See Christopher A. Iacono, Comment, Tender Offers and Short-Form Mergers by Controlling Shareholders Under Delaware Law: The “800-Pound Gorilla” Continues Unimpeded—In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 645, 671 (2003) (“Because of the Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in Pure Resources, the position of the tender offer followed by a short-form merger has been secured as the most favorable transaction for controlling shareholders.”). In In re Cox Communications, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005), Vice Chancellor Strine suggested “a relatively modest alteration of Lynch” in which “if a controller proposed a merger, subject from inception to negotiation and approval of the merger by an independent special committee and a Minority Approval Condition, the business judgment rule should presumptively apply.” Id. at 643-44 (footnote omitted). The only modesty here is Vice Chancellor Strine’s understatement; his dictum calls into question the status of Lynch and even Weinberger.}\]
ened review previously established. And, if the mainstay takeover standards did not suit, the Delaware courts were not shy about conjuring up other judicial standards and statutes to scrutinize these transactions. Additionally, only once did the Delaware courts act to fully deregulate—the Court of Chancery’s decision in Pure Resources, and its holding is still subject to consideration by the Delaware Supreme Court. The result was a spaghetti of holdings and standards in which scholars struggled to find doctrinal coherence and order. However, one explanation for this disarray is to view these decisions through this Article’s prism: the Delaware’s courts’ labors to maintain a firm regulatory and supervisory grip even when ostensibly acting in a deregulatory fashion. These fifth wave decisions generally preserved and extended the ability of target officers, directors, and controlling stockholders to d

230. Thus, in Chesapeake Corp. and Mentor Graphics, Revlon duties were not implicated since Time and QVC had restricted their applicability, yet the courts still could invoke the Unocal standard to sustain their holdings. Similarly, despite the confines Brazen previously placed on court review of lock-ups, the Delaware courts could still apply Unocal to decide Omnicare.


232. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text. Some predict that, if it considers the matter, the Delaware Supreme Court would overrule Pure Resources and maintain its previous consistent bias towards court supervision of going-private transactions and general refusal to wholly deregulate takeover decisions. See Lawrence Lederman & Faith Stevelman Kahn, Conflict Irresolution, DAILY DEAL, Sept. 19, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14646788 (“In a fresh look [at going-private transactions], we can expect the [Delaware] Supreme Court to retain entire fairness review, regardless of the form of the transaction, and make the tender offer format conform to mergers rather than the other way around.”). Others, perhaps more cynical, dispute this prognostication. See Iacono, supra note 229, at 670 (stating that the Delaware Supreme Court “would most likely affirm that the entire fairness standard is inapplicable to tender offers made by controlling shareholders”).

233. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583, 584 (1994) (stating that commentators “have referred to the [Delaware] [S]upreme [C]ourt’s takeover jurisprudence as mush and mud; disparaged the court for wafting and wavering; criticized its opinions for drawing distinctions ‘without foundation,’ being ‘equivocal,’ and lacking clarity”); Skeel, supra note 165, at 166 (“From a doctrinal perspective, Time[] and QVC are extremely difficult to reconcile.”). See generally William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 864 (2001) (reviewing the standards of review and conduct promulgated by the Delaware courts and observing that “new standards of review [have] proliferated”).

234. There is a subtle interplay here between the Delaware courts’ shifting standards and regulation and the maintenance of such standards and regulations. Specifically, swings in these standards and regulation themselves can be viewed as a function of the Delaware courts as a regulating entity. See Griffith & Steele, supra note 11, at 2 (noting “the ability of state corporate law, especially in Delaware, to alternate between lax and stringent regulation, shifting between hard-edged rules and fuzzy standards” in response to crises and other public developments).
irect the takeover decision. This relaxation in standards can also be characterized as furthering promanagement ends, including the ability of management to entrench itself, to the detriment of stockholder choice. All of this conduct was consequential, but particularly so since in the fifth wave the Delaware courts became the sole regulator of takeovers. Thus, it no longer mattered that the 1980s SEC would most likely have vigorously opposed these Delaware court holdings or that the Delaware courts would therefore likely have not treaded so far in favoring corporate management interests in light of such opposition. The SEC was nowhere in sight—a state that still exists today.

V. THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION

The SEC abstention not only permitted a new, Delaware-driven takeover code to emerge, it also engendered an increasing mismatch between the federal takeover code and the takeovers that it was created to govern. The federal takeover code had largely been established in the 1960s through the Williams Act and built upon by the SEC through the 1980s. This model had been constructed for a time when acquisitions were perpetuated in another manner, takeover tactics and strategies different, takeover and transaction defenses virtually non-existent, capital markets less well-developed, and research on the validity and utility of various takeover substantive, procedural, and disclosure requirements unavailable or preliminary. Yet the federal takeover rules have remained static in the face of these developments as the SEC failed to adapt them to changed circumstance. The result is an outdated federal takeover code. Moreover, the takeover laws promulgated by the Delaware courts have arguably exacerbated these federal failings and altered the requirements for future, necessary federal action. This Part traces these shortfalls by illuminating some of the more trenchant examples.

A. The Failure of the Williams Act

The following three examples illustrate Williams Act’s outdatedness due to the substantially changed takeover environment existent today.

235. See generally Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1067 (2000) (“[E]vidence suggests that, although Delaware is successful in attracting charters, its law is not optimal. . . . Delaware law appears to favor management interests at the expense of shareholder interests.”). Unfortunately, not all of Delaware's conduct fits neatly into this box. Certainly, Kahn and Omnicare are outliers. But they can still be shoehorned into this Article's thesis if explained as an assertion of regulatory authority by the Delaware courts.

236. Thus, Time and QVC cut back the compass of Revlon duties, thereby increasing the power of target directors to reject, in the stead of stockholders, a takeover; Unitrin enlarged the play-book of board permitted takeover defensive conduct under Unocal; Brazen expanded a board's capacity to contractually grant lock-ups inhibitory and possibly preclusive of other alternative, stockholder preferred transactions; and Pure Resources enhanced controlling stockholders' and management's ability to take a corporation private and freeze out minority stockholders. See supra Parts IV.A-IV.D.
1. Offer Period

In 1979, the SEC set the minimum offer period for a full tender offer at twenty business days. The purpose was to finish off the “Saturday Night Special” and slow unsolicited, coercive offers which forced overly hasty stockholder decisions to tender. Today, short-period offers of this nature are precluded by the poison pill, which effectively necessitates a concomitant and time-consuming proxy contest if the target board does not consent to the proposed transaction. This has rendered the federal minimum offer period redundant and unnecessary to the extent it purports to protect stockholders from the coercive aspects of short-period tender offers. Thus, the original rationale underpinning this rule no longer exists.

In this absence, there are arguments that this period is too short, too long, or even unnecessary. First, the allotted period is arguably insufficient to permit stockholder consideration of the transaction and for alternatives to emerge. The period should rather be that of two to three months in a merger transaction or even longer. This is an argument that has been put forth for decades. But it has stronger purchase in today’s takeover environment since an acquiree can now agree to a tender offer structure with a preselected acquirer which includes potentially preclusive lock-up provisions that favor and advantage this acquirer. Accordingly, an acquiree’s ability to select a shorter tender offer over a merger period in the presence of lock-ups is yet another arguably unneeded way for an acquiree to incrementally favor a chosen acquirer.

Alternatively, reasons militate towards either a shorter mandatory period or none at all. In the advent of the poison pill, truly hostile takeovers are no longer possible, and it could be argued that the period for an any-and-all tender offer is one that should or could be negotiated and set between the acquiree and the acquirer as a bargain between two commercially sophisticated, equally footed parties. Furthermore, application of mainstay fiduciary duty principles could

238. See Prentice & Langmore, supra note 125, at 435 n.291.
239. See supra note 206.
241. See e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg, Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers: A Dissenting View and Recommended Reforms, 43 Md. L. Rev. 225, 232-33 (1984) (arguing for a mandatory freeze-period of 120 days for tender offers to permit competing offers to emerge and adequate antitrust review); Lowenstein, supra note 240, at 317 (proposing a six-month offer period for unsolicited tender offers which are not accepted by a target board). This argument is supported by the common practice in tender offers for stockholders, particularly stockholders who are arbitrageurs and represent a significant if not majority of tendering shares, to wait until the last day to tender despite the existence of withdrawal rights. James R. Pagano, Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 203, 228 n.146 (1987).
242. See supra Part IV.C.
243. This is evidenced by the rarity of acquirers and acquirees contractually agreeing to a tender offer period that is longer than the statutory minimum.
244. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
function to protect stockholders from a board's attempt to coerce its own stockholders through a curtailed offer period.\textsuperscript{245} Regulation is therefore unnecessary, and its removal or curtailment possibly a boon to takeover activity by speeding up these acquisitions to a measured degree and inducing an increased rate of bidding.\textsuperscript{246}

2. Outside Purchases

Former Rule 10b-13 (now redesignated Rule 14e-5) prohibits bidder purchases outside of a tender offer from the time of announcement until completion.\textsuperscript{247} The primary reason put forth by the SEC for barring these purchases in 1969 was that they “operate[] to the disadvantage of the security holders who have already deposited their securities and who are unable to withdraw them in order to obtain the advantage of possible resulting higher market prices.”\textsuperscript{248} This is no longer correct; bidders are now obligated to offer unlimited withdrawal rights throughout the offer period.\textsuperscript{249} Moreover, Rule 10b-13 was issued at a time when targets had no ability to defend against these bidder purchases. They were yet another coercive and abusive tactic whereby the bidder could obtain control through purchases without the tender offer, thereby exerting pressure on stockholders to tender before the bidder terminated or completed its offer on the basis of these purchases.\textsuperscript{250} This is not feasible today. Poison pills and second and later generation state takeover statutes act to restrict these purchases to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{245} The fifteen-day waiting period for cash tender offers under the HSR Act would still typically apply to impose a \textit{de facto} minimum waiting period. See 16 C.F.R. § 803.10 (2006).
\item \textsuperscript{246} Professors Jarrell & Bradley have also argued that an extended period is detrimental to bidder incentives to bid because it permits other prospective bidders to free-ride on the initial bidder's knowledge and reputational investment. \textit{See generally} Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley, \textit{The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers,} 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1980). This and other arguments for shortening or eliminating the period are in line with studies finding that takeover premiums and the number of bids actually declined following the adoption of the Williams Act. \textit{See} Kevin S. Nathan & Terrence B. O'Keefe, \textit{The Rise in Takeover Premiums: An Exploratory Study,} 23 J. FIN. ECON. 101, 115-18 (1989) (finding that mean takeover premiums declined in the six years immediately following the Williams Act and then increased in 1974). For general criticism of the Williams Act on economic efficiency grounds, see Daniel R. Fischel, \textit{Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers,} 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978).
\item \textsuperscript{248} Rule 10b-13 Release, supra note 51, at 83,708.
\item \textsuperscript{249} 17 C.F.R. § 230.14d-7.
\item \textsuperscript{250} The SEC stated in the 10b-13 Release that such purchases could defeat the tender offer, either by driving the market price above the offer price or by otherwise reducing the number of shares tendered below the stated minimum. Alternatively, they could further the tender offer by raising the market price to the point where ordinary investors sell in the market to arbitrageurs, who in turn tender.
\end{itemize}

In the wake of these developments, the original reasons underlying the promulgation of Rule 10b-13 no longer exist.

Moreover, Rule 14e-5, by its terms, acts to confine bidder purchases to periods prior to offer announcement. However, a bidder's capacity to make preannouncement acquisitions has been adversely effected by a number of subsequent changes in the takeover code, such as the Hart-Scott-Rodino waiting and review period requirements. These have combined to chill a bidder's ability to make preannouncement acquisitions or forthrightly precluded such purchases. Consequently, one study has recently reported that at least forty-seven percent of initial bidders have a zero equity position upon entrance into a contest for corporate control.

A bidder's preannouncement purchase of a stake in the target, known as a toehold, can be beneficial. The toehold purchase defrays bidder costs, incentivizes the bidder to complete the takeover, and reduces free-rider and information asymmetry problems. This can lead to higher and more frequent bids. Meanwhile, market purchases amidst a tender offer can provide similar benefits while providing market liquidity and confidence for arbitrageurs to fully act in the market.

Since the initial premise for this rule is no longer valid and recent research supports encouragement of these purchases, the SEC should accordingly consider loosening restrictions on bidder toeholds and postannouncement purchases. This deregulation may be particularly appropriate in order to defray bidder sunk costs if a regime for corporate control transactions which prohibits or limits lock-ups is ever adopted.

251. For a discussion of the limitations on acquisitions placed by state takeover statutes, see Pinto, supra note 156, at 713-16.


257. A regime which allows for bidder toeholds is another way to compensate bidders for due diligence, reputational, and other bid-related investments in the face of an auctioneering regime which encourages competing bids and limits the ability of lock-ups to provide such compensation. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Edith Hotchkiss et al., Holdups, Renegotiation, and Deal Protection in Mergers (July 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=620442. But Professor Guhan Subramanian has found that em-
Bidder toeholds and off-market purchases, however, do have a potentially corrosive effect if the stake is significant. To dampen this possibility, a relaxation of these purchase rules could be combined with provisions similar to those in the U.K. Takeover Code which permit pre- and postannouncement purchases but require the bidder to pay for a set period thereafter no less than that price paid for all subsequently acquired shares. Alternatively, the SEC could wholly deregulate and leave the possibility or actuality of bidder toeholds and postannouncement purchases to be regulated by targets through a low-threshold poison pill or other takeover defenses as well as through bargaining with potential bidders.

Finally, Rule 14e-5 has never applied to bar purchases while a merger transaction is pending. Presumably, this path dependency was set in 1969 because a bidder in a merger situation requires acquiree agreement; the acquiree can therefore contractually respond to and regulate this conduct. But whatever the reason, today a bidder who runs a proxy contest without a tender offer is permitted postannouncement purchases during the contest. Unsolicited bidders will therefore initially characterize their offers as mergers in order to leave the option of such purchases. The result is preferential bias towards mergers over tender offers, discrimination which no longer seems sensible in a world where a takeover transaction will not succeed unless the original or replaced acquiree board agrees to it. Any prohibition on outside purchases should apply to both merger and tender offer structures or to neither.

3. Going-Privates

The federal going-private rules do not apply if stock consideration is offered instead of cash. The SEC-professed reason for this exception is that the protections of the going-private rules are unnecessary, since the minority stockholder continues to maintain an interest in the going-concern on an equal basis as the affiliated stockholders. The reasoning has always been tenuous, as the coercive elements of a going-private remain, no matter the form of considera-
tion. The propriety of this exception is further suspect in the wake of the Pure
Resources decision. Now, an acquirer, through a first step exchange offer struc-
ture, can exploit this federal loophole and side-step all of the prior requirements,
both federal and state, for going-private transactions. Moreover, the further
safeguard of dissenters’ rights is typically unavailable in stock-for-stock going-
private transactions. These likely were not consequences that the SEC ex-
pected when it promulgated its own federal regulation of going-privates.

More generally, the SEC going-private rules were issued after the Singer de-
cision. The SEC presumably structured its own archetype to work in tandem
with this Delaware holding. Yet the Singer holding has been trimmed by the
Delaware Supreme Court and largely gutted by Pure Resources. Moreover,
Delaware has still yet to substantively address the re-emergent problems with
management-sponsored buy-outs often made in tandem with, and financed by,
private equity firms to the disadvantage of unaffiliated stockholders. These de-
velopments, as well as the loophole noted above, arguably render outdated the
current federal going-private rules. They no longer act to prevent and mitigate
the abusive practices in going-privates in the manner in which they were ini-
tially intended. This is a claim supported by recent empirical findings that mi-
nority stockholders in going-privates receive lower compensation than they
would in traditional corporate control transactions. Going-privates are thus
an area ripe for the SEC to update its rules.

4. Other Examples

There are numerous other examples. The continued rationale for the prohibi-
tion on short and hedged tendering in partial offers is questionable in light of

264. For a discussion of the Pure Resources holding, see supra notes 224-29 and accom-
panying text.

265. Delaware appraisal rights are generally unavailable to any stockholder in a
merger or consolidation where the stock is either (1) listed on the stock exchange or quoted
on an inter-dealer quotation system or (2) held of record by more than 2,000 holders and
where the consideration is stock of the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger
or consolidation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2)b (2006).

266. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.

267. Here, the “trimming” I refer to is Weinberger’s limitation of the Singer test to the

268. See generally Subramanian, supra note 164 (arguing that Delaware law on going-
privates permits inefficient going-private transactions and deters efficient going-private
transactions). In a companion piece, Professor Subramanian conducted an empirical study
of the treatment of minority stockholders in tender offer and merger going-private transac-
tions. He found that minority stockholders receive a lower premium in going-private ten-
der offer transactions than in mergers. See Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freezeouts:
Theory, Evidence and Policy (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & Bus., Dis-
olin_center/corporate_governance/papers.htm. Moreover, the arguable need for further
regulation is supported by a recent study by Dealogic which found that “[t]he premium
that management-led buyers paid to shareholders was, on average, just shy of 20 per-
cent . . . compared to the 27.5 percent average premium that shareholders received when a
rival or a private equity firm unaffiliated with management was the buyer.” Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Investors, Watch Your Wallets if Managers Lead the Buyout, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
2006, at C33.
the current deeply liquid capital markets. SEC disclosure standards are arguably not copious enough or require disclosure that is no longer appropriate or applicable to the present paradigm. Meanwhile, wholesale repeal of the all-holders/best price rule may be appropriate in today’s takeover environment in order to permit transaction participants to order their own economic rights. Alternatively, the all-holders/best price rule may be better extended to fully encompass the pre- and posttender offer periods. Finally, withdrawal rights are arguably unnecessary in a world where their coercive aspect can be regulated by targets and where irrevocable tenders can provide bidders flagship support in unsolicited transactions. These are four further instances, but, in light of modern developments and the cobwebs set upon federal takeover regulation, the validity of the entirety of Williams Act regulation is subject to scrutiny and questioning.

B. The Failure of Takeover Structure

The Williams Act is not the only feature of federal takeover regulation that has failed to keep abreast with the progress of takeovers. Indeed, the shifting legal and structural landscape has arguably rendered obsolete the fundamental structure of federal takeover regulation.

269. The SEC rules on short and hedged tendering, in particular, have continually been controversial, at one point prompting a rare dissent by an SEC Commissioner in favor of deregulation. See Short Tendering Release, supra note 112, at 86,715-17. Short and hedged tendering can create a more efficient market in preacquisition shares and result in an arbitrage preclose price for a transaction that is closer to reality. This provides price and liquidity benefits to nontendering stockholders that arguably outweigh the loss to tendering stockholders who have fewer shares purchased. In light of the well-developed capital markets and arbitrage community present today it may be time to wholly deregulate short and hedged tendering.

270. For example, fairness opinions are increasingly controversial and SEC disclosure obligations on the subject increasingly inadequate—the impetus for pending NASD rules. See Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1595-98 (2006).

271. One commentator has cited the all-holders/best price rule as increasing the pressure to tender because “tendering shareholder[s] [are] assured of receiving the highest price that the bidder might offer.” Richard A. Booth, The Problem with Federal Tender Offer Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 707, 713 (1989). Repeal of this rule would alter stockholder behavior and possibly relieve this pressure. In such a circumstance, any further needed protection could then come from acquiree and acquirer negotiation or through increased stockholder collective action.

272. The issue here is the possibility of further bidder purchases at a premium that are not shared equally with other target stockholders who, due to the inherent coercive nature of tender offers, may not tender early. This is the prisoner’s dilemma. Their further disparate and uncoordinated nature does not permit them the ability to negotiate this right ex ante. But acquirees may negotiate this right in the face of a change in corporate control. See generally Subramanian, supra note 117, at 413 (proposing that stockholders “should replace their poison pills with a binding and enforceable agreement . . . to share any premium they receive in the context of a tender offer” in order to ensure sharing of any increased or lower back-end premium).

273. Unlimited withdrawal rights also hasten stockholder tenders by reducing the risk of early tendering. By incentivizing stockholders to tender early, they make unattractive bids look better and more likely to succeed. Booth, supra note 271, at 714.
1. Structural Incongruity

The stream of Delaware takeover decisions in the fourth and fifth waves has substantial implications for the structural focus of the federal takeover code. More specifically, the federal takeover code has traditionally had its locus in the Williams Act regulation of tender offers, with mergers regulated via the proxy rules. The SEC traditionally justified this distinction because mergers were viewed as being in lesser need of federal supervision. They were negotiated transactions between commercially sophisticated, reasonably equal parties; thus, the problematical, coercive aspects of tender offers were presumed absent. The initial federal regulatory focus upon tender offers was therefore appropriate since in the 1960s the aforementioned target defense was unavailable in the case of tender offers.

This preference also comported with unsolicited bidders’ earlier penchant for tender offers over proxy contests. A tender offer is superior to a proxy contest since the bidder in a proxy contest must incur both the expense of the contest and the risk of complete defeat, whereas in a tender offer the bidder can condition its offer on the acquisition of a minimum number of shares which it can adjust as desirable. And historically, a bidder had a higher probability of success in a tender offer rather than a proxy contest due to “management’s well-known dominance of the proxy machinery.”

The existence of the poison pill and other takeover defenses has rendered this federal regulatory bias moot. A proxy contest is now the only viable way for a bidder to acquire a recalcitrant target. The tender offer alone can no longer achieve corporate control in such situations. Yet Delaware law forcefully acts to favor targets over bidders in proxy contests to the possible detriment of stockholder choice. Delaware permits adoption of a staggered board. This arguably reduces the effectiveness of a proxy contest (and unsolicited bid), making it unappealing to anyone but the most persistent, and perhaps irrational, bidder. Similarly, Delaware notice and director removal statutes further impede

274. See Leebron, supra note 6, at 159-63 (discussing the structural relationship between the negotiated merger and the tender offer).
275. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
276. Fischel, supra note 246, at 7.
277. Recent successful examples of joint proxy contests and tender offers include BASF’s successful bid for Englehard and Oracle’s successful bid for Peoplesoft. See, e.g., Peter D. Lyons, Unsolicited, But Welcome, DAILY DEAL, July 25, 2006 (discussing BASF’s tender offer and proxy solicitation); Steve Lohr & Laurie J. Flynn, Oracle to Acquire Peoplesoft for $10.3 Billion, Ending Bitter Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at C1 (discussing Oracle tender offer and proxy solicitation).
278. Corporations adopting a staggered board under Delaware law elect a fraction of their directors, usually one-third, each year to serve for a period of years, typically three. Thus, only a portion of the board can be replaced in any given year. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2006).
the timing and feasibility of these contests. They permit Delaware targets to confine proxy contests to a singular time of year, the annual election of the target board elections. This provides ample time for targets to anticipate and counteract looming bids. The likely consequence of these Delaware laws is to deter proxy contests, resulting in fewer bids and adverse effects on the value of potential acquirees.

The paradigm shift in unsolicited takeovers to proxy contests implicates the entirety of the federal takeover code, including the proxy and tender offer procedural and substantive rules. In a world where the poison pill is permitted continued existence, it militates towards deregulation of tender offers combined with increased regulation and oversight of proxy contests. This appears particularly appropriate due to Delaware law’s prejudice with respect to proxy contests. Yet on a microlevel, the SEC has not acted to revise or update the federal takeover rules to take this into account. Nor has the SEC considered the macro implications of this shift, including a changed regulatory focus and possible rulemaking action to restore a level playing field between bidders and targets in proxy contests for corporate control.

2. Structural Discrimination

Federal takeover law has traditionally distinguished in the scope and manner of its regulation of tender offers and mergers. However, the old, simplified reason for this distinction—the ability of a bidder to implement an unsolicited offer without target consent—is no longer valid. The death of the true hostile, functional requirement of target consent and other takeover developments has made many of these historical biases largely anomalous. More bluntly, there no longer appears to be any reason to continue the federal takeover code’s general, disparate treatment of the two structures.

The most glaring example of this unwarranted discrimination is the undue timing advantage tender offers have over mergers. Tender offers currently have a minimum offer period of twenty business days; this compares with a two- to three-month minimum period to complete a merger. Again, the justifications for this distinction appear no longer relevant in a world where acquiree consent is necessary, as the acquiree can negotiate its preferred takeover structure. One way to address this disconnect is to lengthen the tender offer period; perhaps an optimal result for the reasons discussed above. The other salve is obviously to shorten the merger period to bring it in line with the period for tender offers. This would require the SEC to revise Rule 14a-6 of the Exchange Act and for the SEC to reconsider its preclearance procedures for proxy statements before

280. See Grundfest, supra note 206, at 860 n.6 (citations omitted).

281. Even the Delaware courts have made this shift and now increasingly act to regulate proxy contests rather than tender offers. The reemergence of the Blasius line of review in Liquid Audio is perhaps the most powerful example. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003). But the willingness of the Delaware courts to forcefully apply Unocal in the proxy contest paradigm is another. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000).

mailing and solicitation of proxies. Depending upon the scope of revision it would also require the SEC to compel the stock exchanges to revise their own proxy solicitation regulation and preempt conflicting state laws. Ultimately, whatever the direction of the cure, the point is that the original timing distinction under federal law for these two structures no longer exist and appear inappropriate.

There are other cases where this discrimination no longer appears sustainable in light of a target's effective ability to control takeover structure. The federal disclosure requirements in mergers and tender offers are distinct, with variant and increased or lesser disclosure required for each. The propriety of this differentiation on the whole no longer seems apposite: full harmonization should be considered. Moreover, the all-holders/best price rule is applicable only to tender offers. There is no longer a reason for this. If the rule is maintained, application of the rule to merger transactions (or elimination in the case of tender offers) may be appropriate in order to stem the systematic bias that the rule, as currently interpreted, provides towards merger transaction. There is also the matter of bias under Rule 14e-5 discussed above.

283. Rule 14a-6 requires that unless otherwise agreed by the SEC, "preliminary copies of the proxy statement and form of proxy shall be filed with the Commission at least 10 calendar days prior to the date definitive copies of such material are first sent or given to security holders." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (2006). The SEC will then decide whether to review and comment upon such proxy statement. The definitive proxy statement together with a proxy cannot be mailed until cleared by the SEC. While a 1992 rule change permits a preliminary proxy to be mailed so long as a proxy card is not included, no acquirer would in practice do so, due to the continuing possibility of SEC review and comment. See generally Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1 (1992).

284. For example, Delaware requires that due notice of a stockholder meeting and accompanying proxy be mailed at least 20 days prior to the vote on a merger transaction. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2006). Meanwhile, the NYSE recommends that a minimum of 30 days be allowed between the record and meeting dates. NYSE Listed Co. Manual § 401.03 (2006). Delaware also requires that the record date be no more than 60 nor less than 10 days before the date of such meeting. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (2006). This minuet of time periods must be coordinated with any notice period for setting the record date as well as SEC timing restrictions.

285. A significant example is with fairness opinions. Federal securities law mandates disclosure of the analyses underlying a fairness opinion in a merger transaction but not a cash tender offer. There is no compelling reason for this disparity. See Davidoff, supra note 270, at 1590-94. There are also significant unwarranted timing distinctions in the delivery of information. In a cash tender offer transaction, information is typically published in the tender offer document within 5-10 business days. In a merger, however, there is no public disclosure until the definitive proxy statement is mailed to stockholders 1-2 months later.


287. The application of the all-holders/best price rule to tender offers and not mergers has historically created prejudice towards use of the merger structure. See generally David Marcus, Tender Returns, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 30, 2006 (stating that acquirers have "increasingly opted to acquire targets by merger, where 14d-10 does not apply, rather than by tender offer"). The reason is that courts have broadly interpreted the meaning of a tender offer to arguably encompass change of control and other payments to executives in connection with the transaction. See generally Ben Walther, Note, Employment Agreements and Tender Offers: Reforming the Problematic Treatment of Severance Plans Under Rule 14d-10, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 779-801 (2002) (outlining the divergent judicial opinions on the scope of Rule 14d-10 and its potential application to change-of-control compensation). But there has been no bright-line test announced for when these payments are so deemed in-
C. The Failure to Regulate Takeovers

Meanwhile, it is not just a matter of federal takeover laws that arguably have become obsolete. In the SEC’s absence, a number of emergent and festering takeover issues remain unaddressed. These are areas of national import within the current regulatory purview of the SEC that the SEC has chosen through inaction not to regulate. I point out two of the more significant ones here.

1. Change of Control Compensation

Officers and other executive employees of an acquiree are often compensated in takeovers over and above the consideration paid to unaffiliated acquiree stockholders. The debate over this change of control compensation has been heated and prevalent. Some commentators have forcefully argued in favor of this compensation, asserting that it better aligns management and stockholder interests by shifting risk and incentivizing management to negotiate and accept takeover bids that might hurt their own pecuniary interests but otherwise benefit stockholders. Furthermore, in light of the ability for directors suborned by management to effectively block or impede takeovers, the need for this carrot is self-evident. The converse argument decrees this compensation as a rent extrac-

288. This benefit most commonly takes the form of “golden parachutes,” accelerated option vesting, and other compensation mechanisms which award executives upon a change in control of the corporation. The disproportionate gain can also take the form of employment or consulting arrangements, noncompetition agreements, or other future benefits provided by the acquirer to the acquiree’s management.

289. This benefit also serves as a compensatory mechanism: the change of control payments recompense for the manager’s lost investment of time and resources. There is also the base argument that they serve as a form of takeover defense. See generally Richard P. Bress, Note, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 955-63 (1987) (discussing the justification and structure of golden parachutes); Kenneth C. Johnsen, Comment, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909, 915-18 (1985). Another justification for these payments is that they reduce the corporation’s ex ante compensation costs, shifting them to a prospective acquirer and thereby increasing the value of the corporation if no takeover ever occurs. Alternatively, the compensation burden is shifted to an acquirer through a possible higher takeover premium. See Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting Mechanism, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 170, 183-84 (2004).
tion, money pick-pocketed from unaffiliated stockholders. Officers are subject to fiduciary duties, and, accordingly, their duties should be to the stockholders; payment of this compensation is therefore wholly inappropriate and unnecessary. Moreover, these payments create a perverse incentive whereby the manager can be induced to drive down the acquiree share price in order to encourage a takeover.\footnote{290} Change of control payments should therefore arguably be banned or subject to approval (precatory or otherwise) by stockholders.

The sums involved are numerically, if not relatively, large. A recent study of change of control payments to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) found that CEOs, on average, accrue $8 to $12 million in change of control compensation triggered by a takeover.\footnote{291} This is an average—there are instances of much larger amounts. In 2005, James Kilts, CEO of Gillette, became entitled to $165 million in change of control payments when Proctor & Gamble acquired Gillette.\footnote{292} In 2006, Bruce Hammonds, CEO of MBNA, accrued $102 million in compensation when MBNA was acquired by Bank of America.\footnote{293} Indeed, recent outrages over excessive executive pay include similar complaints about ubiquitous and inordinate change of control payments.\footnote{294} The value of these payments has also become more suspect since a recent study found that when CEOs do receive extraordinary treatment through change of control compensation, the stockholders of the acquiree actually receive lower acquisition premia.\footnote{295} The arguments that change of control payments are worthwhile since they reduce agency costs and ultimately benefit acquiree stockholders through a higher premium now appear less firm.

The SEC has not addressed this issue in any substantive manner, although it recently adopted increased disclosure requirements for change of control arrangements as part of an over-all review of executive compensation disclosure.\footnote{296} Meanwhile, the Delaware courts and other potential regulators have refused to inject themselves into the debate concerning the appropriateness of these payments.\footnote{297} The large sums involved, the public discontent, and the bias (or arguable benefit) that these payments potentially inject into the takeover

\footnote{290. See generally Bress, supra note 289, at 961-62 (discussing criticism of golden parachutes); Johnson, supra note 289, at 918-23 (rejecting arguments that criticize golden parachutes and arguing that the benefits of these arrangements outweigh their costs).


293. Id.


297. The Delaware Supreme Court recently showed its bias against questioning these types of payments in the Disney case when it held that the payment of $130 million severance package paid to Michael Ovitz did not constitute a breach of the board's fiduciary duties. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).}
system make this an area that is clearly open for SEC investigation, study, and perhaps substantive or procedural rulemaking.

2. Due Diligence and Disclosure

Due diligence by prospective and actual acquirers is a murky and lightly regulated area raising three complex issues. The first is one of bidder equality. The U.K. Takeover Code requires that a prospective acquiree provide equal and prompt informational access to all prospective bidders. The federal takeover code has no such rule of equality or any other explicit rule governing bidder (prospective or otherwise) access to information. Consequently, acquirees can discriminate among bidders in the provision of information. This can lead to favoritism and reduced opportunities for competing, higher bids due to information inequality and asymmetry.

The second issue is one of stockholder equality. Regulation FD prohibits selective disclosure: generally speaking, when a corporation discloses material, nonpublic information it must make public disclosure of that information. However, Regulation FD does not apply to bidder due diligence. Thus, a prospective bidder can obtain access to an acquiree's nonpublic information through the due diligence process. It can then decide, based on this information, whether to bid or not to bid. But if the bidder chooses not to bid, the nonpublic material information provided to the bidder is not required to be publicly disclosed. A prospective bidder therefore receives an informational advantage over ordinary stockholders who do not receive access to this material when making their own purchase decisions.

Finally, there is a third issue raised by acquirer receipt of acquiree information when the acquirer does decide to agree to a transaction. The disclosure requirements for acquirer due diligence in this circumstance are generally governed by the federal securities law antifraud strictures. Beyond this, the SEC has not annunciated specific requirements for disclosure related to information supplied to acquirers by acquirees in the diligence process. Accordingly, the parameters of required disclosure are vague and acquirers tend to under-disclose

298. CITY CODE, supra note 259, at Rule 20.2.
299. This discrimination is permitted under Delaware law if the board has a reasonable belief that it will serve the interests of acquiree stockholders. See, e.g., In re J.P. Stevens & Co., S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781-83 (Del. Ch. 1988).
301. Regulation FD by its terms does not apply to the extent the recipient agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence. Id. § 243.100. In addition, Regulation FD does not apply to any disclosure made in connection with a business combination involving the offering of securities registered under the Securities Act. Id. §§ 243.100-.102.
information received through the due diligence process. For example, projections relied upon by acquirers are often not disclosed or are disclosed in a summarized and rarely useful form. \(^3\) Contrast this with the U.K. rule which requires all assumptions underlying disclosed projections to be specifically stated and the policies and calculations supporting them to be examined and reported upon by the acquiree's accountants. \(^4\)

Bidder due diligence, accordingly, raises a number of disclosure and equality issues that arguably adversely affect acquiree stockholders and the overall economic efficiency of the takeover process. Yet SEC regulation of, let alone attention to, these issues has been largely absent. This is mirrored in the state courts, which have also directed scant attention to the issues arising from bidder due diligence. Accordingly, further SEC examination and study of this area is appropriate and follow-up federal regulation should be considered.

\section*{D. The Failure of Delaware}

Finally, there is the 	extit{deus ex machina}, the Delaware courts. Issues that were previously the concern of the SEC are now primarily, if not entirely, regulated by the Delaware courts. \(^5\) Delaware now acts alone in takeover standards and takeover defenses. Moreover, the positions of the Delaware court on these issues during the 1990s through today are markedly different than those of the fourth wave—an era of SEC engagement.

The modern-day takeover code engendered by this sea change is not necessarily the one that the SEC, had it been so engaged, would have fashioned or permitted. It is, of course, mere speculation to consider the type of regulation or other pressure that the SEC would have brought to bear, if any, on these issues as well as the effect any such 	extit{ex ante} influencing acts might have had on these Delaware court decisions. However, Delaware's current regulation of takeover defenses, at least, is largely contrary to the SEC's 1980s preferences. \(^6\) Similarly, in going-privates and transaction defenses, the Delaware courts have acted contrarily, or not at all, on issues of prior SEC focused concern. \(^7\)

The Delaware courts have largely acted in all these areas to circumscribe stockholder protection and choice. \(^8\) This is a specific SEC interest in takeover regulation. Moreover, the Delaware-built takeover code is arguably adverse to...
other broader, national SEC interests. At a minimum, it is inapposite to the level-playing-field precepts embodied in Williams Act. Moreover, the Delaware takeover code discriminates to the preservation of management discretion. This is anathema to the SEC’s historical goal of stockholder protection and autonomy. This bias also fosters management entrenchment and exacerbates agency costs. This is inefficient and likely on the whole detrimental to the national economy.

The SEC is therefore arguably obligated to shift the course and promulgate correcting regulation to the current Delaware-erected takeover code. This is not a question of federalism, the internal affairs doctrine, or whether the SEC should act beyond its current regulatory authority or even propose legislation to do so. The possibility of more sweeping action will be discussed in Part VI.C. Rather, this is a question similar to that posed when the SEC trumped Delaware’s holding in Unocal on stockholder equality grounds by adopting the all-holders rule. Should the SEC fulfill its regulatory mandate, respond to and protect its constituencies and interests, and, in doing so, act to modify the takeover code promulgated by Delaware? The underlying premise here is that the national takeover code structured by the Delaware courts in the SEC absence is not an optimal one for the nation and is adverse not only to the congressional intent underlying federal securities regulation but also is contrary to the SEC’s congressionally mandated role in the regulation of takeovers. If this is true, the federal takeover code is ripe for an update to cure these Delaware-induced deficiencies. In fact, the SEC is obligated to take such steps.

VI. A RETURN OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION

A. A Reexamination of Federal Takeover Regulation

We have now seen that the consequence of the SEC absence is an obsolescent federal takeover code and suboptimal regulation of takeovers by the Dela-

309. See supra Part IV.
310. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
311. There is a wealth of literature finding adverse economic effects resulting from the adoption of takeover and transaction defenses. See generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 279 (finding empirical evidence that adoption of a staggered board reduces stockholder wealth); P.R. Chandy et al., The Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Pennsylvania Fourth Generation Anti-Takeover Law, 32 Am. Bus. L.J. 399, 401 & n.14 (1995) (citing studies finding adverse economic effects surrounding the adoption of antitakeover devices); Coates & Subramanian, supra note 212, at 347 (finding empirical support for increased rates of takeover completion in the presence of lock-ups). But see John C. Coffee Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-ups, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 435, 437 n.7 (presenting a review of the conflicting conclusions of studies measuring the effect of the passage of stakeholder, or constituency, statute legislation); Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (2004) (citing empirical evidence to suggest that firms with antitakeover provisions, among other governance features, show greater returns over three-, five-, and ten-year periods than companies without comparable provisions), available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/Corporate%20Governance%20Study%201.04.pdf. See also Romano, supra note 135, at 113 (stating that state takeover statutes are “troublesome, for they can produce results that are inconsistent with the core goal of corporation law—the maximization of equity share prices”).
312. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
ware courts. The magnitude of these deficiencies alone argues for more than
tinkering; rather a wholesale reexamination of the federal takeover code. How-
ever, there are other reasons for such a step. First, the federal takeover code was
largely erected through one-off, SEC rulemaking. The result is a patchwork
quilt of a federal takeover code. It is time to examine the various interlocking
pieces—how they work together as well as individually. Second, the wholesale
shift in takeover law, structures, tactics and strategy require that the entire fed-
eral takeover code be attuned to these changes. Third, a takeover code is an in-
terconditional and interdependent beast, and, as singular changes may implicate
further revision, any reexamination of a rule should occur in the context of the
whole.\textsuperscript{313}

There is also a trove of information and experience available to the SEC
to inform such a reexamination; resources that were nonexistent when the SEC
was last active. For example, the takeover systems outside the United States—
Europe, Japan, and Australia, in particular—have substantially developed since
the fourth wave and provide much experiential data.\textsuperscript{314} Then there is the learn-
ing garnered from the United States.\textsuperscript{315} Moreover, research in the takeover field
has blossomed; pioneering studies of takeover defenses, transaction defenses,
bidder and target tactics and strategies, other takeover rules as well as comparative
work on takeover codes, and study of the structure of the takeover itself are
now available.\textsuperscript{316} The emergence of this constellation of resources also supports
a reexamination of the federal takeover code.

This reexamination should not merely focus on restitching the frayed patch-
work quilt. If there is a singular lesson to be learned from the takeover story of
the past forty years, it is that takeover structures hurriedly evolve—more
quickly than regulators, burdened by the rulemaking process, can respond. In
order to forestall repeated obsolescence and the recurrence of piecemeal regula-
tion, the SEC should consider formalizing the shadow principles which have
previously guided its takeover rulemaking.\textsuperscript{317} These include the principles of a

\textsuperscript{313} For example, if withdrawal rights are maintained, then elimination of Rule 14e-5
may be appropriate. If they are eliminated, then the original purpose for Rule 14e-5 is
again present and Rule 14e-5 may still be necessary. See supra Part V.A.2.

\textsuperscript{314} For recent comparative review of these takeover codes, see generally CHRISTIN M.
FORSTINGER, TAKEOVER LAW IN THE EU AND THE USA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2002);
Curtis J. Milhaupt, \textit{In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan},
105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005); Geoffrey Miller, \textit{Political Structure and Corporate Gover-
nance: Some Points of Contrast Between the United States and England}, 1998 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 52; Paul von Nessen, \textit{The Americanization of Australian Corporate Law}, 26

\textsuperscript{315} See supra Parts II-IV. See generally George Bittlingmayer, \textit{The Market for Corpo-
rate Control (Including Takeovers)} (Mar. 18, 1998), available at

\textsuperscript{316} For a brief survey of these developments, see generally Gregg A. Jarrell et al., \textit{The
Market for Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence Since 1980}, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988);

\textsuperscript{317} A principle-based takeover code would set forth the general principles underlying
the takeover code. The regulator and participants would then act under the "spirit" of
these principles and the detailed rules which would be promulgated thereunder to provide
level playing field vis-à-vis bidders and targets and the goal of stockholder protection and decisional primacy.318 If the SEC adopts this course, it should enable it to respond more quickly to individual developments through application of principles rather than the several-year rulemaking process.319 It will also have the virtue of dictating a logically coherent federal takeover code, one which has internal order to its promulgated rules.

Ultimately, though, the product of such review is not this Article’s topic. I believe that such a review will bring to bear the SEC’s national interests to conclude that the federal takeover code today is not right for the day.320 But it may not. The result will depend upon selection of first principles, the appropriateness of one-off regulation, perception of current deficits, the current scope of regulatory authority, political and interest group considerations and other vagaries of the regulatory process.321 These make it difficult if not impossible to predict the exact outcome. However, without such a review we will not have the benefits of a systemwide reexamination, let alone a fix for any current dysfunction. The requirement and results of a review are therefore not outcome determinative to the extent the benefits of comprehensive analysis prevail.

Nor do I presume that such SEC reexamination will produce the results necessarily wanted by the SEC or otherwise generate unbiased, economically efficient regulation. The SEC rulemaking review and regulatory process is not a perfect one.322 However, the SEC has historically maintained a sufficient dis-

specific direction. The principles would be articulated in open terms and therefore would be observed in both generalities and specifics. The U.K. Takeover Code is a model of one such code. See CITY CODE, supra note 259.

318. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. There are others, such as the one of equal opportunity, undergirding the all-holders/best price rules and the going-private rule. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359, 371-77 (1996). There is also the self-evident principle of the efficiency of the national capital markets. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2000) (requiring that the SEC “consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition and capital formation”).

319. This could be implemented in part through a process that exists in the U.K. whereby participants regularly communicate with the Takeover Panel on issues of uncertainty.

320. Moreover, an important driver in this conclusion is that the bulk of the available studies show that takeover transactions are, in general, wealth-creating. See Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton and Rowe’s Apologia for Delaware: A Short Reply, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 40-48 (2002); Jensen & Chen, supra note 316, at 6-7; Roberta Romano, supra note 316, at 124 n.13. See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).


322. However, the SEC is generally held in high esteem for its processes and output. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 800 (2006) (stating that “most commentators consider the SEC an extremely successful regulator”); David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1765, 1779 (1995) (“The SEC is one important reason why the securities industry is in so much better shape than other financial service industries, and why U.S. securities markets are the best securities markets in the world.”). But see Langevoort, supra note 167, at 529
tance from industry and avoided capture, such that the chance of industry-biased regulation is low.\textsuperscript{231} The bias, if anything, is more towards inertia; however, when the SEC acts in takeovers it focuses on its own regulatory interests, its shadow principles.\textsuperscript{234} Therefore, from a historical perspective, action is the primary issue, not product.

There is still the question of congressional influence on any review and in the implementation thereof. Congress is capricious and acts within a wider political sphere.\textsuperscript{235} If the SEC revisions require legislation, such laws may not pass in the desired SEC form or even at all.\textsuperscript{236} Professor Roberto Romano, for example, has argued that congressional intervention and complete federalization of corporate law is undesirable since it is likely to produce more restrictive limitations on takeovers than those placed by the states.\textsuperscript{237}

In order to stem these influences, the SEC should take steps to insulate any review from politics by channeling it through a specially appointed apolitical committee akin to the Advisory Committee. Moreover, congressional involvement can likely be forestalled through aggressive interpretation within the current regulatory framework. This has been a course the SEC has taken before with takeover regulation.\textsuperscript{238} Furthermore, more radical reform can also be implemented through SEC-mandated regulation via stock exchange rulemaking.\textsuperscript{239}

\begin{quotation}
\small
(assuming that the SEC's takeover regulation is the result of organizational behavior concerned with internal self-serving goals); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 948 (1994) (concluding that "[t]he SEC's major litigation efforts and regulatory initiatives have been designed to protect the Commission's regulatory turf, rather than to further important areas of public policy"); A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1101 (2005) (arguing that the SEC is "independent" in name only" and behoond to Congress such that "the SEC—under the watchful eye of Congress—has fueled the cyclical swings in regulatory policy as a means of gaining additional authority and budgetary support"). See generally ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982).

\textsuperscript{232} See SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at xix ("Few have suggested seriously that the SEC has been a 'captive' of the industries it regulates . . . . [S]uch a suggestion cannot be sustained by a reasonable reading of the Commission's history.").


\textsuperscript{234} See generafly Roe, supra note 2, at 596-98.

\textsuperscript{235} This was the unfortunate case with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This legislation is seen by many commentators as rulemaking by Congress, over SEC objections, which produced inefficient and unproductive results. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1595-97 (2005).

\textsuperscript{236} See Romano, supra note 101, at 503. See also Jonathan R. Macey, Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds Do a Better Job than the States in Regulating Takeovers?, 57 BUS. LAW. 1025 (2002); Mary E. Kostel, Note, A Public Choice Perspective on the Debate over Federal Versus State Corporate Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2129 (1993) (arguing that "[t]he history and effects of the Williams Act suggest that federal regulation is unlikely to monitor better the behavior of corporate management in the gaps where the market for corporate control fails").

\textsuperscript{237} The adoption of the all-holders/best price rule, going-private rules, and rules requiring mandatory withdrawal rights through an offer period are prominent examples. See supra notes 56-70, 151-53 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{238} The SEC took this route in prohibiting midstream dual-class stock recapitalizations through stock exchange rulemaking after the SEC's own rule was struck down by the
In the end, the risk of a deficient or ham-fisted regulatory takeover code is certainly present. Yet this is counterbalanced by the deep flaws in the current regime and the consequent need for a wholesale reexamination and reform. The weight tips in this favor.

B. The Return of the SEC

Even if there is a wholesale update of the federal takeover code, the requirement of an active SEC within this context is a paramount goal in and of itself. The initial reason for this is practical; if the SEC does not tend to its takeover law, it will again quickly become outdated. Weeds grow in an uncared for lawn. This is true even if a principle-based takeover code is put forth, as specific enforcement, interpretation, and regulatory action under such rules remains necessary. Moreover, an active SEC will be better positioned to incorporate research and other practical experience as it unfolds.

An engaged SEC also provides positive force in a world where Delaware is now the primary takeover regulator. In the 1970s and 1980s takeover regulation was arguably an SEC game and many of the prostockholder decisions of the Delaware courts, including Singer, Unocal, and Revlon were arguably crafted in response to SEC pressure or the threat of SEC intervention.330 However, in the 1990s the evaporation of the SEC exigent pressure led the Delaware courts to veer sharply promanagement.331

There is a lesson here. Throughout the contemporary history of takeovers, an active SEC has tempered the promanagement interests of Delaware. First, when Delaware or another state has leaned too far against federal interests, the SEC has acted to trump this conduct.332 Second, the Delaware courts appear to be acutely aware of this real or potential federal action, and under this specter decide their cases in greater alignment with federal interests.333 This threat of active intercession tames Delaware's promanagement bias.334 The SEC presence alone is therefore a powerful mitigating device to ensure that the takeover code produced by the Delaware courts is one keyed to national needs.335

330. See supra Parts II.B & II.C.
331. See Sean J. Griffith, Daedalean Tinkering, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1247, 1263 (2006) ("[W]hen the threat of federal preemption had faded...[c]ourts began to apply Unocal less aggressively and to narrow Revlon but, by retaining the principle of intermediate scrutiny, never to the point at which other states could steal incorporations by appealing to shareholders.").
332. This occurred in the case of first generation takeover statutes and the exclusionary self-tender. See supra notes 87, 132-34, 151-53 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 3, 236.
334. See generally Note, The Case for Federal Threats in Corporate Governance, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2726, 2726 (2005) (arguing that the "federal government threatening intervention [would]...prompt states to adopt more desirable rules").
335. See Roe, supra note 12, at 2502-04; see also McDonnell, supra note 12, at 136.
Concomitant to this point, the SEC is a national regulator. The SEC takes into account national interests rather than the narrow ones that Delaware acts upon.336 Historically, SEC regulation is likely to be prostockholder and in favor of rules that promote efficient national and international markets.337 Moreover, as Professor Roe has argued, the federal government can crush Delaware and represents a wider divergence of interests. If Delaware goes too far in representing its special interests to the detriment of those represented at the higher, federal level, the federal government will intervene.338 Compare this to Delaware's regulation which has tended towards rules that on their face favor manager decisional autonomy and entrenchment to the detriment of stockholders.339 Placed in a historical context, the SEC not only tempers Delaware but is more apt to enact a takeover code beneficial to the nation as a whole.

The SEC can also bring to bear capabilities as a national regulator that the Delaware courts or any other state regulator cannot. First, when the SEC acts, it acts nationally, and there is contiguity that no other state actor, even Delaware, can provide. Second, the SEC has the resources of the federal government at its disposal. The SEC can use these to support research, review developments, and continually study issues. It has superior personnel quality and numbers and consequently more capacity for enforcement action and regulation. Third, the SEC has a voice that speaks at a national level and with more focus and influence than any state actor.340

Finally, the SEC regulates in a manner wholly different than the nation's current takeover regulator, the Delaware courts. The SEC promulgates and enforces a rule-based takeover code, whereas Delaware regulates by court decision. There are benefits and deficits to both types of regulation. However, rule-based regulation is produced through a responsive deliberative process that involves a comment period and public input. It is consequently more nuanced, targeted, and globally consistent than regulation issued on a case-by-case basis.341 It is not burdened by the Delaware courts' limitation of rulemaking based on the cases and underlying facts before it. In the instance of Delaware, this limitation is illustrated by the Delaware courts' tendency towards schizophrenic standards and haphazard enforcement.342 While there are also arguments in favor of judicial takeover codes—they are arguably more flexible in responding
to changes in public mood, for example—a rule-based takeover code offers benefits that a case-based one inarguably cannot.\textsuperscript{343}

Thus, there are clear national benefits to an active, engaged SEC. These benefits, however, do not mean that the ultimate product will be a beneficial and economic takeover code. This is due to an effect that countervailing forces, such as Congress and other federal bodies, may have on further, engaged regulation. It also may be due to internal workings or failures of the SEC. Yet an active SEC within the parameters of its rulemaking purview is what is being discussed here. This Article does not call for an engaged Congress—rather, an engaged SEC. While again there are risks of regulatory capture and misregulation, the history of the SEC's takeover regulation outlined in this Article leads one to conclude that it would take a measured approach to issues that arguably favored stockholders and national interests—as occurred in the 1960s through the 1980s.\textsuperscript{344} And, in the absence of scandal or public furor, Congress has largely left the SEC to regulate without interference.\textsuperscript{345} There is no reason to think this would be different in the future.

\textit{C. Towards Refederalization?}

The return of the SEC as an active regulator and a wholesale update to federal takeover regulation leads to the natural question of whether this will result in the takeover code's complete federalization. This would rather be refederalization, since, as we have seen, takeovers prior to the mid-1970s were strictly a federal concern. Nonetheless, I do not think that this will occur or is appropriate for a number of reasons.

First, federalization would take congressional lawmaking. While incremental legislative and regulatory federalization is certainly possible and likely if this Article's call is successful, again, Congress is unlikely to approve wholesale federalization without some public outcry or scandal to motivate it.\textsuperscript{346} Thus practically, federalizing legislation is an outlier possibility that is unlikely to occur simply because of the reexamination and reengagement that this Article calls for.

Second, this Article is not a plea for or against federalization but for a cogent, comprehensive federal takeover code which takes into account national interests, is current, and is perpetuated in such manner. Again, some portion of the takeover code may be federalized as a result of SEC review and reengagement, but the focus should be on creating a functional national takeover code. In this regard, significant portions of the state code currently do regulate appropri-

\textsuperscript{343} For a discussion of the benefits of the Delaware system, particularly its ability to adjust to public developments, see Griffith & Steele, supra note 11, at 13-22.

\textsuperscript{344} See Steinberg, supra note 321 (outlining the positive role the SEC plays in national securities regulation).

\textsuperscript{345} See Banner, supra note 17, at 850 (observing that congressional action on securities regulation has largely been the product of scandal or other public furor).

\textsuperscript{346} See id. This is true even if the SEC acted through stock exchange rulemaking. The changes would likely be so significant that congressional approval would be an effective requirement.
ately and should be maintained. Moreover, a reengaged SEC would channel the state takeover code into a greater harmony with the SEC’s desired national code. Any regulation by the SEC should take this into account. The issue is therefore one of an optimal takeover code, not federalization for its own sake.

Finally, federalization is arguably not an optimal norm on either a process or a substantive level. A judicially supervised takeover code can add value. The Delaware court process of case-by-case searching review is arguably not achievable through SEC regulation. Delaware fiduciary standards regulating the internal affairs of a corporation provide a base level of court supervision and regulation for takeovers that the SEC rules cannot. Thus, a vigorous duopoly appears to have potential to be a satisfactory regulator of takeovers. The preservation of Delaware would arguably mitigate risks of SEC industry capture as well as preserve an alternative laboratory for ideas and developments, albeit one subject to SEC supervision and response. It would also allow for quicker variances of response; either the SEC or the Delaware courts could act. This is strong brew—a duopoly preserves the unique talents which each regulator can bring to bear.

This is another lesson of the fourth wave. If each regulator focuses on its interests, it can arguably build a more fitting, politically and economically optimal takeover code. This appeared to be the destination of takeover regulation in 1985, the year of the Delaware court’s decisions in Revlon and Unocal and a high tide for SEC involvement. Alas, the dream went by the wayside upon the SEC’s subsequent withdrawal. Nonetheless, SEC regulation should take this collaboration into account to craft a national code which maintains space for state takeover regulation. The SEC will obviously maintain a check on Delaware and the other states, but this trump should be one utilized only when national interests militate.

347. See Griffith & Steele, supra note 11 (arguing the benefits of the Delaware corporate code).
349. See Gilson, supra note 320, at 40-42 (2002) (“Courts cannot distinguish with precision whether underperformance results from bad luck on the one hand, or bad judgment on the other. The business judgment rule properly serves to allocate that assessment to the market.”); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1939 (1998) (arguing that “[t]he competitive advantage that Delaware derives from legal indeterminacy may have shaped its law indirectly”).
351. This is a natural outcome of having two focused regulators, although of course conflicting regulation is also a possibility. The trump available to the SEC, however, should alleviate and forestall this problem.
352. Cf. Kamar, supra note 349 (arguing for imperfect competition of suboptimal regulation as a plausible intermediate regulatory structure between perfect competition and monopoly).
353. This would be accomplished through the threat and actuality of SEC intervention if harmonized regulation was not achieved.
VII. CONCLUSION

Our whirlwind tour of federal takeover regulation has exploded a surrounding myth. The myth was that of the SEC as a currently active regulator of takeovers. This was once fact; the SEC was the primary regulator of takeovers from the 1960s through to the twilight of the 1980s. But it is no longer the case; since 1989 the SEC has largely abstained from the regulation of takeovers.

The consequences of this truth are manifold. In the SEC absence, federal takeover law has become obsolete. It oftentimes regulates incongruously, does not regulate important areas, or regulates in a manner inconsistent with the welfare of its interested parties. Moreover, the SEC’s failure to tend the federal takeover code and practice of one-off rulemaking has created incoherence. Many takeover rules now lack justification or otherwise do not function effectively in tandem with the remaining federal code. In short, there is an existing failure of federal takeover regulation.

The post-1989 abstention of the SEC has also resulted in the emergence of the Delaware courts as the nation’s primary takeover regulator. Delaware has vigorously seized this position and proceeded to erect a takeover code structured in accordance with its narrow pro-management and other self-interests. The consequence is a suboptimal takeover code, one that is contrary to national interests as well as the SEC’s traditional concerns of stockholder protection and decisional autonomy.

This all sustains a loud cry for an SEC reexamination and update of the federal takeover law, and for the SEC’s return as an active, engaged regulator of public takeovers. The result would not only be a forward-going, current takeover code, but one that keeps the Delaware courts in check. This would engender a more economically efficient, informed, and internally ordered national takeover code in the better interests of stockholders and the nation.