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Greek Forerunners of Simenon*

David Daube†

I

Rhetoric as a reality of life started the moment that two persons were in existence. (Or even earlier, to judge by North Beach, where folks stand around animatedly talking to themselves.) As a craft, analyzed and taught, it originated—if we can trust Aristotle¹—around 500 B.C. in Sicily, Greek-speaking at the time. The island was then in a peculiar state, reminiscent of Germany or Italy after World War II. The dictators who had overthrown the traditional city constitutions were deposed again. At first, many who had been ill-treated by them or their henchmen used self-help to exact retribution and recover their losses. But as this created turmoil, the courts took over.

In the trials that ensued, old-accustomed notions of criminality turned out to be inadequate. One had to go much further than before in bringing to account evil-doing by remote control. As usual in such regimes, those on top had left much of the dirty work to their underlings: to take it out on these alone would make no sense. Similarly, one had to go further in punishing passivity—collaboration by staying on and pursuing ordinary activities when high-minded citizens chose exile.² Another vast area demanding fresh solutions was moral assessment of conduct: what weight was to be accorded to the manifold excuses available in so troubled a period? An outrage might have been perpetrated in deference to superior orders, disregard of which would be perilous.³ Foreign mercenaries and their families might have received land from the tyrant for services which, on the whole, were beneficial to the community and which, in any case, it was not up to them to question.⁴

* The form of Professor Daube's classical citations is in accordance with *A Manual of Style* (12th ed. 1969), copyright by the University of Chicago Press.

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1. As reported by Cicero, *Brutus* 12.46. See Himmelschein, *Studien zu der antiken Hermeneutica iuris*, in *SYMBOLAE FRIBURGENSES IN HONOREM OTTONIS LENEL*, 373 ff. (1933).

2. Cf. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 8.5.

3. Cf. Lysias 12, *Against Eratosthenes* 25, 13, *Against Agoratus* 52.

4. Cf. Diodorus of Sicily, *Library of History* 11.76.5.

Nor was it only the substantive law that needed bold reshaping. Partly as a corollary, it was no longer feasible to rely on familiar, simple methods of proof such as oracle, ordeal, oath, eyewitness, documents, or generalized rules (*e.g.*, if an object of mine is found with you, then, given certain exactly defined conditions, you have stolen it).⁵ Take oath. Quite apart from its devaluation owing to decline of faith, it was not suitable to deal with the complications just outlined. A process could hardly be settled by the accused swearing: "I have not indirectly promoted this assassination or expropriation," or "My fear of the government was sufficiently great to relieve me of any blame for what I did."⁶ Or take documents. A name might appear on a register of the dictator's followers though its bearer never supported him.⁷ (It is clearly safest to be neither on an enemies' list nor on a friends' list.) The way out was to allow free play to circumstantial evidence, *Indizienbeweis* in German.

The opening up of the substantive law tied in with the recognition that the man in the dock was rarely altogether good or bad. What the court had to decide was how much he had of either. Again, the breakthrough in methods of proof was accompanied by the insight (which later on determined the standard form of the Roman sentence⁸ and is being revived in modern science) that, in general, a conclusion could not be put forward as definitely true; all that could be claimed was that a careful reading of the evidence rendered a certain result likely. The court's task, then, was to decide which of the two conflicting presentations submitted to it enjoyed a higher degree of probability. It was realized that, with very human judges in charge of evaluations so subtle and flexible, an enormous deal depended on the way the advocates for each side put their respective arguments. No wonder a theory of rhetoric—forensic rhetoric, to begin with—came into being. Before long, it was taken up and elaborated at Athens, where deep political and social dissensions provided a fertile soil.

II

The oldest extant treatise on the subject is not much earlier than Aristotle's, but plainly draws on a far more archaic model. In sketching the avenues open to the defense, it begins with denial of the deed, then goes on to admission qualified by such pleas as that it was justified

5. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities* 1.39; *Gen.* 31:17-30, 44:1-12; Gaius, *Institutes* 3.192. See D. DAUBE, *STUDIES IN BIBLICAL LAW* 201 ff. (1969).

6. See Daube, *Negligence in the Early Talmudic Law of Contract*, in 1 *FESTSCHRIFT FRITZ SCHULZ* 146 (1951), on the awkwardness of the oath "I have not been negligent."

7. Cf. Lysias 16, *In Defense of Mantisheus* 6f.

8: "He appears (*videtur*) to have committed—or, not to have committed—the deed," commented on by D. DAUBE, *FORMS OF ROMAN LEGISLATION* 73 (1956).

legally, morally, or politically, or that it was committed in error, or that it was an accident.⁹ Nowadays we emphasize the precariousness of separating off denial from qualification (and, if we are Freudians, conscious offense from error and accident).¹⁰ I shall briefly return to this point below.¹¹ For the moment it suffices to note that, for its time, the system was an outstanding analytical feat; and, after all, it did go unchallenged for over two thousand years—not too bad.

One factor that must have helped its formation was the emphasis placed by primitive penal laws on the act, irrespective of motivation and the like: so when equal standing was accorded to the latter, it was readily seen as something extra. It may be worth pointing out that the original concentration on the act does not, as is often held, spring from blindness to all that goes into it. If Adam and Eve had slept open-mouthed and the fruit had just dropped down, I think we should still be in Eden. Of the true reasons for those laws, the most important is the near-impossibility, in a loose-knit community, of establishing an isolated deviation from the regular. The Assyrians or Hebrews always knew, for example, that a man might sleep with another man's wife in ignorance of her status; but to secure exemption of this rare case from punishment, a fair degree of organization had to be in existence.¹²

However, the developments outlined above—in particular, the liberalization of proof—undoubtedly contributed most to the classification of this treatise. An oracle could sweepingly declare: "Let off this man," or "Expel him," or "He ought to donate a golden statue to the temple." Once the verdict was to be based on a sifting of data, with practically no restriction on the kind of detail, aggravating or mitigating, that might be introduced, things were more laborious. The courts now badly needed guidance as to the sorting out of the material: they must have found the step-by-step progress from the deed as such to various attributes immensely useful. How far the schema influenced, and was influenced by, the relation between different Athenian tribunals I shall not here examine.

9. *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 4, 36. See Himmelschein, *supra* note 1, at 377; Daube, *Error and Accident in the Bible*, in 2 *REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'ANTIGUITÉ* 189 ff. (1949).

10. "If I accidentally break my toothglass, it is either because I dislike it, or because I like it and want to punish myself, or indeed because I neither dislike it nor like it but substitute it for something else which I either dislike or like." D. DAUBE, *ROMAN LAW* 145 (1969).

11. See discussion at note 43 *infra*.

12. *Assyrian Laws* 14; *Gen.* 12:11-20, 20:2-14, 26:7-11. See D. DAUBE, *SIN, IGNORANCE AND FORGIVENESS IN THE BIBLE* 7 (1960); D. DAUBE, *supra* note 10, at 157 ff. Against the similarly fallacious conclusion that, since primitive penal laws single out direct causation, indirect causation is not understood, see DAUBE, *Direct and Indirect Causation in Biblical Law*, in 11 *VETUS TESTAMENTUM* 246 ff. (1961).

III

Manifestly, the first position, "I have not done it," is of far less intrinsic philosophical interest than the various applications of "I have done it, but." The former concerns merely the question: What happened? No doubt, in solving it, much acumen can be displayed and fascinating facts can come to light; but none of this is inherent in the question as such. By contrast, the buts designed to neutralize admission—"I acted in self-defense, under duress, for the good of the country, from ignorance"—themselves give rise to momentous problems regarding fate and responsibility: Does self-defense exonerate? Always? Sometimes? Fully? Partially?

It is not surprising that the famous tragedies of the fifth century fasten on these deeply disquieting modes of vindication. Of course, the cases presented, coming down from ancient mythology, are few of them of exactly the kind an ordinary, earthly panel would be called on to tackle. They are nevertheless sufficiently close to enable the playwrights to debate all that can be said for and against a deed—taking the deed for granted.

Clytemnestra concedes that she assassinated her husband Agamemnon returned from war and that, while he was away, she lived in adultery. But she reminds her accusers that he had sacrificed their child Iphigeneia and taken Cassandra to mistress.¹³ As for that sacrifice, was it the thing to do seeing that Artemis would not otherwise let the Greek fleet sail to Troy? Orestes slays Clytemnestra. His "but" is that Apollo bade him avenge his father.

Oedipus kills his father and marries his mother—without knowing who they are: does this remove the stain? One of his sons loses his life leading a rebellion. A royal decree forbidding him burial, on pain of death, is flouted by his sister Antigone. Is she entitled to put natural ties above the law of the state? Does her younger sister Ismene come nearer to the mark when she maintains that such disobedience is not for women? Is the king right in carrying out his threat, in order to uphold public authority?

Phaedra, before hanging herself, sends her husband Theseus word that Hippolytus, his son from a former marriage, tried to ravish her. She does so, wounded by Hippolytus' rejection of her love and fearing he may reveal her advances. Theseus brings about his son's destruction: is he exculpated, having been misled by his wife?

Medea kills Jason's bride and the children she herself has borne him. But he discarded her, who had given up everything to help him

13. See B. DAUBE (my brother), *ZU DEN RECHTSPROBLEMEN IN AISCHYLOS' AGAMEMNON* 178 ff. (1938).

win glory, for that woman at present more useful to him, and the children's future looks dismal.

With regard to all these deeds, beyond specific considerations, there is the fundamental one that, maybe, to some extent at least, they are the result of inescapable destiny and irresistible characteristics rather than of governable conduct.

IV

With attention riveted by these profundities, it tends to be forgotten that the simple, primary defense, too, plays a role in literature, has in fact given birth to a genre of its own: the detective story. The detective's job is not to ponder the lesser or greater wickedness of the deed but to identify the doer who, in one form or another, disavows his part. In one form or another: he may be one of ten suspects lined up in the first chapter of the book, all of them protesting their innocence; or he may lie low and manage not to be thought of at all till the last page. Always, basically, his message is: "I have not done it."

It is this unphilosophical nature of the main theme that explains why highbrows instinctively look down on such yarns. (My teacher W. W. Buckland was very keen on them, yet mostly read a mere fraction—enough for him to guess the outcome. It is no coincidence that he also solved the *Times* Literary Crossword in record time.) Writers like Dickens or Poe, to be sure, by their humanity, psychology, and superb narration can make a masterpiece even of a "crimi." But the magic of, say, *Edwin Drood* is external to the structure of the plot as such; in the *Antigone*, the latter directly involves issues of tremendous consequence.

Let us recall that the clear distinction of the rhetoricians between denial and other pleas was connected with the acceptance of previously unacceptable means of demonstrating your case. Under the past dispensation, with oracle, ordeal, and so on, there had indeed been no place for a detective. He could come into his own only when circumstantial evidence was permitted: from that moment, conviction or acquittal might depend on his effectiveness in observing and interpreting any clues that offered.

Did Greek authors spot the potential here for an engrossing new type of tale and, if so, how soon? At the outset, there would be a crime by an unknown hand (everybody loves a crime, everybody loves a mystery); then, centrally, the systematic collection of indications—some misleading, some useful (everybody loves a manhunt, everybody loves suspense); and in the end the unmasking (everybody loves a clever dénouement, everybody loves the final kill). Apparently, Sophocles, whether the first in the field or not, saw it all.

V

As his *Oedipus the King* opens, the protagonist is reigning at Thebes. He was brought up as the Crown Prince of Corinth; but when foretold that he would one day slay his father and wed his mother, he left home in order to have no opportunity of doing so. Arriving at Thebes, he found Queen Jocasta widowed: King Laius had been killed while travelling. He married her and for a number of years things went well; they had children and their subjects flourished. Now, however, all is changed: women are miscarrying, fields and flocks are diseased, and even a plague has broken out. The oracle, consulted as to why heaven shows such anger, answers that it is because the city has failed to track down and punish Laius' murderer.

So the plot starts like nine out of ten present-day ones: with a corpse, victim of violence, and with no idea as to the culprit. In a modern state, it is taken for granted (with what degree of realism I leave open) that the law-enforcing agencies will not rest till they have caught him. The community Sophocles envisages has to be forcefully reminded of this duty: it was then of fairly recent date. Directly relevant to my thesis is the inordinate stress on the mechanics of the task. Again and again in the deliberations following receipt of the oracle, Oedipus remarks on the difficulties caused by so long a delay,¹⁴ on the need to leave no stone unturned,¹⁵ on the value of the faintest clue.¹⁶ The audience, that is, receives notice that a wide-ranging probe of the novel sort will be the principal subject of the drama that is unfolding.

A detour at the beginning only serves to bring the main route into fuller relief. Before making proclamation that whoever has anything to say about the crime should come forward, Oedipus sends for the seer Teiresias who—monstrous surprise—declares that it was perpetrated by Oedipus himself. In summoning the prophet, the king was guided less by his own inclination than by that of others:¹⁷ but for their urging, he would have done without him. Naturally, though somewhat shaken deep down, he dismisses his pronouncement as malicious nonsense; and he taunts him with his failure, in a previous calamity, to guess the riddle of the Sphinx whereas Oedipus, relying not on supernatural signs but on intelligence, succeeded.¹⁸

A straight confrontation of old and new in the matter of proof. Time was when the inspired dictum would have been final. Now it can be spurned, in favour of rational investigation. (In California, we are

14. Sophocles, *Oedipus the King*, lines 108-09.

15. Lines 264-68.

16. Line 120.

17. Lines 278-86, 288, 555-73.

18. Lines 397-99; cf. line 132.

going into reverse again: investigation is out, the psychic is in.) Certainly, different characters in the play have rather different attitudes, and even the same character may shift in accordance with events. Jocasta, in support of her husband's rejection of the fearful verdict, repudiates the whole mantic art;¹⁹ in a later scene he follows suit,²⁰ only to retract in the same breath.²¹ It is the chorus, I suppose, the bystanders, ordinary citizens, whom the author has express the official view of the period: a message in the deity's name, while not to be taken lightly, needs to be supplemented by convincing secular demonstration.²² This chimes with the court speeches of Antiphon, Sophocles' contemporary, which have been shown²³ to reflect the transition from antiquated and narrow to progressive and unrestricted evidence.

In the end, alas, Teiresias will turn out right. Sophocles does not preach irreligion: though, in the reformed procedure, judgment must be based on data and reason, divine illumination does occur. There are Jewish and Christian parallels to this harmonization—as when scholars are exhorted to be absolutely objective, with the assurance that their results cannot but confirm the essential teachings of the Bible.

VI

Most of the rest of the drama is devoted to the quest, of which I shall give the briefest summary.

Oedipus is informed that Laius and all his attendants but one were done to death by bandits at a crossing of three roads. This reminds him that he once got into a quarrel with a group of travellers at such a spot and struck them down. As he elicits further details concerning time, place, looks of the group, and so on, his anxiety grows. But what still gives him hope is that the massacre is attributed to highwaymen in the plural whereas he acted singlehandedly. It should be borne in mind that, at this point, though it is bad enough should he prove to be his predecessor's murderer, the possibility of a relationship does not yet occur to him.

He locates and calls for the survivor of the melee. Before the latter arrives, however, a messenger from Corinth brings news of the king's death. Oedipus, thinking him his father, rejoices that the prophecy he would become a parricide cannot henceforth come to pass. He adds a subtle reflection.²⁴ Not wishing to be impious, and badly in need of

19. Lines 708-24.

20. Lines 964-67, 971-72.

21. Lines 969-70. See note 24 *infra*.

22. Lines 483-508.

23. See Solmsen, *Antiphonstudien*, in 8 NEUE PHILOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN (1931).

24. Sophocles, *supra* note 14, at lines 969-70. See note 21 *supra*.

psychological security, he suggests that, in a sense, the augury is perhaps fulfilled: the king may have died from longing for his absent heir, hence could be said to have found his end through him. A remarkably generous view of causation.

The messenger assures him that he need never, on account of that prediction, have removed himself from Corinth: he was not the king's son. He was found when three days old on Mount Cithaeron, with his feet pierced and tied together (Oedipus means Swellfoot), and given as a present to none other than the messenger himself. He in turn passed him on to the king who, childless, was happy to adopt him. Questioned who first handed him the baby, he replied that it was one of Laius' shepherds.

By now, the queen puts two and two together. (Buckland would have got it sooner.) Early on in his reign, Laius was warned by the gods that he would fall by the hand of his son. Therefore, when she bore him a boy, he decided at once to do away with him; and he had a shepherd expose him on Cithaeron. The soft-hearted man, she realizes, saved the baby, who grew up to do precisely what Laius had designed to prevent. She knows further that the one member of Laius' retinue to escape the slaughter is that shepherd. In fact, it must be because he recognized Oedipus and wished to protect him that he falsely blamed bandits.

He has been ordered to present himself and is expected any moment. It is obvious to her that, if Oedipus examines him, he will discover the horrid truth. She begs him to break off his inquiry. (Cover-ups are not inventions of the 1970's.) But he, believing she is merely afraid he may turn out to be of humble origin, refuses. As she leaves for the private part of the palace, the shepherd appears. His interrogation does end in the manner foreseen by her. Oedipus, shattered, follows his wife-mother into the inner rooms. She has hanged herself, and he with her brooches scrapes out his eyes.

This compares well with many a twentieth-century effort, especially when we consider the constraints the poet had to put up with. If he wanted to be in tune with his public, he must not deviate overmuch from the treatment of the saga in current mythology. By theatrical convention, the action must all happen in the same place, with no change of scenery. Nor must it take longer in reality than in the performance. I could go on. Actually, the most intriguing feature of this chase, its culmination in the sleuth cornering himself, is met in modern thrillers only from about 1930. By then, educated readers had heard a good deal about abnormal states of consciousness, hence appreciated an inspector unaware of his shoplifting because it was done under hypnosis or because he suffered from amnesia. (This kind of thing happens.

The other day an article I was reading made reference to a theory so weird that I undertook to trace its originator. A relatively short catena of quotes cleared it up: it was me.)

VII

To write a full-length tragedy about Oedipus without once formulating the chief problem of his situation is surely a tour de force. Yet even in the final scene, after Jocasta's suicide and his self-blinding, when it is being debated what to do with him next, in not a single line does he or anyone else assert, or even hint, that, despite all that emerged, he is innocent. The play deals solely with position one, "I have not done it"; its refutation closes the case.

This focusing on the *Tatfrage*, the outward act, to the exclusion of the *Schuldfrage*, his state of mind, is underlined by the unmitigated harshness with which, once his career is revealed, he is judged by both himself and all others. He deprives himself of sight, deeming himself the mortal most abhorred by the gods²⁵ and so guilty towards father—as a parricide—and mother—as sharer of her bed—that strangulation would be too good for him.²⁶ The citizens call him "a doer of dread deeds"²⁷ and agree with him that it would have been better had he not been rescued as a child from the wilderness.²⁸ Jocasta's brother Creon, an old enemy of his, indeed considers him a pollution not fit to be seen either by humans or by earth, rain, and sun.²⁹

There is a paradox here. The progressive changes of substantive and procedural law in the wake of the Sicilian trials make possible the composing of a "who-done-it?" At the same time, by strictly keeping to this theme, and not letting in any distracting secondary considerations, what is effected is, in a sense, a throw-back to the epoch of *Erfolgshaftung*, when the laws came down on the doer without taking account of exceptional data in his excuse.³⁰ Sophocles, needless to say, was conscious of this: he liked evoking the awesomeness of the remote past.

Still, he did not leave it at that. The rhetorical handbook adverted to above gives denial of the deed as the first line of defense; but if it fails, there are others. These he took up in *Oedipus at Colonus*, completed some twenty-five years after *Oedipus the King* and first staged after his death.

25. Lines 1341-45, 1518.

26. Lines 1373-74; cf. lines 1287-1312, 1441, 1496-1500.

27. Line 1328.

28. Lines 1349-54.

29. Lines 1424-28.

30. See discussion preceding note 12 *supra*; cf. B. DAUBE, *supra* note 13, at 204.

VIII

There can be no doubt that he planned a sequel to the latter from the outset: alone, it would be a torso. The long interval is explained by his inaking of the second drama an exploration not only of the offender's special alibis but also, or even primarily, of the power of time—a formidable subject. Time, while leaving a few things untouched,³¹ transforms nearly all, for better or worse. It may aid the growth of love—as, for instance, between Oedipus and his daughters, though even this bond will cease with his death³²—or of hate—as between him and his sons—or, indeed, of insight into past experiences. It is the last-mentioned effect which enables him, arrived after years of wandering at Colonus (a precinct of Athens and—we must not forget—Sophocles' birthplace) to correct the earlier, starkly condemnatory verdict. The qualifications, that is, designed to exonerate even though the deed as such is admitted are introduced here as coming into operation when immediate reaction has been superseded by cooler meditation: brilliant psychology. At any rate, to deny that *Oedipus the King* was always meant to be rounded off by a piece resolving the glaringly unresolved would be like denying that Shakespeare projected part II of *The Winter's Tale* when engaged on part I.³³

The first person in *Oedipus at Colonus* to declare the hero blameless is, movingly, his daughter Antigone.³⁴ In the main, naturally, he conducts his own case. His principal excuse is ignorance: he had no inkling that he was killing his father, marrying his mother.³⁵ So strongly does he feel on this score that he contrasts himself, free of sin because he acted unwittingly, with Creon who, by taking no notice of this aspect and continuing his gross aspersions, wittingly contravenes elementary decency.³⁶

In regard to both parricide and incest, he advances additional grounds of acquittal. The former took place in self-defense: Laius was about to deal him a fatal blow.³⁷ In fact, the pressure he was under, he argues, ought to rebut any suggestion that he was remiss in not knowing whom he had before him: who, when set upon by an assassin, would stop to ask him whether by any chance he was his father before hitting back?³⁸ In current terminology, his ignorance was not culpable.

31. Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, lines 703, 726-27, 1519-20.

32. Lines 1618-19. *But see also* lines 1703-14.

33. For a brief comparison of *Oedipus at Colonus* and *The Winter's Tale*, see B. DAUBE, *supra* note 13, at 205.

34. Sophocles, *supra* note 31, at lines 239-40.

35. Lines 976-77, 982.

36. Lines 984-90.

37. Line 547.

38. Lines 992-95.

As for his incest, just as the killing was provoked by the attack, so his marriage was initiated not by himself, but by the people of Thebes who, grateful to him for ridding them of the Sphinx, offered him their widowed queen as a gift.³⁹ (The trapped Adam similarly insinuates that what he did should really be imputed to his wife's donor: "The woman you gave to be with me, she gave me of the tree and I ate."⁴⁰)

Now and then he goes as far as to claim that, as he was drawn into parricide and incest without proper intent, they were not his work at all.⁴¹ This is not a resumption of the "I have not done it" of position one, which refers to the outward act; that question is settled in *Oedipus the King*. However, in many cultures, from very early on, "I have not done it" occurs also in pleas of innocence by one who admits the act itself, signifying: "I, as a being of thought and will, have had no share in this."⁴² Contrary to a widespread misconception, people were alive from the first to the peculiar, nonliteral meaning of this kind of disavowal. From the first, that is, we have to do with an adumbration, however faint, of recent theories—adverted to above⁴³—which stress the interlocking of objective act and subjective guilt.

Some of Sophocles' formulations are indeed highly refined. When Oedipus maintains that his crimes "were undergone by him rather than done,"⁴⁴ he is applying the rhetorical notion, mentioned at the beginning, that in most complex matters, you had best be content with a "rather than," with establishing that one factor prevails over another, and not try to make it all either this or that. The XII Tables are influenced by the same teaching in their formulation of accidental homicide: "If the missile fled from his hand rather than that he threw it."⁴⁵ A distant echo in *King Lear*: "more sinned against than sinning."⁴⁶

Oedipus at Colonus ends on a note of justification, sanctification, and glorification that completely expunges the previous cruel sentence. Even after losing the battle about the primary defense, you may yet win the war with the help of the "buts."

IX

Though none of Sophocles' other surviving works is as full-fledged a detective piece as *Oedipus the King*, his interest in this direction comes out elsewhere too. His *Ajax* commences with Odysseus follow-

39. Lines 539-40. See B. DAUBE, *supra* note 13, at 186, 201; Daube, *supra* note 12, at 253f.

40. *Gen.* 3:12. See Daube, *supra* note 12, at 247.

41. Sophocles, *supra* note 31, at lines 265-66, 271, 521-25, 538-41.

42. *E.g.*, *Hittite Laws* 1.3 f.; *Exod.* 21:13.

43. See text accompanying notes 10 and 11 *supra*.

44. Sophocles, *supra* note 31, at lines 266-67.

45. The XII Tables 8.24 (*si telum manu fugit magis quam iecit*).

46. Shakespeare, *King Lear*, act 3, sc. 2, line 59.

ing the trail of the fellow who, during the previous night, wrought havoc among the herds and herdsmen of the Greek princes: some he hacked down, some he maimed, some he drove away. In this case also, there is interplay between rational proof—by tracking and inferences drawn from its results—and proof from heaven—information imparted to Odysseus by Athena. The particular method representing rationality here, pursuit of an intruder's trail, has indeed an old history.⁴⁷ But I shall not enlarge.

Nor shall I fill in the huge expanse between Sophocles and modern mystery writing. That study I reserve for the silver jubilee of the JSP program.

47. See note 5 *supra*.