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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

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It is a great honor to participate in this event honoring Wiley A. Branton, not only because of the great contributions of the man but also because this is Howard Law School, the mother church for any of us who care about racial and ethnic justice in America. I am quite genuinely humbled by the invitation.

In these brief remarks, I will dispense with specifics about the upcoming reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act of 1965[1] because other speakers in this symposium are addressing that in considerable detail, and with the benefit of insider knowledge of current legislative politics. So as tempting as it is to offer my own views about, for example, *City of Boerne*[2] and the nature of the social science evidence that might best establish the constitutionality of whatever we do with the Section 5 trigger of preclearance coverage,[3] I will leave that to my fellow participants. Instead, I want to first comment on what is at stake in the VRA reauthorization in a general sense, then comment on the broader context of strategies for deepening democratic engage-

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1. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000).

2. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

3. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, requires that "covered" jurisdictions submit changes in election practices to the Department of Justice or the District Court for the District of Columbia for "preclearance." The trigger specifying which jurisdictions are covered by this preclearance requirement is based on judgments by the enacting Congress about historic and then-persisting racial discrimination in voting. Critics argue, "That was then; this is now." Under the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence, there is a question of the extent to which a Congressional imposition, such as Section 5, must be based upon "refreshed" legislative findings, and if so, the required nature of such findings.

ment. I will finish by addressing the role of lawyers and law schools in contributing to this and similar struggles.

I. VRA REAUTHORIZATION

What is striking about this reauthorization debate, and a hopeful sign, is how confined the legislative risks are. In particular, while there are some risks regarding reauthorization, as a political matter one has the sense that we do not need to fight for our lives to hold onto the basic statute, including the core antidiscrimination mandate of Section 2.[4] Indeed, over the past two years, the discussions within the civil rights community and research community around the core of the statute have been more concerned with exploring how more ambitious provisions might be crafted to advance effective participation of racial and ethnic minorities, and how simple binary conceptions of discrimination, polarized voting, and the like can be updated to reflect the more complex multiracial demography of an increasing number of jurisdictions. While it is now clear that the political environment is inhospitable for such ambitions, that disappointment is less painful than the bloodiness of an all-out defensive battle.

Certainly, the questions regarding reauthorization of the preclearance requirement in Section 5 and the language minority protections in Section 203[5] are somewhat dicier. Both provisions are impositions on state and local jurisdictions, thought by Congress to be justified, and although critics decry underenforcement, the affected jurisdictions can hardly be expected to welcome the regulatory oversight.

So yes, there are important particulars that we need to worry about, but overall we are not moving into a reauthorization in which, we think, the guts are going to be ripped out of the VRA. But why is that? It is certainly true that, not to put too fine a point on it, you would not say friends of the kind of progressive civil rights embodied by the VRA and its enforcement are in control of the Congress, the Executive Branch, or, for that matter, the federal Judiciary. One possible explanation is that the VRA is a success, both in practical terms

4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Section 2 prohibits any voting practices that result in a denial of voting rights on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. This includes outright vote denial as well as "vote dilution," where members of a protected class have less opportunity than non-members to participate and elect candidates of choice.

5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a. Section 203 requires certain jurisdictions, based on census data, to provide all election related materials and assistance they provide in English in certain designated non-English languages.

of the enfranchisement of minorities and in terms of the moral education of America to believe in the basic principles to which the VRA speaks. So you have to be pretty extreme to think of the VRA as a mistake that should be wiped from the books entirely. This is one possible explanation, and I suspect it applies to a great many of our elected officials on the Hill.

Another possible explanation is that the decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court over the last several years have so weakened the VRA that its radical potential has slowly been drained away. In some sense, the statute is no longer a threat. It is a set of principles and aspirations that can be embraced across a wide part of the political spectrum because, given the limiting construction imposed by courts, the principles have been rendered pallid.

I suggest that both explanations are true. The VRA's progressive transformation of America's political culture over the decades has occurred *alongside* the constricting court interpretations of the Rehnquist era, and an appraisal of the VRA must encompass both forces and the balance of tensions. Consider the metaphor of a great river, like the Colorado, over years carving a transformation in the landscape. But even as it does so, there is accompanying erosion and an accumulation of choking silt that saps the river of its former force.

Without in any way suggesting that the VRA has been unsuccessful, we should raise the question of "what next?" Even as we fight to do the best we can to preserve what is there, and even as we fight against all odds to strengthen it in some ways, it is also important to think about what is the next set of challenges in this political moment related to deepening democratic engagement. As we consider the next steps, we should undertake to ensure that we do our job, that job being to offer up not the pallid and the palatable but to offer up the medicine that will produce the needed healing.

II. BEYOND THE VRA: DEEPENING DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENT

Although there are legislative and litigation battles surrounding the text of the statute, there is the critical issue of how the statute is enforced. If, within the Department of Justice, Section 5 preclearance is a rubber stamp, and only a handful of monitors are dispatched to ensure the rights of language minorities under Section 203, then the statue has been hollowed and amended *de facto*. In the current Ad-

ministration, there have been reports of long-serving attorneys in the Civil Rights Division, who have a form of civil service status, having an unusually diminished decisionmaking role. Over a twenty-five year arc, enforcement budgets for alleged violations of racial and ethnic minority rights have eroded substantially.[6]

Given this context, the issue is how to engage the enforcement effort more effectively in the years ahead, in all quarters: from more aggressive fighting about the annual appropriation of funds to the Voting Rights Section of the DOJ, to strategies to make state attorney generals take voting rights enforcement seriously as a part of their own mandates. For example, while serving as Associate Director of the White House Office of Management and Budget under President Clinton, I proposed establishing a grant-in-aid program under the Civil Rights Division to state attorney generals which would have provided matching grants to support increased enforcement work in voting and other areas. As my model, I took analogous grant programs[7] at Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to support state, local, and non-profit enforcement of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.[8] Those programs not only complement the federal enforcement effort, they leverage non-federal resources and build a nation-wide enforcement constituency, or lobby.

Beyond enforcement of the VRA itself, there are other statutes to consider. In particular, let me comment on the Help America Vote Act of 2001 (HAVA).[9] After the voting debacle in Florida in 2000, a group of foundations established a commission co-chaired by former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, on which I served. (Professor Spencer Overton, also a speaker at the Branton Symposium, serves on a successor commission also chaired by former President

6. Cite reports of US Commission on Civil Rights. There are reports documenting the declines in enforcement budgets. There have also been numerous stories in the New York Times over the years.

7. The Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIP) provides funding to non-profit organizations and state and local agencies that engage in fair housing education, enforcement, and testing programs. *See* Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 § 561, 42 U.S.C. § 3616; 24 C.F.R. pt. 125 (implementing regulations); http://www.hud.gov/progdesc/fhip.cfm. The Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) funds state and local fair housing enforcement programs for state/local fair housing provisions that are "substantially equivalent" to Fair Housing Act requirements. *See* 42 U.S.C. 3616, 24 CFR Part 115, and http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/partners/FHAP/index.cfm. In "substantially equivalent" jurisdictions, victims who choose the Act's administrative enforcement option file their complaints with the state/local agency rather than HUD.

8. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C § 3601, *et seq.*

9. 42 U.S.C § 15,301 (2000).

Carter). The Carter-Ford commission studied Florida and related developments around the country, and produced a bipartisan report,[10] which led to a classic Rose Garden presentation ceremony at the White House, and then became the blueprint for legislation.

My frustration on that commission was simply this: Democrats love to govern and love to search for bipartisanship. While that is not all bad, one result is that few Democrats on the commission, and proportionately few Democrats on Capital Hill, were inclined to give full-throated advocacy to the interests of the disenfranchised, since there were very few Republicans willing to sing in harmony. The search for political accommodation and bipartisanship led, in my sad judgment, to the abandonment of the more aggressive legislative strategies and proposals that would have made HAVA truly effective at deepening democratic engagement. Yes, there was an authorization (subject to subsequent appropriation) of 325 million dollars in grants to states to upgrade technologies,[11] a play to the public's dismay with punch cards and hanging chads. But nothing was done to get at the heart of the problem. The most fundamental issue is the system of local financing for election administration, which inevitably leaves county commissioners at budget time trading off the quality of democracy's infrastructure for the need to fill highway potholes or hire jail guards. In political battles of that sort, which neighborhoods are more likely to be served? Which neighborhoods will get their streets paved, and which neighborhoods will get long lines at the polling booth, inadequate outmoded technologies, and underinvestment in voter education?

The result of that inequitable distribution of resources is, to me, most clearly measured by the atrocious racial and economic disparities in the rates of ballot spoilage, meaning the proportion of ballots that cannot be counted because of machine or human error[12] (human er-

10. *See* FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION REFORM, *available at* http://www.reformelections.org/ncfer.asp#finalreport.

11. *See* 42 U.S.C § 15,304 (2000). Title I of HAVA authorized $650 million to be paid to the states, one half to improve administration of elections and the other half to upgrade election technologies. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 15,302, 15,303. In addition, Title II of HAVA authorized the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to pay $3 billion over 3 years to states who comply with HAVA requirements regarding the creation and maintenance of a state election compliance plan and filing a certificate of HAVA compliance with the EAC. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 15,401, 15,403, 15,407 (2000). Furthermore, HAVA authorized payment of 100 million dollars over 3 years to states to improve voting accessibility for voters with disabilities. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 15,424 (2000).

12. *See* Harvard Civil Rights Project, *Democracy Spoiled: National, State, and County Disparities in Disenfranchisement Through Uncounted Ballots*, http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/electoral_reform/ResidualBallot.pdf (estimating that at least 1.9 million votes were

ror, in this sense, is when either no vote or too many votes are cast for a particular office, as when some Floridians voted for both Al Gore and Pat Buchanan as president). So, with this system of predominantly local financing and administration of elections, we turn over the question of who will be the President of the United States to the budgetary, managerial, and political whims of local county registrars. In Florida, in 2000, we saw within individual counties some predominantly non-Black precincts, 90% or more non-Black, with ballot spoilage rates of less than 6%, and a few miles away, predominately Black precincts, 90% or more Black, with ballot spoilage rates of over 22%.[13] Now, at 20 to 25% of the votes cast in a precinct being spoiled, that means 1-in-4 or 1-in-5 attempts by voters to participate are going up in smoke.

That is vote dilution, and it seems to me, at the risk of sounding overly dramatic, that it is a cancer in our democratic process. I say this because the disparities in dilution rates, or spoiled ballots, seem closely related to socioeconomic disadvantage, race, and ethnicity.[14] This kind of *infrastructural dilution*, therefore, reinforces the classic divisions that have poisoned our civic life and to which the Voting Rights Act and broader civil rights movement were addressed. For this reason, the problems seem especially pernicious. But in the HAVA debates on Capitol Hill, Democratic and Republican legislators alike were with rare exceptions unwilling to take on problems of this sort. They were unwilling to hold states accountable, through their absolute sovereignty over subordinate jurisdictions, for actually creating equality in the democratic infrastructure and, of course, it is

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not counted in 2000 nation wide and that rates of such "residual votes" varied widely from state to state, with Idaho, Wyoming, New Mexico, Kansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New Jersey, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina registering a higher proportion of residual votes than the national average).

13. *See* U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION *available at* http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/pubsndx.htm (citing voting data that shows disparities in invalid votes by precinct in Duval County, Florida. Similar data regarding Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties are also presented.). In addition, this report finds, *inter alia*, that in Florida, African American voters were far more likely to have their votes rejected than non-African American voters in Florida in 2000 and that the percentage of rejected votes cast by African American voters outstripped the African American share of the Florida electorate. *Id.*

14. *See id.* Although the analysis showed that educational attainment was not the cause of disparate rates of vote rejection, since it controlled for education and still found that race was correlated with high rates of rejection, the study surmises that economic disparities may have played a roll as African American voters were more likely to reside in jurisdictions using less reliable voting systems.

precisely this state-level default that required equality-seeking action through the federal civil rights statutes in the first place.

More broadly than the infrastructure issues, there is the problem of low, disparate participation rates. It is certainly bad enough that people in "democratically disadvantaged" jurisdictions are more likely to have to wait in line for hours, more likely to be hassled to produce identification, and more likely to have their ballots go uncounted. Still worse is that so many of us do not even go to the polls at all. The reasons for this are many, and I would hypothesize that the deterrent effect of disparitites in the infrastructure is a minor factor. Broader issues of registration, voter education, and voter alienation are surely the dominant explanations. Specifically, the questions are:

- to what extent are these major challenges differently acute in minority communitites;
- what combination of general and targeted strategies will narrow those differences; and
- who can be expected to finance and execute those strategies—one or another level of government, party organizations, or others?

I should put all of this more pointedly. Heroes were beaten and martyrs were murdered, but in the 2004 Presidential election nearly half of our minority voting age population is too cynical, too disengaged, or too uninformed to take advantage of the right that was so hard won.[15] The question for us is: what is the full range of strategies to complement voting rights that will effectively enable our communities to take advantage of those rights? And what is the role of lawyers in that agenda?

III. LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS, AND UNIVERSITIES

More precisely, I want to talk a little bit about the role of lawyers and law schools. As for law schools, as I stand here in Houston Hall, I am reminded of a comment I once made to a reporter. I explained

15. *See* US CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2004, TABLE 13: REPORTED VOTING AND REGISTRATION AMONG NATIVE AND NATURALIZED CITIZENS, BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, AND REGION OF BIRTH: NOVEMBER 2004, *available at* http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/cps2004.html. According to these data, 40% of eligible Black citizens, 55.8% of eligible Asian citizens, and 52.8% of eligible Latino citizens did not participate in the November 2004 elections, either because they were not registered or they were registered but did not vote. *Id.* In comparison, only 36.2% of all eligible citizens and 32.8% of eligible non-Hispanic White citizens did not participate in that election. *Id.*

that if you scratch a civil rights lawyer, out will come the example of Charles Hamilton Houston of Howard Law School, mobilizing some of the best minds of the day to plot a multi-year legal strategy to dismantle Jim Crow, and the ensuing litigation battles of Thurgood Marshall and his comrades to overturn *Plessy*, and win *Sweatt* and *Brown*.[16] That saga is somehow programmed into our professional DNA.

A few years ago, I gave a speech in North Carolina, and in the audience were several people who had been leaders in the civil rights movement in the '60s. I paused at one point, and I argued that on many fronts today, the civil rights movement has stalled and we haven't made as much progress as one might have thought possible in this past generation. I said to those leaders,

> It's your fault. It's your fault because people in my generation, coming of age in the '60s, looking at what you were doing, you were so great, you made it look so easy, that we somehow came to the conclusion that America's progress toward racial and ethnic justice is inevitable; that it really was like water rolling down the mountainside, when the reality is that it's more like pushing a boulder up that hill. But you leaders were so effective and successful at bringing about a revolution in race relations, that we were persuaded about the fundamental goodness of America. I think a lot of people in my generation just assumed that, well, "I can go off and do something else, that I don't have to worry about defining my responsibility to carry the struggle forward."

Well, of course, I was speaking mostly in jest. But the larger point is that we must teach each generation about its responsibility to bear the burden of carrying the work forward. Preparing and inspiring successive generations of leadership seems to me a crucial obligation, in the first instance, of law schools. This is because of the critical role that lawyers must play. America's goodness, under the Rule of Law, is not inevitable. It is a goal that demands continuous struggle.

But we have a second role. Lawyers within the university must be a source of intellectual capital for the legal and policy ideas that can make a difference. And here again is the story of Howard University, and of Charles Hamilton Houston, and of Thurgood Marshall. Today, the question is—for those important organizations and for those luminous leaders who are struggling for racial and ethnic equal-

16. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

ity—to what extent are our universities and law schools, in a very powerful and practical sense, sources of intellectual capital that are useful?

Well, I suggest to you that, frankly, as academics, we don't score very well measured by that aspiration. For issue after issue on our contemporary racial justice agenda—the quality of K-12 education, access to health care, strategies for mobilizing political participation, etc.—academia is not, by and large, producing the intellectual capital that our civil rights organizations and the broader society need.

There is, of course, a battle to get those organizations' leaders at the table to participate in the political and policy discussions, and as to that, the foundation of the VRA helps us have the power to demand a voice. But once we are at the table, we have to have something to say. You can not just show up at a meeting about the crisis in access to health care and not have something in your pocket to put on the table to say, "Here is what ought to be enacted; here's why; here's the analysis; and here, with the help of first rate lawyers, are the carefully drafted and engineered legislative amendments to get it done."

Our leading organizations ought to be able to walk into any forum of government decision-making, federal, state, or local, or any group of key private sector leaders, equipped with the ideas they need in order to do battle. Today, those civil rights organizations do not have the resources to invent the ideas and conduct the research as the waging day-to-day advocacy entity. Yet, unlike two generations ago, we are *in* the universities, and not just historically Black colleges and universities, and not just Hispanic-serving institutions. A growing number of us even have leadership roles within these universities. So there is no excuse for a disconnect between the world of ideas and the world of action for racial justice.

Yet, having said that, the specific role of lawyers is a complicated one. On the good side, lawyers are problem solvers by profession and the best lawyers must work on the most difficult and most important challenges. Moreover, lawyers frequently, by intellectual habit, are general contractors. I mean this in the sense that what a lawyer often does in practice is pull in the variety of professions and disciplines that have to be mobilized to answer the client's question. So if you are a litigator, whether it is in a medical malpractice case, a Voting Rights Act case, or a case involving intellectual property enforcement in the European Union, you will reach out to the statisticians or to the economist, to the sociologists or to the physicians in order to solve the

client's problem. This general contractor mode of serving clients is vitally important in complex problems, and racial justice surely qualifies as that.

On the other side, however, I have a serious concern. I can illustrate it with a story dating back to when I served in the Carter White House with Howard Law School's dean, Kurt Schmoke. Kurt and I were on the Domestic Policy Staff, and my portfolio included responsibility for welfare reform. I spent over a year leading an interagency working group of subcabinet officers to devise a plan that would cost roughly $11 billion per year. When we were ready to unveil the President's proposal, I went to Capitol Hill with my boss, Stu Eizenstadt, to lobby a moderate Democratic congressman from Georgia. I laid out our proposal in some detail, and please be assured that it was quite wonderful in every respect. The Congressman, Rep. Ed Jenkins, listened quite patiently and when I was finished, he said something like, "Well, thanks, that's all very nice, young man. But listen, I have to tell you, I'm not hearing anything from my constituents about welfare reform." That was problem number one: all politics is local. He continued, "Moreover, if I did talk to them about welfare reform, they probably think it's about spending *less* money on poor people, not *more* money. So I don't think I can really help you."

Well, I did not have a response for him because I was only about twelve years old at the time. A few years later, however, I started to put it together and eventually understood what had happened, and why Carter's welfare reform proposals went nowhere. What I was doing, what liberals on my side were doing, is that we were talking about welfare reform in terms of things like a national minimum benefit, mandatory eligibility for two-earner families, reducing the Medicaid "notch," the benefit reduction rate, the food stamp asset limit, the refundability of the earned income tax credit, and so forth. In other words, we were talking about *policy plumbing*. People on the other side of the debate, in contrast, were talking about the "deserving" versus "undeserving" poor, out of wedlock births, the work ethic, "welfare queens" driving Cadillacs, and a so-called culture of dependency. In order words, they were talking about *values* while we were talking about *policy plumbing*. And then, a few years later, we had Democrat Bill Clinton running for the presidency, saying "Let's end welfare as we know it." And one day shortly after that, liberals woke up and the entitlement structure of federal welfare law was repealed, because liberals had spent twenty-five years talking about *policy plumbing* and

conservatives had been talking about values. It turns out that the American people are not interested in plumbing. But they are interested in values.

Somewhat miraculously, in 1995 that same president said of affirmative action, "Mend it, don't end it." I say "miraculously" because there is no compelling social or political logic why these two arguments weren't flipped—why didn't he say about welfare, "Mend it, not end it," and about affirmative action, "Let's end affirmative action as we know it." In a real sense, when Clinton said, "Mend it, don't end it," the wind was taken out of the sail of the anti-affirmative action by congressional Republicans, led by Speaker Newt Gingrich. The civil rights community in that sense dodged a bullet, while the antipoverty welfare-rights community did not.

The lesson, however, is that notwithstanding the Clinton reprieve on affirmative action, we were and are in a perilous position because in civil rights we more often than not talk policy plumbing, not values. The other side is talking about "colorblind justice," and we are talking about the footnotes to support Section 5 of the VRA. We should be talking about excellence and merit, but we are talking about the nuances of 14th Amendment Equal Protection doctrine, what does "narrow tailoring" mean, and the psychometric flaws in high-stakes testing of students. Ours is the kind of strategy that proved disastrous in the welfare rights arena.

After Martin Luther King, Jr., was murdered on April 4th, 1968, over a period of time lawyers, many of them great, came to the fore along with policy wonks. As a lawyer and policy wonk, these were and are my kind of people. But the secularization of the racial justice movement, accomplished by turning leadership over to technocrats, lawyers, and policy wonks, has produced a situation in which we are losing the values war on justice.

So, obviously, you need lawyers because lawyers are problem solvers. And, obviously, lawyers can and should be leaders. The difficult question in my mind is this: How, going forward, can lawyers continue to make the contributions that we must, continue to play the leadership role that we must, and combine our expertise as technicians with the skills of listening and speaking to people's values and aspirations? That is the combination our "client" requires of us.

A few years ago, at the Harvard Civil Rights Project, shortly after Gary Orfield and I started it, I was struck by this question of values and trying to figure out how we might be able to recapture religion

and spirituality in the discourse around civil rights. Gary and I organized a sizeable conference on this subject, which produced an interesting little monograph.[17] We had theologians and leaders from a variety of faith communities, along with civil rights lawyers and community activists, come to Harvard to spend a day arguing about this. The fundamental question that we put to these faith leaders was: How do you use your religion, your spirituality in your racial justice work? My premise was that if the American people want to hear about values, 90% of them engage their values through their spirituality, through their religion. If the civil rights community ignores that 90% and just focuses on the 10%, we are starting with two hands and two legs tied behind our back.

What emerged from the conversation is that, in essence, in the civil rights movement we turn to the faith community for three things. First, a free basement in which to hold meetings. Second, a good mailing list to help organize people. And third, maybe there's a church leader or a rabbi who can be an effective community voice at a press conference or city hall event. But we do not turn to the faith community to understand how we might tap religion and theology to motivate people to change their values and their sense of community. Indeed, what these faith leaders said to us is that in their day-in and day-out work in civil rights, they do not directly use their faith either; their religion is what called them to this work, but in its actual execution, the work has been secularized. Now, surely that is not true universally, but as a general point it was very striking.

What I want to suggest is that, as irreligious as I am, I have come to the conclusion that the new and future role for lawyers is to find a professional definition that combines our technical expertise with our diplomatic skills of bridging cultures, bridging understandings, and bridging communities. And that, as strange as it may sound given the difference in the rationality of the law and the logic of religious faith, it may be that because, as lawyers, our calling proclaims the centrality of values and justice, we are well positioned to link arms with other professions whose business is values.

The role of lawyers in this season's battle to preserve our voting rights is actually quite inspiring if you look at it up close. There is a new generation of younger lawyers swarming all over Capitol Hill

17. *See* RELIGION, RACE, AND JUSTICE IN A CHANGING AMERICA (Gary Orfield & Holly J. Lebowitz eds., 1999).

both as aides and as lobbyists. A new generation of lawyers in leadership positions in leading civil rights organizations. There is every reason to believe that while we need more civil rights lawyers, and while we certainly need more leaders, the lawyers and leaders we have today are outstanding and we could not be in better hands.