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The place of religion in the public schools is only one aspect of the problem of Church-State separation, but if the emotional response following last year's United States Supreme Court decision in the Regents' Prayer Case is any indication, it is an important one. In this Article, Professor Choper proposes that, for purposes of testing the constitutional validity of religious activity in the public schools, the first amendment's establishment clause is violated whenever the state engages in "solely religious activity that is likely to result in (1) compromising the student's religious or conscientious beliefs or (2) influencing the student's freedom of religious or conscientious choice." After analyzing a number of precedents, Professor Choper applies this standard to various situations that involve religious activity in the public schools; he concludes that the price of abolishing certain religious influences in the schools must be paid to protect religious liberty.

Jesse H. Choper*

Thirteen years ago, Father John Courtney Murray stated: "No one who knows a bit about the literature on separation of church and state, that for centuries has poured out in all languages, will be inclined to deny that hardly another problem in the religious or political order has received so much misconceived and deformed statement, with the result that the number of bad philosophies in the matter is, like the scriptural number of fools, infinite." Perhaps Father Murray would similarly evaluate the writing that has

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appeared since 1949. Whether or not one agrees with his judgment on the merits of the literature, no one would deny that the quantity of discussion is indeed overpowering. With the Supreme Court's recent decision in the Regents' Prayer Case, it is inevitable that much more will be forthcoming. This term, the Court has already indicated that it will take a more active role in resolving church-state conflicts. Perhaps the wiser course would be to heed the warning implicit in Father Murray's comment. No doubt, many men of wisdom have declined to express themselves on this issue "so likely to generate heat rather than light." But light, in the form of principled standards to determine the constitutionality, under the first and fourteenth amendments, of the multitude of church-state problems inherent in a democracy such as ours, is sorely needed.

The constitutional standard to be developed in this article is not suggested as a solution for every type of church-state conflict. Rather, it is to be confined to a narrow but exceedingly important segment of the question. The two drives that give rise to the greatest current constitutional controversies regarding the church-state separation commanded by the first amendment, according to Mr. Justice Rutledge, involve the use of the public schools to foster religion and the procurement of public funds to support parochial schools. This article will deal only with the first area.

The proposed constitutional standard is that for problems concerning religious intrusion in the public schools, the establishment clause of the first amendment is violated when the state engages in what may be fairly characterized as solely religious activity that is likely to result in (1) compromising the student's religious or conscientious beliefs or (2) influencing the student's freedom of religious or conscientious choice.

6. Use of the phrase "public schools" is meant to encompass all kindergarten, elementary, and high schools maintained under governmental authority and control. The word "state" is used to designate all that is included
RELIGION IN THE SCHOOLS

I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD

A. SOME SETTLED PROPOSITIONS

Certain preliminary issues must be disposed of at the outset. First, the Supreme Court has decisively settled that the first amendment’s mandate that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” has been made wholly applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Although the history, logic, and desirability, of this thesis have been articulately questioned, the Court’s consistent position renders further discussion unprofitable. Second, the Court has unequivocally rejected the proposition that the purpose of the within the concept of state action under the fourteenth amendment. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). This would cover not only the state legislature and executive, see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879), but also all administrative agencies, Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), political subdivisions, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), and individuals (such as school principals and teachers) acting under color of state authority. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).


The first part of the first amendment will hereinafter be referred to as the “establishment clause”; the second part, as the “free exercise clause.”

8. Howe, The Constitutional Question, in RELIGION AND THE FREE SOCIETY 49 (1958). The essence of Professor Howe’s position is that the language of the fourteenth amendment that “no State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” indicates that its intention was only to bar the states from infringing on those rights that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). By virtue of the fourteenth amendment, the states not only are forbidden to deny that liberty that is protected by the free exercise clause, but also are powerless to give any aid to religion that would significantly impair the intellectual or spiritual liberties of individuals. The establishment clause, however, may be read to bar many federal aids to religion that do not appreciably affect individual liberties—for example, the granting of tax exemptions to churches and the public schools’ permitting the gift of Bibles to willingly receptive pupils. The fourteenth amendment should not be read to prohibit the states from extending these aids to religion.

In answer, it might be suggested that some of the aids to religion that Professor Howe finds to have little impact on the secured rights of individuals—for example, the distribution of Bibles in the public schools—may well have substantial impact. See text accompanying note 509 infra. Furthermore, even those aids to religion that have no immediate effect on individual liberty—for example, financial assistance to religion in the form of tax exemption or, for that matter, a direct appropriation to a particular church—historically and logically have tended to cause so much strife among religious sects as to ultimately endanger individual liberty. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11, 53–54 (1947).
establishment clause is only to forbid governmental preference of one religion over another.\textsuperscript{9} Despite heated (and often intemperate) argument to the contrary,\textsuperscript{10} the establishment clause bars certain governmental aids to religion even if impartially afforded to all religious sects.\textsuperscript{11} Finally, the Court has firmly determined that the ban of the establishment clause extends beyond the setting up of a state church,\textsuperscript{12} a proposition with which there has been relatively little disagreement.

B. AIM S OF THE PROPOSED STANDARD

Although it has been suggested that "it is not reason but history that must be consulted"\textsuperscript{13} to determine what is right and proper in the field of church-state relations, such a dichotomy neither can nor should be drawn. The precise intentions of the framers of the first amendment are surely of great importance, but scholarly investigation has produced antithetic conclusions.\textsuperscript{14} The desirable course is to frame a principle for constitutional adjudication that is not only grounded in the history and language of the first amend-

\textsuperscript{10} E.g., O'Neill, Religion and Education Under the Constitution (1949); Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3, 9-16 (1949); Murray, supra note 1, at 23. Disagreement with the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause is not limited to nonjudicial commentators. Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida decided that it was not impressed with the language quoted [from four Supreme Court decisions] as being definitive of the "establishment" clause. It goes far beyond the purpose and intent of the authors and beyond any reasonable application to the practical facts of every day life in this country. We feel that the broad language quoted must, in the course of time, be further receded from, if weight is to be accorded the true purpose of the First Amendment. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd., 143 So. 2d 21, 24-25 ( Fla. Sup. Ct. 1962). See also id. at 28; Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 179-82, 100 N.E.2d 436, 472-73 (1951) (concurring opinion); 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 495, 499 (1962).
\textsuperscript{13} Herberg, Religion, Democracy, and Public Education, in Religion in America 118, 142 (Cogley ed. 1958).
1.5 but one that is also capable of consistent application to the relevant problems. When applied, the principle should take into account those values now cherished in our society and should not produce decidedly farfetched or unacceptable results. The last criterion is particularly crucial in the emotionally-charged area of religion in the public schools.

The proposed constitutional standard attempts to meet these requirements. If there are any points of general agreement in the field of church-state relationships, they are that probably the paramount purpose for the enactment of the establishment clause was to safeguard freedom of worship and conscience, and that the protection of religious liberty remains our society's major concern in the church-state sphere. By stressing the security of religious and conscientious scruples of public school children, the proposed standard attempts to fulfill both the predominant histori-

20. See, e.g., Butts, The Relation Between Religion and Education, 33 PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION 140, 141 (1956): "This movement [from the latter part of the 18th century to the early 20th century] toward separation of church and state in education was undertaken in order to preserve freedom for all." Johnson, Religion and Education, 33 PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION 143, 145 (1956): "[P]rotection of religious liberty is the beginning and the end of the separation of church and state." Katz, supra note 19, at 436, points out that "fear of the Roman Catholic church as a potential threat to religious freedom" probably explains the strict separationist position of those who oppose government aid to religion, such as financial assistance to parochial schools, that seemingly does not result in an impairment of religious liberty. On the other hand, those who attack the strict separationist position on such issues as financial aid to parochial education and public school released time do so on the ground that complete separation violates the religious liberty of those who attend parochial schools or who wish to participate in released time. See, e.g., Bishops of the United States, The Place of the Private and Church-Related Schools in American Education, 33 PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION 152 (1956); Hayes, The Constitutional Permissibility of the Participation of Church-Related Schools in the Administration's Proposed Program of Massive Federal Aid to Education, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 161, 162 (1962); Reed, Church-State and the Zorach Case, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 529, 540 (1952); Slough & McAnany, Government Aid to Church-Related Schools: An Analysis, 11 KAN. L. REV. 35, 72 (1962).
cal and contemporary concerns with religious freedom. It prohibits certain governmental action that is likely to result in (1) a student's doing something that is forbidden by his conscientious beliefs, thus *compromising* his scruples or (2) a student's engaging in religious activities that, although not contrary to his religion's beliefs, he would not otherwise undertake, thus *influencing* his freedom of religious participation or choice. The results the proposed standard produces seem to me to be, for the most part, favorable; those that are not are nonetheless acceptable.

C. DELIMITATION OF THE AREA AND DEFINITION OF SOLELY RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY

Many writers have considered the problems of religious infiltration in the public schools and financial aid by government to religious schools to be subject to singular treatment. Some have concluded that the result of both is to "aid" religion, and therefore, both must be measured by the same standard. The contention that both "aid" religion is indisputable, but it cannot follow that "aid to religion" is the constitutional determinant. If it were, few governmental activities could withstand constitutional attack.


24. The public fire and police protection afforded parochial schools undeniably "aid" them. The closing of public schools each Saturday and Sunday, which enables Christian and Jewish children to attend their respective churches and synagogues, clearly "aids" attendance at religious services. The best evidence that the Court never intended the phrase "aid to religion," as commonly understood, to be the constitutional determinant, but rather considers "aid" to be a word of art (perhaps poorly chosen), is that in the first two decisions in which the phrase was used, the Court reached opposite conclusions despite the fact that both situations obviously resulted in "aid" to religion. *Everson v. Board of Educ.*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
Nor, when more objective standards are available, is it satisfactory merely to say that the question of what kinds of "aid" are constitutional and what kinds are not "is one of degree.

Various forms of public financial assistance to parochial education are permissible under the first amendment because such assistance, despite its resultant aid to religion, has the accomplishment of a nonreligious public purpose as an independent primary goal, as distinguished from a dependent derivative goal. Thus, the use of tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils was upheld by the Supreme Court as "public welfare legislation" protecting "children going to and from church schools from the very real hazards of traffic." Likewise, the argument, whatever its merit, for the constitutional inclusion of religiously affiliated schools in any federal program providing financial assistance for elementary and secondary school buildings and teachers' salaries is that such government support "confers directly and substantially a benefit to citizen education," and that such an end is within the legitimate scope of federal concern. Although these governmental programs aid religion, they may not be fairly characterized as solely religious activities. However, other practices, such as prayer recitation and Bible reading, must be fairly characterized as solely religious activities having no independent primary nonreligious purpose. Their exclusive primary goal is to inculcate the students with religious and spiritual ideals or to assist in such inculcation.

(upholding the use of public funds to transport children to parochial schools); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating religious instruction during released time in the public schools).
25. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961), in which the Court treated the problem of what is sufficient state involvement in private action to constitute state action as a question of degree only "because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned."
27. See, e.g., 1 BUFFALO L. REV. 198, 200 (1951); 3 RUTGERS L. REV. 115, 119–21 (1949). The aid obtained by religion is often referred to as being merely "incidental."
28. See text accompanying notes 31–37 infra.
31. For other instances of the use of this position, see Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 519, 113 A.2d 114 (1955); Schade v. Allegheny County Institution Dist., 386 Pa. 507, 126 A.2d 911 (1956); Slough & McAnany, supra note 20, at 62–64. See also Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). Evaluation of this thesis is beyond the scope of this article. Since the governmental action with which it deals may not be fairly characterized as "solely religious," it falls outside the constitutional standard proposed herein and is subject to independent consideration.
Contentions proclaiming a public purpose for these solely religious activities are numerous. It has been argued that their intention is to combat juvenile delinquency among American youth; to teach "tolerance, love of fellow men, kindness, responsibility for the welfare of others"; to prevent rape and other crimes; and to develop "deep and intelligent convictions" in our children. It has even been suggested that since failure to engage in these practices causes upset and disturbed community reaction, the prevention of such situations is a secular justification for having the religious exercises.

But these arguments ignore the crucial point. The results that follow from the introduction of religion into the public schools are unimportant. What is relevant is the fact that if such effects are produced, they come about only if the primary goal—the implanting of spiritual and religious beliefs—is achieved; the purported secular ends are derivative from the exclusively religious end.

Perhaps governmental aid to parochial education may be constitutionally justified on the ground that, despite the fact that aid to religion is a necessary effect, an equally necessary effect is the promotion of a secular goal. But to uphold the constitutionality of religious incursions into public education on the basis of their alleged secular benefits, despite the fact that they are merely derived from the sole necessary effect of advancing religion not only opens "the doctrinal floodgates for infinitely greater aid to religion," but literally reads the establishment clause out of the first amendment. Such incursions "employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy." If the instilling of moral, ethical, and spiritual values will sustain these solely religious practices, there

33. Sullivan, supra note 21, at 108.
34. W. S. Fleming, quoted in Pfeffer, op. cit. supra note 19, at 300–01.
35. Chairman of New York University Department of Religious Education, quoted in Boyer, supra note 22, at 232.
37. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion); Note, 3 Rutgers L. Rev. 115, 121 (1949).
41. The argument that this is the saving "public purpose" has been made
would seem to be no reason why a government could not subsidize
the church that it feels best inculcates its members with these
qualities. 42

Nor is it a solution to judge these solely religious activities by
balancing the public benefit derived against the quantum of aid
extended to religion. 43 This test may have some value in the case
of governmental action that results directly in both secular and
religious benefit, but when the public benefit is derivative—when
it is secured only after the religious inculcation is achieved—the
secular benefit will always vary directly with the religious benefit,
and any balancing is logically impossible.

The reasons calling for separate treatment of the problem of
religious activities in the public schools and the problem of finan-
cial aid to parochial education are also applicable in severing the
former from that presented by other governmental activity that
allegedly violates the establishment clause, but has an independent
primary nonreligious purpose. 44 Also, since children of elemen-
tary and high school age are far less mature and intellectually
developed than the public generally, 45 since they are particularly
unable to evaluate conflicting religious beliefs objectively, 46
since they are especially susceptible to being influenced in reli-
gious choice, 47 and since they are compelled by law to attend the

by Creel, Is It Legal for the Public Schools of Alabama to Provide an Elective
Course in Non-Sectarian Bible Instruction, 10 Ala. Law. 86, 95 (1949);
Harpster, Religion, Education and the Law, 36 Marq. L. Rev. 24, 47
(1952); Meiklejohn, Educational Cooperation Between Church and State,
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 61, 67 (1949). See also Hart v. School Dist.,
2 Lancaster L. Rev. 346, 352 (Pa. C.P. 1885). The writer in 30 Fordham
L. Rev. 509 (1962), asserts: "It would seem quite arbitrary for the Supreme
Court to hold that a general day of rest and relaxation served a public
purpose but the acknowledgement of a God by people 'whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being' was not a public purpose."

42. Professor Kauper suggests this result, although somewhat more
cautiously: "Moreover, the notion that government can directly aid religion
in order to bolster morale suggests implications of a wider use of public
moneys in direct aid of religion." Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom:
A Review, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 829, 837 (1954). See also Pfeiffer v. Board of
43. See Note, 17 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 516, 529 (1949); 57 Yale L.J.
1114, 1120–21 (1948).
44. E.g. Sunday closing laws (see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961)); appropriations to hospital, maintained under religious auspices,
for treating indigent patients (see Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291
(1899)).
45. Cf. Pfeiffer, op. cit. supra note 19, at 423; Cosway & Toepfer,
Religion and the Schools, 17 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 117, 137 (1948); Comment,
22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 888, 893 (1955). Possible distinctions between ele-
mentary school children and high school pupils will be discussed infra.
47. Cf. 25 Cal. Ops. Att'y Gen. 324 (1955); Cushman, The Holy
site of these religious practices, there is a sound basis for giving distinctive treatment to solely religious practices in the public schools instead of treating them together with similar practices existing in our society generally.

D. THE REGENTS' PRAYER CASE

In 1951, the New York State Board of Regents, the governmental agency that supervises the state's public school system, composed and recommended to all local school boards the following prayer: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country." In 1958, the New Hyde Park Board of Education instructed all teachers that the prayer be recited aloud by each class at the beginning of every school day. An action in the state courts was instituted by parents of attending students, who were Jewish, Ethical Culturists, Unitarians, or non-believers asserting, inter alia, that the practice should cease because it violated the establishment clause. Their claims were rejected at all state levels, although it was made clear that objecting students had the right not to participate. The Supreme Court reversed in Engel v. Vitale, holding the practice to be contrary to the establishment clause, a ruling that "aroused more public controversy than any decision since Brown v. Board of Education."
At the outset, Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, characterized the recitation of the Regents' prayer as "a religious activity." That it was a solely religious activity, having no independent primary nonreligious purpose, is beyond dispute. Examination of the remainder of the opinion, however, leaves somewhat unclear the precise basis and extent of the decision. There is language indicating that the decision holds no more than that the evil in the situation was the fact that a governmental agency had taken it upon itself to compose an official prayer for use in the public schools.

the Law Week characterization. Many, if not most of the attacks on the case were emotionally oriented and were founded on a basic misunderstanding (unintentional or otherwise) of the decision. Those who found it politically expedient to denounce the "ruling against God" did so, without pausing to learn whether the Court so ruled. Long-time critics of the Court exploited the opportunity to heap further abuse, without regard to the limitations stated in the reasoning and language of the case. For a discussion of this criticism, see Choper, What Did Court Really Rule on Prayer, Minneapolis Star, Sept. 15, 1962, p. 6A, col. 5. See generally Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying . . .", in 1962 SUPREME COURT REV. 1; Pfeffer, supra note 39.

57. He was joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Clark, Harlan, and Brennan. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Stewart dissented. For discussion of these last two opinions, see notes 188-89 infra. Neither Mr. Justice Frankfurter nor Mr. Justice White participated, the former being ill when the decision was announced and the latter not yet having been appointed when the case was argued.

58. 370 U.S. at 424. The fact that the prayer recitation immediately followed the salute to the flag was not even considered as changing the characterization of the nature of the activity. Record, p. 13, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 421. In this connection, see Schempp v. School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1959). However, the Court's opinion later pointed out that this was an "unquestioned religious exercise" (emphasis added) and distinguished this case from "patriotic or ceremonial occasions" such as "singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being," 370 U.S. at 435, n.21. Although it appears that this refers only to "The Star-Spangled Banner," the third stanza of which contains references to the Deity, it seems that the Court may be willing to single out those parts of a daily school exercise that are of a religious nature yet unwilling to sever those verses of a song that are solely religious. See text accompanying notes 541-44 infra.

59. This was acknowledged in The Regents Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools, Record, pp. 28-29, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

60. The petitioners contend . . . that the . . . prayer must be struck down as a violation of the Establishment Clause because that prayer was composed by government officials as a part of a governmental program to further religious beliefs. . . . We agree with that contention since we think that the [establishment clause] must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government.

370 U.S. at 425.
Even if the Court's holding is this limited, it does not augur well for the closely related public school practices of reading the Bible and reciting other long-established prayers. \textsuperscript{61} It can be argued that since the Bible and such prayers as the Lord's Prayer were not \textit{composed} by any governmental agency, they do not fall into the same category as the Regents' prayer, \textsuperscript{62} but there seems to be no reason to distinguish between a governmental agency \textit{composing} a religious prayer for use in the schools and that same agency \textit{selecting} a prayer or other religious material composed elsewhere. \textsuperscript{63} If anything, the Regents' prayer, which has been described by some as "purely nondenominational," \textsuperscript{64} would be much less objectionable in our religiously pluralistic society than any version of the Bible or the Lord's Prayer, none of which are unobjectionable to all of the major religious faiths. \textsuperscript{65} Nor would the circumstances be improved if, instead of the Regents selecting or

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} Pfeffer, Committee on Law and Social Action Reports, \textit{supra} note 21, at 5–6, says that it follows from \textit{Engel} that the Lord's Prayer and Bible reading are likewise unconstitutional.
\item \textsuperscript{63} It is difficult to believe that the decision in \textit{Engel} would have been different if, instead of the Regents having composed the words of this prayer, they had selected them from a collection of prayers composed by someone else. The opinion laid great emphasis on the bitter controversy in 16th and 17th century England over the governmentaly approved Book of Common Prayer. 370 U.S. at 425–27, 429–30. The source of that struggle was the question of what the content of the Book of Common Prayer should be. Surely, it made no difference in that controversy whether the government \textit{composed} prayers that reflected the sentiments of a particular religion or selected prayers already composed of the same kind. See Sutherland, \textit{Establishment According to Engel}, 76 \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} 25, 38 n.36 (1962).
\item There is language in the opinion to support the conclusion that this distinction should not be drawn.
\item [O]ne of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way [lies] in the Government's placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer. . . . [N]either the power nor the prestige of the . . . Government [shall] be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can say. . . .
\item [G]overnment . . . is without power to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any program of governmentally sponsored religious activity. . . .
\item [E]ach separate government in this county should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers. . . .
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{65} See text accompanying notes 258–81, 230–36 \textit{infra}.
composing the prayer, either the teacher or the students made the choice. Indeed, since these people would be much further removed from the pressures of the political process than the Regents, the product of such selection or composition would much more likely be oriented toward the teachings of a particular religious sect. 66

Certain other observations may be made from an examination of the Court's opinion. The question of whether the prayer was denominationally neutral 67 was sidestepped by the Court. 68 The answer is manifest. Since it involved a supplication to God, it patently favored the theistic religions over those that are nontheistic, such as Ethical Culture (the religion of one of the complaining parents). 69 The conceded "purpose and effect" 70 of this program was "teaching our children . . . that Almighty God is their Creator, and that by Him they have been endowed with their inalienable rights . . . ." 71 Opposition was expressed even among those religions teaching belief in a Supreme Being; some complained that the prayer was ineffectual, while others found it plainly contrary to their religious beliefs. 72 Furthermore, theistic religions differ on the propriety of offering prayers not specifically decreed by the sect and of seeking divine assistance in certain matters. 73


68. 370 U.S. at 430.


72. Although the Catholic Church and most Protestant groups warmly endorsed the prayer, The Christian Century deemed [it] 'likely to deteriorate quickly into an empty formality with little, if any, spiritual significance.' The leaders of the Lutheran Church of Our Redeemer in Peekskill [N.Y.] charged that Christ's name had 'deliberately been omitted to mollify non-Christian elements,' and that the prayer 'therefore is a denial of Christ and His prescription for a proper prayer. As such it is not a prayer but an abomination and a blasphemy.'

PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 396 (1953). Opposition was also expressed by the Schenectady (N.Y.) Methodist Church Board, the Liberal Ministers Club (primarily Unitarians and Universalists), and "every important interested Jewish organization in the state." Ibid.

73. See the authorities cited in Brief for American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amici Curiae, p. 20 n.6, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See also Brief for Synagogue
Thus, the Court could have easily reached its result by use of the generally noncontroversial proposition that the establishment clause forbids governmental preference of some religions over others. However, since the Court had based a decision just one year before on the thesis that a state cannot "constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers," it would be hypercritical to say that, on this ground, the Engel holding is too broad.

The holding may be criticized as too broad on another ground, however. A major defense for the constitutionality of the Regents' prayer was the fact that participation in its recitation was wholly voluntary; objecting students were privileged either to remain silent or to be excused from the room. The Court's opinion found "the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary" to be irrelevant. Although recognizing that "when the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain," Mr. Justice Black stated that "the Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not." The essence of this position seems to have emanated from the argument by two amici curiae in the case—one finding an establishment clause violation, irrespective of the privilege of nonparticipation, anytime government is engaged in "undertaking or sponsoring religious programs"; the other, whenever there is state "participation in religious affairs."
broad interpretation of the establishment clause was not necessary to the decision in Engel. The case could have been more discretely decided specifically on the ground that, regardless of the dissenting student's right of nonparticipation, compulsion did exist, because of the "indirect coercive pressure" that this program exerted; that the program would result either in the young children of the minority groups involved taking part in a religious exercise that was contrary to their conscientious beliefs or in their being singled out as "oddballs" by their peers; that this is a cruel choice that no state may constitutionally demand if it engages in a solely religious activity.

II. SUPPORT FOR THE STANDARD

A. INDIRECT COERCION

Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that indirect coercive pressure constitutes a violation of the establishment clause, there is a plethora of material to support this rationale.

1. Existence of Indirect Coercion

It is universally recognized that such pressures in fact exist. Many writers of widely diverse backgrounds have observed that young people of minority religious groups are extremely sensitive about conspicuously absenting themselves from religious exercises conducted by the majority and that there is a powerful, albeit subtle, pressure to conform. The emotional strain is very frequently so great that it results in unwilling participation in preference to some amount of social ostracism. Student commentators

83. See text accompanying notes 189–92 infra.
84. But see Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 25, 39 (1962).
85. The parents bringing this suit had a total of ten children attending school. The ages of the children ranged from seven to 15. Record, pp. 11–12, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
87. This is pointed out in 9 U.C.L.A. Rev. 500 n.25 (1962).
have made the same judgment.\textsuperscript{89} A recent opinion by the Attorney General of California stated that "children forced by conscience to leave the room during such exercises would be placed in a position inferior to that of students adhering to the State-endorsed religion."\textsuperscript{90}

Social psychologists and sociologists have pointed out that children place great importance on how they are esteemed by their classmates.\textsuperscript{91} The urge to conform to their classmates' attitudes is peculiarly strong,\textsuperscript{92} and "the fear of being accused by the others of wanting to be 'different' " and the "very strong need to remain a member of one's group"\textsuperscript{93} are carried so far as to cause these children to do and say things in accordance with the majority that they are convinced are wrong, even with reference to simple perceptual materials.\textsuperscript{94} This is particularly prevalent "where the situation is ambiguous and not very clear-cut."\textsuperscript{95} The option either to participate in the majority's religious worship or "to suffer the pain of psychic loneliness"\textsuperscript{96} has been recently described by Dr. Robert Bierstedt as forcing these immature students "to choose between equally intolerable alternatives."\textsuperscript{97} Even religious educators have warned "that so-called voluntary exemption [from religious observances] does not overcome the compulsion exerted by majority behavior."\textsuperscript{98}

The insight is not new. As long ago as 1890, state appellate court judges recognized the fact that a nonparticipant in a reli-

\textsuperscript{89} E.g., 11 AM. U.L. REV. 91 (1962); 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 146 (1961).
\textsuperscript{90} 25 CAL. OPS. ATT'Y GEN. 316, 319 (1955).
\textsuperscript{91} BOSSARD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT 462 (1948).
\textsuperscript{92} MURPHY & MURPHY, EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 511-16 (1931). See also Cushman, The Holy Bible and the Public Schools, supra note 88, at 495: "A number of psychologists, backed by parents . . . point out the tremendous strength of the pressure to conform."
\textsuperscript{93} BERENDA, THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP ON THE JUDGMENTS OF CHILDREN 30 (1950).
\textsuperscript{94} Id. at 16-33.
\textsuperscript{95} Id. at 32.
\textsuperscript{96} Address by Professor Robert Bierstedt, The Use of Public Schools for Religious Purposes, ACLU Biennial Conference, June 22, 1962, p. 10. Dr. Bierstedt is Chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the New York University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Committee on Religion and Public Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, Relation of Religion to Public Education—A Study Document, INTERNATIONAL J. OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, April 1960, pp. 21, 29. See also Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 23, 39 (1949): "Thousand of educators of all religious convictions are increasingly agreed that the atmosphere of public schools is not free from pressures."
religious exercise "loses caste with his fellows." Lower federal court judges have also made this observation. Four Justices of the Supreme Court subscribed to this theory when they stated: "That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates, and nonconformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children."

The fact that these public school religious practices are inherently compulsive may be empirically demonstrated by examining actual situations in some of the litigated cases. Terry McCollum, whose mother, an ardent atheist, successfully challenged a program of released time religious classes on public school premises in Champaign, Illinois, exercised his right of nonparticipation during the first semester of his fourth grade, but the next semester he did attend religious classes. The following year, he changed schools. In the first semester of his fifth grade, he and only one other pupil declined to attend religious classes; during the second semester, the other boy capitulated. In Terry's school, "children of some thirty-one sects, including Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant, as well as many children without any particular religious preference," voluntarily attended a course teaching the tenets of Protestantism. Donna Schempp's father, a member of the Unitarian faith, challenged Bible reading in the Abington Township, Pennsylvania, public schools as contrary to his family's re-

99. State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 200, 44 N.W. 967, 975 (1890). In North v. Board of Trustees, 137 Ill. 296, 304, 27 N.E. 54, 56 (1891), the court observed that it was well-known that public schools conduct religious exercises "and that, with rare exceptions, those attending them yield cheerful obedience thereto, regardless of their personal views on the subject of religion." See also Wilkerson v. City of Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 786, 110 S.E. 895, 906 (1922) (dissenting opinion); People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 351, 92 N.E. 251, 256 (1910); Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 699–700, 166 N.W. 202, 205 (19–18); Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 1050, 68 So. 116, 121 (1915); Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 155–56, 214 N.W. 18, 23 (1927) (dissenting opinion); Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 190, 176 N.E.2d 579, 587 (1961) (dissenting opinion).


ligious beliefs. Donna had never voiced her objections to school authorities and, on occasion, even volunteered to read the Bible herself. In Southern elementary schools, there are established periods of Christian Bible study; Jewish children have the option of leaving the room, but "some believe that it is better to remain seated than to have forty-three children watch one or two others shuffle out."

2. The Defenses of Indirect Coercion

Although there are a few instances of disagreement with the proposition that subtle coercion inheres in these situations, most writers and state judges, unwilling to find a constitutional violation, argue that "these pressures to conform are part of the normal social pattern and part of the price of being a religious nonconformist is the social stigma which all nonconformists have to bear" and that it "is perhaps not a major hardship and is a sacrifice which a minority might well make to a majority." Some argue that "if the State is going to undertake to protect the child at one point, there seems to be no logical reason for its stopping there—it should protect the child from such mental and

106. Id. at 400. "Indeed the lack of protest may itself attest to the success and the subtlety of the compulsion." Id. at 407.
107. Harry L. Golden, quoted in PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 304 (1953). "The Christian children wonder why one or two of their number 'do not want to hear about God,' and the Jewish child is also heartsick as well as bewildered." Ibid.
108. People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 293, 255 Pac. 610, 618 (1927): "The shoe is on the other foot. We have known many boys to be ridiculed for complying with religious regulations, but never one for neglecting them or absenting himself from them." For a singularly acrid and sarcastic (although neither very confident nor persuasive) rejection of the fact, see Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Public Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21, 31–33 (Fla. 1962). The suggestion has been made that non-believing children may simply remain silent when religious invocations are being delivered by all of the others and thereby avoid the appearance of "non-conformity." Lewis v. Allen, 5 Misc. 2d 68, 74, 159 N.Y.S.2d 807, 818 (1957). See also 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 499–500 (1962). Such advice is extremely naive; remaining silent conspicuously indicates the nonparticipant's status.
emotional abuse in all circumstances. But this is totally impos-

sible."\textsuperscript{112} The progenitor of this reasoning is the dictum of Mr. Justice Jackson that "it may be doubted whether the Constitution which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can be con-

strued also to protect one from the embarrassment that always at-

tends nonconformity, whether in religion, politics, behavior or
dress."\textsuperscript{113}

One need not quarrel with the unfortunate truism that it is
probably inherent in our society that aberrant religionists and non-
believers will be subjected to some scorn and derision. Because
of this, societal pressures will be brought to bear on religious non-
conformists to forsake their beliefs. As long as these societal
pressures are initiated by "private action," the Constitution affords
no self-executing relief. But when the state or federal government
adopts a solely religious program—whose only immediate effect
is the promotion of religion and in which benefit to religion is a
condition precedent to any possible public benefit—it has ap-

proached the brink of its constitutional power. Some would seem
to contend that such governmental activity of itself crosses the
first amendment's boundary of church-state separation.\textsuperscript{114} However, the proposed standard only requires that when this govern-
mental activity unavoidably results in pressures on the immature
to abandon their conscientious scruples, or in the influencing of
free religious choice, the establishment clause should be deemed
violated. It should not be the function of a governmental program
to increase "the price of being a religious nonconformist"\textsuperscript{115} when

\textsuperscript{112} Harpster, Religion, Education and the Law, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 24, 48 (1952).

\textsuperscript{113} Illinois \textit{ex rel.} McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 233
(1948) (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Jackson spoke only for himself.
It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Justice Jackson's subscription
to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's \textit{McCollum} opinion that takes the opposite
stand. See text accompanying note 101 \textit{supra}. See also the statement
by Mr. Justice Reed that "one can hardly speak of that embarrassment as a
prohibition against the free exercise of religion." 333 U.S. at 241. For dis-
cussion of the free exercise issue see note 126 \textit{infra}.

It should be made clear that it is not merely "embarrassment" that
results in the situations under discussion. To define the problem with that
term "tends to assume that a child of tender years has the necessary
courage of his convictions—or perhaps more accurately in this situation,
the courage of his parents' convictions—to withstand with emotional im-
punity some very real pressures to conform to group standards and to avoid
being marked by his fellows as an 'outsider.' " 11 AM. U.L. REV. 93
(1962).

\textsuperscript{114} See text accompanying notes 78-82 \textit{supra}.

\textsuperscript{115} Cushman, \textit{supra} note 110, at 495. Cf. Kamisar, \textit{Betts v. Brady
Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values}, 61
MICH. L. REV. 219, 246 (1962), who argues that because an indigent crim-
the only immediate results of the program, if any results are forthcoming at all, are aids to religion. Majority will should not be permitted to impose minority sacrifices when that will is expressed through solely religious governmental action in an area afforded specific protection by the first amendment. Neither unorthodox behavior nor dress fits that category; logical distinctions may be drawn. The contrary position amounts to "no less than the surrender of the constitutional protection of the liberty of small minorities to the popular will."

It is not being suggested that, in vacuo, the state is obligated to undertake to protect children of religious minorities, or children of the religious majority who have marginal convictions, from the embarrassment and concomitant pressures that nonconformity brings. The Constitution does not demand that the result of every state activity be free from such effects. Solely religious programs should not be confused, as they have been, with those instances in which the state's program has the accomplishment of a secular purpose as its immediate goal.

The Flag Salute Case illustrates this distinction. The Supreme Court held that a state could not compel the pledge of allegiance and salute to the flag by public school children who objected because of religious conviction. The result was that objecting children were excused from participation. Since the daily program of saluting the flag continued, there is no doubt that those who conscientiously objected were faced with precisely the same type dilemma as the children whose beliefs precluded participation.

118. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Complainants in the case were Jehovah's Witnesses. Their religious beliefs included a literal version of Exodus, 20: 4–5, which says, "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image . . .: Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them." They considered the flag as an "image" within this command.

Although the Court stated that the case did not "turn on one's possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held," 319 U.S. at 634, and found that the state was generally without power to compel anyone to salute the flag, id. at 642, the case has been often considered, because of its facts, as presenting a free exercise of religion issue. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
in the recitation of the Regents' prayer. School children whose religious scruples forbid them from taking part in military training or from attending classes in physical education, social dancing, or hygiene, suffer similar difficulties. However, since the requirement of pledging allegiance to the flag is imposed to promote patriotism, and since military training and physical education, dancing, and hygiene classes are placed in the public school curriculum to further national and educational goals, these activities of the state must be fairly characterized as secular. In no way do they promote religion, nor do they rely on religious inculcation for their attainment. Such activities, on their face, are unquestionably within the scope of state power. Some children's religious objections to participating in these secular activities may entitle them to be excused on the ground of protecting the free exercise of their religion, but since the state's program is secular, dissenters cannot require the state to abandon it altogether because its continued operation inherently coerces them to join. This is the price the deviator must pay. To hold otherwise would indeed be minority oppression of the majority. It is only when the state engages in a solely religious activity that it should bear the full responsibility for the infringements on freedom of religious choice that such a program brings about. It is un-

122. Cf. ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37-7-12 (Supp. 1958); 1 FLA. STAT. § 231.09 (1) (1959); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204 (5); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 14-1419 (1962).
124. The question of whether and when the free exercise clause is violated by the compelling of participation in secular activities irrespective of the fact that such participation is forbidden by one's religion is beyond the scope of this article. The issue is one that the Supreme Court appears not yet to have resolved. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).
125. Professor Kauper rejects this analysis. He agrees that it would be unconstitutional if actual pressure were exerted on any student to take part in the solely religious activity of released time. See text accompanying notes 467-72 infra.

But a proper sense of concern for the non-participant does not require rejection of the program on constitutional grounds. A Jehovah's Witness child may not be required to take part in a public school flag salute exercise. He is permitted to abstain. But the public school is not required in deference to his religious convictions to abandon the flag salute exercise even though it carries religious connotations for persons in this category and may, therefore, in this sense be characterized as a religious exercise. Similarly it should be possible to retain a released time program . . . while doing justice to the non-participants.
necessary to determine whether such infringements result in a violation of the free exercise clause.\textsuperscript{126} If the activity is both solely religious and inherently compulsive, it should be found to be a violation of the establishment clause.

B. Support from the Supreme Court

1. The McCollum Case

As already mentioned, there is no Supreme Court decision that articulates this rationale as its basis. However, examination of the \textit{McCollum} case\textsuperscript{127} lends strong support. In that case, the board of education permitted teachers employed by private religious groups to hold weekly religious classes in the public school buildings during regular school hours.\textsuperscript{128} The classes were attended by those students whose parents signed cards requesting their permission, and nonparticipants were required to continue their public school studies in other classrooms. The parent of a nonparticipant challenged this program under the establishment clause and was sustained by the Supreme Court.

Some writers have interpreted McCollum to stand for the proposition that any use of public property for religious purposes is forbidden.\textsuperscript{129} The Court's subsequent decision in the \textit{New York Kauper}, \textit{Church, State, and Freedom: A Review}, 52 MICH. L. REV. 829, 842 (1954). (Footnotes omitted.)

The difficulty with this approach is the characterization of the flag salute as a "religious exercise," thus putting it in the same category as the Regents' prayer. The two activities are intrinsically different. One furthers religion if it does anything; the other in no way advances any religious cause. To say that any governmental activity that offends some religion is a "religious exercise" would mean that a declaration of war could be so characterized. \textit{Cf.} Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).

\textsuperscript{126} It may well be argued that even though these indirect pressures, which accrue when the privilege of nonparticipation is granted, do not result in a breach of the free exercise clause when the state's activity is secular, free exercise is violated when the state action is solely religious. This would certainly be true if the outcome of free exercise problems "depends upon the balancing of the secular needs of the community against the religious rights of the individual ...." Brief for Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory Council as Amici Curiae, p. 17, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).


\textsuperscript{128} Originally, classes had been conducted by Protestant teachers, Catholic priests, and a Jewish rabbi. During the final few years, the Jewish classes had been discontinued. The classes were held for 30 minutes in the lower grades and for 45 minutes in the upper grades. \textit{Id.} at 207–09.

Released Time Case furnishes credence to this analysis. If this reading is accurate, the Court’s decision in Engel was predetermined by McCollum irrespective of the question of inherent compulsion since the Regents’ prayer was conceded a religious exercise being conducted on school property. In fact, the Regents’ prayer arguably made greater use of public “property” than the released time program since, in the former case, the teachers conducting the religious exercise were publicly employed. But such a reading of McCollum must be rejected. In the Engel opinion, McCollum was not even cited. Although the Court at several points in its McCollum opinion did refer to the fact that tax-supported property was being used for the dissemination of religious doctrines, each time it did so it was careful to couple this fact with a reference to the fact that the public school machinery was being used to foster attendance at religious classes. Furthermore, on several occasions the Court has held that the equal protection clause forbids discriminatory treatment in permitting the use of public parks by religious organizations for religious purposes, thus implying that such use of public property is not constitutionally barred. Indeed, at least one commentator has argued that to deny religious organizations the use of public property while permitting its use by other agencies in the community would itself violate the religion clauses of the first amendment.

Even when religious organizations have made the only nonpublic use of public property (which appears to have been the case in McCollum), such use has been sustained by state courts when it did not result in any measurable cost to the taxpayers. In

132. 333 U.S. at 209, 212.
133. The author of the McCollum opinion, Mr. Justice Black, made clear that it was at least his intention that the “decision would have been the same if the religious classes had not been held in the school buildings.” Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 316 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
137. Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1959) (temporary use of public school buildings by several
his excellent book, Leo Pfeffer contends that the principle of *de
minimis non curat lex* has no application when either the establish-
ment clause or the free exercise clause is concerned; "the right
sought to be vindicated is a religious right, not an economic one,
and it is therefore inappropriate to measure it in economic
terms." The Supreme Court, some time ago, indicated its re-
jection of the *de minimis* maxim in regard to first amendment
freedoms. But when governmental activity, even that fairly
characterized as "solely religious," does not infringe on religious
liberty, either by violating the free exercise clause or by compro-
mising or influencing the freedom of conscientious choice in a
manner that arguably does not violate the free exercise clause,
the financial expenditure involved must be subject to measurement
by the *de minimis* standard. Otherwise, the appearance of "In God
We Trust" on our coins would be unconstitutional. Even Pfeffer
has found this to be "insignificant almost to the point of being
trivial," thus impliedly invoking the *de minimis* principle.
Examination of his analysis reveals that Pfeffer was concerned
solely with those religious programs by government that tend to
compromise one's religious beliefs. Likewise, the Supreme Court
dictum was concerned with the protection of liberty. Other recog-
nized authorities have suggested that there must be a place for the
*de minimis* doctrine in this area. State courts have specifically
accepted its existence, and the *Engel* case need not be read to

churches for Sunday religious meetings); Nichols v. School Directors,
93 Ill. 61, 34 Am. Rep. 160 (1879) (occasional use of school houses by
different church organizations for religious services); State *ex rel.* Gilbert
v. Dilley, 95 Neb. 527, 145 N.W. 999 (1914) (occasional use of school
building for Sunday school and religious meetings). *But see Hysong v.
Gallitzin Borough School Dist.,* 164 Pa. 629, 30 Atl. 482 (1894) (use of
public school rooms immediately after regular school hours for Catholic
religious instruction to those students of the school who were Catholic by
Catholic sisters who were also public school teachers).

It might be suggested that in this final case, unlike the other three, the
facts created an atmosphere that resulted in pressures on both Catholic
and non-Catholic children to attend the religious classes. See note 461 *infra.*

138. The law does not concern itself with trifles.
139. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 168 (1953).
140. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 543 (1945). More recently,
the Court appears to have retreated from this position. See, *e.g.*, Baren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72, 77-78 (1959).
141. See text accompanying notes 125-26 *supra.*
142. Pfeffer, *Church and State: Something Less Than Separation,* 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23 (1951).
143. Kauper, *supra* note 135, at 837; Sutherland, *Due Process and
144. Southside Estates Baptist Church *v.* Board of Trustees, 115 So.
2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1959); People *ex rel.* Lewis *v.* Graves, 219 App. Div.
have rejected it since it may be explained on grounds of inherent compulsion.\textsuperscript{145} Therefore, since the operation of the released time program in \textit{McCollum} involved "no direct appropriation of any kind or direct expenditures of money of any kind,"\textsuperscript{146} the use of public property there must be considered \textit{de minimis}, and the Supreme Court's decision cannot be explained on the basis of financial aid to religion.\textsuperscript{147}

The \textit{McCollum} decision can only be accounted for on the ground that the operation of the released time program—a program having no independent primary secular goal—resulted in compromising the conscientious beliefs of the complainant's child.\textsuperscript{148} This inherent effect of released time must have been the "invaluable aid"\textsuperscript{149} that the Court found the state was affording "sectarian groups . . . in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious

\textsuperscript{233, 236, 219 N.Y. Supp. 189, 192 (1927); Nichols v. School Directors, 93 I11. 61, 63, 34 Am. Rep. 160, 162 (1879). In the first case, the court stated that the state constitution would be violated "if the use of the school buildings [for Sunday religious meetings] were permitted for prolonged periods of time, absent evidence of an immediate intention on the part of the Church to construct its own buildings . . . ." 115 So. 2d at 700.}


\textsuperscript{146. \textit{People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 396 I11. 14, 24, 71 N.E.2d 161, 166 (1947). The court pointed out that the classes were held in the schoolrooms during the current school period and the rooms were in use during the entire period, and, no doubt, the same cost for lights, heat, janitor service, etc. would exist whether or not the schoolroom was used at the particular time by this particular class. Any additional wear and tear on the floors would seem to be inconsequential. . . . Any additional wear and tear of furniture due to the religious education classes . . . would be negligible. \textit{Ibid. See also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 234 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).}}

\textsuperscript{147. As this author has suggested elsewhere, the use of the \textit{de minimis} principle in this field may call not only for a measurement of the financial expenditure by government, but also for an examination of the financial benefit to religion. \textit{Lockhart, Kamisar & Choper, Supplement to Dodd's Cases on Constitutional Law} 358 (1962). Although the former may be negligible, the latter may be quite substantial. See 35 I11. B.J. 361, 363 (1947). However, this aspect of the problem was not considered at any stage of the \textit{McCollum} litigation. See note 146 supra. The Court did find that the released time program afforded unconstitution al aid to religion, but it was not the financial benefit received that turned the decision. See text accompanying notes 148–53 infra. \textit{Cf. Cushman, supra note 129, at 352.}}

\textsuperscript{148. \textit{See Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying . . . ." 1962 \textit{Supreme Court Rev.} 1, 29–30. For a complete discussion of how and why this is the result of the program's operation, see text accompanying notes 376–87 infra.}}

\textsuperscript{149. 333 U.S. at 212.}
classes through the use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. The Court did state that it was unnecessary to consider the contention that the program "was voluntary in name only because in fact subtle pressures were brought to bear on the students to force them to participate in it." This declaration may be explained as a response to appellant's argument that the factual evidence in the case belied the trial court's finding that Terry McCollum's teachers and classmates did nothing to subject him to embarrassment because of his religious opinions. The Court's statement should not be read as rejecting the contention that the released time program was in some way inherently coercive and therefore constitutionally defective. Indeed, other writers have found some form of inherent coercion to be the basis upon which the decision was predicated.

Furthermore, it would seem that the only justification for the Court's finding that appellant had standing to maintain the action was the fact that Terry was subject to certain subtle pressures inherent in the released time program. The existing rule is well settled that a "party who invokes the power [of the federal courts to restrain unconstitutional acts] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediate-

150. Ibid. Further evidence that the Court relied on the inherent pressures of the activity:

The operation of the State's compulsory education system thus assists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular education are released in part from their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes.

Id. at 209–10.

151. Id. at 207 n.1. (Emphasis added.)

152. The trial court's finding may be found in Record, p. 68, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Brief for Appellant, pp. 26–30, advanced the testimony of a number of witnesses that was contrary to this finding and explained how the testimony relied upon by the trial judge was inadequate. Although counsel for appellant interwove this contention with the "inherent compulsion" argument, the Court's statement was addressed only to those of appellant's arguments that took "issue with the facts found by the Illinois courts . . . ." 333 U.S. at 207.


154. The Court perfunctorily rejected the contention that appellant had no standing. 333 U.S. at 206. Mr. Justice Black, the author of the Court's opinion, has indicated on other occasions that his standard on the question of standing in the church-state area is considerably more lenient than is the prevailing rule. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 n.6 (1961); Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592 n.10 (1961).
ly in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”\textsuperscript{155} The interest of appellant, Terry’s mother, was asserted as that of a resident, taxpayer, and parent of a child then enrolled in a public school having a released time program.\textsuperscript{156} The record made clear that appellant was an atheist who desired that her child not be indoctrinated with any religious teachings.\textsuperscript{157} Although the Court permitted a local taxpayer to challenge local governmental action as being in violation of the establishment clause in \textit{Everson},\textsuperscript{158} that case involved “a measurable appropriation or disbursement of school-district funds.”\textsuperscript{159} Since the released time program in \textit{McCollum}, like Bible reading in the public schools,\textsuperscript{160} did not involve a substantial disbursement, appellant had no standing as a taxpayer. If appellant had sought standing solely on the basis of the fact that she was a parent of an attending child, she would have failed because there could have been absolutely no showing of any direct injury. It could have been accurately said that there was “no assertion that [he] was injured or even offended thereby or that [he] was compelled to accept, approve, or confess agreement with any dogma or creed or even [attend released time religious classes].”\textsuperscript{161} Nor, under existing doctrine,\textsuperscript{162} could standing have been conferred on appellant on the ground that those who were injured were unable to assert their rights effectively.\textsuperscript{163} Appellant satisfied the existing standing prerequisites by alleging the infringement of a constitutionally protected right—the right of her child to be free from certain inherent pressures to participate in a solely religious governmental activity irrespective of any direct coercion. Only by finding the recognition of such a right in \textit{McCollum} may those who questioned appellant’s standing be answered\textsuperscript{164} and may the decision be satisfactorily explained.\textsuperscript{165}

\begin{itemize}
\item 156. 333 U.S. at 205.
\item 160. \textit{Cf. id.} at 429.
\item 161. \textit{Id.} at 432 (dictum).
\item 162. See text accompanying notes 219–27 \textit{infra}.
\item 165. See generally Sutherland, \textit{Establishment According to Engel},
2. Other Doctrines

There is other support to be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court for the proposed constitutional standard. The Court has unanimously held that, unless justified by some valid overriding interest, a state cannot compel individuals to disclose their membership in an association if such identification, although not directly suppressing the right of free speech protected by the first amendment, nevertheless would have this consequence.\(^{166}\) It can hardly be said that the state's engaging in a solely religious activity manifests an overriding public interest;\(^{167}\) in fact, such state activity has been attacked as being in itself invalid.\(^{168}\) When the state embarks on such a program and then grants the privilege of nonparticipation to conscientious dissenters to avoid problems under the free exercise clause,\(^{169}\) disclosure of membership in a religious (or nonreligious) group results. Such identification, in turn, tends to compromise religious beliefs\(^{170}\) that fall within the broad ambit of the first amendment's protection.\(^{171}\)

This effect is generally unquestioned.\(^{172}\) The fact that this "re-

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\(^{168}\) See text preceding note 114 supra.

\(^{169}\) See text accompanying notes 79–82 supra.

\(^{169}\) It is undisputed that the free exercise clause, if not also the establishment clause, would be violated if participation in these solely religious activities were governmentally compelled. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311–12 (1952); Lewis v. Allen, 5 Misc. 2d 68, 72–73, 159 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Kauper, Released Time and Religious Liberty: A Further Reply, 53 MICH. L. REV. 233, 234 (1954); 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 336, 341 (1948).

\(^{170}\) Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958): "Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissenting beliefs."

\(^{171}\) There is persuasive authority for the proposition that it would be unconstitutional for the Government itself to cause a religious nonconformist to be embarrassed, harassed, or humiliated so as to coerce him to compromise his conscientious beliefs. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 528 (1960) (concurring opinion); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).


Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. Under these circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may
pressive effect... follows not from state action but from private community pressures" is irrelevant; "the crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the introduction of solely religious programs... that private action takes hold."

It is true that all of those Supreme Court decisions in the church-state area that have relied on a compulsion theory to find governmental action to be forbidden by the first amendment have involved instances of compulsion directly imposed by government. However, the Court has shown no inclination to give any weight to differing degrees of governmental compulsion so long as it seems that the state action is likely to compromise conscientious beliefs or influence the freedom of religious choice. Thus, a state requirement that people who wish to become notaries public must declare their belief in God does not as forcefully compel the forsaking or influencing of conscientious beliefs as would be the case if the state prosecuted those who refused to declare their belief; nor does the imposition of a license tax on religious colporteurs compel them as strongly as would a penal provision. But since "the loss of opportunity to obtain private employment... may be sufficient to persuade at least some uncommitted persons to adopt a religion," the Court did not hesitate in *Torcaso v. Watkins* to strike down the required notaries' declaration by a unanimous vote; the license tax was held invalid in *Murdock v. Pennsylvania* because it "tends to suppress" religious practices.

Induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure. 173. *Id.* at 463.

174.

In the domain of these indispensable liberties [under the first amendment], the decisions of this Court recognize that abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action... The governmental action challenged may appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties. *Id.* at 461.

175. *Id.* at 463. (Emphasis added.) This same analysis is implicit in the decision holding an ordinance that forbade the distribution of anonymous handbills unconstitutional on the ground that it tended to restrict freedoms protected by the first amendment. *Talley v. California*, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). See generally Rosenfield, *Separation of Church and State in the Public Schools*, 22 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 561, 582-84 (1961).

176. See cases cited notes 177-80 infra.


180. 319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943).
It would seem to be only a small step to hold, as state courts have done,\textsuperscript{181} that when the state engages in a solely religious activity, its action is constitutionally barred if it inherently produces social compulsion to abandon religious convictions.

Before moving on, it should be noted that the constitutional significance of coercion in the area of church-state problems has not escaped attention. Thus, in evaluating several governmental programs that must be fairly characterized as solely religious, Professor Paul Kauper has relied on the absence of any sort of coercion to sustain their constitutionality.\textsuperscript{182} On the other hand, he condemns the appropriation of public funds for church buildings or ministers' salaries since "the maintenance of churches is itself not a governmental function and since it coerces the conscience of nonbelieving taxpayers."\textsuperscript{3} Professor Robert Levy has concluded that "any program which operates to compel the young and impressionable to orient to religion should be unconstitutional."\textsuperscript{4}

3. Application in Engel v. Vitale

Thus, the way had been well paved for the Supreme Court specifically to restrict its 	extit{Regents' Prayer} decision to the compulsive effect on young children inherent in this solely religious activity by the state. Such a definite limitation would have clearly immuniz-


\textsuperscript{182}. In discussing the chaplains in both houses of Congress, Professor Kauper states that "this is a plain case of spending federal money for religious purposes." Kauper, \textit{supra} note 135, at 837. This seems clearly to indicate that he considers this a solely religious activity. He goes on to state that "it can hardly be considered a substantial use of public funds in aid of religion, and it is not seriously argued that anyone's conscience is coerced by this practice." \textit{Ibid.} The final point is clearly sound although it would not be similarly valid if the chaplains gave daily prayer recitations in the public schools. In raising the question of "substantial use of public funds," Professor Kauper seems to present this as an independent criterion for judging solely religious activities. If it is, as it may well be, one might effectively argue that an annual expenditure of $17,620, see 75 Stat. 320, 324 (1961), is hardly \textit{de minimis}, even when compared to the entire federal budget. See also text accompanying note 147 \textit{supra}.

As to released time programs, Professor Kauper concludes that it has not been demonstrated that they deprive anyone of any liberty. Kauper, \textit{supra} note 135, at 236. An attempted refutation of the conclusion may be found at notes 376-87 \textit{infra}.

\textsuperscript{183}. \textit{Ibid.} at 846. Here, again, the point made seems to be that this is a solely religious activity.

\textsuperscript{184}. Levy, \textit{Views from the Wall—Reflections on Church-State Separation}, 29 \textit{HENNEPIN LAW.} 51, 55 (1961). Examination of the context of this statement seems to indicate that Professor Levy was concerned only with those public school "programs" that are solely religious.
ed the Court from the position, taken in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, that government cannot "constitutionally finance a religious exercise . . . whatever form it takes." It would also have effectively distinguished the Regents' prayer situation from most "of the religious traditions of our people, reflected in countless practices of the institutions and officials of our government," cited by Mr. Justice Stewart in his lone dissent. However, although the language used by the Court appears to be quite comprehensive, it would be rash to conclude that Engel passed judgment on (or even hinted at) the long list of governmental activities disapproved by Mr. Justice Douglas or brought forward by Mr. Justice Stewart. The Court's statement that

187. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
188. Among the governmental programs and activities that Mr. Justice Douglas would seem to find unconstitutional are congressional and armed service chaplains, use of the Bible for the administration of oaths, "In God We Trust" on coins and currency, and opening prayers in legislative chambers and courts—including the Supreme Court. None of these would seem to produce the inherent pressures that arise from a solely religious activity in the public schools and, thus, are subject to separate consideration. Also included were activities having an independent primary secular goal, such as the availability of funds for parochial schools, G.I. Bill payments to denominational schools, and National School Lunch Act benefits to religious schools. In addition, Mr. Justice Douglas expressed his present disagreement with his vote with the majority in Everson (see text accompanying notes 28-29 supra), a case raising problems very different from those presented by the Regents' prayer. See text accompanying notes 21-49 supra. The evil ingredient that he found to be common to all of these governmental activities was that they "insert a divisive influence into our communities." 370 U.S. at 442, 443. For criticism of this standard, see text accompanying notes 362-65 infra.

Mr. Justice Douglas found "no element of compulsion" in the case. 370 U.S. at 438. He stated that there was no more inherent coercion here than there was in the prayers that open sessions of Congress and the Court. Id. at 442. This seems to ignore the pertinence of the public school setting and the maturity of the participants. See text accompanying notes 87-107 supra.

189. In addition to a number of the matters referred to by Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Stewart listed such things as presidential inaugural statements asking the protection and help of God and presidential proclamations of a National Day of Prayer. Neither of these produce effects that are realistically comparable to the social pressures produced in the public school atmosphere. Whether or not constitutional, they must be considered apart from the Regents' prayer.

Mr. Justice Stewart decided that the case was "entirely free of any compulsion . . . including any 'embarrassments and pressures,'" because "the state courts have made clear that those who object to reciting the prayer must be" free of these things. 370 U.S. at 445. (Emphasis added.) But no mandate of any court can free this solely religious activity from its concomitant inherent pressures.
"the Establishment Clause . . . does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion" is entirely consistent with the rationale that the establishment clause is violated by certain laws that produce inherent, albeit indirect and nongovernmental, compulsion. So is the Court’s pronouncement that the establishment clause “is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.” Those “laws which establish an official religion” might well be interpreted to mean those laws having no independent primary secular purpose or effect, and the entire pronouncement might not have been intended to deal with those “solely religious laws” that operate neither directly nor indirectly to coerce nonobserving persons. In any case, since the governmental program in issue in Engel did operate indirectly to compel dissenters, the decision should not, and may not, be read for the proposition that the establishment clause bars all solely religious programs by government.

Close examination of the positions taken by the two amici curiae also indicates that they perhaps meant less than would initially appear. To illustrate the thesis that the establishment clause is violated whenever government undertakes or sponsors a religious program, the argument was made that “the holding of a Mass in a public school during the regular day would violate the Establishment Clause even though all non-Catholic pupils were permitted or required to absent themselves.” This would be unconstitutional, but not simply for the reason that the state was “sponsoring [a] religious program”; an establishment clause violation would occur because the minority dissenters would be under the same social pressures from the Catholic majority as the dissenters were in Engel. Remove the coercive effect of the public school at-
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mosphere and have the Mass held in the public school on Sunday, and a significantly different question is presented. Further, these amici's thesis was documented by citing McCollum, as was the proposition advanced by the other amici that the first amendment's ban on establishment would be violated by state "participation in religious affairs." The sound basis for McCollum, however, is the presence of inherent compulsion.

C. DISTINGUISHING THE INDISTINGUISHABLE

Acceptance of the proposed constitutional standard not only effectively circumscribes the Engel decision, but also provides a ready means for distinguishing between situations heretofore found by some to be indistinguishable. For example, Mr. Justice Jackson, seconded by several commentators, charged that McCollum's program of this sort would only be instituted if there were a Catholic majority. Cf. Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 695, 166 N.W. 202, 203 (1918); Williams v. Board of Trustees, 172 Ky. 133, 364 Mo. 121, 129-31, 260 S.W.2d 573, 576-78 (1953). If for some reason this were not the case, the result should be the same because of the program's influence on Roman Catholic students who would not attend Mass otherwise, see text accompanying notes 221, 439-53 infra, and because of the influence on free religious choice generated by the public school sponsorship of such an activity. See text accompanying notes 244-46 infra.

196. See text accompanying notes 129-47 supra.
199. It must be noted, however, that the Pfeffer brief argued that if the state's "conduct is religious, then it is outside the competence and jurisdiction of the State or its instrumentalities, and even if participation were not compulsory, the conduct would be unconstitutional." Id. at 17. The scope of this standard is not clear. From the context, it would not seem to apply only to the state's undertaking solely religious activities in the public schools and granting dissenters the right of nonparticipation; it seems to say that all solely religious activities by the state are barred. This is a matter that was clearly not in issue in Engel, and such a thesis is clearly unworkable and unacceptable. See text accompanying notes 140-44 supra. Even if this standard is meant to apply only to those governmental activities that require participation (the context of the statement does lend credence to this), query if these can be found to violate the establishment clause if it can be shown that they are neither inherently compulsory (as only mature adults may be involved) nor involve a substantial use of public funds. See note 182 supra. It is difficult to differentiate such a case from "In God We Trust" on coins and currency.
ban from the public schools of the solely religious activity of released time, *a fortiori*, determined the question of whether the state was permitted to bar the solely religious activities of some people in the public streets and parks. The theory was that since *McCollum* forbade the use of tax-supported school property by any and all sects for the propagation of religion, it was patently anomalous for the Court to hold, as it did, that the state was compelled to permit the nondiscriminate use of tax-supported street and park property for that same purpose. It is not difficult to combat this analysis. The effect of the activity in *McCollum* was to coerce those who were either unwilling to participate or uninterested in doing so. This evil—a significant constitutional ingredient—is not present when the public streets or parks are used for religious purposes. No citizen who declines to participate is in any way compelled to do so, and therefore, no person’s religious liberty is impaired.

One writer has stated that he is at a loss to determine “why it is constitutional for a public institution to purchase a sectarian book [such as the Gideon Bible], but not to enable its pupils to read such books as gifts . . . .” The explanation is the same.

While no one has ever argued that dissenters are compelled to desert their religious convictions because public school libraries contain sectarian literature, there has been expert testimony that public school sponsorship of the distribution of Bibles creates coercive pressures to do so.

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202. See cases cited note 200 supra.

203. Professor Corwin put it this way:

> The discrepancy between the two holdings is apparent. In one [*McCollum*] it is held that a school board may not constitutionally permit religious groups to use on an equal footing any part of a school building for the purpose of religious instruction to *those who wish to receive it*. By the other [*Saia*] the public authorities are under a constitutional obligation to turn over public parks for religious propaganda to be hurled at all and sundry whether they wish to receive it or not. The Court seems to cherish a strange tenderness for *outré* religious manifestations which contrasts sharply with its attitude toward organized religion.

Corwin, supra note 201, at 8.


205. Another reason for distinguishing these situations might be that the state has a secular educational aim in placing Bibles in public school libraries—to make this literature available for academic investigation. See text accompanying notes 333–37 infra. No such secular purpose is found in sponsoring Bible distribution. The goal of the Gideons International is to “win men and women for the Lord Jesus Christ.” Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 33, 100 A.2d 857, 858 (1953).

206. Id. at 50, 100 A.2d at 867. See notes 501–09 infra and accompanying text.
In upholding the New York released time plan in Zorach v. Clauson, the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Douglas, implied that such solely religious activity is equivalent to "prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; [and] the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday..." Several state courts have sustained public school Bible reading on similar bases. Because of the presence of inherent coercion, it seems that Zorach was incorrectly decided and that daily Bible reading in the public schools is also unconstitutional. Whether or not the other activities referred to are constitutionally valid, it is fairly clear that they are not inherently coercive, and therefore, they should not control the disposition of Bible reading and released time.

Relying on the governmental activities referred to by Mr. Justice Douglas, the House Committee on the Judiciary made the same faulty analogy when it stated that the inclusion of the words "under God" in the pledge of allegiance to the flag did not run afoul of the establishment clause. Immature dissenters from the amended flag pledge will surely be subject to the same coercive pressures in the public school as were the children in Engel. Because of this, whether the amended pledge to the flag will withstand attack should turn on whether it may be fairly characterized as a solely religious activity.

In a recent comprehensive article dealing with religion in the public schools, one writer has urged that "the Constitution directs the public school to be a completely secular agency" and that it "proscribes the use of public school funds, facilities, personnel, time, sponsorship, auspices, or authority for religious instruction, practice, or ritual, or for any other religious or religiously-oriented purpose, direct or indirect." Under this standard, not only were prayers, Bible reading, and released time found to be unconstitutional, but so also was the objective or academic study of religion. "On the other hand, where information or ideas about religion are intrinsic to the subjects in the school's normal secular

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208. E.g., Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, ---, 179 A.2d 698, 702 (1962); Church v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 7, 109 S.W. 115, 118 (1908).
209. See text accompanying notes 397-403 infra.
212. For discussion of this question, see text accompanying notes 536-41 infra.
214. Id. at 571-78. "Teaching religious doctrine, under any heading, is forbidden." Id. at 578.
curriculum, such as history, art, literature, etc., they should be presented factually and objectively." Why a single course in comparative religion makes the school less of a "secular agency" than does the infiltration of religious matter into every other course in the curriculum is unclear. Why the one, and not the other, indirectly instructs in religion is also a mystery. The source of the difficulty seems to be the generality of the standard and the resulting perplexity in its application. Not so, hopefully, with the constitutional standard proposed here.

Finally, it should be noted that use of this suggested standard would even seem to satisfy those, at least for the time being, who contend that since the language of the fourteenth amendment bars only the denial of liberty, "so far as the fourteenth amendment is concerned, states are entirely free to establish religions, provided that they do not deprive anybody of religious liberty."

D. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES CARRIED ON WITHOUT OBJECTION

The seemingly broad standard suggested in *Engel*, as well as the rather sweeping criteria advocated by amici curiae in that case, may be read as stating that any governmental program that is solely religious violates the establishment clause. Under such a reading, there is no question as to the unconstitutionality of such a program, even when no one objects to it. However, since the constitutional principle of the proposed constitutional standard is grounded in the sanctity of the religious and conscientious scruples of public school children, a question does arise as to the extent of its application to a situation in which the public school engages in a solely religious practice and there is no opposition by the attending school children or their parents.

In the two cases in which the Supreme Court has found a practice of this sort to be contrary to the establishment clause, there were conscientious dissenters who instituted the litigation. Thus, if the rationale of these two cases is to be explained on the basis of the proposed constitutional standard, the decisions must be narrowly read to hold no more than that the establishment clause

215. Ibid.
216. For discussion of the application of the proposed standard to the various religious aspects in the public schools, see text accompanying notes 229-566 infra.
217. Corwin, *supra* note 201, at 19. See also note 8 *supra*. It is interesting to theorize whether the establishment of an approved church by a state could be considered an infringement of religious liberty. See text accompanying note 183 *supra*.
is violated when a public school engages in a solely religious practice that is objected to by nonconforming students in attendance; if there are no dissenters, the practice may be valid even if, by its nature, it will likely result in compromising of religious beliefs or influencing of the students' freedom of conscientious choice. Furthermore, it may be argued that under prevailing standing requirements, only the parents of a student whose religious beliefs would preclude participation in the school program could be permitted to challenge its constitutionality. 219

However, the rationale that underlies the proposed constitutional standard calls for rejection of the above conclusions. Despite the fact that the privilege of nonparticipation is extended to religious nonconformists, the societal pressures on children to take part in state-sponsored religious activities often result in their choosing to do so in preference to suffering embarrassment among their peers. This being the fact, if the constitutionality of solely religious activities turns on whether opposition is voiced, these programs most often will be carried on without objection despite the fact that there are nonconformist pupils whose conscientious scruples are being compromised. 220 Even if all the pupils are nominally members of the same religious sect, very likely solely religious programs of that sect conducted in the public schools will result, due to the inherent coercive pressures, in those students with marginal religious convictions being influenced in their freedom of religious choice. 221 Because of these same social pressures, the results of inquiries made by public school officials or parent groups to determine whether all students would be willing to participate in a public school religious activity will probably not reflect the true feelings of those polled. 222 Parents who are

219. See text accompanying notes 154–63 supra.
221. Hypothetically, if all of the students of a public school are of the Roman Catholic faith and it is therefore decided to have a daily Mass in the school with attendance being voluntary, the inherent pressures on those non-churchgoing Roman Catholic children to attend this Mass might well be greater than are the pressures on children of minority faiths to take part in majority religious activities.
222. For a decision stating that the unanimous consent of all parents could not save the ceding of public school control to church authorities, see Williams v. Board of Trustees, 173 Ky. 708, 726, 191 S.W. 507, 514 (1917). For a similar case in which the complainant appeared originally to have given his acquiescence, see Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 700, 166 N.W. 202, 205 (1918).
religious dissenters usually refuse to instruct their children to decline to participate because of the fear of their children being subjected to ridicule. Many hesitate to institute litigation because of this and because of "the prospect of disrupted community life, with perhaps devastating consequences to the minority groups themselves, that would result from arbitrary interference with deep-seated community customs." The upshot of all of this would be that those values cherished in our society, which are at the foundation of the standard set forth in this article, would be emasculated by the rule that only those public school religious programs that are in fact objected to by attending students or their parents are unconstitutional. Prophylactic treatment is necessary. The law should be that those solely religious practices in the public schools that are likely to influence free religious choice or to compromise conscientiously held beliefs are per se unconstitutional.

Empirical studies in the church-state field have shown that judicial determinations of unconstitutionality do not substantially deter communities from engaging in patently invalid practices. Thus, the burden of policing falls upon the courts and ultimately upon those willing to risk the time, expense, and hazards, of litigation. If only those parents of attending children who conscientiously oppose public school religious actions were to have standing to attack them, many of these programs would go unchallenged despite the fact that the very values that are afforded the protection of the first amendment are being submerged. The "right" protected in these instances—the "right" to be free from social

223. [T]he children's father testified that after careful consideration he had decided that he should not have [the children] excused from attendance at these morning ceremonies. Among his reasons were the following. He said that he thought his children would be "labelled as 'odd balls'" before their teachers and classmates every school day; that children . . . . were liable "to lump all particular religious difference[s] or religious objections [together] as 'atheism'" and that today the word "atheism" is often connected with "atheistic communism", and has "very bad" connotations, such as "un-American" or "pro-Red", with overtones of possible immorality.


pressures to conform to the majority's religious practices that are
governmentally sponsored—depends upon anonymity for its ef-
fective vindication. To require that it be claimed by those affected
themselves would result in substantial nullification of the “right”
at the very moment of its assertion. It would therefore be ap-
propriate here for the Court to fashion an exception to the general
requirement of standing because of the weighty countervailing
policy of adequately securing these “rights.”

III. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD

As has been observed by another proponent of a constitutional
standard for church-state controversies, “the genius of ... Ameri-
can constitutional law [is] that its growth and principles are measur-

226. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459
(1958).

questions of upon whom standing should be conferred and how this may
be accomplished doctrinally is beyond the scope of this article. The Supreme
Court has permitted litigants to assert the constitutional rights of others,
but none of the decided cases appear to be wholly satisfactory in solving
the problem at hand. Professor Kenneth Davis has pointed out that this
permission has been, and should be, granted much more liberally once the
litigant has properly commenced a proceeding to vindicate his own rights.
3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.07 (1958). This doctrine
is not very helpful here. Other cases may be explained on the basis of the
fact that the litigant will suffer direct economic injury as a result of the
These, too, are not very useful.

However, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),
the Court permitted an association to act as the representative of its members
in asserting their rights. Similar to the problem at hand, the rights of the
NAACP members would have been nullified if the individuals themselves
would have been required to assert them. By analogy, perhaps associations
composed of religious dissenters may initiate proceedings. Perhaps it may
also be said that such an association “is but the medium through which
its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their
own views.” 357 U.S. at 459. But NAACP v. Alabama also stressed the
fact, not likely to be present in the case at hand, that there was “reasonable
likelihood that the Association itself through diminished financial support
and membership may be adversely affected” by the governmental action.
Id. at 459–60.

Furthermore, the membership of many associations of minority religious
groups is well known. In such instances, an action by the association will
redound to the members, thus causing the members to discourage associa-
tion action for the reasons discussed previously. Granting standing to the
parent of any attending child, irrespective of religious conviction, on the
ground that to force the parent to assert prejudice will expose the child
to opprobrium would also probably be inadequate. Parents would realize
that whether or not they were in fact religious dissenters, they would be
so publicly regarded. It would seem that full protection can be afforded
only by a more relaxed standing criterion. But see Sutherland, Establishment
ed in terms of concrete factual situations . . . ."\(^{228}\) Thus, it would be helpful to examine some of the many actual instances of religious intrusion into the public schools, and to determine their constitutional validity when measured by the proposed constitutional standard.

A. PRAYERS

The prayer at issue in *Engel v. Vitale*, neutral and inoffensive as it was,\(^ {229} \) would fail the proposed constitutional test on several counts. Its purpose and effect was admittedly solely religious. The context in which it was delivered was inherently coercive. Due to its theistic basis, it would likely infringe on the conscientious beliefs of some members of the heterogeneous school population.

However, it need not logically follow that every public school prayer would similarly fail. First, if it were possible to devise a prayer against which no one could raise any conscientious objection, it could not be said that its recitation would result in the compromising or influencing of anyone's religious beliefs or choice. Such a prayer would therefore be free from constitutional attack under the proposed standard. Although projects have been undertaken to attempt to satisfy this requirement,\(^ {230} \) the obstacles appear to be insurmountable. Certainly, the Regents' prayer having been rejected, any prayer that invokes the aid or blessing of the Deity runs afoul of this test. Not only would such a prayer


\(^{229}\) Compare the daily prayer offered by teachers in *Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist.*, 120 Ky. 608, 614-15, 87 S.W. 792, 793 (1905):

> Our Father who art in Heaven, we ask Thy aid in our day's work. Be with us in all we do and say. Give us wisdom and strength and patience to teach these children as they should be taught. May teacher and pupil have mutual love and respect. Watch over these children, both in schoolroom and on the playground. Keep them from being hurt in any way, and at last, when we come to die, may none of our number be missing around Thy Throne. These things we ask for Christ's sake. Amen.

This prayer was found not to be "sectarian," and therefore outside the state constitution's prohibition. Whether or not one agrees with the Kentucky court's definition of "sectarian," there is no question that this prayer is a "religious" exercise under the establishment clause. If recited in the same setting as the Regents' prayer, it would be invalid, under *Engel* or the proposed constitutional standard, even if the reference to Christ were omitted.

cause conscientious objections to be raised by atheists, agnostics, and humanists, but it also appears that at least one of the three chief faiths would have religious objections. It has been shown that when many of the attempts to distill a "common core" or nonsectarian religion are scrutinized, the product "comes to mean the common core of orthodox Protestant belief, and . . . what a substantial majority—not of all, but of the believing—agree upon." Furthermore, theologians and educators have pointed out that aside from the fact that the task is extraordinarily difficult, even if it were possible, the result would probably be the reduction of theology to triviality and the creation of a public school sect that would be objectionable to all religious faiths. Moreover, it is likely that some people would conscientiously resist participation in any public supplication, regardless of its content.

Second, if it were possible to find that the prayer recitation had some independent primary secular purpose, it then could not be characterized as a solely religious activity and would thus avoid this requisite for unconstitutionality. Several endeavors of this nature have already been found wanting. The assertion that the prayer's purpose would be "to prepare the children for their work, to quiet them from the outside," should probably also

233. Jews believe . . . that when a faith in God is taught, it must be achieved in the context of historical associations accompanied by religious rites and symbols that are related to that particular religious group. . . . We do not appreciate the vague and undefined God to which the "American religion" offers lip service. We do not want our children to think of God only in abstract terms, nor in Christian terms. . . . This is a task, therefore, only for the home, synagogue or church.
234. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 308 (1953). See also Comm. on Religion and Education, Am. Council on Education, Religion in Public Education, 42 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 129, 161 (1947), which stated that permitting instruction in a common core religion "would be, at best, to assume that the support of an overwhelming majority of the people justified overriding the convictions of a minority."
237. See text accompanying notes 32–42 supra.
fail, either because of disingenousness, or because it would seem that if the prayer did produce placidity, it would be due originally to its religious effect.

Third, if the circumstances under which the prayer were to be recited could be so molded as to remove the likelihood that there would be infringement or influencing of any student's religious or conscientious principles, it would be free from challenge despite its solely religious nature. One suggestion toward this end has been that only one student each day be invited to read the prayer while the others simply remain silent. The difficulty with this is that the same social compulsion that operates on students to participate in group recitation would seem to operate here to force a dissenter to take his turn at reading before the class. Even if only the teacher were to recite the prayer, with the students simply listening in silence, the result should probably be the same. It is likely that the conscientious scruples of some students would forbid even this quantum of "participation" in what is clearly a devotional exercise. Therefore, they would be inherently compelled to compromise their scruples. Furthermore, it is most reasonable to believe that the reading of a prayer, each and every day, "buttressed with the authority of the State and, more importantly to children, backed with the authority of their teachers, can hardly do less than inculcate or promote the inculcation of various religious doctrines in childish minds."

Educators have

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239. The proponent of this justification herself conceded that the prayer recitation "was religious to the children that are religious, and to the others it was not." Billard v. Board of Educ., 69 Kan. 53, 58, 76 Pac. 422, 423 (1904). The court, in sustaining the practice did not do so on the ground that the prayer recitation was not a religious activity. Rather, it found that the exercises "were not a form of religious worship or the teaching of sectarian or religious doctrine" as forbidden by the state constitution. Ibid.

240. If the mere recitation of any reading would accomplish the teacher's goal, then, as indicated in the text, the practice may not be characterized as a solely religious activity and it is not, for that reason, violative of the establishment clause. However, the establishment clause may be violated for another reason. Although the practice would have the immediate secular end of maintaining order, it would also have the immediate effect of promoting religion. Since, by virtue of the above analysis that saves this practice from being a solely religious activity, the secular end obviously could be just as well attained by means that do not promote religion (e.g., recitation of one of Shakespeare's sonnets), the selection of a reading that furthers religion should be unconstitutional. Accord, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466-67 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).


242. This has occurred. See text accompanying note 106 supra.


244. Id. at 404. Cf. The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of
expressed the opinion that even a single instance of school approbation of certain religious principles might have this effect.\textsuperscript{245} Surely, the daily repetition of devotional exercises will likely result in instilling religious values, thereby affecting the immature students' freedom of conscientious choice.\textsuperscript{246} Many students will be influenced to engage more actively in religious endeavors, and the effect of this practice might be to cause pupils of dissenting religious faiths to compromise their scruples.

Several other suggestions merit consideration. One has been "to have each school day commence with a quiet moment that would still the tumult of the playground and start a day of study."\textsuperscript{247} Since each student could utilize this moment of silence for any purpose he saw fit, the activity may not be fairly characterized as solely religious, and since no student would really know the subject of his classmates' reflections, no one could in any way be compelled to alter his thoughts. However, the proposal of recitation of the words of a song that invoke or make other hallowed references to the Deity as a replacement for a traditional prayer\textsuperscript{248} falls into a different category. Even if the singing of such a song in the public schools were wholly unobjectionable,\textsuperscript{249} the recitation of its words as a devotional exercise transforms its entire complexion. This is clearly no more than the designation of an official prayer, irrespective of by whom it is done, and it is invalid for reasons previously mentioned.\textsuperscript{250}


The child who, for example, is compelled to attend a segregated school may be able to cope with ordinary expressions of prejudice by regarding the prejudiced person as evil or misguided; but he cannot readily cope with symbols of authority, the full force of the authority of the State—the school or the school board, in this instance—in the same manner.


\textsuperscript{246} \textit{Cf.} Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 244 P.2d 520 (1952), in which the court permitted occasional public school religious activities, but held invalid the continuous availability of religious pamphlets.


\textsuperscript{248} See \textit{N.Y. Times}, July 29, 1962, § 1, p. 36, col. 4; \textit{id.}, Aug. 10, 1962, § 1, p. 21, col. 1; \textit{id.}, Aug. 30, 1962, § 1, p. 18, col. 3.

\textsuperscript{249} See text accompanying notes 541–44 \textit{infra}.

\textsuperscript{250} See text accompanying notes 62–66 \textit{supra}.
B. Bible Reading

Past and present, one of the most prevalent solely religious practices carried on in the public schools has been Bible reading. Its legality and constitutionality have evoked a glut of litigation in the state courts and a surfeit of writing by legal and lay commentators. The Supreme Court has managed to elude the problem in the past, but appears finally to be compelled to adjudicate it on the merits. By any reasonable test, this practice should be unconstitutional.

The prime reason advanced by many state courts for sustaining the practice is that since the Bible is a nonsectarian document, no single religious sect benefits from its use. This factor is crucial under many state constitutional provisions that prohibit “sectarian” teaching in the public schools. However, it is irrelevant as far as the first amendment is concerned since, under the Everson dictum, “state action violates the ban . . . if it aids all religions on a nonpreferential basis.” Under the proposed constitutional standard, the question of whether the Bible is sectarian is likewise inconsequential. This solely religious practice would be invalid so long as it is likely to cause any student, even if he belongs to no religious sect, to have his conscientious convictions influenced or compromised.

However, it should be made plain that no version of the Bible may be fairly characterized as nonsectarian, even in the sense that none of the major religious faiths find it unobjectionable. The earliest challenges to Bible reading in the American public schools were leveled by members of the Roman Catholic faith, who con-

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251. A recent survey estimates that 42% of American public schools have daily Bible reading. Geographically, the breakdown is: East—68%; South—77%; Midwest—18%; West—11%. Dierenfield, The Extent of Religious Influence in American Public Schools, 56 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 173, 176 (1961).


253. See note 3 supra. The Court had little choice but to hear the Schempp case since it was appealable as a matter of right under § 1253 of the Judicial Code, and the three-judge court below had found that public school Bible reading was contrary to the establishment clause.

254. See text accompanying notes 60–64 supra.

255. See e.g., People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927); Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. (o.s.) 417 (Mass. Police Ct. 1859); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890).

256. See cases cited in note 255 supra; PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 387 (1953).

257. Id. at 391.

258. For examples, see text accompanying notes 105–07 supra.
scientiously objected to the use of the King James version. Although there has been some indication that this position is in a state of flux, recent litigation has again been undertaken by Catholic parents. Unitarians, members of the Jewish faith, Buddhists, and atheists have all asserted in the courts that public school Bible reading offends their religious and conscientious beliefs. Universalists and some Lutherans and Baptists also oppose the activity.

A number of state courts, although a minority, have recognized the fact that no version of the Bible is acceptable to everyone. Theologians of all faiths encounter no difficulty in arriving at this conclusion. The Roman Catholic religion finds only the Douay version of the Bible acceptable, despite an assertion to the contrary, "a Catholic child commits a grave sin if he knowingly owns or reads from the Protestant version of the Bible." Very recently, Catholic parents protested a New Jersey community's requirement that their children listen to readings from a King James Bible. The Roman Catholic position has


260. See Reed, Another Tradition at Stake, Catholic Action, Feb., 1950, p. 4.


266. 2 Stokes, Church and State in the United States 571 (1950).


272. Pfeffer & Baum, Public School Sectarianism and the Jewish Child 31 (American Jewish Congress, May, 1957). Roman Catholics "are forbidden... to listen to any version of [the Bible] unauthorized by the
been that the King James version is filled with error and false explanations and is used "as an instrument of proselytism." 273

The Protestant stand regarding the Douay translation of the Bible is similar in many respects to the Roman Catholic feeling about the King James version. 274

The Jewish faith finds the New Testament, whether it be the Douay or King James version, incompatible with Hebrew teachings. 275 Of course, nonbelievers find the dogmatism of every version of the Bible as an imposition on their conscientious scruples. 276 Nonetheless, the argument has been made that the Old Testament is generally immune from objection. 277 Even discounting those minor religious groups that "in this country . . . are numerically small and, in point of impact upon our national life, negligible," 278 this argument is far from being accurate. Unitarians have testified that much of the Old Testament's content is contrary to their faith. 279 A Jewish theologian has pointed out that there were specific instances in which the King James Old Testament had been


[T]he translators' dedicatory preface [to the King James version] states that the purpose of the translation was to give 'such a blow unto that Man of Sin (the Pope) as will not be healed [and] to make God's holy truth to be yet more and more known to the people whom they ("Papist persons at home or abroad") desire still to be kept in ignorance.


275. See Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 154-55, 214 N.W. 18, 22-23 (1927) (dissenting opinion); Comment, 43 ILL. L. REV. 374, 382 (1948); 27 TEXAS L. REV. 256, 258 (1948).

276. See Comment, 43 ILL. L. REV. 374, 382 (1948).


278. Id. at 449, 75 A.2d at 887.

279. In content, the father objected to material in the Old Testament regarding blood sacrifices, uncleanness, and leprosy, together with the whole concept of the Old Testament God which was contrary to the concept of deity which he endeavored to instill in his children. He testified that he did not want his children to acquire an image of Jehovah, the God of vengeance. He pointed out that in the very midst of the Ten Commandments was a verse asserting that God would visit the sins of the father upon the fourth generation . . . and the witness went on to assert that this concept of God was in sharp contrast with the God of his own church . . . .

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imbued with a Christological significance.280 Clearly, there is no "English text of the Old Testament accepted fully by the several faiths."281

Recognizing this inherent weakness of any complete version of the Bible, it has been suggested that the defect may be remedied by selecting those portions in any version that are in no way religious, but contain only moral principles that are common to all men.282 If this could be done, the practice would be valid under the proposed standard. Not only could it not be fairly characterized as solely religious, but no one's conscientious beliefs could possibly be affected. The difficulty is that those who have advocated this course have concluded, somewhat contradictorily, that there is no one competent to select these portions.283 Even if it be assumed that such Biblical passages may exist, until there is at least a general consensus as to which ones they are, the establishment clause should forbid any individual or group from choosing some and causing them to be read in the public schools. If this were permitted, for reasons previously advanced,284 it is very likely that infractions of religious liberty would occur and go unredressed.

Other attempts have been made to justify the constitutionality of public school Bible reading. They also fail on examination. Several state courts have excused the practice on the ground that dissenters are afforded the right of nonparticipation.285 The inadequacy and fictitiousness of this position have already been labored.286 Others have attempted to validate the practice because

280. Dr. Solomon Grayzel, cited id. at p. 10.


283. Ibid. See also Comment, 43 ILL. L. REV. 374, 382 (1948): "However carefully selections for reading may be chosen it is inevitable that some students will be forced to listen to portions which they cannot accept."

284. See text accompanying notes 219–24 supra.


286. The consistency of holding, on the one hand, that the Bible is nonsectarian and then holding, on the other hand, that it is saved from religious liberty objection because of the right of nonparticipation has long been questioned. See People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 351, 92 N.E. 251, 256 (1910); Note, 3 RUTGERS L. REV. 115, 125 (1949).
it does not transform the public school into a "place of worship." While this contention may satisfy some state constitutional prerequisites, it has no bearing vis-a-vis the establishment clause.

A provision that the reading of the Bible be done without comment has often been submitted as a sustaining feature. This argument ignores the fact that to some sects, "the reading in public of any portion of any version of the Scriptures unaccompanied by authoritative comment or explanation, or the reading of it privately by persons not commissioned by the church to do so, is objectionable, and an offense to their religious feelings . . . ."

In addition, since other readings in the curriculum are subjected to critical comment and scrutiny, there is reasonable likelihood that the practice of reading the Bible without discerning comment "will tend to the acceptance by those pupils of the statements in the selections as true." Finally, the daily repetition of this activity, in some schools for a substantial segment of time, under the sponsorship of school and teacher will surely have its effect even if done without comment. These points also dilemma would be solved only if Bible reading could be characterized as a secular activity. See text accompanying notes 117-25 supra. It is clear that this may not be done.


290. Pfeiffer v. Board of Educ., 118 Mich. 560, 578, 77 N.W. 250, 257 (1898) (dissenting opinion). Of interest also is the following statement in State *ex rel.* Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 194-95, 44 N.W. 967, 973 (1890):

>A most forcible demonstration . . . is found in certain reports of the American Bible Society of its work in Catholic countries . . . in which instances are given of the conversion of several persons from 'Romanism' through the reading of the scriptures alone; that is to say, the reading of the Protestant or King James version of the Bible converted Catholics to Protestants without the aid of comment or exposition.

291. In Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21, 31 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1962), the court noted that Bible reading consumed from three to five minutes each day.


293. Notice again the inconsistency between finding the Bible to be nonsectarian and, at the same time, finding no infringement of religious liberty only because it is read without comment. See note 286 supra; Note, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 611 (1960).
overcome the defenses occasionally asserted that the mere reading of the Bible denotes no implication as to the truth or falsity of the subject matter and that merely listening to it compels no student to believe in what he has heard.294

1. Teaching of Moral Values

The argument is frequently made that Bible reading, religious study, and other devotional exercises in the public schools are indispensable to teaching students moral values and qualities, and that this is a vital function of our public schools in teaching good citizenship and in combating "Godless Communism."295 If this means that the only available method for inculcating students with these values is first to imbue them with religious ideals, then regardless of how important this may be, the establishment clause should forbid the training.296

However, the prospects for the public schools' producing good citizens are not quite so bleak. There is ample evidence that religion in general education is unnecessary to produce better child behavior;297 moral values may be very effectively taught without the aid of religion.298 "However we [citizens of the American democracy] may disagree on religious creeds, we can agree on moral and spiritual values."299 Educators and philosophers have shown300 that such universally accepted values as justice, property rights, respect for law and authority, and brotherhood301 may be derived from nonreligious sources302 and may be enforced

294. E.g., Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 399 (1854). See also Spiller v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 12 Allen 127 (Mass. 1866).
296. See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
299. Id. at 33.
300. Id. at 37-45.
302. "After all, if Aristotle, 350 years before the advent of Christianity, could write a rather comprehensive and enduring work on ethics, I do not see why it should be so difficult for modern American secularists of good will to do likewise." Address by F. E. Flynn, Professor of Philosophy, Col-
by nonreligious sanctions. In fact, there is persuasive authority for the view that moral values are better learned through concrete examples during the school day than through lessons that preach them.

Other generally recognized values, "in the sense that they are common to all segments of our society, irrespective of religious faith or philosophic school," are "responsibility, honesty, temperance, and self-control." Thus, while the Illinois legislature demands that "every public school teacher shall teach the pupils honesty, kindness, justice and moral courage for the purpose of lessening crime and raising the standard of good citizenship," it recognizes that this aim may be accomplished on a neutral basis by making clear that the statute "shall not be construed as requiring religious or sectarian teaching." Similarly, New York prescribes courses in "patriotism and citizenship," but implies that this goal may be attained by "instruction in the history, meaning, significance and effect of the provisions of the constitution of the United States, [and of the state of New York], the amendments thereto, [and] the declaration of independence." Surely it may. While teachers should educate their students about the fact that most of our citizens believe that there are various religious sources and sanctions for our moral values, they can successfully instill commonly cherished values without engaging in religious indoctrination.

Although one writer, in his intellectual struggle to validate Bible reading, went so far as to concede that the machinations

303. "[T]he [ancient] Greeks are an excellent illustration of a people whose principles of conduct were independent of religious sanction . . . . Buddhism is primarily, if not entirely, a system of ethics; one of conduct, without the inducements of rewards and punishments characteristic of Western religions." THAYER, THE ATTACK UPON THE AMERICAN SECULAR SCHOOL 205–06 (1951). See also THAYER, THE CHALLENGE OF THE PRESENT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION 14–16 (1958).

304. See EDUCATIONAL POLICIES COMM'N, op. cit. supra note 298, at 60–70; HARTFORD, MORAL VALUES IN PUBLIC EDUCATION passim (1958); THAYER, THE ATTACK UPON THE AMERICAN SECULAR SCHOOL 212–18 (1951).

305. Id. at 210.

306. Ibid.


309. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 801.

of his proposal were "contrary to reason," all others seem to have recognized that there are some religious objections to every version of the Bible. When it is read as part of a devotional exercise, the activity must be fairly characterized as solely religious. While teachers no longer beat dissenting students, the fact is that there is an inherent compulsion to participate, and therefore, conscientious scruples are influenced and compromised. The practice should be held to violate the establishment clause.

2. Academic Study of Religion

One last area of discussion concerning the place of the Bible in the public schools must be considered. The suggestion has frequently been made that the Bible (and religion generally) is a vital educational tool. If this means "that the highest duty of those who are charged with the responsibility of training the young people . . . in the public schools is in teaching both by precept and example that in the conflicts of life they should not forget God," then it must be rejected under any reasonable standard. Aside from the fact that this is educationally unacceptable, the Court has made clear that the establishment clause forbids governmental indoctrination of religious beliefs and public school religious instruction.

Under the proposed constitutional standard, this effort to inculcate religious beliefs would unquestionably be a solely religious activity likely to influence and compromise the students' freedom of conscientious choice. However, it is totally inaccurate to conclude, as many have done, that this rejection "sanctions [the public schools'] utilization for the purposes of atheists." This would be correct only if the public schools were

311. Harpster, supra note 268, at 46.
313. See Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698, 708 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
315. Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 681, 288 S.W.2d 718, 725 (1956). See also Church v. Bullock, 100 S.W. 1025, 1027 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907): "It may be said that said exercises tended to teach that there was an Almighty God; but this cannot be held objectionable . . . ."
either constitutionally permitted or forced to teach that there is no God. Obviously, the first amendment forbids this just as much as it forbids exhortations to the contrary. The result, therefore, is one of true neutrality.

It is also error to deduce that this rejection demands "that the child has a 'legal duty' to put all this time in on secular subjects, none on religious subjects";\textsuperscript{319} that it results in "the compulsory exclusion of any religious element and the consequent promotion and advancement of atheism";\textsuperscript{320} that it "surrender[s] these schools to the sectarianism of atheism or irreligion";\textsuperscript{321} that it bans all study of God as connected with our principles of government\textsuperscript{322} or that it compels silence about the Bible, religion, and God, thus impressing school children that these matters are insignificant.\textsuperscript{323} It can hardly be denied that "we are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being"\textsuperscript{324} since it is a matter of "common notoriety"\textsuperscript{325} that the great majority of our citizens are religious in the sense that they do believe in God.\textsuperscript{326} Although there is some dispute concerning the percentage of our population that is affiliated with organized religious groups,\textsuperscript{327} the most recent government survey showed that less than three percent of all persons over the age of 14 reported that they had no religion whatever;\textsuperscript{328} almost 95 percent of the population considered themselves to be either Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish.\textsuperscript{329} Nor can it be denied that "acknowledgement of a Supreme Being has . . . been a part of our history."\textsuperscript{330}

\textsuperscript{319} Murray, \textit{Law or Prepossessions?}, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 23, 36 (1949).
\textsuperscript{320} Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 184, 176 N.E.2d 579, 583 (1961) (Burke, J., concurring opinion).
\textsuperscript{321} Luther A. Weigle, formerly Dean of Yale Divinity School, quoted in \textit{Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom} 291 (1953).
\textsuperscript{323} Schmidt, \textit{supra} note 318, at 187-88. See also \textit{Parsons, Which Way, Democracy?} 11 (1939).
\textsuperscript{324} Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
\textsuperscript{326} \textit{Pfeffer, op. cit. supra} note 321, at 289, has acknowledged that "we are a religious people even though our government is secular."
\textsuperscript{327} Pfeffer contends that the figure is only about 50%. \textit{Id.} at 303. This must be compared with the fact that the various religious bodies claim church membership in 1960 of 64% of the total population. \textit{Bureau of Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States} 48 (83d ed. 1962).
\textsuperscript{328} \textit{Id.} at 46.
\textsuperscript{329} \textit{Ibid.} Query as to how many of these felt "compelled" to make such a disclosure.
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While there is some dispute as to how religious the founding fathers were, the heritage of this country, both in the past and at present, is replete with examples of theistic and religious influences too multitudinous to enumerate fully.

These being the facts, not only would it be virtually impossible, as a practical matter, to obliterate all references to religion from the public schools, but it would be educationally undesirable.

But a public school program that seeks to prevent children from growing up as religious illiterates may not be fairly characterized as a solely religious activity. There is a distinct and weighty public purpose in seeing that all school children comprehend the role that religion has played in this country's evolution and that they have some understanding of the nature of the conscientious beliefs possessed by most of our citizens. Under the proposed constitutional standard there would be no constitutional objection to an academic study in comparative religion or to

332. A partial list might include the fact that the Declaration of Independence refers to the Deity four times; that the constitutions of 49 states acknowledge the existence of God and many imply that the rights and liberties of the people issue from God and express gratefulness therefore. See Brief for Respondents, pp. 44–54, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). "In God We Trust" has been impressed on our coins since 1865. In 1956, Congress adopted these words as our national motto. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address referred to God, as did the Mayflower Compact of 1620 and Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. Such national monuments as the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the Washington Monument, and the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials all contain inscriptions mentioning the Deity. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 stated that religion was necessary to good government. All of our Presidents have asked for the protection or help of God on assuming office. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446–49 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
334. "A course in the history of California which did not describe the early Catholic missions is unthinkable." 25 CAL. OPS. ATT'Y GEN. 325 (1955). This same report found prayers and Bible reading in the public schools to be contrary to the first amendment.
335. But see text accompanying notes 347–48 infra.
the study of the Bible as an artistic work. The salient distinction is that this would be teaching objectively about religion and the Bible and would not be religious indoctrination.

The academic study of religion may not take the form of teaching "that religion is sacred" nor present religious dogma as factual material. The only purpose for this approach is to inculcate religious beliefs. Nor may daily devotional Bible reading exercises with the privilege of nonparticipation be validated merely by characterizing them as an "elective course in non-sectarian Bible study." The difference between a devotional exercise and an ordinary literature course that examines the Bible, attempting no indoctrination and therefore not exerting pressure on students, is the difference between a solely religious program that is likely to result in the influencing or compromising of students' conscientious scruples and a secular act by government that is within its power.

It is not easy to deny, at least where younger children are concerned, that even an objectively presented academic examination of the Bible, or of religion generally, will result in some indoctrination. But to concede that there is much truth in the contention that "the young mind cannot grasp the nebulous distinction between the Bible as literature and the Bible as sectarian instruction" is not automatically to invalidate a school board's good faith attempt to educate students with "much useful information about the religious faiths, the important part they have played in establishing the moral and spiritual values of American life,  

338. Such was the announced purpose of a program adopted, in the name of academic study of religion, by the Denver school system for "intergroup education." Herberg, Religion, Democracy, and Public Education, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 118, 136 (Cogley ed. 1958).
340. This was suggested in Creel, Is It Legal for the Public Schools of Alabama to Provide an Elective Course in Non-Sectarian Bible Instruction?, 10 ALA. LAW. 86, 94 (1949).
341. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 321, at 311; Sutherland, supra note 336; Vishny, supra note 336.
342. Cosway & Toepfer, supra note 333, at 137.
and their role in the story of mankind." No doubt, indoctrination often results from academic pursuits. Therefore, although the wisdom of reserving this inquiry to the higher grades may be decided by local authorities, it would not seem to be a proper question for the Supreme Court.

However, despite the fact that the activity is secular and thus immunized from the proposed constitutional standard, it may still be in violation of the establishment clause. The thesis suggested is that when a secular activity by government results not only in attainment of a civil objective, but also promotes religion, the establishment clause is violated if the civil goal may be accomplished just as well by means that do not promote religion. Thus, it may be argued that the establishment clause demands that the objective study of religion or the Bible be confined to those higher grades where the influencing or compromising of religious beliefs would not occur because the audience is adult enough to distinguish between indoctrination and academic discussion. The contention would be quite convincing if it could be shown that, by so doing, the state's secular objective of making students religiously literate could be just as effectively achieved.

The Roman Catholic church has voiced strong opposition to allowing its children, at any age, to participate in academic courses in religion. It has also been observed that "the objective teaching of religion is likely to be unacceptable to most churches." In the first analysis, this becomes only one factor to be considered in making the legislative choice. If, however, some religious sect demands that its members do not participate in this instruction as a matter of religious dogma, the question becomes

344. EDUCATIONAL POLICIES COMM'N, NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL ASS'N, MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 78 (1951).

345. The unity of our own country, our understanding of the other nations of the world, and respect for the rich religious traditions of all humanity would be enhanced by instruction about religion in the public schools. Like any other teaching in which deep personal emotions are involved, such instruction should, of course, give due consideration to the varying degrees of maturity of the students.

Id. at 78-79.


347. See note 240 supra.


349. See PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 321, at 310.

350. Ibid.
one of whether the free exercise clause is violated by compelling attendance in these courses. Here, as elsewhere, a difficult and delicate free exercise problem is raised when there is a direct conflict between a religious tenet and action compelled by the state—that is, when the state, in pursuit of a secular purpose demands on pain of criminal prosecution that a person compromise his religious scruples. The Supreme Court has not clearly articulated any principle to govern these situations and the issue is beyond the scope of this article. What should be made plain, however, is that regardless of whether participation in the program may be made mandatory under the free exercise clause, the state is engaging in a secular activity when it introduces the academic study of religion into the public schools. Therefore, with one possible reservation, the establishment clause is not in issue and religious objections to the activity may not result in its abolition.

No doubt there are practical difficulties in administering a program of teaching about religion. It may be argued that instructors, who are themselves affiliated with a particular sect, cannot or will not objectively present all points of view, the result, especially

351. See text accompanying notes 118–22 supra.
354. The Court has stated that "legislative power . . . may reach people's actions when they are found to be in violation of important social duties or subversive of good order, even when the actions are demanded by one's religion." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603–04 (1961) (dictum). If this be the standard, the question of whether the state may demand a religious dissenter to attend classes in the objective study of religion turns on whether the Court feels that any student's failure to attend would be "in violation of important social duties or subversive of good order."

On the other hand, the Court has also noted the importance of whether the religious freedom asserted by the dissenter brings him "into collision with rights asserted by any other individual." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943). It is fairly plain that by absenting themselves from classes engaged in studying about religion, the objectors would not be directly affecting anyone else. Thus, it could be argued that their free exercise claim should be upheld. However, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the Court upheld the conviction of a Mormon polygamist who defended on the ground that the tenets of his church demanded that he practice polygamy. Here it would seem that the defendant's action affected only those persons who volunteered to be affected. For general discussion of this problem, see Lockhart, Kamisar & Choper, Supplement to Dodd's Cases on Constitutional Law 400–01 (1962).
355. See text accompanying notes 347–48 supra.
as far as the younger children are concerned, will be indoctrination at least as powerful as that obtained by a solely religious activity. If the secular purposes of a program of the academic study of religion were inherently subject to abuse, then the only remedy might be to ban the activity. But the alleged defect appears not to be inherent. Educators have stated that "the public school can teach objectively about religion without advocating or teaching any religious creed." Theologians "believe that the teachers of the American public school system are, on the whole, qualified to maintain free discussion with genuine respect for religious perspectives." The remedy for teacher abuse is to enjoin it or to get another teacher; it is not to outlaw the program.

Another objection leveled at the academic study of religion in the public schools is that since it is, by its nature, highly controversial, it is likely to engender serious antagonisms among students of the different religious faiths. Instances of this have been recorded. It has been suggested that this matter of "divisiveness" should determine the constitutionality of governmental programs in the religious area. This seems to be neither a desirable nor workable approach to the problem. While this matter is unquestionably relevant to the legislative decision, once a genuinely secular-based program is enacted, it is difficult to see why it should be threatened with preordained abolition under the establishment clause either because some religious group finds it objectionable or because the sensibilities of some students will be offend-

359. EDUCATIONAL POLICIES COMM’N, NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL ASS’N, MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 77 (1951). That religious beliefs are controversial is not an adequate reason for excluding teaching about religion from the public schools. Economic and social questions are taught and studied in the schools on the very sensible theory that students need to know the issues being faced and to get practice in forming sound judgments. Teaching about religion should be approached in the same spirit. General guides on the teaching of all controversial issues may be helpful. If need be, teachers should be provided with special help and information to equip them to teach objectively in this area.

Id. at 78.
361. See Lieberman, A General Interpretation of Separation of Church and State and Its Implications for Public Education, 33 PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION 129, 134 (1956); Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1952).
ed. If the governmental activity were a solely religious one that would likely result in the influencing or compromising of religious beliefs, the question should be answered differently, as has been maintained throughout this article. But many secular educational programs create dissention and discomfort among students.\textsuperscript{364} If the basis of this is due to religious conviction, the free exercise clause may afford individual relief.\textsuperscript{365}

Some ardent religionists (and also, undoubtedly some avid non-religionists) have advocated the exclusion of all religious matter from the public school curriculum.\textsuperscript{366} This would mean, of course, that the study of European history would ignore the Protestant Reformation and the great religious controversies of the Middle Ages; that American history would be devoid of the struggle for religious freedom in the colonies; that art courses must exclude Da Vinci's "Last Supper" and Michelangelo's "Moses"; and that Beethoven's "Missa Solemnis" and Caruso's rendition of "Adeste Fidelis" could not be played in a music class. This line of reasoning might even prohibit the Bible from the public school library.

Despite the fact that one state court recently could find no difference between studies of this nature and devotional Bible reading,\textsuperscript{367} the distinction is quite obvious. The inclusion of that religious material that is an intrinsic part of other disciplines is vitally necessary to a well-rounded education and is, therefore, a secular act.\textsuperscript{368} It is thus subject to the same constitutional analysis as the objective study of religion. Unfortunately, from an educational standpoint, a recent study of American public education has revealed a "more or less deliberate avoidance of religious subject matter even when it was clearly intrinsic to the discipline concerned."\textsuperscript{369} Unfortunately, from a constitutional standpoint, the same study "found planned religious activities widely prevalent."\textsuperscript{370}

\textsuperscript{364} See note 359 supra.
\textsuperscript{365} See note 354 supra.
\textsuperscript{366} See PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 321, at 287; Johnson, Religion and Education, 33 PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION 143, 146 (1956).
\textsuperscript{368} See 25 CAL. OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 316, 325 (1955); Johnson, supra note 366, at 145.
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid.
C. RELEASED TIME

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision on the Regents' prayer, the Court had decided only two other cases on the merits that concerned the question of religious penetration in the public schools. Both of these cases involved released time programs. Such a program may be defined as "a system of religious education in connection with the public school under which those children desiring to participate in religious instruction are excused from their secular studies for a specified period weekly, while those children not participating in religious instruction remain under the jurisdiction and supervision of the public school for the usual period of secular instruction. No distinction is made in the use of the term between religious instruction classes held within or without the public school building; nor between classes held at the first or last period of the school day and those held sometime between these two periods."

Under the proposed constitutional standard, all released time plans should be held in violation of the establishment clause. The only immediate purposes of such a program are to "encourage religious instruction" and to aid in the religious indoctrination of school children. In upholding the constitutionality of these programs, neither the Supreme Court nor the state appellate courts have denied this fact, nor have the many commentators noted.

372. PFIEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 315 (1953). For a general history of the program, see id. at 313-27. Research has revealed one "first-hour-of-the-day" released time program which was said to be voluntary. Nonetheless, "no pupil . . . has refused or failed to attend such morning services for religious instruction." State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 359-60, 28 N.E.2d 256, 261-62 (1940).
374. Ibid.
who have defended these decisions. That a system of released
time is inherently coercive, thereby compromising the students' freedom of religious choice, has already been mentioned and somewhat demonstrated above.\(^3\) Further evidence of its influencing and compromising nature is not lacking. The existence of compulsion has been found in the fact that religious leaders have so strenuously pressed for the establishment of released time systems.\(^4\) While this is not necessarily valid when measured by the strict rules of logic,\(^5\) it is nonetheless quite persuasive. Religious educators who are proponents of the system have noted that released time programs have a "remarkable evangelistic record,"\(^6\) for in those schools where they operate, a substantial percentage of students attend religious classes who would not otherwise do so.\(^7\) Religious leaders who oppose released time view it as "a means of applying public pressures to non-conformists so as to make them 'give in.'"\(^8\) Schools with released time programs have reported "a considerable percentage of pupils in attendance whose parents do not belong to any church."\(^9\) Where released time systems have been abandoned, attendance at religious classes has declined.\(^10\) Children of minority religious faiths have been known to enroll in the majority's religious classes because they did "not wish to be marked."\(^11\) The

\(^{376}\) See text accompanying notes 102-04, 148 supra.

\(^{377}\) See PFEEFFER, op. cit. supra note 372, at 373; Cushman, The Holy Bible and the Public Schools, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 475, 497 (1955).

\(^{378}\) Religious leaders may have any one of a multitude of reasons for seeking the establishment of the released time system, and even if their reason is that they believe the system is compulsive, that does not in fact make it true.


\(^{380}\) Ibid. Dr. Shaver points out that before a released time system, half of the school population receives no religious training; when the system is instituted, an average of one-third of this neglected half is reached.

\(^{381}\) Glenn Archer, Executive Director of Protestants and Other Americans United, quoted in PFEEFFER, op. cit. supra note 372, at 332.

\(^{382}\) JACKSON & MALMBERG, RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE STATE 39 (1928).

\(^{383}\) Sullivan, Religious Education in the Schools, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 92, 94 (1949).

\(^{384}\) See id. at 111.

fact that some may not have done so in no way refutes the existence of the inherent pressure. \(^{386}\) Those who chose not to enroll, or who were forbidden by their parents from doing so, have told of being "ostracized by the other children in after-school activities."\(^ {387}\)

Examination of the reasoning utilized by those few who defend the constitutionality of released time by denying the presence of coercion is revealing. The Illinois Supreme Court, in *McCollum*, "proved" the nonexistence of any coercion by (1) saying that it was no more present there than it was in a prior, similar case, and (2) referring to some testimony by Terry's mother. \(^ {388}\) The first reason, of course, merely avoids the issue, and aside from the fact that the quoted testimony failed to support the court's contention, \(^ {389}\) there was overwhelming evidence to the contrary. \(^ {390}\) Father Murray has taken the position that no threat to any personal rights was visible in *McCollum*, \(^ {391}\) Terry was not pressured into doing anything he did not want to do. \(^ {392}\) However, he then

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386. The argument that this disproves the existence of coercion was made by Chief Judge Desmond, concurring in *Zorach v. Clauson*, 303 N.Y. 161, 176, 100 N.E.2d 463, 470 (1951).


389. Mrs. McCollum had testified that, "I do not know it [released time] would bother him [Terry] one way or the other. I did not know it until in court." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

390. See, *e.g.*, notes 103, 385 *supra*.


392. *Id.* at 39.
recognizes that there was "pressure by the school system in the interest of religious sects," but justifies its existence by stating that the public schools' "sheer omission of religion from the curriculum is itself a pressure against religion," and that "the system as such has become a formidable ally of secularism." This position may be refuted simply by denying the premises. As has been pointed out, the establishment clause does not demand that the public schools omit religion from their curriculum, nor does it forbid them from objectively educating children as to the important role religion plays and has played in our civilization and in others. And so long as the establishment clause forbids the indoctrination of pupils with the ideas that there is no God or that, if there is, His influence is unimportant, the public schools may not fairly be said to be allied with secularism.

While the Supreme Court did find the McCollum released time system in violation of the establishment clause, it sustained the program at issue in Zorach v. Clauson. The only significant difference between the cases, so recognized by the Court majority, was that in McCollum the public school classrooms were used for religious instruction, whereas in Zorach the religious classes were held away from the public school premises. It has already been shown that these cases cannot be meaningfully distinguished on the basis of the use of public property. It may be true that "if the location of the school building makes the trip to a church long or hazardous because of dangerous street crossings, attendance will be improved by securing permission to teach in the school building." But the fact that the system in McCollum may have more effectively promoted religious education does not mean that the Zorach plan did not promote it at all. It could be argued that the holding of the religious sessions in the same classrooms in which the ordinary daily school activities took place suggested that the religious instruction was an integral part of the public school program and, therefore, created a greater compulsive pressure on dissenters. This may make the result in McCollum more understandable, but it does not erase the "in-eradicable built-in pressure to 'sign-up' for religious instruction"

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393. Ibid.
394. Ibid.
395. Ibid.
396. See text accompanying note 318 supra.
398. Id. at 315.
399. See text accompanying notes 129–47 supra.
400. Sullivan, supra note 383, at 94.
in Zorach. Even those who favor the result in Zorach\textsuperscript{402} agree with those who do not\textsuperscript{403} that the decisions are irreconcilable on the matter of inherent coercion.

Probably the most frequently voiced argument in support of the constitutionality of released time is that its validity is dictated by the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.\textsuperscript{404} That case held an Oregon statute requiring public school attendance for children of certain ages unconstitutional on the ground that the fourteenth amendment gives parents the right to direct the education of their children and, therefore, the right to send their children to private or parochial schools that meet state qualifications. One aspect of the argument is that the right recognized in Pierce was a right guaranteed by the free exercise clause of the first amendment; to deny the availability of religious instruction in the public schools to those parents who, for financial or other reasons, send their children there, is to confine this right "to parents who can afford to send their children to parochial or other private schools . . . ."\textsuperscript{405} The contention that rights protected by the free exercise clause would be suppressed by forbidding released time and other religious programs in the public schools has also been made by a number of others without the aid of the Pierce case.\textsuperscript{406}

Apart from the question of whether Pierce really upheld a free exercise claim,\textsuperscript{407} the argument must fail. The shortest answer is that released time programs violate the establishment clause and that ends the matter. Although this point seemingly begs the question, it is strengthened by the fact that the two most articulate proponents of the free exercise argument recognize that the validity of their argument turns on whether the continued operation of re-


\textsuperscript{403} E.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 187-88, 100 N.E.2d 463, 477 (1951) (Fuld, J., dissenting); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 77 (1961); Comment, 7 Ala. L. Rev. 99, 107 (1954); Note, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 1033, 1038-39 (1952); Note, 61 Yale L.J. 405, 413-16 (1952); 74 Harv. L. Rev. 611, 614 (1961); 31 Texas L. Rev. 327, 329-30 (1953).

\textsuperscript{404} 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

\textsuperscript{405} Corwin, The Supreme Court As National School Board, 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3, 20 (1949).

\textsuperscript{406} E.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 178, 100 N.E.2d 463, 471 (1951) (Desmond, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 198 Misc. 631, 636-37, 99 N.Y.S.2d 339, 344 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Harpster, Religion, Education and the Law, 36 Marq. L. Rev. 24, 53 (1952); Murray, supra note 391, at 33; Reed, Church-State and the Zorach Case, 27 Notre Dame Law. 529, 540 (1952).

leased time programs infringes on the rights of anyone else.\(^{408}\) While it has not been contended that the program's imposition on nonconformists violates their rights specifically guaranteed by the free exercise clause,\(^{409}\) it has been amply shown that the system of released time does infringe on their conscientious scruples.

The more authoritative answer to the argument based on Pierce is that the Court has specifically rejected a similar free exercise contention. If the free exercise clause is not violated by a law that "simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive,"\(^{410}\) a decision by the Court to uphold the establishment clause surely must not fail because it has this effect.\(^{411}\) It may be true that the rights guaranteed by Pierce would forbid a state from so regulating its public school system "as to make religious education or exercise impracticable or to limit such education or exercise to Saturday or Sunday"\(^{412}\) and would preclude a state from "the pre-empting of the whole of the child's time so as to leave no adequate part for religion."\(^{413}\) Such regulation would effectively bar action "demanded by one's religion."\(^{414}\) But, since no religion demands that its children be excused early from school to attend religious classes, the abolition of released time "does not make unlawful any religious practices . . . ."\(^{415}\) At most, the denial of a released time program may be said to impose "only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion . . . ."\(^{416}\) Clearly, neither the purpose nor the effect of the denial of a released time program "is to impede the observance of

\(^{408}\) Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 178, 100 N.E.2d 463, 471 (1951) (Desmond, J., concurring); Corwin, note 405 supra. See also Johnson, Summary of Policies and Recommendations of the American Council on Education Committee on Religion and Education, in THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN APPRAISAL 5, 16-17 (Brown ed. 1958).

\(^{409}\) But see Pfeffer, supra note 407, at 96-97. See also 1 BAYLOR L. REV. 79, 81 (1948).


\(^{411}\) To adopt this free exercise rationale, see text accompanying note 405 supra, would be tantamount to saying that the free exercise rights of indigent Roman Catholics would be denied by the state's failure to provide free parochial schools.

\(^{412}\) Fahy, Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 73, 84-85 (1949).

\(^{413}\) PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 372, at 289.

\(^{414}\) Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961). Even here, the Court has stated that this is not an absolute test for determining free exercise clause violations. 366 U.S. at 605. See text accompanying notes 351-52 supra.

\(^{415}\) 366 U.S. at 605. See also Pfeffer, supra note 407, at 96.

\(^{416}\) 366 U.S. at 606. See also Note, 61 YALE L.J. 410-11 (1952).
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one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions . . . ." If it were, the free exercise clause might be violated.\textsuperscript{417} Rather, the purpose and effect is to prevent a violation of the establishment clause.\textsuperscript{418} Since this "nonreligious" purpose would plainly be thwarted by any program of released time, under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court,\textsuperscript{419} there is no evidence to the contention that any person's free exercise rights are denied by the exclusion of released time programs.\textsuperscript{420}

Another aspect of the argument based on Pierce deals with the matter of compulsion. The rationale articulated by the Court in striking down the program in McCollum was that "the operation of the State's compulsory education system . . . assists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular education are released in part from their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes. This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith."\textsuperscript{421} The Court concluded that, by the system, "the State . . . affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. This is not separation of Church and State."\textsuperscript{422} The argument advanced is that if the McCollum plan was defective because it conditioned absence from the public school upon attendance at religious classes, then, by a fortiori, the parochial school attendance upheld in Pierce is also constitutionally defective for precisely the same reason, for it permits children to satisfy the compulsory school attendance law by attending religious classes.\textsuperscript{423} Both arrangements produce attend-

\textsuperscript{417} See 366 U.S. at 607.
\textsuperscript{418} Cf. 366 U.S. at 609.
\textsuperscript{419} If the nonreligious purpose (preventing an establishment clause violation) could be accomplished by means that do not impose an indirect burden on religious observance (exclusion of released time programs may be said to impose such a burden, see text accompanying note 416 supra), the Court has indicated that failure to employ the alternative means would violate the free exercise clause. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
\textsuperscript{420} Accord, Kauper, supra note 402, at 848.
\textsuperscript{422} 333 U.S. at 212.
\textsuperscript{423} See Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 173-74, 100 N.E.2d 463, 468-69 (1951); Corwin, supra note 405, at 20; Meiklejohn, Educational Cooperation Between Church and State, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 61, 67-68 (1949); Sullivan, supra note 383, at 109; 22 SO. CAL. L. REV. 423, 440 (1949).
ance at religious classes by discharging parents from their obligation under the compulsory school provisions. "It is not merely fanciful or frivolous to suggest that [Pierce]... represents one hundred percent released time." 424

This line of argument is not wholly unpersuasive. If McCollum were based on nothing more than the compulsory education law, it would seem to jeopardize Pierce. Or if the main thrust of McCollum were that truancy regulations were enforced by reports of attendance at religious classes being made to the public school and that "knowledge that an official record is kept of his attendance necessarily places pressure on the child—accustomed as he is to the discipline of school—to attend these religious classes," then again the system upheld in Pierce might seem to be faulty.

But, even accepting the validity of these bases, the situations are distinguishable. Under the system of released time, the only alternative to remaining in the public school is to attend religious classes. This is not the case in the Pierce context. There, children who were excused from public school attendance had a broader range of alternatives; they could attend any accredited private school as well as parochial school. 427 A true analogy between released time and the situation in Pierce would exist only if religious classes were but one of several desirable choices available to students. 428 A school board program that would permit students to be released for a certain period of time each week on condition that they attend one of a group of extra-curricular education classes—for example, classes in music, art, religion, drama—might well be valid under the establishment clause. 429 Indeed, the reasoning of one noted commentator suggests that the exclu-

424. Kauper, supra note 402, at 841.
427. The case itself was prosecuted by both a parochial school and a military training school.
428. Here, again, the question of legislative motive becomes relevant. See note 343 supra.
429. "Released time as now practiced had its origin in Gary, Indiana, in 1913 when the Superintendent of Schools directed the dismissal of children an hour earlier one day of each week to enable them to pursue their individual interests such as religion, music or art." Pfeffer, Religion, Education and the Constitution, 8 LAW. GUILD REV. 387, 396–97 (1948).
sion of religious education as one of the alternatives would violate constitutionally protected religious freedom. Most importantly in regard to the proposed constitutional standard, the difference that might make this program valid is that the provision of attractive alternatives to religious education would remove the inherently coercive element in released time. Students who were religious nonconformists and students with marginal beliefs would not be faced with the choice of either receiving religious instruction, which would compromise or influence their conscientious scruples, or being regarded as "oddballs." They could join with those of their friends of the religious majority who preferred to study art, music, or drama rather than religion. It may be that by instituting such a program, more children would attend religious classes than would be the case otherwise. This is undoubtedly the result of the decision in Pierce. But, despite the fact that this represents aid to religion, the absence of coercion calls for a favorable constitutional judgment under the proposed constitutional standard. State action of this nature may be fairly characterized as merely an "accommodation."

However, there is a more compelling distinction between the Pierce situation and released time, again based on compulsion. Regardless of the presence of alternative choices, no child of a minority religious faith (or of no faith at all) feels compelled to attend a parochial school simply because, under the Pierce case, the government must permit him to do so. But, in the released time situation, nonconforming pupils do feel compelled to accept religious instruction, thus compromising their conscientious beliefs. This last argument has been rejected on the ground that

431. Kurland, supra note 403, at 5.
432. Those children of minority religious faiths who choose to go home to receive religious instruction from their parents, a plan suggested by the counsel for the school board in Zorach, would be just as "oddballish" as those who were forced to remain in school because their parents had no religion to impart to them. See PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 372, at 355.
433. In light of the fact that only about half of the public school population would accept religious education without a program of released time, see note 380 supra, if attractive alternatives to religious education were available to released students, it is most likely that many religious conformists would accompany the dissenters to the nonreligious classes.
434. It is obvious that if the Court had upheld the statute in Pierce, parochial school attendance would be diminished.
435. See text accompanying notes 463–72 infra.
436. It might be argued that by the Supreme Court's action in Pierce, removing any legal impediment to full time parochial education, the clergy was left free to exert strenuous pressures on their parishioners to send their children to parochial schools and that, in this way, governmental action resulted in private pressures being brought to bear on those
it "is based on the premise that the public school represents a kind of involuntary imprisonment, release from which may be effected by attending religious education classes," and that it may not "be accepted as an unquestioned proposition of fact that religious instruction is so attractive and public school education so repressive that parents and children will invariably respond by choosing to escape the public school classroom." This is not the premise advanced here. The inherent compulsion does not necessarily arise from the unattractiveness of the public school, but from the urge of the nonconforming students, who would otherwise be left behind, to join the group. Thus, released time is a solely religious activity that is likely to result in compromising and influencing religious beliefs.

Of course, if it could be shown that in those schools that have adopted released time there is majority nonparticipation, it would be difficult to maintain that those students who remain behind will be considered "oddballs" by their colleagues. As a practical matter, it would seem that unless a large proportion of the school were "willing" to participate, the program would be discontinued. For the most part, the available statistics bear out the assumption that most children attend. Those involved in the program have stated that "the enrollment of 90 to 99 percent of the public school constituency in the weekday church school is quite common. To reach less than 80 percent is the excep-

members of the faith with marginal convictions, thus influencing the freedom of religious participation; this then would be no different than that aspect of released time. This argument may be rebutted by pointing out that the Pierce decision was dictated by a serious free exercise claim: since the Roman Catholic religion demands that its children attend parochial schools, the Oregon statute was in direct conflict with the religious practice. See text accompanying notes 479–81 infra. It has already been pointed out that denial of released time presents no comparable free exercise claim. See generally text accompanying notes 410–20 supra. Thus, although released time must be characterized as a solely religious activity, the purpose of the decision in Pierce may be fairly characterized as "nonreligious."

438. Ibid.
441. There appear to be no published national statistics on the percentage of participation in those schools that do have released time programs. See generally id. at 317–21.
Reports from such cities as Spokane, Washington, Champaign, Illinois, Salina, Kansas, and Van Wert, Ohio, confirm this. On the other hand, some schools in Berkeley, California, Mount Vernon, New York, Minneapolis, and Chicago report minority participation. Released time should nonetheless be invalid in most of those schools with minority participation because of the consequences of the unpleasant atmosphere that exists for those pupils, many of them members of the religious majorities, who remain. Educators have complained that one of the major problems involved in the administration of released time programs is what to do with the nonparticipants. The dilemma facing them is that if special programs or normal educational activities are conducted, this in effect penalizes those who attend religious classes; on the other hand, it is unfair to the nonparticipants "to keep them occupied solely with 'busy' work." If the latter course is taken, an unattractive environment is produced for those left behind, thereby influencing attendance at religious classes. Furthermore, if regular school courses are continued, although the religious school may be intrinsically no more attractive than the public school, it is likely that the mere opportunity to change environment and "escape from the classroom and school routine" will act as an incentive to students to go elsewhere. These being the less attractive alternatives available in the public schools, the solely religious program of released time will likely influence the student with marginal re-

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442. Dr. W. Dyer Blair, Director of the Department of Weekday Religious Education of the International Council of Religious Education, in 1940, quoted in id. at 335.
444. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
445. 95%. JACKSON & MALMBERG, op. cit. supra note 382, at 50.
446. 81–96%. Ibid.
449. Overall, about 50%. But individual schools vary from 12 to 94%. A majority of them are above 50%. Greater Minneapolis Council of Churches, Comparison of Weekday Church School Enrollment with Public School Enrollment, Nov. 13–17, 1961.
450. Less than 10%. See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 348 (1953).
451. See Nelson, supra note 447, at 41.
452. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 450, at 325.
453. Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1952). See also Cushman, supra note 430, at 496.
ligious beliefs to attend religious classes—something he would not otherwise do.

The same cannot be said for a program of dismissed time, “the system under which, on one or more days, the public school is closed earlier [or opened later] than usual, and all children are dismissed, with the expectation—but not the requirement—that some will use the dismissed period for participation in religious instruction.” It is no surprise, therefore, that there is general agreement, even among those who find released time unconstitutional, that dismissed time is valid. True, such a program will probably result in greater attendance at religious classes than would otherwise occur. Moreover, it might be demonstrated that the school board’s purpose in early closing was solely religious. Nevertheless, the element of state-caused compulsion is absent. Students are not faced with the publicly imposed choice of either going to religious school or remaining behind in an unenticing setting. If they choose to attend religious classes, they will do so in preference to other equally alluring, and, in many cases, more than equally alluring, alternatives. Perhaps dissenters will nonetheless be subject to pressures from their conforming colleagues who choose to attend religious classes, but this would exist even if the schools closed at the regular hour. Unlike the case of released time, the coercion may not be attributed to governmental action. The argument has been made that a

454. See City of New Haven v. Town of Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 197, 43 A.2d 455, 457 (1945).
455. PFEPFER, op. cit. supra note 450, at 315.
456. Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 190, 100 N.E.2d 463, 478 (1951) (Fuld, J., dissenting); Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American Constitutional Law, 45 ILL. L. REV. 333, 354, 356 (1950); Sullivan, Religious Education in the Schools, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 92, 93 (1949); Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (1952); Comment, 43 ILL. L. REV. 374, 386 (1948); 46 MICH. L. REV. 828, 829–30 (1948); 27 TEXAS L. REV. 256, 259 (1948); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1114, 1119 (1948).
458. A decision to hold the school picnic on Sunday afternoon, so as to enable those students who wish to go to church to do so, seems to have a solely religious purpose. But since this action does not inherently compel church attendance, it could not be said to violate the establishment clause under the proposed standard.
459. “[R]eligion can compete more successfully with arithmetic than with recreation.” Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1114, 1119 (1948).
460. See generally 31 TEXAS L. REV. 329 (1953).
461. Query if the same could be said if the public school rented its premises for religious classes to commence immediately following the end of the public school day. Would not the coercive pressures here be attributable to the school board’s action? See note 137 supra.
dismissed time plan "could not be used if the effect of the dismissal were to make the total time in school less than that required as compulsory attendance."\textsuperscript{462} This would be irrelevant under the proposed constitutional standard because it has no bearing on the matter of compulsion. In any case, it is difficult to determine what merit the argument has since the required time for school attendance could easily be reduced.

There has been much discussion, particularly with reference to released time and other religious infiltration in the public schools, about the state's assuming a role of "neutrality" in this conflict and about the state's making an "accommodation" between the competing interests.\textsuperscript{463} While this may have an abstract appeal, it does not adequately substitute for analysis under a principled standard.\textsuperscript{464} The New York courts have upheld the constitutionality of the Regents' prayer\textsuperscript{465} and released time\textsuperscript{466} on this basis. Professor Kauper, a most articulate advocate for the constitutional validity of released time, agrees that it aids religion, but justifies it as a "reasonable accommodation."\textsuperscript{467} It is true that "in matters of public education due respect for the democratic process should

\textsuperscript{462} Cosway & Toepfer, Religion and the Schools, 17 U. CINC. L. REV. 117, 141 (1948).
\textsuperscript{463} See, e.g., 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 495, 501 & n.30 (1962) and authorities cited therein.
\textsuperscript{464} Professor Robert F. Cushman calls for "a doctrine of state neutrality." Cushman, supra note 430, at 490. He argues that "if all social groups, without regard to purpose, were allowed to come into the schools and conduct meetings which the students could attend, religious groups, since they are social groups, would be included." Perhaps so. But under this same principle, it would be valid for the Community Sandlot Baseball League, the Model Railroad Club (two of Cushman's examples, \textit{id.} at 491), and the Roman Catholic Church (my example) to come into the public schools to proselytize for members. Professor Philip Kurland's "neutral principle of equality" would appear to call for the same result. Kurland, \textit{Of Church and State and the Supreme Court}, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1961). Under the principle proposed in this article, the establishment clause would forbid the inclusion of the Church. There is nothing in the Constitution prohibiting the use of the public schools for Little League proselytizing; the first amendment stands in the way of any religion doing the same thing. Nor would the prohibition violate the free exercise clause under any Supreme Court interpretation of it. At most, this would be "only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961). See generally text accompanying notes 415-20 supra.
\textsuperscript{466} Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 66, 73, 85 N.Y.S.2d 682, 690 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
permit some discretion to the community in shaping its educational policies,” and that “the interest of parents in the religious education of their children is a legitimate legislative concern.” Dismissed time satisfies these appeals. Professor Kauper agrees that “no actual pressure [should be] placed on any student to attend classes in religious education.” But he states that “a proper sense of concern for the non-participant does not require rejection of the [released time] program on constitutional grounds,” since “it remains to be demonstrated that the optional released time privilege deprives anyone of [religious liberty].” Hopefully, it has been demonstrated here.

1. **Excusing Children for Religious Holidays**

The argument has often been advanced that excusing children from the public schools for observance of their particular religious holidays is merely an “instance of released time but on a smaller scale,” and, therefore, this practice stands or falls with released time. But there are many distinguishing features. Released time is inherently coercive because it operates to single out the nonconformists against their will and compels them to attend religious classes against their will. When children are excused from classes on religious holidays, they ask to be singled out because they wish to attend religious services. Assuming that the public school act of excusing them has a solely religious purpose, the act is requested by the religious nonconformists themselves.

In the case of released time, majority participation works to coerce minority attendance. Minority participation usually results in the practice of excusing children for religious holidays since the public schools ordinarily close on the majority's religious holidays. However, for the same reasons that operated in the re-

469. Kauper, Released Time and Religious Liberty: A Further Reply, supra note 467, at 236.
471. Ibid.
472. Kauper, Released Time and Religious Liberty: A Further Reply, supra note 467, at 236. See also Katz, supra note 457, at 439.
475. Professor Kurland would probably also distinguish these situations, but on other grounds. Since released time makes only religious education
leased time context, it may be that permitting children of religious minorities to be excused from the public school to attend religious services will likely influence students of these religious minorities with marginal beliefs to attend the church or synagogue of their faith. Nonetheless, the situations are distinguishable because, while it has been shown that there is no colorable claim that denial of released time infringes on rights under the free exercise clause, denying children of minority religious faiths their wish to attend holiday religious services does raise a serious free exercise question. Even those who have argued that the two situations are otherwise similar recognize this difference. Attendance at religious services is often an act demanded by one's religion. By the public schools' refusal to permit such attendance, the student faces the choice of either violating his religious principles or receiving whatever penalties the school chooses to impose. The Supreme Court has not held that, in a situation of this nature, the free exercise claim must prevail, but it has recognized that "in such cases, to make accommodation between the religious action and an exercise of state authority is a particularly delicate task." The free exercise claim here does appear to be quite substantial and persuasive because it can hardly be said that a student's action in absenting himself from school for one day is "in violation of important social duties or subversive of good order."

available, he would likely find it invalid because "it is . . . forbidden the state to confer favors [only] upon religious activity." Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1961). Since pupils may be excused from the public schools for many reasons (e.g., funerals, dental appointments), he would likely say that the first amendment demands that they also be excused for religious holidays because "inhibitions [may] not be placed by the state on [only] religious activity," Ibid. However, it would seem that if the public school forbade absence for all extracurricular activities, Professor Kurland's thesis not only would permit the schools to deny excusing children for religious observances, but would actually forbid the schools from granting it. Since there is a substantial and persuasive, albeit not conclusive, free exercise argument for granting children absence from the public schools to observe their religious holidays, see text accompanying notes 478–81 infra, one might well disagree with this last point. See LOCKHART, KAMISAR & CHOPER, SUPPLEMENT TO DODD'S CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 399 (1962).

478. See text accompanying notes 414–20 supra.
478. Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 173, 100 N.E.2d 463, 468 (1951); Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, supra note 467, at 840, 848.
479. 366 U.S. at 603.
these reasons, the establishment clause may well permit a state to excuse children from school for religious observances despite the influence it may have on them and other pupils. No comparable "nonreligious" justification exists for released time.\footnote{482}

2. \textit{Shared Time}

The newly adopted program of "shared time,"\footnote{483} under which parochial school students come to the public schools each day to take certain secular classes, merits brief consideration. As presently constituted, the plan involves a relatively small number of Catholic students\footnote{484} joining their public school associates for a few hours each day. There would seem to be no constitutional objection under the proposed constitutional standard in these circumstances, since the activity may not be characterized as being solely religious and it is unlikely that public school students will feel compelled to join their Catholic colleagues when the latter return to the parochial school.\footnote{485}

One might suggest that, since the experience over the years with released time has revealed teachers' persistent application of direct pressures on pupils to attend religious classes, despite the fact that teachers have been specifically prohibited from so doing,\footnote{486} the program is inherently subject to abuse and, therefore, unconstitutional.\footnote{487} However, we need not go this far. Despite the warning that "the critical constitutional issues with respect to released time cannot be solved by any play of language in using the word 'compulsion,'"\footnote{488} it is submitted that this solely religious activity should fail, principally for that reason.

D. \textsc{Teachers Wearing Religious Garb}

Next to Bible reading, the issue involving religious infusion in the public schools probably most often brought before the state courts is whether the schools may employ teachers who wear religious garb.\footnote{489} The reason commonly given for the invalidity of

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{482} Cf. note 436 \textit{supra}.
\item \footnote{483} Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 5, 1962, p. 25, col. 1.
\item \footnote{484} About 10% of those in attendance in the public school. \textit{Ibid}.
\item \footnote{485} The question of whether this program constitutes unconstitutional financial aid to parochial schools is beyond the scope of this article.
\item \footnote{486} For extensive documentation, see \textsc{Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom} 356--67 (1953); Note, 61 \textsc{Yale L.J.} 405, 412--13 (1952).
\item \footnote{487} See Note, 52 \textsc{Colum. L. Rev.} 1033, 1038 (1952).
\item \footnote{489} "A recent survey showed that members of religious orders in
this practice is that “the distinctive garbs, so exclusively peculiar to the Roman Catholic Church, create a religious atmosphere in the schoolroom. They have a subtle influence upon the tender minds being taught and trained by the nuns. In and of themselves they proclaim the Catholic Church and the representative character of the teachers in the schoolroom. They silently promulgate sectarianism.”

There is by no means the same general consensus on this point, however, as there is about those practices previously discussed. The pressures on the religiously nonconforming child that are created by his failure to join his colleagues in a particular activity are absent here. Nor can it be said here, as it was in connection with Bible reading, that by engaging teachers who wear religious garb, the state influences the student’s freedom of conscientious choice by placing its “stamp of approval” on the Roman Catholic faith. It should be clear to students in the upper grades that when public school teachers are employed, the state approves only of their intellectual qualifications; the state does not endorse their sex, political beliefs, or religious affiliations any more than it sanctions the clothes that they wear or the street on which they live. As to those students in the lower grades, it would seem that any influence of the religious garb would not differ substantially from that produced by the pupils’ knowledge of their teacher’s religious devotion acquired elsewhere—from statements the teacher has made, from religious insignia the teacher wears, or from general community information. The evidence that this practice is likely to compromise religious beliefs or influence conscientious choice is not very strong.

Even if the evidence were more convincing, the practice of permitting teachers to wear religious garb in the schools would not violate the establishment clause under the proposed constitutional standard unless it could be fairly characterized as solely religious. The practice has been defended on the ground “that to prohibit religious garb were employed as teachers to some extent in the public schools of sixteen states and territories.” Fahy, Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court, 14 LAW & CONTEM. PROB. 73, 89 (1949).


a teaching Sister from wearing the garb would infringe the free exercise of religion." If this premise is valid, it would seem to be a "nonreligious" justification for the practice. However, while it is quite clear that the Constitution prohibits state discrimination against its employees on the basis of religion, it is not clear that the free exercise clause requires the state to permit its teachers to do anything that their religion demands. Aside from the fact that barring teachers who wear religious garb from the public schools would constitute only a rather minor disability, there is some indication that Catholic Sisters may receive dispensation to wear lay clothing while teaching in the public schools. These being the facts, if further research revealed that the wearing of religious garb was likely to act as a compromising or influencing factor, it seems doubtful that the free exercise clause could be read to prohibit a state from barring religious garb from the public schools. If this be true, the wearing of the garb in the schools might fairly be characterized as a solely religious practice.

In any case, if it is found that the practice is influential or coercive, it may be that the establishment clause is violated despite the activity's arguably secular foundation. The secular objective (qualified teachers) may be attained just as well by employing those who do not wear religious garb and, by so doing, the objectionable effects would be eliminated. As of now, the factual premises remain unproven.

The fact that Roman Catholic Sisters contribute their net income from public school teaching to the church should have no bearing whatever on the constitutional validity of the practice. Persons should be able to spend their income for any legal purpose. In fact, the argument may well be made that "to deny the right to make such contribution would in itself constitute a denial of that right of religious liberty which the Constitution guarantees."
RELIGION IN THE SCHOOLS

The whole discussion of this subject has dealt only with the single practice of teachers wearing religious garb. The result suggested here may be different if the totality of the circumstances in the public school environment, of which the teacher's attire is merely one element, is likely to compromise or influence the conscientious convictions of the students.\textsuperscript{501}

E. DISTRIBUTION OF BIBLES

In a recent survey of over 2,000 public school superintendents throughout the country, over 40 percent admitted that the distribution of Gideon Bibles to students was permitted through their schools.\textsuperscript{502} This practice is unquestionably solely religious,\textsuperscript{503} and the only two cases considering the problem that have reached the appellate level have found it to be in violation of the establishment clause.\textsuperscript{504}

There should be no dispute that the King James version of the Bible, which is the version distributed by the Gideons, is objectionable to a large number of religious faiths, and that the scruples of Roman Catholic children will be compromised by receipt of a copy.\textsuperscript{505} However, one might agree that this activity is, at best, mildly compulsive on the objectors as compared with some of those programs previously discussed.\textsuperscript{506} Consider the situation in \textit{Engel}; it would seem much less likely that a child, during the prayer recitation, would leave the room to stand outside with nothing to do,\textsuperscript{507} than that he would decline acceptance of a Bible. This would seem particularly true when the procedures for acquisition of the Bible were carefully drafted so as to avoid the singling

\textsuperscript{501} See Note, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 888, 890 (1955); text accompanying notes 560–63 infra.


\textsuperscript{503} The Gideons International is a nonprofit corporation . . . whose object is "to win men and women for the Lord Jesus Christ, through . . . (c) placing the Bible—God's Holy Words—or portions thereof in hotels, hospitals, schools, institutions, and also through the distribution of same for personal use."

\textsuperscript{504} Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 33, 100 A.2d 857, 858 (1953).


\textsuperscript{507} In fact, no child requested such permission although it had been provided for. Brief for Petitioners, p. 31, \textit{Engel v. Vitale}, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
out of nonconformists. Nonetheless, there has been expert testimony that the program, as administered, generated pressures to conform. If this factual premise remains unshaken, under the proposed constitutional standard the practice must cease.

F. SCHOOL CREDIT FOR OUTSIDE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION

It has been reported that "in a number of communities the public school—generally at the high school level—will give credit toward graduation for religious instruction obtained after public school hours or during week ends under the auspices of the child’s church." The purpose and effect of this program—sectarian indoctrination—is solely religious. If those students who do not participate will have to spend extra time in the public school acquiring these credits while the participants are dismissed, this program is no different from released time. Nonparticipants will be conspicuous and, if in the religious minorities, will be subject to pressures to compromise their beliefs. If there is only minority participation, the opportunity to avoid public school routine will likely influence free religious choice. But despite the unquestioned aid that religion would receive, these results would not follow if the public school arranged its schedule so that all students, regardless of whether they participated in outside religious classes, remained in school during the entire school day. Furthermore, if the school were to give credit for a number of extra-curricular educational courses that were of generally equal attractiveness, all pressures and incentives would seem to be removed, and the program should pass the proposed constitutional standard.

The fact that some time of public school administrators and teachers may be taken in insuring that the instruction is being taken by the students and being given by qualified personnel must be excused as de minimis. However, if the public schools insist on examining and grading the students on the basis of what they have learned, the program should probably be invalid. In such cases, pupils whose religious beliefs differ from those of the public school teacher will very likely be tempted to learn what they

508. In Tudor, parents simply had to sign a permission slip. Children whose parents had signed reported to a room "at the close of the session." No other students were present. No reason was to be stated when the announcement calling the students was made. 14 N.J. at 34–35, 100 A.2d at 858–59.
509. 14 N.J. at 50–52, 100 A.2d at 867–68.
510. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 305 (1953).
511. See text accompanying notes 141–47 supra.
believe will be generally acceptable or at least to assert this for examination purposes. Such a compromising element should be barred.

G. BACCALAUREATE AND GRADUATION

Baccalaureate exercises, under public school auspices, are widespread and have divided communities "with bitter conflict and tension." Many of these programs are "occasions to impart spiritual truths" and ordinarily include all the elements of a Protestant church service—processional hymn, invocation prayer, choral hymns, Bible reading, address by a clergyman, benediction prayer, and recessional hymn. These must be fairly characterized as solely religious activities whether the service is held on public school or church property. Certain faiths, particularly the Roman Catholic, forbid participation in exercises of this kind. Although nonparticipation is often permitted, it would likely be ineffective as far as inherent compulsion is concerned for reasons previously discussed. Thus, since participation would directly compromise some students' religious scruples, the establishment clause would be violated under the proposed constitutional standard. Of course, this would neither bar the individual churches from conducting baccalaureate services for members of their own faith nor prevent the public schools from having a nonreligious assembly program that is called a baccalaureate.

513. Almost 87% of school superintendents polled stated that the activity was engaged in in their school systems. Dierenfield, The Extent of Religious Influence in American Public Schools, 56 Religious Education 173, 175 (1961).


515. Sample comment by public school supervisor, quoted in Dierenfield, supra note 513, at 179.


517. Boyer, supra note 514 at 196, 205.

518. See Chamberlin v. Dade County School Bd., 17 Fla. Supp. 183, 197 (Cir. Ct. 1961). However, in West Virginia and Pennsylvania, recent instances are reported in which nonparticipating Catholic students were denied public awarding of their diplomas. See American Civil Liberties Union, 37th Annual Report 64 (1957); Pfeffer, op. cit. supra note 516, at 420.

519. However, it may be argued that the pressures on a nonconforming student to attend a single program are virtually nonexistent, especially when compared to the pressures generated to participate in an activity that occurs every day or once each week.

There have been several reports of public schools conducting their graduation exercises in church buildings.\textsuperscript{521} It this were the only available site for the occasion,\textsuperscript{522} it would be difficult to argue that this is a solely religious practice. Moreover, if this be the fact, the alternative argument for establishment clause violation is likewise inadmissible;\textsuperscript{523} despite any religious objections to the practice, the secular objective of having a suitable building may not be attained by alternative means.

Graduation invocations delivered by clergymen present a somewhat different problem. This part of the graduation program must be considered as solely religious despite efforts to make it nonsectarian. But there are several reasons why this program may be defended under the proposed constitutional standard. Research has not revealed that listening to the invocation is contrary to anyone's religious or conscientious beliefs. If this is true, the practice could not possibly result in compromising any student's conscientious scruples. And even if there were some objection, the atmosphere is not conducive to inherent compulsion to attend the invocation. The dissenting pupil need not absent himself from the entire program, and he will likely have the comfort of his parents' and relatives' presence and will be in the midst of many people outside his peer group.\textsuperscript{524} Finally, the fact that this is but a small segment of a program that a student attends but once makes fairly unpersuasive the "stamp of approval" argument for influencing religious beliefs advanced in connection with daily religious exercises in public school classes.\textsuperscript{525}

H. RELIGIOUS INSIGNIA

A North Dakota statute requires "a placard containing the ten commandments of the Christian religion to be displayed in a conspicuous place in every schoolroom, classroom, or other place where classes convene for instruction."\textsuperscript{526} Not long ago, a New York school board passed a resolution that a neutral version of the Ten

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{521} See State ex rel. Conway v. District Bd., 162 Wis. 482, 156 N.W. 477 (1916); American Civil Liberties Union, 34th Annual Report 51 (1954).
\textsuperscript{522} See Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 244 P.2d 520 (1952).
\textsuperscript{523} See text following note 346 supra.
\textsuperscript{524} The situation has been accurately compared to an opening of Congress or a presidential inauguration. Committee on Religion and Public Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, Relation of Religion to Public Education—A Study Document, International J. of Religious Education, Apr. 1960, pp. 21, 29.
\textsuperscript{525} See State ex rel. Conway v. District Bd., 162 Wis. 482, 495, 156 N.W. 477, 481 (1916).
\end{footnotes}
Commandments, amalgamating and modifying the Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant versions, be placed in each classroom. There has been a proposal in Massachusetts to place the words “In God We Trust” in every public schoolroom. All of these practices must be fairly characterized as solely religious, and all of these mottoes undoubtedly would be found violative of someone’s conscientious scruples. Aside from the fact that they arguably violate the establishment clause because they involve a measurable and perhaps substantial expenditure of public funds solely in aid of religion, it would seem that they would also fail under the standard proposed herein.

The identification of the public schools with these religiously oriented mottoes constantly in view of immature students with malleable minds and highest regard for the public school institution, is likely to result in influencing or compromising their religious beliefs. This should be contrasted with the placing of a Christmas creche on the public school lawn that “was not erected or displayed while school was in session” and where “no public funds were expended, nor was the time of any public employee involved in its erection or display.” The compromising or influencing potential here seems minimal indeed, as it probably also would if the creche were displayed within the school for a few days while classes were in session.

528. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 37TH ANNUAL REPORT 64 (1957).
529. The announced purpose of the New York program “was to strengthen the moral and spiritual values of the students in the school district.” See Note, 22 ALBANY L. REV. 156 (1958).
530. See ibid. Note that those theses that propose “neutrality” as the constitutional determinant would seem to permit all of these since there is no constitutional bar to other symbols such as the American or state flag or the sign of the Red Cross or Heart Fund. Indeed, this analysis might well permit the permanent erection of a Crucifix or Star of David or of any extremely sectarian motto. See note 464 supra.
531. See note 182 supra; 3 N.D. CENT. CODE § 15–47–10 (1960): “The superintendent of public instruction may cause such placards to be printed and may charge an amount therefor that will cover the cost of printing and distribution.”
535. Ibid.
I. FLAG PLEDGE AND PATRIOTIC SONGS

In 1954, Congress amended the pledge of allegiance to the flag to include the words “under God.” Whether as a general matter this is unconstitutional is not the question to be considered here. Rather, the issue is whether a school board’s requirement that the pledge be stated each day in the public schools violates the establishment clause. This is a difficult question when measured by the proposed constitutional standard. If the only purpose and effect of the inclusion of these words is to have the student recognize the existence of God and to inculcate religious beliefs, then the words should be stricken for reasons previously examined. However, it could be argued that this activity is not solely religious; that, unlike the Regents’ prayer that required an invocation of the Deity and a supplication to God, the flag pledge merely requires the recitation of an historical fact—that this nation was believed to have been founded “under God” and that most of our people currently believe this still to be the case. The recitation of the flag pledge would then be no different from the recitation of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address which, while involving the mention of God, does not demand that the student swear allegiance to Him but merely requires the student to learn American history. On this characterization, the activity is secular, and, under the proposed standard, the establishment clause would not demand its exclusion. If some student’s conscientious beliefs forbid participation, the free exercise clause demands that he be excused. The fact that he may be inherently compelled to participate is unfortunate but irrelevant.

Even accepting this line of argument, the issue may not be fully resolved. The distinction presented is exceedingly subtle, very likely too fine to be perceived by even an above-average student. There is little doubt that the inclusion of the words “under God” in a daily school exercise will result in compromising of some students’ conscientious scruples. Therefore, the argument that the establishment clause is violated because the state may accomplish its secular purpose—teaching students that the founding fathers and

540. See text accompanying notes 118–26 supra.
most citizens believe that this nation exists under God—just as effectively by less obtrusive means is quite forceful.\footnote{541}

An even closer question is presented by the public school activity of singing certain songs as part of the daily opening exercises. Some very popular patriotic compositions, such as "God Bless America" and the final stanza of "America,"\footnote{542} undeniably involve supplications to the Deity. This is probably true also of any number of songs. Nevertheless, it seems fair to contend that neither the purpose nor the effect of these is solely religious; the thrust of these songs is to instill love of country and not love of God. This argument becomes even more persuasive when the entire content and spirit of the remaining parts of the opening exercises is nonreligious. Perhaps this argument stretches the principle a bit. But even ardent separationists agree that this activity is secular.\footnote{543} Therefore, while the free exercise clause may demand the right of nonparticipation for students whose scruples forbid them from taking part, under the proposed standard, the establishment clause does not forbid the practice. The alternative position for establishment clause violation may also be satisfied by the contention that, since these songs have become something of an American tradition, it is doubtful that the state's secular purpose may be achieved \textit{just as effectively} with their elimination. As to the third stanza of "The Star-Spangled Banner,"\footnote{544} the analysis above is even more forceful, especially since the words do not involve an invocation to God but are more like the recitation of historical facts.

\section*{J. Holiday Observance}

The commemoration of certain religious holidays is a very com-
mon public school practice. Many of the forms that this takes may not be fairly characterized as solely religious. Nor do many of these practices lend themselves to student participation. The presence of these two factors would clearly preclude an establishment clause violation under the proposed principle. Thus, the placing of a Christmas tree or an Easter bunny in the public school has virtually no religious significance and, even if it did, its short lived presence, combined with its scant religious import, would seem to have minimal effect.

The singing of religious songs and the staging of religious pageants are entirely another matter. While the tenor of some holiday songs (for example, "White Christmas" and "Jingle Bells") and of some plays (for example, Dickens’ "Christmas Carol") is quite clearly associated with our people’s culture rather than with their religious beliefs, this cannot fairly be said of those whose language and purport is Christological, devotional, or otherwise religious. The evidence of the inherent compulsion on members of religious minorities to participate in these songs and pageants is substantial. At a school in which Jewish children were in the majority, a sixth grade pupil asked to be excused from the singing of Christmas hymns; after class, she "was belabored by her classmates with such epithets as 'Christ-killer who refuses to sing hymns to Jesus Christ.'" In reaction to or in anticipation of such occurrences, "many Jewish children, with the blend of ingenuousness and ingenuity natural to their age, . . . often engage in one or another subterfuge to produce the appearance of cooperation in the school celebration without at the same time genuinely participating in violation of their religious convictions."

545. A recent study showed that Christmas was celebrated in 88% of the public schools polled; Easter, 58%; Hanukkah, 5%; Passover, 2%. Dierenfield, The Extent of Religious Influence in American Public Schools, 56 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 173, 176-77 (1961).

546. THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 214 (Barnhart ed. 1959) gives, as a definition of Christmas: "Dec. 25 (Christmas Day), now generally observed as an occasion for gifts, greetings, etc." See also PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 407 (1953); Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the Public Schools, 22 U. PIT. L. REV. 561, 573 (1961).

547. Cf. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 546, at 406:
Nor can any non-Jew rightfully assert that such singing ["Come, let us adore Him, Christ the Lord," or "Born is the King of Israel"] will not violate the Jewish child's religious conscience, any more than the school principals in the 19th century could rightfully assert that the Catholic child's religious conscience would not be violated by reading from the King James Bible.

548. Id. at 407.

549. PFEFFER & BAUM, PUBLIC SCHOOL SECTARIANISM AND THE JEWISH CHILD 6 (1957). See examples cited id. at 7-9; Franck, quoted in
that this produces is quite obvious. No doubt, many less determined children fully sacrifice their religious scruples by joining their colleagues. These solely religious activities that require student participation, whether it be the singing of hymns or the acting in plays, are likely to result in compromising conscientious convictions.\footnote{550} Nor is the practice validated under the establishment clause by celebrating the holidays of a greater number of religious faiths. Since religious leaders of all faiths have objected to this,\footnote{551} it would only seem to compound the difficulty.

Nothing that has been said would deter examination, in the public school curriculum, of certain aspects of religious holidays as an academic matter. Thus, the singing and learning of religious hymns in a music class, as part of the study of different types of musical compositions, must be fairly characterized as secular activity.\footnote{552} Likewise, the occasional showing of motion pictures that depict various religious happenings may be of considerable educational value,\footnote{553} and, even if not, the quantum of participation required would be so slight that it is unlikely that the compromising or influencing of conscientious scruples would occur. This last instance is to be contrasted with a public school group activity of making religious cut-outs to be pasted on the schoolroom windows and walls.\footnote{554} Here, the element of inherent compulsion seems quite powerful, and under the proposed constitutional standard, if the children were required to make only religiously significant pictures, and this practice were contrary to their religious beliefs, the establishment clause would be violated.

\section*{K. Public Schools in Parochial Buildings}

In a small percentage of school districts throughout the country, public school classes are held in church owned buildings.\footnote{555}

\begin{thebibliography}{10}

\footnote{550}{But see Levy, \textit{Views From the Wall—Reflections on Church-State Relationships}, 29 \textit{Hennepin Law.} 51, 56 (1961).}

\footnote{551}{See Pfeffer, \textit{op. cit. supra} note 546, at 410–12; \textit{American Civil Liberties Union}, 41st \textit{Annual Report} 27–28 (1961).}

\footnote{552}{See Pfeffer, \textit{Court, Constitution and Prayer}, 16 \textit{Rutgers L. Rev.} 735, 750 (1962).}

\footnote{553}{But see Chamberlin v. Dade County School Bd., 17 Fla. Supp. 183, 196 (Cir. Ct. 1961).}

\footnote{554}{Cf. Sutherland, \textit{Due Process and Disestablishment}, 62 \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} 1306, 1344 (1949).}

\footnote{555}{Dierenfield, \textit{The Extent of Religious Influence in American Public Schools}, 56 \textit{Religious Education} 173, 177 (1961), reports almost 8\%.}

\end{thebibliography}
This practice has spawned a good deal of litigation in the state courts. If the practice involves no more than the school board's renting the only available property, it may hardly be fairly characterized as solely religious. Thus, there would be no violation of the establishment clause, either under the proposed constitutional standard or under the alternative test previously discussed. The fact that the school rooms have religious pictures and decorations would possibly not alter these conclusions, despite the fact that their placement in an ordinary public school would be objectionable; if, irrespective of the religious decor, the church building is still found to be the best available space, the issue is entirely different. It may be reasonably argued that no matter how great the amount of religious infusion in the environment due to quasi-control by the church, the school board's practice of using parochial buildings cannot be said to be solely religious, either in purpose or in effect; in each instance, it is the considered judgment of the public school board that, on balance, these are the best available facilities for public education. Perhaps this would immunize the practice under the proposed standard.

This may not be the case in regard to the alternative criterion for establishment clause violation. It is ultimately the function of the Court to determine whether "on balance, these are the best available facilities" and whether the secular end may not be attained by less objectionable means. It has been suggested that the solution here is: "that which is legally tolerable ends where the religious infusion becomes unreasonably great." But certain guidelines may be established. Public officials should not be permitted to abdicate their responsibility of selecting teachers and textbooks to clerical authorities. The potentiality for unchecked religious indoctrination of public school students in these cir-

556. See Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801, 806-07 (Ky. 1956).
557. See text accompanying note 523 supra.
559. This line of argument assumes, of course, that the pictures and decorations are there without the consent of the public school officials. If they had control over these matters, then the retention of these decorations could be accurately described as a solely religious activity.
cumstances would seem so great\textsuperscript{562} that no justification for it should be held acceptable, perhaps even if the result is tantamount to the temporary suspension of the so-called "public" education. The same, of course, must be said if the result of the use of the parochial buildings is compulsory religious teaching.\textsuperscript{563} In such cases, the Court should find that alternative means (for example, construction of an independent public school building or arranging for public education in another school district) must be used to accomplish the secular end of providing a public education. Even if the Constitution permits the use of public funds to aid parochial education, this is no authority for the proposition that the state may demand that children of all faiths who wish a "public education" attend a publicly supported institution that is essentially no different from a parochial school.

On the other hand, if the unalterable consequences of using church property for public education are that the schools, granting the right of nonparticipation, engage in certain solely religious practices such as prayers and worship in daily chapel exercises\textsuperscript{564} or programs of religious instruction akin to released time,\textsuperscript{565} the Court should place a heavy burden on the state to demonstrate that less objectionable means do not exist. Otherwise, all the protections afforded religious liberty in the public schools that have been discussed may be easily circumvented by turning over some of the control of public education to the clergy of a particular religious faith.\textsuperscript{566}


\textsuperscript{563} See cases cited note 562 \textit{supra}.

\textsuperscript{564} See Williams v. Board of Trustees, 172 Ky. 133, 134, 188 S.W. 1058 (1916); Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist., 364 Mo. 121, 131–32, 260 S.W.2d 573, 577–78 (1953).


\textsuperscript{566} \textit{Cf.} Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 725–26, 166 N.W. 202, 213 (1918):

\[W]henever the adherents of any particular creed can command a majority of any school board, it may abandon the schoolhouse provided for the common and equal use of all the people, move the school into some church or some parochial or private building established for sectarian use, put in charge of it trained ecclesiastics bound by solemn vows to devote their lives, their services, and all their God-given powers to the advancement of the interest of their church, fill the school with distinctive emblems of their faith, and by a multitude
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has not been to reconcile the myriad of state court decisions involving the problems of religion and the public schools. There has been no attempt to demonstrate the existence of an internal consistency even within the very few cases decided by the Supreme Court. Nor has the endeavor been to predict the outcome of future litigation. While the recent decision in Engel v. Vitale has been examined, it has not been suggested that the case permits of only one interpretation. Rather, the purpose here has been to submit a rational and desirable standard for constitutional adjudication in this area, and to demonstrate its application in some specific situations. In many of these instances, "nice" distinctions have been drawn. But a "boundary line is none the worse for being narrow."567 It should be made clear that "the principle offered is meant to provide a starting point for solutions to problems brought before the Court, not a mechanical answer to them."568 If some of the underlying factual premises advanced here are shown to be incorrect, the results suggested must be changed. But the principle should be adhered to.

Central to the theme of this article has been the fact that it is vital to the preservation of religious liberty to recognize that although "you send your child to the schoolmaster . . . 'tis the schoolboys who educate him."569 Voluntariness is a concept, not merely a word. "Compulsion which comes from circumstances can be as real as compulsion which comes from a command."570 If the price for the protection of religious liberty in the public schools is the abolition of certain religious influences,571 that price must be paid. Although this conclusion may be said to manifest no more than "the traditional American weakness of identifying our own preferences and predilections with the Constitution,"572 the effort has been made to submerge these preferences and predilections in favor of historical and contemporary national goals.

569. EMERSON, THE CONDUCT OF LIFE 123 (1860).