Why is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute

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ABSTRACT

The United States has policed the multinational effects of multinational corporations more aggressively than any other country, but recent decisions under the Alien Tort Statute indicate that it is now backtracking. Europe, paradoxically, is moving in the other direction. Why do some countries retract extraterritorial jurisdiction while others step forward? The article traces the opposing trends through corporate human rights cases and suggests that the answer may lie in attitudes towards national sovereignty. The developments raise important questions regarding the position of the United States in a globalizing world and its role in upholding international norms.

INTRODUCTION

For several decades, the United States has acted as the global leader in imposing accountability on multinational corporations in the area of human rights. Recently, however, U.S. courts have declined jurisdiction to police their extraterritorial abuses. In September 2010, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that corporations fall outside the purview of the key legal mechanism used to hold them accountable, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The *

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1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). Since the Kiobel decision, other circuit courts have considered whether the ATS allows for extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporate defendants. Conflicting authorities have resulted. Compare Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (2011); Sarei
ruling deprived residents of the Ogoni region of Nigeria of their legal claim against Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport and Trading Company, though military forces the corporations hired to suppress environmental protesters had shot and killed some civilians, and had beaten and raped others.\(^2\)

The retraction in the willingness of U.S. courts to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over multinationals is occurring just as the courts of many European member states are becoming more open to it. The English High Court recently took review of the\(^3\) Monterrico case, which involves claims of thirty-two indigenous Peruvians that an English corporation, owned by a Chinese consortium and headquartered in Hong Kong, aided and abetted their torture by the Peruvian Police.\(^3\) The District Court in The Hague, meanwhile, will adjudicate the claims of four Nigerian villagers who allege that oil spills caused by Royal Dutch Shell deprived them of their livelihood, even though a similar proceeding is advancing in Nigeria.\(^4\)

For now, the United States has pursued more cases than any EU member state, but the attitudes reflected in the corporate human rights jurisprudence of the two regions appear to be evolving in opposite directions.\(^5\) The question of

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\(^1\) See supra Sections III and IV. See also Obstacles to Justice and Redress for Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuse, OXFORD PRO BONO PUBLICO, 332-33, 338-40 (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www2.law.ox.ac.uk/opbp/Oxford-Pro-Bono-Publico-submission-to-Ruggie-3-Nov-2008.pdf;

\(^2\) v. Rio Tinto, PLC, Nos. 02-56256, 02-56390, 09-56381, 2011 WL 5041927 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2011); see also Aziz v. Alcolac Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 394 n.6 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 2011) (declining to reach question of corporate liability and dismissing on alternative grounds). To address the developing split, the Supreme Court will review Kiobel, and it is widely predicted to, at a minimum, narrow corporate jurisdiction under the statute. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court to Decide if 1789 Law Applies to Shell in 2012, FORBES, Dec. 20, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/12/20/supreme-court-to-decide-if-1789-law-applies-to-shell-today/ (“The Roberts Court is also likely to trim the sails of plaintiff lawyers who want to use the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act to pursue 21st-century class actions.”); Stephen M. Nickelsburg & Erin Louise Palmer, Supreme Court To Decide Corporate Liability Under Alien Tort Claims Act, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Dec. 2011, at 6, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/16694/supreme-court-decide-corporate-liability-under-alien-tort-claims-act (“Even if the Supreme Court concludes that corporations can be liable under the ATCA, however, numerous questions regarding the statute’s interpretation continue to vex the lower courts and could limit corporate liability.”); Lisa Ann T. Ruggiero, Joseph E. Hopkins & Anthony Molloy, What Were They Thinking? How a Circuit Split Over Mens Rea Could Resolve the Alien Tort Statute Corporate Liability, 207 N.J. L.J. 503 (2012) (“Indeed, even if Kiobel is overturned by the Court, not all will be lost for corporations if the Court subsequently reviews Doe v. ExxonMobil.”).

\(^3\) Kiobel, 621 F.3d. at 123.


\(^5\) See supra Sections III and IV.
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why, in an increasingly interconnected world, the United States is growing less tolerant of extraterritorial adjudication just as EU member states are entering the field, is what this article seeks to explain.

What happened? Thanks to an innovative application of the Alien Tort Statute, the United States emerged as a staunch protector of foreign plaintiffs. Throughout recent decades, no nation did more to enforce universally recognized international norms against multinational corporations. However, not only have U.S. courts recently called into doubt the applicability of the ATS to corporations, but they also have recently decided that corporations cannot be sued under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act does not apply to extraterritorial corporate activities, and that the principal antifraud provision of the federal securities laws does not apply extraterritorially to foreign transactions, even when fraudulent conduct has occurred within the United States.

What is compelling here is not that the United States is acting inconsistently. Rather, what is puzzling is why EU member states are increasingly a driving force behind the enforcement of corporate standards and why the United States is reversing course. The paradox of a leader potentially lagging behind warrants exploration.

The aim of this article is wider than simply describing the trend. Instead, the article is focused on understanding the reasons behind the U.S. evolution in comparative perspective. While many articles have criticized the recent U.S. approach to extraterritoriality, none has considered the moves made by U.S. courts in global context. Part II discusses the attributes of the corporate form that make it susceptible to human rights abuses and establishes why extraterritorial jurisdiction is necessary for regulating the conduct of multinational corporations. Part III examines case law under the ATS leading up to the decision that the statute does not apply to corporations. Part IV investigates the means through which EU member states are beginning to address the foreign conduct of


corporations, without an equivalent statute providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over causes of action in customary international law. Part V suggests that different cultural attitudes towards sovereignty, rooted in history, animate the current approach each region takes towards extraterritoriality. The article concludes by proposing that instead of depending on U.S. courts to adjudicate extraterritorial claims, even as they grow increasingly hostile to them, alternative forums could develop human rights norms in international law to achieve accountability.

The developments in the United States raise fundamental questions about its position in a globalized world. Among them: Should the United States seek to project a moral example beyond its borders? What is the correct scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction within the U.S. legal system? To what extent should the United States accept constraints on its sovereignty and join international regulatory initiatives?

I.

POLICING THE MULTINATIONAL EFFECTS OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS REQUIRES EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

As corporations have become increasingly transnational, they have outgrown the national corporate law regimes designed to govern them. The modern multinational corporation, bearing little resemblance to the archetypal sole trader operating alone within his own country or the early corporation selling shares to individual investors, is now difficult to hold accountable in spite of the susceptibility of corporations to human rights abuses. To fill the resulting governance gap, extraterritorial jurisdiction has become necessary.


14. There are few international bodies with enforcement power over companies. U.N. committees can investigate in conjunction with the Torture Convention, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is enforced by the European Court of Human Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights is overseen by the Inter-American Commission and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is implemented by the African Commission. The French delegation led efforts to include corporate liability in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but consensus was impossible. See Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 189, 199 (Lee ed., 1999).
A. Modern multinational corporations transcend national jurisdiction

Today roughly 80,000 multinational corporations with ten times as many subsidiaries operate on a global scale, far beyond the borders of any single territory, but this was not always the case.\textsuperscript{15} Intercorporate stock ownership originally was outlawed in the United States and Europe.\textsuperscript{16} The first holding company act, which allowed corporations to buy and hold stock in other corporations, was not adopted until 1888.\textsuperscript{17}

Over time, corporations used their rights of intercorporate ownership to cluster separate corporations into global networks of subsidiaries, achieving levels of transnationality and economic power at odds with territorially based laws.\textsuperscript{18} Cross-shareholding, inter-enterprise contracts, linked directorships, and concentrated voting rights became common.\textsuperscript{19} While the interlocking, international structures of the modern enterprises enabled more efficient delivery of goods and the standardization of products, the scope and financial strength of the networks now threatens to overshadow individual states.\textsuperscript{20} Separate legal regimes continue to govern each national unit of multinational corporations, in spite of the broader international strategy that each jointly


\textsuperscript{16} See, e.g., Central R.R. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582 (1869); Hazelhurst v. Savannah, Griffin & N. Ala. R.R., 43 Ga. 13 (1871); First National Bank v. Nat’l Exch. Bank, 92 U.S. 122, 128 (1875) ("Dealing in stocks is not expressly prohibited; but such a prohibition is implied from the failure to grant the power"); Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Inst. for Sav., 68 Me. 43, 46 (1877); Rumänischen Eisenbahn case of 1881, 3 RGZ 123 (Ger.); Petroleum case of 1913, 82 RGZ 308 (Ger.). See also René Reich-Graef, \textit{Changing Paradigms: The Liability of Corporate Groups in Germany}, 37 \textit{CONN. L. REV.} 785 (2005) (discussing fact corporate stock ownership outlawed in Europe and German law unique in changing this in German Stock Corporation Act of 1965).

\textsuperscript{17} 1888 N.J. Laws 385-86; 1888 N.J. Laws 445-46. See also Meredith Dearborn, \textit{Enterprise Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups}, 97 \textit{CAL. L. REV.} 195, 203 (2009) ("In 1888, New Jersey was the first state to grant permission for any corporation chartered in the state to own stock in any other").

\textsuperscript{18} See, e.g., Olivier De Schutter, \textit{Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a Tool for Improving the Human Rights Accountability of Transnational Corporations}, \textit{BUSAESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE} 40 (Nov. 3-4, 2006), http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/775593 (background paper to the seminar organized in collaboration with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Brussels) ("the multinational corporation appears as a coordinator of the activities of its subsidiaries, which function as a network of organizations working along functional lines").


pursues.  

B. Limited liability and separate legal personality insulate multinational corporations from accountability

The national corporate law systems governing the individual units originated prior to the proliferation of interconnected multinationals and do not translate well to them. While countries generally want to attract investment from multinationals in order to gain access to foreign capital, international markets, and new technologies and training, the same advantages make them difficult to hold accountable under national corporate laws. Their ability to abuse the corporate form, however, is by now well known. Delegated decision making, asset partitioning, and other corporate attributes make them susceptible to abuse by actors who treat human rights norms lightly. From I.G. Farben during World War II to Union Carbide in Bhopal, they have long caused significant harm. Many multinational corporations operate in conflict-affected regions where “bad things are known to happen,” structuring their risky ventures to avoid liability.

The lack of correspondence between the corporate form designed for single corporate enterprises and the integrated economic form of multinational

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22. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, supra note 12 at 54 (“Multinational corporations have long outgrown the legal structures that govern them, reaching a level of transnationality and economic power that exceeds domestic law’s ability to impose basic human rights norms”); ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (1996) (“the law has not kept up with reality . . . law was developed with a view to a single firm operating out of a single state, owned by shareholders who . . . were not other corporations”).


corporations makes the corporate fiction problematic.\textsuperscript{26} The act of incorporation carries with it an artificial separate legal personality, dividing the incorporated enterprises and their shareholder-owners into separate spheres and bestowing limited liability on the owners.\textsuperscript{27} The theory of limited liability developed to encourage individuals to invest, so that corporations could pool capital and put it to efficient use.\textsuperscript{28} Limited liability, however, continues to apply to corporate owners within multinational corporations, without distinguishing their incentives from those of human investors.\textsuperscript{29}

While the doctrines of separate legal personality and limited liability protect individual shareholders against losses that exceed their initial investments, thus encouraging them to invest, the doctrines have different consequences when they apply to corporations.\textsuperscript{30} Multinationals can exploit them to shield parent corporations from liability for human rights abuses committed by their foreign subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{31} If they strategically insulate dangerous activities within separate entities,\textsuperscript{32} the corporate fiction ensures that each one remains legally separate in spite of their economic interdependence, and limited liability protects the parent corporations against responsibility.\textsuperscript{33}


\textsuperscript{27} See, e.g., Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932) (“A corporation and its stockholders are generally to be treated as separate entities”); Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1949) (“Normally the corporation is an insulator from liability on claims of creditors”); see also Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6 1965, BGBl. § 1; art. 5 French loi du 24 juillet 1966; English Companies Act, 1985, §§ 1, 13 (Eng.). For examples of limited liability legislation, see, 1830 Mass. Acts 325, 329, Act of Feb. 23, 1830 ch. 53, S 8; Limited Liability Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 133; Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c. 47.


\textsuperscript{29} See, e.g., Andreas Lowenfeld, supra note 22 at 83-85.


\textsuperscript{31} See, e.g., De Schutter, supra note 18, at 36.

\textsuperscript{32} Stiglitz (2007-2008), supra note 23, at 474; José Engrácia Antunes, Enterprise Forms and Enterprise Liability – Is There a Paradox in Modern Corporation Law? In: II REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO 187, 217 (2005) (187-225) (“In some cases MNCs take a country’s natural resources, paying but a pittance while leaving behind an environmental disaster. When called upon by the government to clean up the mess, the MNC announces that it is bankrupt: All of the revenues have already been paid out to shareholders. In these circumstances, MNCs are taking advantage of limited liability”).

\textsuperscript{33} See, e.g., Lowenfeld, supra note 22, at 82. For a private international law perspective on gaps in governance, see Horatia Muir-Watt, Private International Law as Global Governance: Beyond the Schize, from Closet to Planet, (2011), available at http://works.bepress.com/horatia_muir-watt/1.
C. Accountability requires extraterritoriality

In this way, multinational corporations challenge the effectiveness of national corporate law systems, and a recognition has emerged that their regulation demands legal liability beyond national borders and across corporate groups. Extraterritoriality, a legal doctrine that allows judicial systems to exercise authority outside the typical jurisdiction, has become a tool for countering the accountability gap that globalization has caused. Extraterritorial jurisdiction can be used to impose responsibility in situations where no single system has the capacity to find multinationals at fault.

Without extraterritoriality, the host countries of the subsidiaries that committed human rights abuses generally would take jurisdiction over their actions within the national territory. Often, however, multinational corporations can manipulate territorially based jurisdiction to evade liability. To begin with, they can distribute actions that collectively amount to illegalities across many separate entities, so that each individually has operated within the law. If the harmful conduct is carried out in countries other than where its effects are felt, evading the competence of the territorial jurisdiction becomes even easier. Second, even if liability could be imposed on one unit of a multinational, the unit can shift its financial assets within the corporate group, exhausting the funds that would otherwise have been recoverable in the territorial jurisdiction.

34. See, e.g., Schutter, supra note 18, at 21 (“the interdependencies created by the activities of such transnational actors, and the need to devise an adequate reaction”); Zerk, supra note 11, at 5; Michael Addo, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations – an Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 11 (Michael Addo ed., 1999) (“Of all the characteristics of the law it is its predominantly domestic focus which impedes its effectiveness in the regulation of transnational corporations of today”).


36. On the principle of territorial jurisdiction, see U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2, art. 2, para. 4; Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); see also Stephens, supra note 12, at 82.

37. See, e.g., Michael Addo, supra note 34, at 11.


39. See, e.g., De Schutter, supra note 18, at 21.

40. Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty Of States To Enact And Enforce Legislation,
In addition, in a territorial system, even if a single entity acting within a single national jurisdiction has committed a wrong, and even if the entity has not protected its assets by transferring them outside of the jurisdiction, multinational corporations can still rely on their economic strength to evade liability.\textsuperscript{42} In many cases, the countries where the harm occurred will not have made the actions of the corporations illegal so as not to discourage foreign investment.\textsuperscript{43} Even if the actions are illegal, the multinationals can still wield their power to avoid punishment: they can pressure local authorities not to prosecute them, offering continued investment. Local authorities, moreover, frequently have been complicit in wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{44} When prosecutions do proceed, the host countries often lack functioning legal systems or may not have sufficient resources to bring multinationals to justice.\textsuperscript{45}

Extraterritoriality surmounts some of the difficulties by enabling litigation to take place in alternative jurisdictions, either through the direct horizontal application of international laws, as is the case under the ATS in the United States, or through a vertical collapsing of the separation between the parent corporations and the subsidiaries that they own, as has become prevalent in Europe.\textsuperscript{46} The former can be justified under a theory of supranational liability, which assumes that multinational corporations are no longer closely connected to any particular country and have outgrown the exclusive jurisdiction of the territory in which the human rights abuses took place.\textsuperscript{47} The latter mechanism of accountability reflects an enterprise theory of liability and presumes that multinationals, though aggregates of legally separate corporations, are organized as single economic units, so every act of the subsidiaries may be imputed to


\textsuperscript{42} On jurisdiction generally, see Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2008); Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (2011).

\textsuperscript{43} G.A. Res. 60/251, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add.2 (Feb. 15, 2007) (“the state lacks both the ability and inclination to exercise jurisdiction, particularly where it seeks to encourage companies registered on its territory to expand their overseas operations”); Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis Of Domestic Remedies For International Human Rights Violations, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 32 (2002) (“the local municipal law might not recognize the underlying facts as a tort at all”).


\textsuperscript{45} See McLeay, supra note 13, at 5.

\textsuperscript{46} 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); infra Section III.A.

their parent corporations.48 The enterprise theory differs from the usual entity-based approach, in which the separate legal personality of subsidiaries only can be overlooked when they display no will or existence of their own, which is determined through scrutiny of the relationship between the subsidiaries and their parent corporations.49

Extraterritoriality, however, remains controversial.50 Some argue that it is improper to interfere in the domestic affairs of territorial jurisdictions and suggest that each deserves the opportunity to develop local institutions to address local problems.51 The criticisms assume that multinational corporations can be held accountable within a single jurisdiction, even though the wrongdoing may have taken place across multiple countries, evading any territorially bounded prohibition. Other critics defend the interests of the multinationals themselves, stressing that extraterritoriality forces them to comply with conflicting requirements of multiple jurisdictions, leading to legal uncertainty and additional expense.52 These arguments, however, overlook the fact that foreign subsidiaries generally form part of integrated corporate groups under common management. The public relates to multinational corporations at the level of the parent corporations that control each separate unit, and so the parents can be expected to run them in compliance with the laws of the parent jurisdictions. Indeed, multinationals targeted in boycotts and divestment campaigns have not denied that they were doing business in foreign territories that they were doing business in foreign territories.


51. De Schutter, supra note 18, at 7, 10.

52. See, e.g., Ruggie, supra note 25, at 5.
by suggesting that only their independent subsidiaries conducted activities there.53

II.
THE ATS OVERCAME THE OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY, BUT MOUNTING RESISTANCE TO EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION HAS CULMINATED IN POTENTIAL IMMUNITY FOR CORPORATE DEFENDANTS

In the United States, the ATS offered a cause of action in international law coupled with extraterritorial jurisdiction to overcome many of the obstacles to liability described in the previous section.54 Although not its original purpose, Filártigav. Peña-Irala and Doe v. Unocal construed the statute as a tool foreign plaintiffs could use to hold transnational corporations accountable for human rights abuses abroad.55 The claims always have been difficult to bring, however, and they increasingly appear to occupy an uncomfortable position within the U.S. legal system.56 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court restricted the range of international laws that may enter U.S. courts through the statute, emphasizing separation of powers concerns with extraterritorial jurisdiction.57 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, recently handed down in the Second Circuit, narrowed the statute to exclude corporate defendants, reflecting similar uneasiness with nondomestic laws and extraterritoriality.58

A. The ATS brings international laws into U.S. courts for external application against foreign defendants

The ATS allowed U.S. courts to consider external international rules and exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, and thus enabled the adjudication of claims concerning the multinational effects of multinational corporate wrongdoing. Though this was an unintended use of the statute, U.S. courts initially condoned it, reflecting U.S. leadership in human rights.59

53. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, supra note 22, at 99-105.
59. De Schutter, supra note 18, at 6.
Enacted in 1789 with little surviving legislative history, the ATS states: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Its original purpose appears to have been to assure other governments that foreign diplomats and merchants living in the United States would have access to legal remedies.

First used in actions against foreign officials and repressive regimes, and then applied to corporate defendants, the ATS prior to Kiobel offered foreign plaintiffs the ability to hold any defendant accountable in the United States, provided they could make out a cause of action under international law. The statute applied to foreign subsidiaries with separate legal personalities and the harms they caused outside of the United States. The legislation therefore has functioned in both an inward and an outward direction: it has conveyed international causes of actions into federal common law, and it has allowed U.S. courts to impose jurisdiction outward over foreign claims so that they may be adjudicated in the United States.

After nearly two hundred years of nonuse, in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala the ATS enabled a Paraguayan father and his daughter to redress the kidnapping and torture of his son by a Paraguayan police officer. The domestic suit they had brought in Paraguay stalled when the defendant-police officer arrested and threatened their lawyer and another person falsely pleaded guilty. The ATS, however, provided U.S. federal court as an alternative. The Second Circuit found federal question jurisdiction over the claim between Paraguayan citizens because “the law of nations . . . has always been a part of the federal common law.” The court found torture to be a violation of the law of nations, citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other UN documents, and therefore

60. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (“no one seems to know whence it came”).


63. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2010).

64. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1124-28 (9th Cir. 2010); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009).


66. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (2d Cir. 1980).

67. Id. at 885.
actionable under the statute. Filártiga transformed the ATS into a tool for remedying human rights violations committed abroad. The opinion endorsed the domestic integration of international laws and extraterritorial jurisdiction, stating that the federal common law incorporates new international norms as “part of an evolutionary process” and that “[i]t is not extraordinary for a court to adjudicate a tort claim arising outside of its territorial jurisdiction.” The court aspired to make torture “an enemy of all mankind.”

A flurry of cases against foreign officials and repressive regimes followed Filártiga. The cases offered no real prospect of recovery, but their documentary and symbolic functions elicited approval, at least outside of the D.C. Circuit. Law review articles dissecting the cases also supported the role of the statute in stimulating the development of international law. Overall, the new use of the statute seemed well received, perhaps because the need to allege a violation of the law of nations and to withstand motions asserting forum non

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68. Id. at 879-83.


70. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 885, 887.

71. Id. at 890.


73. Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 61, 103 (2008) (“ATS judgments against individual defendants provide invaluable symbolic vindication for plaintiffs and can deter human rights abusers from entering or remaining in the United States, but money judgments against these defendants are notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to collect. Defendants might not have significant assets in the United States, and U.S. judgments can be difficult to enforce abroad”); Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 516 (2011) (“In ATS litigation, American courts have heard cases brought by aliens on account of human rights violations. This litigation has produced some successes, including both symbolic victories against judgment-proof individuals and monetary settlements with corporations allegedly complicit in human rights abuses committed by governments. Human rights treaties have famously weak enforcement mechanisms—some create toothless committees or commissions, others create nothing at all—and litigation in the United States provides a potential avenue for enforcement that is both procedurally sound and more likely to produce tangible victories For this reason, Koh supports this litigation”); Brian Seth Parker, Applying the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility to Corporate Officers: A Theory of Individual Liability for International Human Rights Violations, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (“Beyond monetary redress, ATS litigation provides plaintiffs with symbolic vindication and empowerment while serving as a deterrent against future corporate complicity in international law violations”).

74. Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 175 (2004) (“Hundreds of law review articles analyzing the Filártiga doctrine were overwhelmingly favorable”).
conveniens or sovereign immunity limited the number of claims that could proceed to judgment.\textsuperscript{75}

The D.C. Circuit alone took a more hostile view of the statute and sought to restrict the scope of international law that could come into domestic courts for extraterritorial application. In \textit{Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic}, a claim by Israeli citizens against a Palestinian organization for a terrorist attack in Haifa, Judge Bork stated in a split-panel decision that only Congress could create causes of action.\textsuperscript{76} It therefore followed, he said, that the ATS could not incorporate new causes of action within the meaning of the law of nations as it evolved.\textsuperscript{77} Judge Bork would have limited the incorporation of international laws into U.S. law to the few norms recognized in 1789, when Congress adopted the ATS.\textsuperscript{78} All three judges on the \textit{Tel-Oren} panel declined to impose judgment extraterritorially over events that took place in Israel.\textsuperscript{79} Doing so, they wrote, would amount to the conduct of foreign relations, which separation of powers principles reserve exclusively for the political branches.\textsuperscript{80} Both arguments have reappeared in more recent decisions involving corporations.\textsuperscript{81}

\textbf{B. The ATS extended extraterritorial jurisdiction to multinational corporate defendants}

Corporations provide easier targets for ATS claims than individuals or repressive regimes, and litigators seized the opportunity. The 2001 \textit{Doe v. Unocal} case offered to charge them with complicity in human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{82} Suits against corporations have reached actions taken by many individuals that only collectively amount to illegalities.\textsuperscript{83} Sovereign immunity has not protected

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} \textit{Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic}, 726 F.2d 774, 801-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
\item \textsuperscript{77} \textit{Id.} at 808-19.
\item \textsuperscript{79} \textit{Tel-Oren}, 726 F.2d at 775-76, 798-99, 823-27.
\item \textsuperscript{80} \textit{Id.} at 799, 803-804, 823-827.
\item \textsuperscript{81} \textit{See infra} section B.
\item \textsuperscript{82} \textit{See} Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001), \textit{vacated} 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
\item \textsuperscript{83} For cases involving suing a corporation to reach the actions of many individuals, \textit{see, e.g.},
\end{itemize}
corporations as it has governments. Most large corporations have maintained permanent presences within the United States, making it possible to establish personal jurisdiction over them. Corporations also have had more substantial recoverable assets and stronger incentives to settle claims to avoid negative publicity than other defendants.

In *Doe v. Unocal*, a federal court reviewed for the first time whether the ATS applied to corporate complicity in human rights abuses, relying on an earlier case, *Kadic v. Karadzic*. While liability under international laws generally necessitates state action, the *jus cogens* crimes of slave trading, genocide, and war crimes do not require it. In *Kadic*, the Second Circuit found that nonstate actors also violate international laws when they commit crimes that further a separate *jus cogens* crime. The court therefore allowed an ATS claim alleging genocide against the leader of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, even though the Bosnian-Serb Republic did not qualify as a state.

In *Doe v. Unocal*, the Ninth Circuit endorsed ATS suits against corporations, largely on the basis that *Kadic* already implicitly allowed claims against private actors. The case concerned allegations that a subsidiary of Unocal was complicit with its security partner, the Myanmar military, in the assault, rape, torture, and murder of villagers in Burma. The full circuit voted for *en banc* review to determine the correct standard for aiding and abetting liability, vacating the judgment of the prior panel. Before the *en banc* opinion issued, however, the parties settled the case.

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90. *Id.* at 251.

91. *Doe v. Unocal Corp.*, 395 F.3d 932, 945-55 (9th Cir. 2002).

92. *Id.*, at 936-37.

93. *Doe v. Unocal Corp.*, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).

94. Press Release, Unocal Corp., Settlement Reached in Human Rights Lawsuit, (Dec. 13,
Since Unocal, plaintiffs have sued corporations under the ATS and extracted a few large payouts, although they have rarely won at trial. To date roughly 150 individual lawsuits, a majority of the ATS claims filed, have named corporate defendants.95 Only four of the cases have proceeded to trial, and only one has ended in a judgment against the corporation.96 Most have failed on the grounds of subject matter jurisdiction, statute of limitations, or forum non conveniens.97 These impediments, however, have not precluded substantial settlements. Royal Dutch Petroleum/Shell, for example, agreed to pay $15.5 million after years of litigation over the Wiwa case.98 The large recoveries have appeared to provoke opposition.99

C. Increasing hostility towards extraterritoriality culminated in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum

Assorted opponents of the ATS challenged the recognition of new causes of action that brought increasing amounts of international law into U.S. courts, as well as the foreign policy implications of the judiciary using the law to impose judgments abroad.100 Business Week reported that corporate advocacy groups met in November 2002 to plot a strategy to limit the application of the statute to corporations.101 Some participants claimed that corporations became susceptible to suit just by investing in a foreign country.102
lawsuits filed in 2002 alleging complicity in human rights abuses against corporations that conducted business with the apartheid government in South Africa further inflamed dissent.103 A book published in 2003 labeled the statute an “awakening monster” and argued that ATS litigation “could have profound consequences for the world economy.”104 Senator Dianne Feinstein proposed legislation limiting claims against corporations, then withdrew the bill eight days later; she refused to disclose whether she had consulted with interest groups.105 Growing discomfort with the claims ultimately seemed to reveal itself in briefs of the executive branch and increasingly narrow judicial holdings such as Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.106

Amicus briefs and letters to the court evidence the evolution in attitude towards the extraterritorial character of the ATS. The Carter administration supported the view of the Second Circuit in Filártiga that the statute permits the judiciary to incorporate new causes of action in “international law as it has evolved over time” and impose the law on foreign defendants.107 In its amicus brief in Filártiga, the Department of Justice discounted concerns over extraterritoriality, stating that “there is little danger that judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts.”108 In Trajano v. Marcos, an amicus brief filed by the Reagan administration agreed that enforcing a judgment against former Prime Minister Ferdinand Marcos “would not embarrass the relations between the United States and the Government of the Philippines.”109 In Kadic, a statement of interest filed by the Clinton administration also maintained that “dismissal of these cases at this stage under the ‘political question’ doctrine is not warranted.”110 The Department of Justice during the first Bush administration, however, began to urge limitations on the scope of international law that could be used to create new causes of action under the statute.111

105. S. 1874, 109th Cong. (1995) (introduced Oct. 17, 2005) (limiting ATS suits to those "asserting a claim of torture, extrajudicial killing, genocide, piracy, slavery, or slave trading if a defendant is a direct participant acting with specific intent to commit the alleged tort").
108. Id. at 23.
111. Indeed, the first Bush administration initially opposed passage of the TVPA and was concerned it risked provoking retaliatory lawsuits against U.S. officials. See Brief for U.S. Reps. as Amici Curiae, Relating to Issues Raised by the United States in Its Motion to Vacate October 21,
Nevertheless, President George H. W. Bush signed into law the Torture Victims Protection Act, which allowed for extraterritorial jurisdiction over claims of torture and extrajudicial killing. In a speech at the time, he supported extraterritorial goals, stating, “In this new era, in which countries throughout the world are turning to democratic institutions and the rule of law, we must maintain and strengthen our commitment to ensuring that human rights are respected everywhere.”

The Department of State and Department of Justice in the administration of President George W. Bush, however, pursued a comprehensive attack against the ATS, reprising arguments against admitting international laws into U.S. courts for judicial imposition abroad and raising new challenges to the extraterritorial basis of the statute itself. In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, the Department of State submitted a letter that said “continued adjudication of the claims . . . would risk a potentially serious adverse impact . . . on the conduct of our foreign relations.” It filed another letter in Doe v. Exxon Mobil making the same assertion and attached an affidavit from the Indonesian ambassador. The affidavit stated that Indonesia “cannot accept” a suit against an Indonesian government institution and U.S. courts should not be adjudicating “allegations of abuses of human rights by the Indonesian military.” In Doe v. Unocal, an amicus brief of the Department of Justice first argued that only law that has “been affirmatively incorporated into the laws of the United States” can come into U.S. courts and that “the ATS . . . raises significant potential for serious interference with the important foreign policy interests of the United States, and is contrary to our constitutional framework and democratic principles . . . [because] open[ing] our courts to right every wrong all over the world . . . has not been assigned to the federal courts.” The brief then opposed the entire line of human rights cases developed under the statute: “The ATS has been wrongly interpreted to permit suits requiring the courts to pass factual, moral,
and legal judgment on . . . foreign acts[.].‖ It further stated, “[A] statute is presumed to apply only within the territory of the United States . . . [and] nothing in the ATS or in its contemporaneous history . . . furnish[es] a foundation for suits based on conduct occurring within other nations.”

President George W. Bush took additional measures to curb the litigation and issued an executive order that provided immunity to corporations doing business in Iraq.

The Bush administration lobbied for Supreme Court review of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, and the decision the Court ultimately handed down narrowed the reach of the ATS significantly. Its brief in support of the petition for certiorari maintained that “the ATS cannot properly be construed to permit suits requiring United States courts to pass factual and legal judgment on these foreign acts.” The judgment of the Court did not go as far, but it did confine the statute to claims in international law that contain principles that have been “universally” and “obligatorily” defined to include the “specific” conduct alleged.

Concerns with extraterritoriality appeared to motivate the decision:

It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits on our own State and Federal Governments’ power, but quite another to consider suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to hold that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits. . . . Since many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great caution.

The claim of a Mexican physician that he had been abducted at the behest of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and detained for one day therefore did not succeed. The Court found that while detention commanded universal condemnation, insufficient evidence indicated that the general prohibition against it included the specific conduct in dispute, captivity for one day.

Cases following Sosa, although often inconsistent, continued to narrow the range of international laws that could sustain a cause of action in a U.S. court

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118. Id. at 21-22.
119. Id. at 29.
122. Id. at 25.
123. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (noting that “[a]ctionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory” (citing In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994))).
124. Id. at 727-28.
125. Id. at 737-38.
and the circumstances under which the court could impose a judgment abroad. The Second Circuit, for example, added a purposefulness requirement for corporate liability. The Eleventh Circuit excluded all nontorture cases involving cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The Ninth Circuit required a claim to be exhausted abroad, thereby constraining the most aggressive extraterritorial application of the ATS.

Judge Reinhart wrote in dissent that “neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit has ever imposed an exhaustion requirement.”

*Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum* marks the latest move in the retrenchment. The Second Circuit based the decision on an application of *Sosa* and found that the limited causes of action in international law that can come into court through the statute do not sustain actions against corporations. A footnote in *Sosa* made the circumstances in which courts could impose judgments on foreign corporations subject to the same test it set out for recognizing a cause of action. The Second Circuit found that corporate liability “has not attained [the] discernible, much less universal acceptance among nations of the world” that *Sosa* required. Royal Dutch Petroleum therefore avoided responsibility for abuses government forces perpetrated against civilians in the wake of environmental protests in Nigeria.

The judgment conflicted with earlier decisions of the Eleventh Circuit, as well as two district courts of the Second Circuit.

In a petition for panel rehearing of the case, the chief judge of the Circuit expressed what now seems to be the prevailing attitude towards extraterritorial jurisdiction:

[F]oreign companies are creatures of other states. They are subject to corporate governance and government regulation at home. They are often engines of their national economies, sustaining employees, pensioners and creditors, and paying

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126. Compare Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 245, 287-88 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that a plaintiff may “plead a theory of aiding and abetting liability” under the ATS), with Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 666-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that aiding and abetting liability requires corporations to have acted with the purpose of facilitating the violation of international law).


128. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 at 824 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

129. Id. at 841 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).

130. *Kiobel* v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 at 120 (2d Cir. 2010); *Sosa* v. Alvarez-Machain, et. al. 542 U.S. 692, 732, n20 (2004) (question is “whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual”). See also *Kiobel* v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 289-91 (2011).

131. Id.

132. *Kiobel*, 621 F.3d at 145.

133. Id.

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taxes. . . . American courts and lawyers [do not] have the power to bring to court
transnational corporations of other countries, to inquire into their operations in
third countries, to regulate them, and to beggar them by rendering their assets into
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and (American) legal fees.135

III.
EUROPE INCREASINGLY POLICES THE EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTIONS OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Meanwhile, in Europe both the individual member states and the European
Union are taking steps in the opposite direction to address foreign corporate
human rights abuses. While the ATS provided causes of action in international
law and extraterritorial jurisdiction, the courts of some member states, and
particularly the United Kingdom, are circumventing the need for both by
emphasizing contributing infringements of their domestic tort laws by domestic
parent corporations.136 Member states that incorporate international
humanitarian principles into national statutes offer new causes of action against
multinational corporations. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is also expanding in
Europe through EU regulations and national criminal legislation with
extraterritorial effect.

A. Contributing torts of domestic parent corporations supply national causes of
action and national jurisdiction

In the United Kingdom and other European countries, courts are finding
jurisdiction over corporate human rights cases by characterizing actions or
omissions of national parent corporations as contributing factors in abuses that
took place abroad.137 The negligence claims address the role of parent
corporations in allowing their foreign subsidiaries to cause harm, but the
judgments affect the conduct of the subsidiaries.138 The cases express an
enterprise theory of liability in which multinational corporations appear as single
entities, headed by parent corporations that control the entire business.139

Framing the illegal acts in terms of the failure of the parent corporations to
exercise oversight of their subsidiaries avoids the difficulties posed by the
doctrine of separate legal personality and opposition to extraterritoriality. The
plaintiffs do not have to establish abuse of the corporate form, as they would if

136. Note that this approach was explicitly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa, 542
U.S. at 703-11.
137. See, e.g., Ramasastry, supra note 44, at 93; Obstacles to Justice and Redress for Victims
of Corporate Human Rights Abuse, supra note 5, at 284.
138. See, e.g., Jessica. Woodroffe, Regulating Multinational Corporations in a World of
Nation States, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL
139. On enterprise liability theory in the U.S. context, see, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 49.
the illegalities were articulated as wrongs committed by subsidiaries for which the parents should bear responsibility. 140 Nor do the courts have to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, as they can review the actions of national parent corporations under domestic rules. 141 Although holding corporations present within the jurisdiction accountable for failing to oversee their foreign subsidiaries has extraterritorial effects, it provokes less controversy than directly claiming jurisdiction over subsidiaries in other territories. 142

Lawsuits related to human rights abuses have proceeded in the United Kingdom in tort against several domestic parent corporations. 143 In Sithole v. Thor, the English Court of Appeal found jurisdiction over mercury poisoning among employees at a mining subsidiary in South Africa by reviewing the failure of the English parent corporation to prevent it. 144 The case settled for 1.3 million pounds, far exceeding the recovery in a parallel South African claim. 145 Cases against the English parent corporations of the mining corporation Rio Tinto and the energy corporation Cape confirmed that English courts will exercise jurisdiction over domestic parent corporations when foreign subsidiaries that cause harm abroad have implemented their policies. 146 The High Court also found jurisdiction in Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals over the assault and detention of protestors by Peruvian police at a subsidiary mining site in Peru by focusing on the responsibility of the parent corporation to prevent the harm. 147 In Motto & ORS v. Trafigura, the High Court took jurisdiction over the claims of 30,000 citizens of the Ivory Coast for illness arising from exposure to toxic waste because an English arm of the metals and energy corporation

140. Piercing the corporate veil generally requires mixing of assets (Germany, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, France), or the abuse of the separate legal personality of the subsidiary or parent to defeat the rights of stakeholders or to commit other illegalities (France, Slovenia, Italy).


Dutch courts have used a similar approach and exercised jurisdiction over national parent corporations for human rights violations committed abroad. In 2009, the Minister of Foreign Trade commissioned a study to identify the questions a civil court must ask in order to assess the liability of parent corporations for abuses by their subsidiaries.\footnote{149}{Alex Geert Castermans & Jeroen Van der Weide, \textit{The legal liability of Dutch parent companies for subsidiaries’ involvement in violations of fundamental, internationally recognized rights} (Working Paper, 15 December 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1626225} Later that year, the Hague District Court found jurisdiction over three cases Nigerian fisherman and farmers brought against Royal Dutch Shell claiming that the parent corporation had been negligent in failing to ensure that its Nigerian subsidiary carried out oil production carefully.\footnote{150}{Court of the Hague, Docket Number HA ZA 09-579 (Oguru v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.); \textit{The People of Nigeria Versus Shell: The Course of the Lawsuit}, supra note 4.}

Additional cases addressing foreign abuses through the contributions of national parent corporations have enabled jurisdiction in other European countries, including Switzerland and Germany. The Geneva Court of First Instance reviewed claims of five orphaned Roma children against IBM, the U.S. computing corporation, because the European corporate headquarters were located there during World War II.\footnote{151}{Ian Traynor, \textit{Gypsies Win Right to Sue IBM Over Role in Holocaust}, \textit{The Guardian}, June 23 2004; Swiss Court: Extrait de l’arrêt de la Ire Cour civile dans la cause Gypsy International Recognition and Compensation Action (GIRCA) contre International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) (recours en réforme) 4C.113/2006, Aug. 14 2006; Anita Ramasastry, \textit{A Swiss Court Decides to Allow Gypsies’ Holocaust Lawsuit to Proceed}, \textit{FINDLAW’S WRIT}, July 8, 2004, available at \url{http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040708.html}.} The case alleged that IBM had aided and abetted the murders of the parents of the children by providing computer technology to the Nazis.\footnote{152}{Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C. Files Class Action Lawsuit Against IBM, Feb. 11, 2001; Gypsies Ask IBM for Holocaust Reparation, BBC NEWS, June 10 2001.} Human rights organizations in Germany brought a domestic false advertising claim against Lidl Corporation, the German discounter, to draw attention to abusive labor practices at its foreign subsidiaries.\footnote{153}{See, e.g., European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, \textit{Successful Complaint Against Consumer Deception – Lidl Retracts Advertisements}, available at \url{http://www.ecchr.eu/lidl-case/articles/lidl-retracts-advertisements.html}.} The corporation described its commitment to labor rights in its
advertisements, in spite of poor conditions at foreign plants.\footnote{154}

\section*{B. Causes of action supporting corporate human rights claims grow more prevalent in Europe as routes to liability through customary international laws narrow under the ATS}

The domestic tort suits discussed in the previous section bypassed the need for causes of action in international law such as the ATS has provided, and other causes of action suitable for corporate human rights cases are proliferating in Europe. Some member states automatically allow international law claims in their national courts.\footnote{155} Many do not require a specific domestic cause of action to review alleged violations of international laws.\footnote{156} Others recently have adopted criminal remedies that incorporate international law principles, providing domestic pathways for corporate liability.\footnote{157}

While hostility to judicial absorption of new principles of customary international law into the federal common law has intensified in the United States, the availability of an explicit cause of action is now irrelevant in many European member states. All customary international laws form part of the English common law; the Swedish penal code provides blanket illegality for serious humanitarian violations; and tort rules in civil law countries contain general prohibitions that include abuses of international laws.\footnote{158} Where


\footnote{155. E.g., England, see infra.}

\footnote{156. E.g., Sweden, see infra.}


\footnote{158. R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 276 (“Customary international law is part of the common law, and accordingly I consider that the English courts have and always have had extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in respect of crimes of universal jurisdiction under customary international law.”); see also Human Rights Committee, International Law Association (English Branch), \textit{Report on Civil Actions in the English Courts for Serious Human Rights Violations Abroad}, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 129, 158 (2001); 22 ch. § 6 Brottsbalken (Swed.) (Criminal Code); Liesbeth F.H. Enneking, \textit{Crossing the Atlantic? The Political and Legal Feasibility of European Foreign Direct Liability Cases}, 40 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 903, 922 (2009) (“the continental European systems of tort (delict), which are based on Grotius’s natural law concept that every act that is contrary to that which people in general, or considering their special qualities, ought to do or ought not to do, and that causes damage, potentially gives rise to an obligation under civil law to compensate such damage”).}
considerations of justice support doing so, Austria, Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Poland allow jurisdiction over claims that do not fall within any domestic cause of action.\footnote{In accordance with the doctrine of forum necessitatis, a general principle of law that has developed in EU law to require jurisdiction even if it would otherwise be lacking in order to avoid the denial of justice, see http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf at 64-66; see, e.g., art. 9(b)-(c) Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (Code of Civil Procedure) (Neth.), available at http://www.st-ab.nl/wetten/0471_Wetboek_van_Burgerlijke_Rechtsvordering_Rv.htm.} Belgium and the Netherlands have viewed the jurisdiction as necessary for compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to a fair trial.\footnote{Art. 11, New Code of Private International Law in 2004.91 (“Irrespective of the other provisions of the present Code, Belgian judges have jurisdiction when the case has narrow links with Belgium and when proceedings abroad seem to be impossible or when it would be unreasonable to request that the proceedings are initiated abroad.”); art. 9(b), (c) Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (Code of Civil Procedure) (Neth.).}

Several European countries have drafted new criminal laws for corporations, creating additional avenues for human rights claims against them. Corporate criminal liability in the United Kingdom predated its introduction to the United States, and the majority of other European member states have recently adopted it.\footnote{See, e.g., Allens Arthur Robinson, 'Corporate Culture’ as a Basis for the Criminal Liability of Corporations (report prepared for the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Business) (Feb. 2008), available at http://198.170.85.29/Allens-Arthur-Robinson-Corporate-Culture-paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf; but see discussion of problems in countries where only prosecutors can initiate proceedings, e.g., Hervé Ascensio, Extraterritoriality as an Instrument, Contribution to the work of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on human rights and transnational corporations and other businesses, at 5, available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/extraterritoriality-paper.pdf (describing dismissal of a complaint filed by seven farmers from Cameroon against a French company for illicit trade and bribery for this reason).}

2002 to extend every offense to corporations.164 Belgium reintroduced corporate criminal liability in 1999, having removed it in 1934, and then expanded it in 2007.165 Seventeen member states now provide for corporate criminal liability.166

The criminal provisions have been used to address the complicity of multinational corporations in several human rights suits in France and in other countries.167 Three human rights organizations brought charges against DLH France, the Dutch-owned timber corporation, for the French crime of “recel,” which prohibits handling or profiting from illegally obtained goods.168 DLH had imported timber from Liberian suppliers who did not have harvesting rights, thereby funding the civil war in Liberia.169 French citizens brought a criminal complaint against Trafigura, the Dutch metals and energy corporation, alleging corruption, involuntary homicide, and physical harm leading to death based on the pollution that gave rise to the English civil case Sithole v. Thor, discussed in section IV.A.170 Burmese plaintiffs also settled a criminal case in France against


165. BELGIAN PENAL CODE art. 5; The Act of 4 May 1999 (reintroducing corporate criminal liability into Belgian law); M. Faure, Criminal Responsibilities of Legal and Collective Entities: Developments in Belgium, in CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LEGAL AND COLLECTIVE ENTITIES 105 (Eiser, Heine, Huber, eds. 1999).

166. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., Guy Stessens, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 493, 499-520 (1994); see also Stephens, supra note 12, at 66 (noting that countries without criminal liability frequently penalize the same behavior administratively, such as through the German Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten).


Unocal, the U.S. oil corporation, for the actions in Burma litigated under the ATS in Doe v. Unocal, discussed in Section III.B.171 Greenpeace filed a criminal complaint against the French oil corporation Total Fina Elf for pollution in Siberia under German criminal provisions outlawing polluting water and causing bodily harm with fatal consequences.172

Some European penal codes also include international laws and enable domestic prosecutions of corporations for international crimes, where corporate liability is available.173 Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom, for example, criminalize genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes within their national laws.174 A Dutch judgment against Frans Van Anraat, a businessman who supplied chemicals to the former Iraqi regime, confirmed the applicability of the rules to corporations: “[p]eople or companies that conduct (international) trade, for example in weapons or raw materials used for their production, should be warned that—if they do not exercise increased vigilance—they can become involved in most serious criminal offences.”175 The statutes have primarily been used against individuals, however, securing convictions of two nuns in Belgium for their participation in the Rwandan genocide, four Bosnian Serbs in Germany for their involvement in ethnic cleansing, and an Afghan terrorist in the United Kingdom for torture and hostage taking overseas, among others.176 In member states that allow...
corporate liability and have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) into domestic law, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, plaintiffs can pursue corporations for international ICC crimes, even though the Rome Statute itself does not apply to them.\(^{177}\)

Others have introduced national causes of action based on additional provisions of international law.\(^{178}\) Greenpeace, for example, used a Luxembourg statute implementing the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal to hold Euronav, the Luxembourgian shipping company, accountable for selling a tanker for destruction without first decontaminating it, exposing workers in Bangladesh to hazardous materials.\(^{179}\) The *Trafigura* case in the United Kingdom, discussed in part IV.A, also relied on domestic incorporation of the Basel Convention.\(^{180}\)


178. The process varies by country. In the Netherlands, an example of the *monist* model of international law, no national order is required to convert international law into national law. In the United Kingdom, an example of the *dualist* model of international law, a treaty must be incorporated into national law to have effect.


Although the European Union does not have legislative powers over human rights matters, the European Parliament nevertheless has attempted to enact rules that would address corporate abuses committed abroad, and European courts have enforced judgments against corporations and state actors responsible for them.\textsuperscript{181} The European Parliament has called upon the European Commission to develop a mandatory “European multilateral framework governing companies’ operations worldwide.”\textsuperscript{182} It also has sought to “standardize corporate liability and the law of corporate groups[.]”\textsuperscript{183} Unsuccessful proposals, had they been enacted, would have regulated the conduct of foreign subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{184} The European Court of Justice has ruled that private corporations bear human rights responsibilities, and the European Court of Human Rights has found member states responsible for allowing corporations to cause other harms, offering legal theories that could extend to abuses by subsidiaries of multinational corporations.\textsuperscript{185}


\textsuperscript{182} Resolution of EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries: Towards a European Code of Conduct, 1999 O.J. (C 104); see also Ratner, \textit{supra} note 47, at 446.

\textsuperscript{183} Liability of Enterprises for Offenses, Recommendation No. R (88-163), adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 20 October of 1988 at the 420th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (never passed by the Member States); see Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, at n.21, COM (2003) 284 final (May 21, 2003) (“A draft ‘Ninth Company Law Directive on the Conduct of Groups containing a Public Limited Company as a Subsidiary’ was circulated by the Commission in December 1984 for consultation. According to its Explanatory Memorandum, the Directive was intended to provide a framework in which groups can be managed on a sound basis whilst ensuring that interests affected by group operations are adequately protected. Such a legal framework, adapted to the special circumstances of groups, was considered to be lacking in the legal system of most Member States.”).


C. Extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporate human rights claims expands in Europe as it narrows under the ATS

The European Union and the member states are deliberately expanding jurisdiction for the causes of action discussed in the previous section, while the ATS has narrowed in the United States, in conjunction with limitations on international claims.\(^{186}\) The European Union has instituted extraterritorial jurisdiction within Europe, and many member states now allow access to national courts in the interests of justice.\(^{187}\) New criminal laws that apply to corporations also permit extraterritorial jurisdiction, and other Member State courts seem effectively to offer it through liberal interpretations of jurisdictional rules.\(^{188}\) The United States, however, restricted extraterritorial corporate human rights cases in Belgium by urging it to revoke broad jurisdictional rules.\(^{189}\)

The European Union has indicated willingness to enlarge the coverage of the Brussels Regulation, which currently allows for extraterritorial jurisdiction over intra-European claims.\(^{190}\) In accordance with the Regulation, member states can adjudicate all civil claims against domestic corporations independent of the nationality of the victims or the jurisdiction in which the harm occurred.\(^{191}\) The European Commission raised the possibility of extending the

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186. See also, e.g., Menno Kamminga, Universal Jurisdiction: Is It Legal? Is it Desirable?, 99 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 123, 124 (2005) (“The European Commission . . . has specifically stated that it is not opposed to the exercise of universal jurisdiction in tort cases even though the Commission obviously realized that this competence enables U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over European companies. In its amicus brief in Sosa, the Commission did not argue against extraterritorial jurisdiction, instead it merely urged that jurisdiction in such cases should be exercised with due respect for the limitations imposed by international law.”).

187. The European Union has supported broad jurisdiction over international tort claims. In other areas, such as terrorism, human trafficking, sex crimes, and the environment, it also has implemented new extraterritorial measures, see, e.g., Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, 2002 O.J (L 164) 3; Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings; Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography; Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on the protection of the environment through criminal law. While the European Union no longer emphasizes framework decisions, they nevertheless evidence support for extraterritorial jurisdiction. See infra.

188. See infra.

189. See id.


Regulation to claims against foreign subsidiaries of European parent corporations in a Green paper; however, residual member state laws presently govern jurisdiction over non-European entities.  

Residual rules frequently suffice for extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries. Most member states provide for jurisdiction in cases where subsidiaries have secondary establishments or assets in Europe. Many member states also allow for jurisdiction either where damage was caused or where it was sustained. Lawsuits have therefore proceeded against foreign subsidiaries in European courts based on causal events that occurred in Europe.

Connections to other countries that have blocked many potential ATS cases from adjudication in the United States have rarely prevented European courts from finding jurisdiction over international human rights claims. The Brussels Regulation determines jurisdiction without regard to them, and they do not affect residual jurisdictional rules in civil law countries. The member states that provide jurisdiction over foreign claims when justice requires doing so, discussed in section IV.B., review cases wholly connected to other places.

Recent national criminal legislation expressly provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction. The penal codes of Denmark, Finland, France, and Sweden, for example, allow for jurisdiction over actions committed abroad by defendants of any nationality that are “covered by international conventions.”


194. See Augenstien, supra note 181, at 69.

195. See id.

196. See id.


199. E.g., Austria, Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Poland.

200. See, e.g., Business and Human Rights: The Role of States in Effectively Regulating and Adjudicating the Activities of Corporations with Respect to Human Rights, supra note 50, at 8.

201. STRAFFELOVEN [STRFL] [Penal Code] § 8(5) (Den.) ("[A]cts committed outside the
The Rome Statute offers universal jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{202} The English system has permitted additional routes to jurisdiction over foreign defendants that have resulted in extraterritorial jurisdiction over human rights claims against individuals in the Middle East. In the United Kingdom, jurisdiction depends on the ability of plaintiffs to serve defendants.\textsuperscript{203} The Companies Act 2006 allows service of foreign corporations in any English place of business identified with them.\textsuperscript{204} The English Rules of Civil Procedure also enable service abroad in specific instances, such as when a claim has a close connection to the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{205} Some courts have interpreted connections broadly: In \textit{Al-Adsani v. Kuwait}, the Court of Appeal permitted a plaintiff to serve the Government of Kuwait with charges of unlawful detention and torture at the instigation of the royal family, finding a connection through mental health problems he experienced afterwards in England.\textsuperscript{206} In \textit{Jones v. Saudi Arabia}, the Court allowed jurisdiction over allegations of torture in Saudi Arabia by the Saudi Minister of Interior and other Saudi Arabian officials, based on the same justification.\textsuperscript{207}

The United States has, however, pressured Belgium to repeal very broad extraterritorial provisions, underscoring the significance of extraterritorial jurisdiction for holding corporations accountable for human rights violations.\textsuperscript{208}


\textsuperscript{203}Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 695 (U.K.); see also Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law 141 (2007).


\textsuperscript{206}Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1394 (Eng.).

Prior to 2004, Belgium offered jurisdiction over all humanitarian claims, regardless of whether the crimes had any connection to the country, regardless of the nationality of the plaintiffs or defendants, and regardless of the absence of defendants from the proceedings.\footnote{209} A Belgian court therefore accepted review of a case brought by Greenpeace against Total Fina Elf, the French oil corporation, for complicity in crimes against humanity committed by the Burmese military junta during construction and operation of a gas pipeline.\footnote{210} In the aftermath of other controversial cases against high-ranking foreign officials, however,\footnote{211} the United States threatened to move the NATO headquarters out of Brussels unless Belgium restricted the rules.\footnote{212} In the aftermath of the revocation, the Belgian court could no longer adjudicate the claims against Total Fina Elf.\footnote{213} Without the extraterritorial jurisdiction that they had offered, it could not pursue allegations brought by Burmese citizens against a French company for abuses in Burma.\footnote{214}


\footnote{211} See, e.g., New War Crimes Suits Filed Against Bush, Blair in Belgium, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, June 20, 2003; Marlise Simons, Sharon Faces Belgian Trial After Term Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at A14.


IV.
DIFFERENT VIEWS ON SOVEREIGNTY ACCOUNT FOR DIVERGING U.S. AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Contrary attitudes towards national sovereignty may explain why U.S. courts have withdrawn extraterritorial jurisdiction just as the European Union and several member states have begun to extend it. Extraterritorial jurisdiction depends on a flexible approach to sovereignty; it entails reaching into the territory of another country to impose a judgment. The United States initially used the ATS to facilitate jurisdiction over aggressive extraterritorial claims and to enforce human rights norms against multinational corporations. But the United States increasingly has appeared to interpret intrusions on national sovereignty as a threat to democracy. It has prioritized domestic laws that express the popular democratic will. U.S. suspicion of international laws is linked to the narrowing scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the statute. The courts must read causes of action in international law into the federal common law before they can impose a judgment abroad. Hostility towards international law has therefore narrowed the range of extraterritorial judgments. In contrast, the European member states have appeared to regard conceding national sovereignty as necessary for safeguarding democracy. They have surrendered authority to supranational institutions to enable external protect and enforce baseline standards of behavior. Having done so, the member states have grown increasingly open to international rules. Enforcing them extraterritorially has become an expression of the potential of Europe for human rights leadership.

A. U.S. courts have prioritized laws of elected domestic officials and constraints on international laws have narrowed extraterritorial jurisdiction

Popular sovereignty has long been a touchstone in U.S. jurisprudence. After breaking from England to establish a republic based on direct democracy, the new government restricted the judiciary from making new laws. To protect the fundamental freedoms of the people, it has instead applied rules


enacted by elected legislators. International laws do not derive from publicly-accountable officials and the laws increasingly have appeared to be regarded as antidemocratic. The judiciary lately has limited the jurisdiction of the courts to consider them, leading to the retraction of extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporate human rights claims.

The United States has enjoyed a history of political stability, which has seemed to engender a sense of self-sufficiency. Powerful and geographically separate, it rarely has needed to accept subversions of its authority. It never faced the threat of foreign invasion, never risked succumbing to fascism or dictatorship.

The secure environment nurtured a robust, plaintiff-friendly legal system, capable of driving progress in the area of human rights. Early decisions, such as Marbury v. Madison, established the role of the judiciary in protecting individuals. U.S. courts made redress by victims more favorable by providing devices such as class action lawsuits, pretrial discovery, and default judgments. The courts facilitated access to counsel through contingency fee arrangements and punitive damages. An active plaintiffs’ bar and tradition of pro bono developed. Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, faced genocide and war crimes charges in the United States, not in Europe.

Royal Dutch Shell defended its actions towards the Ogoni people of Nigeria in the United States, too, in spite of efforts to transfer the litigation to the United


218. See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005). But see, e.g., Sarah Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2006) (rejecting the claim that the use of international law is antidemocratic and establishing that international law has properly been used to construe the Constitution).


221. Id. at 17.

222. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).


225. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
Kingdom or the Netherlands. 227

These and other claims under the ATS reflected the U.S. commitment to upholding fundamental rights, but the United States has increasingly appeared to emphasize its domestic rules. The language of Supreme Court decisions has tracked the general trajectory: In 1988, in Thompson v Oklahoma, the Court considered “views that have been expressed by . . . other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading Members of the West European community.” 228 More recent opinions, however, have stated that U.S. courts “should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions,” and “discussion of . . . foreign views is meaningless [and] dangerous dicta.”

The United States lately has refused to ratify international rights conventions, unlike the European member states that have incorporated them into national law. The United States rarely has contravened international standards; it has seemed reluctant to cede its sovereignty to external regimes. 230 It voted against the Kyoto Protocol, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and unsigned the Rome Statute of the ICC. Its use of military commissions rather than international tribunals to try foreign terror suspects appears to reject established systems of international law. 231

The theory of “integrity-anxiety” may offer an explanation of why the


United States has increasingly excluded international laws. The American identity, the theory postulates, derives from the constitution and national laws. In a pluralistic society, decisions based on constitutional principles and congressional legislation receive more popular legitimacy than those that draw from boundless outside authorities. Domestic courts therefore keep disagreements in check by applying only domestic rules. Foreign, international laws threaten the integrity of the system.

Perhaps for this reason a nationalist school seems to have prevailed, and the increasingly strict interpretations of separation of powers principles have resonated in the recent opinions construing the ATS. It has become “antidemocratic” for the federal government to delegate lawmaking authority to outsiders unaccountable to the U.S. electorate. And it therefore has been “countermajoritarian” for U.S. courts to develop and apply international laws.


233. See, e.g., id.


239. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources To Interpret the Constitution,
Judges do not have lawmaking powers, so they have not been permitted to incorporate customary international laws into the federal common law as the ATS has required. The permanent representative to the United Nations during the Bush administration, John Bolton, described mechanisms for extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as the statute as allowing “‘offenses’ by ‘the common enemies of mankind’ that do not readily fit within . . . [the law] . . . [to] be subject to creative interpretations . . . , whether slow-witted national legislators ever vote on them or not.” U.S. courts lately have been held to have jurisdiction to adjudicate only U.S. legislation.

If the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, excluding any reference to outside authority, the customary international laws on which ATS claims depend no longer seem to have a place in domestic courts. Congressional testimony has bemoaned “substantial litigation abuse . . . [in] the importation of foreign claims into U.S. courts.” The extraterritorial reach of the ATS, a statute the Congress drafted in 1789 to provide jurisdiction over violations of international laws, has been narrowed precisely because it requires U.S. judges to apply international laws.

B. Europe instead relinquished sovereignty to protect democracy and solidifies its identity in promoting international rights

Europe, because of its history, has regarded intrusions on national sovereignty as a safeguard for democracy. The member states united to form the European Union to constrain antidemocratic tendencies within a transnational network. Their participation in the regional system familiarized them with

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244. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 1111, 118-120 (2d Cir. 2010).

restrictions on their national authority, and they grew more accustomed to conforming to outside rules. As the European project has encountered obstacles and they have sought a new purpose for the union, they have begun to locate a European identity in the extraterritorial promotion of international standards for human rights.  

The experience of World War II educated Europe in the precariousness of democratic systems. In its wake, sovereign European countries agreed to cede national authority. They empowered external institutions, such as the European Court of Justice, to restrain the will of the people and guard basic rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights established a floor for fundamental rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights has mandated their protection.


246. See, e.g., Samantha Besson, The European Union And Human Rights: Towards A Post-National Human Rights Institution?, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323, 324 (2006) (positing that “economic integration is to a large extent exhausted as a vision for further integration in the European Union” and “the prospects of enlargement have further contributed in the last few years to identifying national, regional and global threats to human rights and hence to conscientise the EU’s vision of itself as a global entity, whose ‘one boundary is democracy and human rights’”).


248. See, e.g., Jodie A. Kirshner, ‘An Ever Closer Union in Corporate Identity?: A Transatlantic Perspective on Regional Dynamics and the Societas Europaea, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1273, 1280 (2010); Victoria Curzon, THE ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: LESSONS OF EFTA EXPERIENCE 28-29 (1974) (“The end of World War II was a time of heroic plans for institutionalizing inter-state relations so as to bring order into international affairs and thus blot out the danger of another war. Nowhere were these feelings expressed more strongly than in Western Europe, where a federation of European states was considered by many to be the only sound basis upon which to build a lasting peace”).

249. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (also established the European Court to Justice).

The establishment of the European Union has exposed the member states to nondomestic laws and extraterritorial enforcement. European member states must routinely accept regulations drafted in Brussels and interpreted in Luxembourg, in spite of the intrusion on national sovereignty. Instead of the apparent U.S. ideal of a discreet body of domestic rules, the European member states have implemented supranational directives and invalidated conflicting national legislation.

The incorporation of external laws has extended to international conventions. The member states have ratified them into national legal codes without concern for their “countermajoritarian” status. When the national constitutions of Germany and France blocked participation in the ICC, both countries amended their constitutions.

Although the European Union developed social rights provisions to organize the relationships among its institutions, member states, and citizens, the Union has primarily followed a program of economic integration. The focus
made support from disparate political groups possible and elided cultural differences.\textsuperscript{256} After unifying the coal and steel industries, the European Union gradually expanded to a broader common market.\textsuperscript{257}

As possibilities for further expansion of the common market approach a limit, however, and the prospect of financial default among the member states throws economic plans into disarray, the European Union has appeared to look to human rights promotion to provide a new rallying purpose.\textsuperscript{258} Difficulty ratifying the Maastricht and the Lisbon treaties weakened the popular legitimacy of the union.\textsuperscript{259} A sense that the potential for economic harmonization had been exhausted has led to calls for a new project, one that would be less technocratic and easier for European citizens to understand and support.\textsuperscript{260}

The prospect of federalizing under the banner of human rights seems to provide a potentially compelling “raison d’etre” for the European Union.\textsuperscript{261} European elites have talked openly of rights promotion as a means of relevance.\textsuperscript{262} The NGO community has agitated for treaty revisions that would make human rights central.\textsuperscript{263}

Increasingly, the European Union has seemed to see itself not just as an economic integration; issues relating to social policy are viewed as secondary, to be addressed only to the extent that they impact upon economic integration. Economic integration, however, has not occurred in a political or social vacuum, and it is generally agreed that the Community has developed a social policy component that arises from, and is consistent with, its broader economic objectives.


\textsuperscript{258} But see Alston & Weiler, supra note 250; Gráinne de Búrca, The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 649 (2011) (arguing that the current EU human rights system is less robust and less ambitious than that envisaged in the 1950s, such that the EU’s aspiration to be taken seriously as a global normative actor is hindered by the double standard created by its internal and external human rights policies).


\textsuperscript{261} But see id. at 1338.


economic project, but as a force for good, and it has advanced a more visible human rights policy. The European Court of Justice ruled that it could shape general principles of Community law from international human rights, and the European Parliament succeeded in enacting a charter of fundamental rights.

Concern for promoting human rights abroad has begun to appear in judicial opinions and in new documents and treaties. Their reach has extended as the European Union enlarges and participates in international development projects.

Unlike the United States, in which a U.S. identity appears to arise from a unique set of national rules that flow only from the Constitution and from the Congress, Europe seems to be finding an identity through a deliberate process of human rights promotion. It has tolerated sublimation of national sovereignty to absorb international conventions and has broadcast its commitment to them. Its rhetoric has promoted its extraterritorial goals: the 2003 Athens Declaration described the European Union as “a project to share our future as a community of values,” which would “uphold and defend fundamental human rights, both inside and outside the European Union . . . .”

CONCLUSION

Multinational corporations expose the limits of territorially based legal

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systems. Single states applying national laws within national jurisdictions lack the capacity to police interconnected, international corporate groups. To hold them accountable, the legal structure must match the economic structure. The enforcement of human rights standards has demanded a flexible approach to sovereignty and openness to extraterritorial jurisdiction.269

Landmark opinions endorsing the use of the ATS have acknowledged the difficulties individual, territorial legal systems have in making multinational corporations responsible for human rights. The statute has enabled U.S. courts to navigate at the margins of other legal systems and interact with international law. Its extraterritorial character has offered jurisdiction concomitant to globalized business and allowed claims to reach human rights abuses of foreign subsidiaries.

The retraction of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the United States has generated concern that the governance gap will reemerge.270 U.S. courts have narrowed the ATS out of concern for encroachments on national sovereignty and related discomfort with international laws.

Instead, the European Union and many of its member states have stepped forward, offering nascent mechanisms of extraterritorial accountability. The economic interdependence of multinational corporate groups has parallels to the political interdependence of Europe itself. The European Union has achieved some common goals through cooperation,271 and member state courts have appeared more comfortable with intrusions on national sovereignty and extraterritoriality.272

The climate therefore presents new avenues for judicial redress of corporate human rights abuses. Developments in Europe counterbalance the shift taking place in the United States. As U.S. courts grow less open to extraterritorial cases, recognition of the broader global context gains importance. Continuing to bring extraterritorial claims in U.S. courts wastes resources. Even if egregious cases can achieve favorable outcomes, the litigation risks the piecemeal development of inconsistent law.

If international human rights norms grow more established within European judicial forums, they eventually could achieve sufficient momentum to pave the way for renewed recognition in U.S. courts. Justice Breyer cited the

272. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International Institutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 291, 305 (2000) (“Today we can afford a broader, more flexible understanding of sovereignty – one that permits us to profit from interdependence . . . .”).
European Commission in order to interpret the ATS, and the English Court of Appeal later referenced his opinion to support extraterritorial jurisdiction. The interlocking citations evidence shared values and a joint willingness to support fundamental rights, in spite of diverging attitudes towards extraterritoriality.