Protean Jus Ad Bellum

Sean D. Murphy
Protean *Jus Ad Bellum*

Sean D. Murphy*

I.

INTRODUCTION

International lawyers recently celebrated the 100th anniversary of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, where they looked back at the accomplishments of that event and at the strides that have been made over the past century in developing international law and institutions. Perhaps more important, however, is to consider the direction international law will take during the next 100 years—to ask about the legacy that will be discussed at the 200th anniversary of the Hague Conference. The purpose of this essay is to consider the past, present and, especially, future state of the *jus ad bellum*, the set of rules in international law designed to regulate the resort to war by states. Will the *jus ad bellum* in 2107 look the same as it does today or might we anticipate efforts to progressively develop it in some fashion?

The *jus ad bellum* is generally viewed as a static field of law. The standard account is that when the UN Charter was adopted in 1945, it enshrined a complete prohibition on the use of force in inter-state relations, except when action is taken in self-defense against an armed attack or under authorization of the UN Security Council. No other exceptions to the general prohibition are permitted, whether for purposes of rescuing one’s nationals abroad, saving aliens from widespread deprivation of human rights, acting preemptively against a grave but distant threat, or for any other reason.

To the extent that some states or commentators see value in further exceptions, the approach is generally still to view the *jus ad bellum* as static, but to engage in strained interpretations of the UN Charter’s text to allow further exceptions, or to admit that no exceptions exist but to argue that deviation is legitimate in extreme circumstances even if not lawful. Of course some observers, whose views are largely grounded in realism theories of international relations,
simply conclude that the *jus ad bellum* is a utopian notion that has no real relevance for contemporary inter-state behavior.

Yet it seems likely that in the years to come, many states and non-state actors will increasingly insist upon a different vision of the *jus ad bellum*, one that conceives of it as more protean in nature. The protean view of the *jus ad bellum* acknowledges that, as of 1945, the static view was correct, but that over time—as we approach the 70th anniversary of the United Nations—the *jus ad bellum* is changing, buffeted in particular by several significant developments: (1) the emergence of weapons of mass destruction of various types potentially controllable by states and non-state actors; (2) the rise of global terrorism as a mechanism for projecting violence against states by non-state actors; (3) the elevation of the person to a central place in the realm of international law, both in terms of being protected and in terms of being held accountable for misconduct; (4) the inability of all states to accept the Security Council as a disinterested arbiter willing and capable of acting to address all threats to international peace and security as they arise; and (5) the continuing erosion of the sanctity of the sovereign state, resulting from exposure to myriad effects of globalization, including intrusive transnational rule of law programs, election monitoring, incessant and extensive media coverage, powerful transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations, and relatively unrestricted movement of capital, goods, and persons across borders.

Protean *jus ad bellum* refers to a normative regime that is less oriented toward a textual codification of the norm and more toward the practical and nuanced application of the *jus ad bellum* in a complex and changing global environment. As such, protean *jus ad bellum* resists a binary approach of regarding all uses of force of a particular type (for example, humanitarian intervention) as being lawful/unlawful in all situations, and instead favors an approach that calibrates a range of factors that are important in predicting the likely response of the global community to a coercive act. Certain forms of state practice, such as the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia in support of Kosovar Albanians, lend credence to the vision of protean *jus ad bellum*, even as other state practice continues to support the static view.

This article suggests that the failure to either formally accept or reject the idea of protean *jus ad bellum* is likely, over time, to diminish the *jus ad bellum*’s effectiveness as a normative regime. Already, there exists considerable confusion and disagreement about the contemporary parameters of the *jus ad bellum*; if you were to ask a random group of legal advisers to foreign ministries their views on whether, for example, humanitarian intervention, or using force to rescue nationals abroad, or a cross-border raid against a terrorist camp, are permissible under the *jus ad bellum*, you are likely to receive varied answers: some saying yes; some saying no; some insisting that it depends on the circumstances; and some refusing to respond to the question. Too often transnational uses of military force occur in circumstances that are inconsistent with the idea of a static *jus ad bellum*: states and non-state actors, at least in some situations, toler-
ate certain types of force in response to the overarching developments noted above. As the International Criminal Court moves closer to including aggression within its mandate for indicting and prosecuting persons, government leaders may see greater value in clarifying what uses of force are permissible.

Things could continue as they are. But in the long-term, if the jus ad bellum is to survive, a more formal way should be found either to reject the notion of protean jus ad bellum or to accept it. If states chose the latter course, then they need to try to identify the contemporary rules in this area, either through formal amendment of the UN Charter, through authoritative interpretations by the principal organs of the United Nations or regional organizations, or through other means.

II.

Static Jus Ad Bellum

In many areas of international law, the law accommodates the possibility of change. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, for example, practice of the parties subsequent to the entry into force of a treaty is a salient factor for interpreting and reinterpreting the meaning of the treaty.\(^1\) Even if the treaty meant one thing at the time it was adopted, practice by the states thereafter may change the norm to mean another thing. In the context of a treaty establishing an international organization, such practice may include precedents set by institutional practice of the organization itself. Moreover, greater license is typically granted for teleological interpretations of such treaties in recognition of the need for the international organization to evolve over time.\(^2\)

Customary international law, of course, is also built upon the idea that contemporary state practice, in conjunction with opinio juris, serves to establish the law, even if that law was different at some earlier time. General principles of law, the third main source of international law, can also change to the extent that principles of law operating in legal systems worldwide change over time. Judicial decisions from international tribunals, though in theory limited to the parties in the case before the tribunal, are also widely regarded as assisting in the development and evolution of international law over time.\(^3\)

The jus ad bellum, however, is viewed by most states and scholars as a static norm. Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, a state may not use force

---


2. See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, Interpreting the Law, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 186-87 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995).

against another state. Under Article 51, a state may respond in self-defense to an “armed attack.” Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UN Security Council, in response to a threat to the peace, may authorize states to take forcible measures. Put all together, static *jus ad bellum* maintains that a state may not use armed force against another state unless it is defending against an armed attack or is authorized by the Security Council to do so.

Though it has been more than sixty years since enactment of the Charter, and though there is considerable state practice involving uses of coercion in circumstances that do not fit the basic *jus ad bellum* paradigm, no consensus exists that the paradigm has changed in any significant way. No doubt there are several reasons why this particular norm has continued to be viewed as static. First, as a formal matter, since the norm is enshrined in the Charter, and since the Charter has a superior status within the hierarchy of international law, there is a reluctance to see the norm change absent a formal alteration, such as through amendment of the Charter. This is not to say that the Charter can only change through formal amendment; plenty of examples exist of changes to the Charter through consensus interpretation of the UN member states. Yet such change is not common and requires a high threshold of consensus. Second, the *jus ad bellum* is considered a fundamental element in international law, so much so that most view it as a norm of *jus cogens* that cannot be altered by states even through treaty relations. While alterations of other norms may have significant social or economic effects (for example, establishing and expanding an exclusive economic zone outside the territorial sea), the stakes in altering the *jus ad bellum* are viewed as considerably higher, and as potentially unleashing a wide range of undesirable coercive behavior. Third, by its nature, the field of *jus ad bellum* does not have extensive and repeated state practice that allows for definitive evolution of the norm; rather, incidents are sparse, can often be distinguished through reference to unique factual scenarios, and often elicit conflicting interpretations by states and scholars concerning the significance of the incident for the law.

The principal actors that might formally recognize a change in the norm have no incentive to do so. Senior government officials in most states have a

---

5. Id. art. 51.
6. Id. arts. 41-42.
7. Id. art. 103.
8. The VCLT defines *jus cogens* as a norm “accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” VCLT, supra note 1, art. 53. The ICJ has referred to the prohibition on the use of force by one state against another as “a conspicuous example” of *jus cogens*. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100, para. 190 (June 27).
vested interest in preserving a norm that prevents transnational uses of force, as a means of fortifying their own authority with respect to external threats. Indeed, states without the power to project force across boundaries appear to fear that formal changes in the jus ad bellum would be simply a subterfuge for potential interventionist policies of the major powers. By contrast, the more powerful states (for example, the United States or United Kingdom) seem to favor the ability to use coercive force in ways that deviate from the static jus ad bellum paradigm, since they tend not to feel threatened by a change. Yet even those states may prefer to try to pigeon-hole their conduct into the static jus ad bellum paradigm, rather than create a new precedent that might someday work to their disadvantage. Meanwhile, groups that might be best served through a change in the paradigm, such as persons facing human rights crises brought on or tolerated by their government, have little formal voice in the state-centric system about whether and how the paradigm should change. For all these reasons, the jus ad bellum as it was conceived in 1945 remains the dominant paradigm, at least formally, today.

III. PROTEAN JUS AD BELLUM

While there is no formal consensus that the jus ad bellum has changed from the time it was enshrined in the UN Charter, there is considerable reason to think that it is not a static norm, and that informal expectations by states and other actors about it have evolved over time and will continue to evolve in the future. Though in the aftermath of the two world wars, consensus crystallized on a broad-scale prohibition on the use of armed force, other overarching developments since 1945—the development of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of human rights law, and the emergence of global terrorism as a mechanism for projecting violence against states by non-state actors—have significantly affected attitudes toward permissible uses of force. In the face of these challenges, a credible case can be made that the jus ad bellum has not remained static, but has changed and is changing, or assumes different meanings when faced with different situations.

A. The Pre-Charter Era

A starting point for viewing the jus ad bellum as protean in nature is to take the long view and recognize that the static position is of relatively recent vintage, itself a product of change. The Hague Peace Conference of 1907, in conjunction with its 1899 predecessor, ushered in a remarkable century for the growth of public international law. Part of that growth entailed the emergence

10. The principal concern of Russian Tsar Nicholas II in convening the Hague Peace Conferences lay in a desire to limit the number of armaments possessed by the major powers of the world and hence to secure a durable peace, an effort that ultimately was not successful. See generally
of a highly restrictive *jus ad bellum* that did not previously exist; indeed, at the start of the twentieth century, there was no globally-accepted norm prohibiting the resort to war. The conventions adopted at the two peace conferences, however, began the process of limiting the means by which states could resort to warfare. Thus, the 1907 Hague Convention II prohibited the resort to war completely when the objective was the recovery of debt, unless the debtor state refused or neglected to resolve the matter through arbitration.\(^{11}\) The Hague Convention III required states not to commence hostilities without previous and explicit warning.\(^{12}\)

That military force should be resorted to only for good reasons or just cause was, of course, a sentiment that preceded the Hague Peace Conferences, harking back to the just war doctrine of Augustine and Aquinas,\(^ {13}\) and even further back to the *bellum justum et pium* doctrine of early Roman law.\(^ {14}\) Yet the Hague Convention II produced the first effort at a conventional prohibition on resort to war in a particular circumstance, where the purpose—economic redress—was considered the least compelling for unleashing the dogs of war. By 1928, some states were willing to take the considerably more extensive step of adhering to an instrument, the Kellogg-Briand Pact (or Pact of Paris), by which they “condemn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce[d] it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.”\(^ {15}\)

**B. Direct Aggression by States**

The Kellogg-Briand Pact failed to stem the outbreak of World War II, but it set the stage for the codification of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the centerpiece around which the static *jus ad bellum* is now built. Though often debated, questioned, interpreted, and reinterpreted, Article 2(4), in conjunction with Article 51, has established a quite stable and clear core normative proscription: States are prohibited from using force against other states unless they are acting in self-defense or under Security Council authorization. Though overt military attacks by one state against another continue to this day, they are readily condemned by the global community and they often, though not invariably, elicit significant countermeasures against the aggressor state. Efforts by one state to

---


\(^{15}\) 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343.
annex another are almost unheard of—Iraq's invasion of Kuwait being the exception that proves the rule—leaving instead projections of force designed to temporarily punish a state, diminish its military capacity, or perhaps adjust a bilateral boundary. Hence, at its heart, the *jus ad bellum* now provides a formidable normative structure unheard of even 100 years ago.

Even so, from the start, uncertainty existed about the scope and content of this basic paradigm. Given that Article 2(4) only refers to "force," is the prohibition limited to use of armed force or does it proscribe other forms of coercion as well? What exactly is meant by prohibiting "threats" to use force? If a state's nationals are seized abroad by another state and held hostage, is that a "use of force" within the meaning of Article 2(4)? If a state responds to such action by using military force to rescue its nationals, is that self-defense against an "armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51? Various examples of "rescue of nationals" exist in state practice, but the concept does not sit easily within the terms of the Charter and hence has been controversial. In short, even within the core Article 2(4)/Article 51 paradigm, difficult questions have arisen, prompting extensive commentary over the years.

**C. Indirect Aggression by States**

Uses of force during the Cold War became much more complex than the type of aggression that spawned World War II. Though direct armed conflict between states remained an important concern, other forms of coercion came to pose a more difficult challenge to the *jus ad bellum*. During the Cold War, the problem of indirect aggression forcefully emerged, whereby one state surreptitiously supplied military and economic support to mercenaries, rebels or insurgents against another state. If one were giving a talk in the 1960's about "new threats" in the *jus ad bellum*, indirect aggression by states would have been the focal point of the discussion. And because of that, it became important to again revisit what exactly was meant by Article 2(4) and Article 51, in order to elaborate upon what was left unsaid.

One important mechanism for illuminating the meaning of the *jus ad bellum* was through its interpretation, in the context of specific incidents of state practice, by the principal organs of the United Nations—the Security Council.


Throughout the initial decades of the Charter, those organs adopted various resolutions considering the projection of coercion in various contexts, especially in the Middle East and Southern Africa. In some instances, the practice even concerned attacks by a non-state actor against a state, such as the Security Council's condemnation as "aggression" of the 1977 attack by an invading force of mercenaries on the Marxist-led government in Benin.

More general interpretations of the jus ad bellum by UN organs were also an important mechanism for illuminating the meaning of this body of law. In 1974 the General Assembly adopted its resolution on the Definition of Aggression, which served to provide a non-exhaustive list of the kinds of coercion that would violate Article 2(4). The Definition of Aggression, of course, included the standard paradigm of one state invading or bombarding another state, but it also included other types of coercion that might have been seen as falling outside the scope of Article 2(4), such as the blockading of ports. The Definition of Aggression recognized that coercion violating Article 2(4) could arise from transboundary conduct of non-state actors—"armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries," at least when such actors were sent "by or on behalf of a State" and when the coercion was "of such gravity" as to amount the kinds of coercion prohibited to states.

The 1986 judgment by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case served as something of a lightening rod for consideration of the meaning of direct and indirect aggression in the Cold War era. The Court had not previously opined on the meaning of Articles 2(4) and 51, though it had addressed some issues relating to the use of force in the course of deciding the Corfu Channel case. The reasoning of the Court in Nicaragua was initially somewhat clouded by the highly charged politics of the case, as well as the U.S. refusal to participate in the merits phase. Over time, however, the Court's judgment seems to have passed into the corpus of accepted jurisprudence, to the point where the United States itself now cites to the judgment as authority.

The basic paradigm set forth by the Nicaragua case found that certain acts, such as the mining of another state's harbors and attacks on another state's naval vessels and oil facilities, were violations of Article 2(4), an outcome that is not

23. Id. art. 3(g).
particularly surprising. More interesting was the Court’s conclusion that certain acts in violation of Article 2(4) might not rise to the threshold of being an “armed attack” for purposes of Article 51, and therefore could not be responded to through the exercise of self-defense. This lack of symmetry between Articles 2(4) and 51 is well-grounded textually in the Charter, but it also rather unsatisfactorily invites coercive behavior that operates below the radar of “armed attack,” and hence has been criticized.

Another notable feature of the Court’s decision was its recognition that an armed attack might occur through the conduct of non-state actors operating across a border. In that regard, the Court confirmed that attribution of such conduct to a state was important in triggering a right of self-defense against that state. Since the Court was not persuaded that the assistance to the Salvadorian armed opposition was imputable to Nicaragua, nor that it was on a “scale of any significance,” the United States had no right to embark on collective self-defense on behalf of El Salvador against Nicaragua.

D. Distant But Grave Threats

The Cold War also saw uncertainty about the temporal scope of the right of self-defense under the Charter. Some maintained that a state could only respond in self-defense after having suffered an armed attack from another state. The text of Article 51 supports that position, since it acknowledges a right of self-defense only “if an armed attack occurs” against a UN Member.26

Yet the complex ways in which contemporary armed coercion can occur, and the dire consequences of a delayed response to that coercion, have prompted observers to advance various arguments for why self-defense may be undertaken even prior to an armed attack. One approach is to emphasize a right of anticipatory or interceptive self-defense, by which is meant acting in self-defense when there is convincing evidence that an armed attack is occurring even though the attacker has not yet penetrated the defending state’s frontier.27 Thus, while it was Israel who first opened fire in the 1967 Six Days War, it has been argued that Israel was responding to an “incipient armed attack by Egypt (joined by Jordan and Syria),” as evidenced by Egypt’s “peremptory ejection of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula; the closure of the Straits of Tiran; the unprecedented build-up of Egyptian forces along Israel’s borders; and constant sabre-rattling statements about the impending fight-

26. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 278 (1963) (“the view that Article 51 does not permit anticipatory action is correct and . . . arguments to the contrary are either unconvincing or based on inconclusive pieces of evidence.”); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 702 (6th ed. 2003) (“Since 1945 the practice of States generally has been opposed to anticipatory self-defence.”).

27. See, e.g., QUINCY WRIGHT, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION OF WAR 60 (1961) (“[I]t is not unreasonable to assume that an ‘armed attack’ is intended to include an immediate threat of armed attack, thus justifying military counteraction in individual or collective self-defence before there is an actual armed attack.”).
Those in favor of allowing such anticipatory or interceptive self-defense sought to extend the concept of an external armed attack to the earliest stages of its unfolding (for example, an "armed attack" begins as soon as your opponent commences warming up its missile silos or directing its battle carrier group toward your coast) or sought to downplay the express text of Article 51 as illustrating but not limiting the manner of self-defense. As a last resort, some observers have stated that such anticipatory action was unlawful, but "may be justified on moral and political grounds," such that "the community will eventually condone [it] or mete out lenient condemnation."

Some state practice supported this position but, as in most areas of the jus ad bellum, the practice was too infrequent and too contested to lead to a consensus position. In 2004, a high-level panel of experts convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a report endorsing the concept of a limited right of unilateral preemptive action when "the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate."

Still others have insisted that for especially grave threats, such as the development of a nuclear or other mass destruction weapon by an unpredictable state, it was also permissible to resort to armed force months or even years in advance to prevent the threat from occurring. Sporadic practice lent some credence to this concept of preemptive or preventive self-defense, such as the 1962 U.S.-led "quarantine" of Cuba in response to the planned deployment of long-range missiles or the 1986 U.S. bombing raids against Libya purportedly to stem future Libyan terrorism. Yet, again, the practice was too uneven to demonstrate widespread acceptance. Indeed, in some instances, such as the 1981 Israeli attack against a nascent Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak, the condemnation of the action by the UN General Assembly as "aggression" and by the Security Council as a violation of the UN Charter strongly suggested that such action was prohibited.

Most recently, this concept of preemptive or preventive self-defense was endorsed by the Bush Administration in its statements on U.S. national security strategy, which identified an evolving right under international law for the United States to use military force preemptively against the threat posed by


31. For a recent proposal, with a preference for authorization by the United Nations or a regional organization, but allowing residually for unilateral action, see Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 136, 137 (Jan./Feb. 2004) ("Like the responsibility to protect, the duty to prevent begins from the premise that the rules now governing the use of force, devised in 1945 and embedded in the UN Charter, are inadequate.").


"rogue states" possessing WMDs. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, though technically undertaken based on a legal theory of Security Council authorization, has widely been interpreted as an application of the doctrine of preemptive or preventive self-defense. The 2004 U.N. high-level panel did not adopt this concept, finding that if there are "good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to."

E. Grave Threats to Persons

One of the signature developments of international law in the twentieth century was the rise of human rights—the recognition that the protection of persons from the excesses of their own governments is central to the project of the rule of law in inter-state affairs. At the time the Charter was adopted, the concept of human rights was known, but was radically under-developed. Through the establishment of a series of multilateral treaties and associated institutions, human rights has emerged as a powerful normative regime for identifying protections that states owe to their nationals and for promoting the global monitoring of those rights. Moreover, the field of human rights has helped open the door for imposition of criminal responsibility on those persons who unleash human rights violations and in some situations illuminated connections between rights-abuse and threats to international peace.

The interface between human rights protections and the use of force prohibition has been troubled, especially since the end of the Cold War. The static *jus ad bellum* paradigm on its face provides no opening for the transnational use of force to protect the rights of persons within the targeted state absent Security Council authorization. Textual arguments have been deployed in favor of regarding humanitarian intervention as consistent with Article 2(4) since it is not the kind of force proscribed by that article or as consistent with Article 51 since "self-defense" necessarily embraces the notion of defense of others, while arguments more rooted in moral philosophy or natural law call for interpreting ambiguous rules in favor of a just outcome, thus permitting use of force

34. WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (Sept. 17, 2002) ("For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.").


when necessary to save lives.\textsuperscript{39}

Arguable examples of intervention undertaken to prevent human rights crises occurred during the Cold War, such as the interventions of India in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam in Cambodia in 1978, or Tanzania in Uganda to oust Idi Amin. After the Cold War, humanitarian crises in the 1990’s, especially in Rwanda, continued to provoke a robust debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{40} Perhaps the high point to date was the March/April 1999 NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia), undertaken to prevent its government from engaging in ethnic cleansing and atrocities in the autonomous province of Kosovo, which many states recognized as an independent state in 2008.

Shortly after the Kosovo incident, an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (established by the Government of Canada) issued a December 2001 report entitled \textit{The Responsibility to Protect}, which sought to provide a legal and ethical foundation for humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{41} The report asserted that a responsibility to protect (or “R2P”)\textsuperscript{42} exists under international law. Further, the report stated that in circumstances when the Security Council fails to discharge that responsibility, “in a conscience-shocking situation crying out for action,” then it “is a real question in these circumstances where lies the most harm: in the damage to international order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council stands by.”\textsuperscript{43} By contrast, the 2004 U.N. high-level panel, writing in the wake of the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq, agreed with the ICISS that there existed an “emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect,” but concluded that armed force may be used to fulfill the responsibility only if so authorized by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{44} Further, the high-level panel identified five criteria of “legitimacy” when engaging in such intervention, relating to the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the intervenors, the exhaustion of pacific means, proportionality, and a balancing of the ensuing consequences.\textsuperscript{45} The U.N. Secretary-General

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{39} See, e.g., FERNANDO TtSON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (3d ed. 2005).

\textsuperscript{40} See, e.g., SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 43-46 (1996); NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2000); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003).


\textsuperscript{42} For a discussion of the emergence of this concept, see Carsten Stahn, \textit{Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?}, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (2007).

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{The Responsibility to Protect}, supra note 41, para. 6.37.

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{High-level Panel Report}, supra note 30, para. 203; see also id. paras. 196, 272.

\textsuperscript{45} Id. para. 207.
\end{flushright}
thereafter generally endorsed the high-level panel’s approach\textsuperscript{46} as did the General Assembly in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document,\textsuperscript{47} though neither expressly adopted the five criteria nor expressly ruled out the unilateral use of force.\textsuperscript{48}

While the ICISS drew the line for humanitarian intervention at “conscience-shocking situations crying out for action,” others have argued in favor of using force to protect a broader array of human rights. Thus, rather than limit the use of force only to extreme situations, such as to prevent genocide or crimes against humanity, some favor deployment of armed forces to restore a democratic government to power (as arguably occurred with the U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983). No doubt with an eye on these emerging threats, the Nicaragua Court issued statements casting doubt on the ability of states to use force to protect human rights\textsuperscript{49} or to bring about regime change,\textsuperscript{50} although those statements are probably best construed in the context of the facts presented and the positions pled (or not pled) in that case.

\textbf{F. Grave Threats from Transnational Terrorism}

If one were to identify the “new threats” faced at the beginning of the 21st century, many observers would likely point to the problem of potential projection of force on a massive scale by non-state actors, operating largely independently from state control or direction. The ability of non-state actors to project force across boundaries was readily apparent even before 9/11, but 9/11 seems to have raised the awareness level to unprecedented heights. When a terrorist group, Al Qaeda, can organize itself so as to launch an attack halfway around the world that inflicts, in a single day, some 3,000 casualties, destroying the World Trade Center, and severely damaging the command center of the U.S. military, policymakers naturally wonder when and where further attacks might occur, and what the law allows in response. Attacks associated with Al Qaeda have occurred annually since 9/11 in various countries from Spain to Indonesia to the United Kingdom.

Does the \textit{jus ad bellum} speak to such attacks? By its terms, Article 2(4) prohibits uses of force by one state against another state. Article 51 is less definitive in addressing only inter-state behavior, but arguably the Charter was de-
signed solely to speak to rights and obligations as between states, and any act of self-defense must be in response to an armed attack committed by or attributable to another state. The Nicaragua Court viewed attribution of non-state actor conduct to a state as a salient factor before the jus ad bellum is implicated, and that view was confirmed and apparently extended by the Court’s 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Wall. In that opinion, the Court rather summarily dismissed Israel’s claim that it was acting in self-defense against attacks by terrorist groups. According to the Court, Israel could not possibly be acting in self-defense under Article 51 because Israel had not claimed that the terrorist attacks at issue were imputable to a foreign state and because those attacks were not transnational in nature, having occurred wholly within territory occupied by Israel.

The advisory opinion thus appears to extend the Nicaragua paradigm by saying that it is not possible under any circumstances to engage in an act of self-defense under international law against a non-state actor; rather, you can only engage in an act of self-defense against another state, and thus only in situations where the acts of the non-state actor are imputable to that other state. Why that is the case, however—especially in light of the reaction of the global community (including the Security Council, NATO, and the OAS) to the attacks by Al Qaeda of 9/11 as justifying a response in self-defense—the Court failed to explain, notwithstanding the admonitions of some of the judges in their separate opinions. Criticisms of the Court’s position may have prompted the Court to backtrack in its 2005 case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, where the Court more tentatively noted that, given the circumstances of the case, there was “no need to respond to the contentions of the Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defense against large-scale attacks by irregular forces.”

The ability of non-state actors to project such force transnationally is coupled with the fear that the next time it will not be airplanes but a weapon of mass

51. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 24, at 83-86, paras. 155-60; 119, para. 230 (rejecting the U.S. argument that collective self-defense was justified against Nicaragua in part because any supply of arms or other support from Nicaragua to the opponents of the El Salvador government was not shown to be trafficking in which Nicaraguan government authorities were complicit).

52. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).

53. Id. at 194, para. 139.


considerable attention is paid to the possibility of a nuclear attack, yet there is also concern that chemical weapons will be used whose toxic properties produce physical or physiological effects—chlorine, phosgene, mustard gas, or nerve gases (such as sarin) come to mind. Similarly, there are fears that a terrorist group might concoct a biological weapon capable of disseminating infectious diseases or conditions that otherwise do not exist or only exist naturally, by using bacteria (for example, anthrax), viruses (for example, smallpox), or toxins (for example, ricin). There are, of course, considerable hurdles for non-state actors in obtaining and delivering such weapons, but they are not insurmountable hurdles, and highly-respected analysts believe the odds to be fairly high that such an attack will eventually occur.

Large-scale terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction are not the only "new threat." Mavens of our "information age" observe that new methods of cyber-warfare are becoming a reality, by which states and non-state actors with a comparative disadvantage in hardware may seek to level the playing field through attacks on software. Even non-traditional dangers such as the transboundary movement of infectious diseases, living modified organisms, invasive plant species, or persistent organic chemicals may emerge as grave threats to which states seek to respond forcibly.

IV. REAFFIRMING OR RECODIFYING THE JUS AD BELLUM

A. Maintaining the Status Quo

Defenders of the static view of the jus ad bellum view the classic 1945 paradigm as normatively the best way of organizing inter-state behavior. States are permitted to defend themselves when exposed to an armed attack and states are permitted to use force when authorized by the Security Council. In all other circumstances, uses of military force are prohibited, even if intended to prevent human rights atrocities, because any further exceptions threaten to swallow the basic rules. Some defenders may maintain that the rule is sacrosanct, but concede (either publicly or in private conversation) that deviations in extreme situations are legitimate even if not technically lawful.

Critics of the static view assert that there are situations where uses of force should be allowed to promote world order, so they typically seek to read the original Charter text as allowing for exceptions. On this approach, the Article 2(4)/Article 51 construct sets forth imprecise standards that must be refined through state practice, so clever interpretations of what it means to use force


“against territorial integrity” in Article 2(4) or what Article 51 means when it refers to an “inherent right” of self-defense allow these critics to embrace contemporary uses of force that are seen as desirable. Such interpretations are creative, but not particularly persuasive, and certainly have not garnered widespread support. Other critics adopt a more protean view, stating that the enormous changes in inter-state relations since 1945 merit rethinking the *jus ad bellum.* Many international relations theorists and some international lawyers see the *jus ad bellum* as simply no longer reflecting contemporary law at all, if it ever did. For them, the *jus ad bellum* is essentially window dressing, trotted out by the major powers when it serves their interests to do so, but shoved aside without much ado when its proscriptions are inconvenient.

Can this state of affairs endure in the long term? Will the current situation remain one hundred years hence? Given the uncertainty that has existed since 1945, it might plausibly be argued that maintaining the *status quo* is feasible and even desirable. The relatively conservative approach in static *jus ad bellum* helps discourage pernicious uses of force by limiting exceptions to the Article 2(4) prohibition. While some further deviations might be desirable, and while lawyers may like to have clear and transparent rules that are routinely and uniformly followed, perhaps law in this area should be somewhat vague, generally coercing states into pacific behavior but providing enough “play-in-the-joints” to accommodate major power politics in a world that cannot be neatly packaged. To navigate those uncertainties, a Security Council exists to help interpret when a state ranges too far outside the gray lines, thereby tacitly allowing some uses of force (for example, Israel’s preemptive self-defense in the 1967 War) while rejecting others (for example, Israel’s attack on the Osirak nuclear facility). Similarly, the Security Council is available to authorize uses of force that are necessary to address extraordinary circumstances that do not fit static *jus ad bellum,* such as to stop a government from inflicting genocide or crimes against humanity upon its own people. On this account, the main purposes of the Article 2(4)/Article 51 paradigm have been met by essentially eliminating the recourse to war for territorial expansion, and largely reducing other types of coercion by forcing states to justify their actions as self-defense against an

---

59. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, *How International Rules Die,* 93 GEO. L.J. 939 (2005); Michael J. Glennon, *Why the Security Council Failed,* 82 FOREIGN AFF. 16 (May/June 2003). For an effort to demonstrate that the *jus ad bellum* regime does impose prudential restraints on the major powers, “altering the manner and timing of their military actions in accordance with the legal arguments they have offered (or intend to offer) to justify those actions,” so much so that in some cases it contributes to the failure of those actions, see JOEL H. WESTRA, *INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF ARMED FORCE: THE UN CHARTER AND THE MAJOR POWERS* 2, 153-54 (2007).
armed attack, and to risk the approbation when the justification is weak. The system may not be perfect, but states are generally comfortable with it, and it is relatively stable.

On the other hand, a fairly plausible case can be made that there is already far too much confusion and uncertainty in how the *jus ad bellum*, as crafted in 1945, should be applied in addressing the wide range of contemporary threats, and that matters may well get worse over the next century. While transboundary uses of force may not be a daily occurrence, they are not infrequent, and their adverse effects can be quite grave. There are dramatic armed confrontations presently occurring between states, such as the 2008 armed conflict between Russia and Georgia, but even the casualness with which Turkey may move armed forces across the border into Iraq to attack PKK bases (discussed below), without any notable condemnation by the international community of the action as unlawful, is striking. Any normative system has gaps and uncertainties, but the list of challenges to the *jus ad bellum*—on rescue of nationals, humanitarian intervention, indirect aggression, responses to coercion not considered an “armed attack,” responses to coercion by non-state actors, anticipatory self-defense, preemptive self-defense—is rather long.

The Security Council does condemn and occasionally act against some of the most egregious violations of the *jus ad bellum*, but the system is not, and should not, be designed to regard as permissible all uses of force that are not condemned by the Security Council; indeed, even when blatant aggression occurs, the Security Council does not always act, such as when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 or when Eritrea invaded Ethiopia in 1998. Moreover, as is well known, even after the Cold War, the Security Council remains inhibited from either condemning or authorizing uses of force when any one of the five permanent members politically opposes such action, as occurred with respect to Kosovo in 1999. While there are areas of common interests among the Security Council members, those interests are often not in alignment, as can be seen in recent discussions over how to address Iran’s nascent nuclear program (resistance from Russia) or the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan (resistance from China). And, like any institution, the Security Council makes mistakes.

To illuminate the problem with the *status quo*, one might consider the range of conflicting practice over just the past two years with regard to whether a state may respond to a terrorist attack by undertaking a cross-border raid against a terrorist camp without the consent of the host state:

- In the summer of 2006, the Hezbollah movement, operating out of Lebanon, crossed into Israel’s northern border, attacked and killed several Israeli soldiers, seizing two as hostages, before returning to Lebanon. Israel responded by sending military forces into, and by bombing

---

portions of, southern Lebanon in an effort to secure the release of the soldiers and to diminish Hezbollah's military capabilities. During the course of the hostilities, Hezbollah fired some 4,000 rockets across the border into Israel, which Human Rights Watch determined intentionally targeted the civilian population. Human Rights Watch also concluded that, in its response, Israel frequently failed to distinguish between military and civilian targets, and failed to take adequate safeguards to prevent civilian casualties. Rather than condemn Israel's action, the Security Council expressed "its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hezbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006" and welcomed Lebanon's efforts "to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon." 

- In January 2007, the Palestinian militant organization and political party Hamas was elected as the government of the Palestinian Authority. In June of that year, Hamas seized control of the Gaza strip from Fatah-controlled Palestinian security forces. Since 2002, Hamas has used homemade (relatively crude) Qassam rockets launched from the Gaza Strip to hit Israeli towns in the Negev. More recently, Iranian-made rockets have allowed Hamas to reach large Israeli cities, such as Ashkelon (population of 120,000). That increased capability prompted Israel in early 2008 to launch a major military ground operation as well as air strikes against Hamas fighters in the Gaza Strip. To date, no resolutions have been adopted by the Security Council or General Assembly on the matter.

- In October 2007, the Turkish government received a one-year authorization from its parliament to conduct military operations in northern Iraq against the Kurdish separatist guerilla organization known as the Kurd-
Since its founding in the 1970's, the PKK has sponsored numerous attacks against Turkish forces as a part of its campaign to establish an independent Kurdistan. By some estimates, over the past three decades, Turkey has responded with twenty-four cross-border attacks into Iraq, but has failed to route the PKK. A recent response involved air strikes against PKK camps and villages, as well as an eight-day ground offensive. Although both the United States and the European Union expressed concerns about Turkey’s action, to date no resolutions have been adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the European Union, or NATO condemning Turkey’s conduct as unlawful.

- In January 2008, the United States launched a pilotless CIA Predator aircraft from a base within Pakistani territory which proceeded to fire two Hellfire missiles into a compound of buildings near the Pakistani town of Mir Ali, reportedly killing a senior Al Qaeda commander. While the United States previously had requested specific permission from the Pakistani government for such operations, in this instance such permission was not sought, though it may have been the product of a general U.S.-Pakistani arrangement allowing unilateral U.S. action.

- In December 2006, Ethiopian military forces ousted from power in Somalia a group of Sharia Courts known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU had united in order to form a rival administration to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, and had succeeded in controlling most of southern Somalia and the vast majority of its population. Since ousting the ICU from power, the United States has launched from its naval vessels at least four missile strikes in Somalia against Islamic leaders accused of being terrorists. (For example, one

---

64. The parliamentary vote was 507 to 19 in favor of using military force by means of strategic strikes or a large-scale invasion. See Molly Moore, *Turkey Authorizes Iraq Incursion*, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2007, at A1. Both the United States and the European Union have classified the PKK as a terrorist organization.

65. *Id.*


70. *See* Stephanie McCrummen, *U.S. Strike in Somalia Targets Terror Suspects*, WASH. POST,
of the strikes targeted a Kenyan who is believed to have played a major role in the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.) The TFG reportedly has allowed the United States a free hand in undertaking such attacks, although since the TFG faces a widespread civil war, its ability to authorize external interference is open to question.

- A classified 2005 U.S. document concerning rules of engagement in Iraq envisaged the ability of U.S. military forces to cross from Iraq into Iran, Syria or other countries bordering Iraq, even without those countries’ consent. Generally, such action was only authorized after securing approval from the U.S. Secretary of Defense, which might entail obtaining Presidential approval. Yet according to the document, the approval of the Secretary of Defense was not necessary in situations of hot pursuit of terrorists or former members of Saddam Hussein’s government from Iraq into Iran or Syria, or “when Syria or Iran cannot or will not prevent a hostile force from using their airspace, land territory, internal waters or territorial seas to attack US and/or designated forces and the hostile force constitutes an imminent threat to ongoing operations.” U.S. helicopters engaged in a cross-border raid into Syria in late October 2008 to strike at a reputed staging area for “foreign fighters” and weapons transmitting into Iraq.

- On March 1, 2008, Colombian military forces bombed and crossed into Ecuador to attack guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), who maintain camps along the border. Colombian leaders regard the FARC as a terrorist and drug-trafficking organization, while some governments in the region see them as revolutionaries fighting a U.S.-backed puppet government. Ecuador and Venezuela responded to the raid by sending troops to their borders with Colombia, while Nicaragua broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia. In this instance, neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly condemned that action. The Organization of American States, however,


72. Id. paras. 3(D)(I)(A and B).
adopted a resolution declaring the Colombian raid to be a violation of Ecuador’s sovereignty, though it stopped short of expressly condemning Colombia.\footnote{The United States was the only county in the Western Hemisphere expressly supporting the Colombian action. \textit{See} Simon Romero, \textit{Regional Bloc Criticizes Colombian Raid in Ecuador}, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2008, at A3. The resolution provided:}

These examples indicate that many states are concerned about the legality of cross-border uses of force to combat terrorism. However, condemnation on the basis of a legal violation is erratic, perhaps suggesting that states are considering a much more nuanced legal standard than is captured by the static \textit{jus ad bellum} paradigm. On issues such as this, as time progresses, the static \textit{jus ad bellum} position may become increasingly questioned and viewed as untenable or unconvincing.

Hence, the argument against the \textit{status quo} is that civilized societies can and should do better, at least if they aspire to maintain international peace and security through predictable and transparent processes. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his 2005 report \textit{In Larger Freedom},

an essential part of the consensus we must seek must be agreement on when and how force can be used to defend international peace and security. In recent years, this issue has deeply divided Member States. They have disagreed about whether States have the right to use military force pre-emptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats; whether they have the right to use it preventively to defend themselves against latent or non-imminent threats; and whether they have the right—or perhaps the obligation—to use it protectively to rescue the citizens of other States from genocide or comparable crimes... Agreement must be reached on these questions if the United Nations is to be—as it was intended to be—a forum for resolving differences rather than a mere stage for acting them out.\footnote{\textit{Development, Security and Human Rights Report, supra} note 46, paras. 122-23.}

In the face of such uncertainty, states should consider a formal reaffirmation of the static \textit{jus ad bellum} position if that position truly reflects contempo-
rary global expectations. By "reaffirmation" of the static jus ad bellum, I do not mean a statement of the kind that was issued at the 2005 World Summit. At that meeting, some 150 world leaders adopted a declaration that, among other things, reiterated "the obligation of all Member States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter [of the United Nations]"77 and reaffirmed "that the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace and security."78 Such a "reaffirmation" fails to grapple directly with differing interpretations of what the Charter actually requires—it simply papers over those differences. Instead, a true reaffirmation would specifically address how the jus ad bellum relates to contemporary threats.

Alternatively, if contemporary global expectations diverge from the static position, then a recodification of the jus ad bellum may in order. By recodification, I mean a restatement of the rudimentary rules of the jus ad bellum in light of the wide range of threats that have already occurred and will continue to occur in the years to come. In essence, it would be an effort to engage in the same conversation today that occurred when the major powers, at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, drafted what became Article 2(4) and when the San Francisco conference adopted Article 51 in 1945.

Trying to reach a consensus either on a reaffirmation of the static jus ad bellum position or on a recodification of the changed jus ad bellum may well be politically infeasible. This is due to a variety of factors, including the significance of the issue, the rhetorical posturing that governments engage in, the considerable divide between more powerful and less powerful states, and the potential for any process to be sidetracked by current events. Recent efforts by even non-governmental entities, such as the ICISS and the 2005 U.N. high-level panel, have revealed the difficulties and controversy that any such effort will entail. Indeed, a credible argument might be made that the only point at which the jus ad bellum will be ripe for either reaffirmation or recodification is when it completely breaks down, ushering in a new era for rebuilding or strengthening international institutions. The ICISS's Responsibility to Protect report candidly noted that "it would be impossible to find consensus, in the Commission's view, around any set of proposals for military intervention which acknowledged the validity of any intervention not authorized by the Security Council or General Assembly."79

Indeed, perhaps the strongest argument for adhering to the status quo is not that the static jus ad bellum is a stable and intrinsically optimal regime, but that efforts to move to a more protean conception will be even more destabilizing, forcing states and non-state actors to confront a normative system over which they have fundamental disagreements. Deep schisms between powerful states

77. 2005 World Summit Outcome, Res. 60/1, para. 77, U.N. Doc. A/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005).
78. Id. para. 79.
79. Responsibility to Protect, supra note 41, para. 6.37.
and less-powerful states, and even among close allies, may well be revealed and become more entrenched. The considerable difficulties that the NATO states encountered in identifying a legal theory justifying their actions to protect Kosovo provide a window on the problems that would be faced in either reaffirming or recodifying the *jus ad bellum*. Imagine the difficulty in securing agreement between the United States and the developing world about preemptive self-defense, or between France and China over humanitarian intervention, and the problem becomes manifest. As such, better to let sleeping dogs lie.

Nevertheless, given that efforts like ICISS or the High Level Panel have already begun, we may be entering a period where a reaffirmation or recodification of the *jus ad bellum* is viewed as politically feasible and desirable. While strong adherence to the core paradigm remains, powerful sentiments are emerging in favor of a more sophisticated normative system, driven by the rise of human rights, the threat of terrorism, and the fear of weapons of mass destruction. As these sentiments become more insistent, initiatives such as ICISS and the 2005 U.N. high-level panel may prove to be just the first wave in efforts to revisit and reevaluate the *jus ad bellum*. Developing countries, faced with issues such as threats of non-proliferation, are acting in a manner that might not have been predicted even a few years ago.80

Notably, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute contemplates that the Court will exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once the states parties adopt a provision at their review conference (scheduled for 2010) setting forth a definition of aggression and the conditions under which the Court could exercise its jurisdiction over it.81 At present, a special working group has been established by the ICC Assembly of State Parties toward that end, and may result in a formulation of aggression that reaffirms or recodifies the static *jus ad bellum*. Even if the ICC’s work essentially cross-references the UN Charter and leaves current uncertainties intact, placing aggression within the scope of the ICC’s mandate may well galvanize states into a reaffirmation or recodification process, as a means of clarifying when government leaders may be exposed to charges of criminal conduct. Some states may resist reaching a consensus, but non-state actors may be powerful agitators for a consensus position to emerge. And while it often seems that certain hurdles in inter-state relations are insurmountable, there are plenty of examples, even in recent years, of those hurdles being swept aside by powerful currents of history (the reunification of Germany, the demise of South African apartheid, or the establishment of an international criminal court come to mind).

Defenders of static *jus ad bellum* might be correct that, notwithstanding all the new inter-state influences since 1945, the prevailing view today is still in fa-


vor of a strictly interpreted *jus ad bellum*; but if that is true, perhaps the time has come to formally reaffirm it. If it is not true, then perhaps the time has come to recodify the *jus ad bellum* so as to ensure its continuing relevance for inter-state relations and to provide it with a stronger pedigree than currently exists.

**B. Debating Reaffirmation or Recodification**

If maintaining the *status quo* is unstable, what directions should a contemporary debate over the *jus ad bellum* take? A starting point might be to approach the *jus ad bellum* more holistically than is usually the case. The standard approach in international legal analysis is to slice the *jus ad bellum* up into segments, in which consideration is given to issues such as rescue of nationals, humanitarian intervention, anticipatory self-defense, and so on. Within each segment, state practice is tallied up as showing either "legality" or "illegality" so as to reach a conclusion about the permissibility of using force in that particular context. Yet doing so is unsatisfactory, given that state practice tends to be sporadic, conflicting, and susceptible to alternative interpretations.

If instead, one were to step back from these segments so as to ask broader questions about when it is that the global community (however that might be defined) generally seems to favor uses of force, then the picture might become clearer. Certain general parameters would seem to be relatively accurate in helping to predict whether coercive behavior is acceptable, no matter the context in which it is deployed. Those parameters might concern: (1) the degree of coercion actually inflicted by State A upon State B or its nationals; (2) the gravity of coercion that State A fears from State B; (3) the extent to which other States are condoning State A’s coercion; (4) the pedigree of State B as a member of the international community; (5) the degree to which State A’s coercion is tailored to respond to the threat from State B; or (6) the degree to which State A’s coercion has adverse collateral consequences for other states or persons.

Under such a holistic approach, one would not read the global response to the attacks of 9/11 as solely relevant to the issue of permissible uses of force against a non-state actor, although it is certainly relevant to that issue. Rather, one would apply the precedent more broadly as relevant to our understanding of how the *jus ad bellum* operates in various circumstances. In other words, the 9/11 precedent can shed light on: (1) what constitutes an armed attack?; (2) how immediate must a likely further attack be before a state can respond in self-defense?; (3) what level of collective support or endorsement is possible when embarking on an act of self-defense?; (4) what kinds of delinquent acts might be held against a state from its past when considering its ability to invoke standard rights of sovereignty today under international law?; and (5) how does the gravity of the attack effect the scope of necessity and proportionality accorded to the defending state?

A second beneficial direction might entail analyzing relevant norms or instruments that are not, strictly speaking, a part of the *jus ad bellum*, but that offer
a window on contemporary community expectations. For example, in thinking through whether a state can engage in self-defense against a non-state actor who is believed to be acquiring weapons of mass destruction, it seems relevant to note that the Security Council decided in 2004 that all states must prohibit non-state actors in their territory from manufacturing or acquiring such weapons.\(^8\) Assuming that the resolution is within the power of the Security Council (some have claimed it to be *ultra vires*), then it seems highly relevant to the issue of the relationship of a state to non-state actors in its territory, and may serve to bridge whatever links of attribution are necessary to allow self-defense against that non-state actor.

Similarly, one might consider how evolutions in the *jus in bello* over time might be affecting the *jus ad bellum*. The 2006 U.S. Supreme Court case *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*\(^3\) concluded that “common Article 3” (that is, Article 3 common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions\(^4\)) refers to an armed conflict that is not international in nature, that includes the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda. One can argue about whether that was the right conclusion: (1) on the one hand, according certain minimal protections to the Guantanamo detainees using common Article 3 and Protocol I Article 75 seems like a good thing; (2) on the other hand, Common Article 3 was probably intended only to address internal armed conflict, not transnational armed conflict involving a state and a non-state actor. The point, however, is that if the *Hamdan* court is right—or even if we set aside the *Hamdan* decision and simply consider the protections that exist in common Article 3 and Protocol II for non-state actors—one arrives at a place where the *jus in bello* is trying to take account of and regulate activities relating to non-state actors. Should not the *jus ad bellum* do so as well?

In an essay of this length, a standard ploy might be to plead that there is not enough time to actually craft a proposed reaffirmation or recodification but, as a starting point, one could imagine the following as possible starting points:


### Reaffirmation of Static Jus Ad Bellum

1. The use or threat of use of armed force by one state against another state is prohibited in all circumstances unless:

   a) taken in response to a prior armed attack by another state until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security; or

   b) authorized by the Security Council as a means of addressing, under Chapter VII of the Charter, a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.

2. Measures taken in the exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.

3. All uses of armed force must be necessary and proportionate in relation to the threat that has arisen and must be undertaken in accordance with applicable international humanitarian law.

### Recodification of Protean Jus Ad Bellum

1. The use or threat of use of armed force by one state against another state is prohibited unless undertaken in accordance with paragraphs (2) – (5).

2. The Security Council may authorize the use of armed force by a state as a means of addressing, under Chapter VII of the Charter, a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.

3. A state may use or threaten to use armed force against another state in response to an actual or imminent armed attack by that other state, including an attack in the form of the seizure of nationals, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

4. A state may use or threaten to use armed force against another state in response to an actual or imminent widespread deprivation of fundamental human rights, after notification to and debate of the matter at the Security Council, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. To the extent possible, such action shall be taken through regional or sub-regional organizations.

5. States may use or threaten to use armed force against a non-state actor located in another state in the circumstances set forth in (3), but only if the other state has been provided a reasonable opportunity to address the matter directly, and has either refused to do so or is incapable of doing so.
Obviously, certain normative choices have been made in the proposed reaffirmation and proposed recodification, placing them at somewhat opposite ends of a potential spectrum of options. Further, the proposals above largely remain captured by the subject matter divisions in possible uses of force, rather than utilizing some of the more abstract (and perhaps controversial) factors suggested previously in this section. Nevertheless, these proposals may serve as a starting point for achieving a consensus on the contemporary preferences of states or non-state actors regarding the *jus ad bellum*.

C. The Means of a Reaffirmation or Recodification

The political feasibility of reaffirming or recodifying the *jus ad bellum* would turn on addressing not just the substance of the law but the means for establishing that substance. The most formal means of change, amendment of the Charter, is the least likely path to success, while the least formal change, through statements of non-governmental actors, may attract insufficient state adherence to be effective. Various possibilities exist that will no doubt be explored, to one degree or another, in the years to come.

*Through Amendment of Charter.* Though the Charter can be amended, the process for doing so is cumbersome, requiring a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and then ratification by two thirds of the UN members, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.\(^8^5\) Successful amendments have only occurred five times, all on issues relating to the increase in the size of the UN membership, not as a means of altering the substantive rights and obligations set forth in the Charter. Hence, the procedural hurdles of this process are quite significant and, absent tectonic shifts in geopolitics, likely insurmountable.

*Through UNGA Resolution.* Technically, the General Assembly has no express power to issue a resolution binding upon all states as to the meaning of Articles 2(4) and 51. Nevertheless, the *travaux preparatoires* of the Charter, and the jurisprudence of the International Court, have recognized the competence of organs of the United Nations, in the first instance, to interpret provisions of the Charter relevant to their work. Though the Security Council is the principal UN organ for addressing peace and security, it is not the exclusive authority, leaving to the General Assembly an important and relevant role.\(^8^6\) Further, since the General Assembly has within it representation of all states, resolutions that it adopts by consensus or by overwhelming majority that purport to recognize existing norms of international law can be highly authoritative evidence that such law exists. With respect to the *jus ad bellum*, the General Assembly has previously played a role through its adoption of various resolutions, including its

---

\(^8^5\) U.N. Charter, *supra* note 4, art. 108.

\(^8^6\) *See* Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20).
resolutions on friendly relations and, as previously noted, on aggression, and remains available to do so today, as evidenced by the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.

The problem with this venue is that the General Assembly has not proven to be a particularly effective body for engaging in sophisticated brokering of views between states over contentious issues. The political dynamics within the Assembly tends to drive toward an outcome that either only reflects the largest bloc of non-aligned states or that represents a consensus view concerning text that has little meaning. Whether a global parliament based on popular representation, rather than on representation of states, would avoid such pitfalls is unclear, but if one were to emerge, it too could be a potential venue.

*Through UNSC Resolution.* This option may represent the most intriguing possibility, given the increased activity of the Security Council in the post-Cold War era, the power of the Security Council to issue decisions that bind all UN members, and the Council’s willingness to engage in legislative-type resolutions on fundamental security issues, such as controls on terrorist financing and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At present there seems to be little P-5 agreement on a recodification of the *jus ad bellum,* but there are emerging areas of common interest (for example, the ability to strike at terrorist havens) and it not beyond imagination that at some point a political alignment would occur to issue a resolution that “clarifies” the meaning of the *jus ad bellum.*

*Through Major Power Agreement.* If reaching agreement within the major political institutions is difficult, another path would be for the major powers to reach agreement on instances when they favor or at least will not oppose uses of military force, as well as those circumstances where they will oppose the use of force. The composition of this group might include the P-5 and other states, or might be more oriented toward North American and West European states. Any product from such a group by itself would be non-binding, but it would help illuminate the beliefs of those states that are most likely to deploy military force. Other states could react to whatever declaration emerges from this process, providing a basis for identifying areas of agreement and disagreement.

*Through Case Law.* At least within international legal circles, there is an acceptance that the decisions of the International Court of Justice and other competent international courts carry considerable weight in identifying international law, including changes that have occurred in the law. To the extent that the *jus ad bellum* requires reaffirmation or recodification, which cannot be secured through political organs of the United Nations, then perhaps international
courts are the place to look. Arguably reaffirmation is exactly what the International Court has done in its jurisprudence; its decision in the *Oil Platforms* case\(^{90}\) might best be understood as confirming the static *jus ad bellum* and eschewing any explicit, significant new contribution to the notion of self-defense.\(^{91}\)

One problem with reliance on case law, however, is that the cases are extremely sparse and often present anomalous factual scenarios that are not easily or convincingly extrapolated to broader statements about the meaning of the *jus ad bellum*. Indeed, given the importance of the subject, it is rather remarkable that the International Court went for fifty years having only squarely addressed the *jus ad bellum* in one case (the *Nicaragua* case). In the post-Cold War era, there has been a somewhat greater willingness for cases to be brought to the Court and for the Court to address, on the merits, matters related to the *jus ad bellum*. Yet even so, cases such as the 1996 *Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons*,\(^{92}\) the 1998 *Spain/Canada Fisheries Jurisdiction* case\(^{93}\) (which provided the Court an opportunity to opine on what sort of coercion does not squarely fall within Article 2(4) of the Charter), the 2003 *Iranian Oil Platforms* judgment, 2004 *Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Wall*,\(^{94}\) and the 2005 *Congo/Uganda Armed Activities* case,\(^{95}\) have left many questions unanswered about the contours of the *jus ad bellum*. Perhaps to fill the gap, other tribunals are joining in as well. In December 2005, the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission found that Eritrea violated UN Charter Article 2(4) by invading and occupying parts of Ethiopia or Ethiopian-administered territory in May 1998.\(^{96}\) In September 2007, an arbitral panel convened under the Law of the Sea Convention found a violation of Article 2(4), this time in the form of a threat to use force by a Surinamese patrol boat against an oil rig.\(^{97}\) Yet these tribunals too have been fairly cautious and sometimes cursory in their treatment of the law.

Broadly speaking, courts and tribunals have done little to advance understandings about whether and how to adapt the *jus ad bellum* to contemporary threats or crises, with the most notable example perhaps being the International Court’s cursory treatment of the issue of attacks by non-state actors in the *Israeli Wall* advisory opinion. While a general advisory opinion might be sought from

---

\(^{90}\) *Oil Platforms* (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6).


\(^{92}\) Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).

\(^{93}\) Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4).

\(^{94}\) See supra note 52.

\(^{95}\) See supra note 55.


\(^{97}\) Award of the Arbitral Tribunal (Guyana v. Suriname), para. 445 (Sept. 17, 2007). The oil rig had been authorized by Guyana to engage in exploratory drilling on a part of the continental shelf in dispute between the two states.
the International Court of Justice on the scope of contemporary *jus ad bellum*, it seems likely that the Court would be extremely cautious in issuing such an opinion, uncertain how its views might be received by states, and reluctant to provide more than the most general of views. Perhaps it is simply too much to expect international courts to lead the way in this area.

**Through “Principles” Adopted by Non-State Actors.** Considerable international legal scholarship in recent years has focused on the rise of the non-state actor as a critical feature of the ways in which international law is created, interpreted, and even enforced. Epistemic communities operating across boundaries are doing much to galvanize public opinion on key issues of transnational law, which in turn influences the ways states conduct themselves.

As the work of the ICISS and the 2005 U.N. high-level panel show, there are roles that can be played by non-governmental organizations or expert groups in attempting to articulate and clarify the central norms of the *jus ad bellum*. The work product of such initiatives is not regarded as binding upon states, and hence may not be effective, but it can be the starting point for a process that flows into a formal arrangement, as may been seen in initiatives ranging from the regulation of land mines to the establishment of the international criminal court.

**V. Conclusion**

While the *jus ad bellum* has a hardened normative core that is widely accepted by states, there appears to be considerably less consensus around the margins of the norm, with its application changing considerably based on the context in which the norm is being applied. In this sense, the *jus ad bellum* has a much more protean nature than is commonly recognized by states and non-state actors. The traditional approach of seeing uses of force as being lawful/unlawful based solely on whether they are taken in self-defense against a prior armed attack, or with Security Council authorization, increasingly seems unconvincing or, at a minimum, a poor predictor of the likely response of the global community. That does not mean that the *jus ad bellum* has no part to play on the margins; it retains an important role in conditioning global conduct and reactions to that conduct, but that role may increasingly diminish in the years to come.

Three options present themselves. States and non-state actors can continue to operate under the current system, which tends to view the *jus ad bellum* as a static law unchanged since 1945. Strong reasons support this option, including


99. See **JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS** 284 (2005) ("Certain structural aspects of IOs, including provision for access to documents and for ‘observer’ or other forms of non-voting status, have provided entry points for NGOs’ growing participation in various forms of inter-state diplomacy, including treaty-making.")).
the claim that the current system is reasonably stable and could be significantly destabilized by moving to a different position. Alternatively, if the existing system is not stable or will become unstable over time, and if that instability is partly due to a belief in some quarters that times have changed since adoption of the original Charter paradigm, then states and non-state actors could seek to reaffirm the static *jus ad bellum*, if that remains the consensus position. Finally, if the *status quo* is untenable, and there is no consensus on the static view, then states and non-state actors might do well to seek consensus on a recodification of the *jus ad bellum* to reflect its protean nature.

A formal reaffirmation or recodification in the near-term may be politically infeasible, but various factors may push the global community in that direction in the years to come. Even short of developing a new global consensus, for the *jus ad bellum* to retain a vibrant, authoritative role in inter-state relations, it likely needs to find ways to accommodate new threats to the global order, through more refined decisions of international courts, more sophisticated approaches to international treaties and UN resolutions, and sharper analysis in the academy.