By Any Means Necessary - Unprotected Conduct and Decisional Discretion under the National Labor Relations Act

Calvin William Sharpe

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjell

Recommended Citation

Link to publisher version (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.15779/Z384S71

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals and Related Materials at Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labor Law by an authorized administrator of Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact jcera@law.berkeley.edu.
“By Any Means Necessary”—Unprotected Conduct and Decisional Discretion Under the National Labor Relations Act

Calvin William Sharpe*

Let us not oppose discretionary power; let us oppose unnecessary discretionary power.... Let us not oppose discretionary justice that is properly confined, structured, and checked; let us oppose discretionary justice that is improperly unconfined, unstructured, and unchecked.1 Kenneth Culp Davis (1969)

In this article Professor Sharpe examines the inconsistency of loss of protection decisions under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. He begins with a description of the multifactor test for establishing protection under section 7 and identification of the means test as the focus of this article. Sharpe considers the textual, legislative history and decisional bases for current loss of protection doctrine as well as the inconsistency of cases in this area of law. Finally, Sharpe proposes a rule-like standard and

* John Deaver Drisko-Baker & Hostetter Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, School of Law. The author received many helpful comments from workshop participants at the Case Western Reserve, Chicago-Kent, DePaul, and Minnesota Law Schools. He is particularly indebted to Jim Atleson, Matt Finkin, Jack Getman, Rafael Gely, Bob Gorman, Marty Malin, Andy Morriss, David Rabban, Doug Ray, Stewart Schwab, and Bob Strassfeld for their feedback during earlier stages of the article. Geoffrey Ashley, Brian Bursiek, Maribeth Calvit, Pat Fahey, Laurie Peterson, James Powers, and Alan Solomon supplied important research assistance in the development of the article. The author has benefitted greatly from the dedicated clerical assistance of Rebecca Wright. The appendix was compiled by Jim Peters.


demonstrates its ability to rationalize loss of protection jurisprudence and bring clarity, predictability and fairness to the administration of section 7.

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................. 204

II. COMPONENTS OF PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY ........ 207
   A. Concertedness ............................................. 208
   B. Appropriate Objectives or Ends .......................... 208
   C. Appropriate Means ......................................... 208

III. SOURCES AND INTERPRETATION .................................. 213
   A. Legislative History ......................................... 213
   B. Jefferson Standard and Washington Aluminum ............ 215
   C. Overlapping Categories ..................................... 218

IV. A PROPOSED STANDARD ........................................... 219
   A. Loss of Protection: Rule or Standard ...................... 219
      1. Costs and Benefits in Loss of Protection Law .......... 221
      2. Content ................................................ 223
   B. Attempts at Formulating a Standard ....................... 225
      1. Scholarly Proposals ...................................... 225
         a. The Coxian Approach ................................ 225
         b. Getman’s Observations ................................ 227
         c. Atleson’s Approach .................................... 228
         d. Branscomb’s Contribution ............................. 229
      2. Judicial Proposals ......................................... 229
         a. Earle Industries, Inc. v. NLRB .......................... 230
         b. NLRB v. NYU Medical Center ............................ 231
         c. Dreis & Krump v. NLRB ................................ 232
   C. Comprehensive Rule-like Standard ......................... 232

V. APPLICATION ..................................................... 236
   A. Explaining Supreme Court Precedent ....................... 236
   B. Further Application ......................................... 237

VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................... 244

Appendix: Typology of Unprotected Conduct Cases: 1985-1995 ............................................. 245

I. INTRODUCTION

The issue of how far unorganized and organized employees can go in pressing legitimate claims has been controversial since the inception of the National Labor Relations Act (Act or NLRA). Recent union tactical innovations, such as inside games and corporate campaigns, have heightened


the controversy. Consider, for example, an employer and union negotiating under an expired collective bargaining agreement. During this period the normal grievance-arbitration machinery is suspended, though other terms of the expired agreement remain intact as part of the status quo. In order to pressure the employer toward a successor agreement, the union organizes a grievance meeting about safety and health concerns. Leaving their jobs during working time, a majority of the employees go to the administration building in an orderly manner and demand that the employer protect their safety and health. Feeling pressure to return to the orderly procedure of a collective bargaining agreement, the employer accedes to the Union’s demands at the bargaining table.\(^4\) The Union is able to achieve its objectives in this case without resorting to a strike that would leave its members vulnerable to the permanent replacement rights of the employer. Could the employer have terminated, replaced, or disciplined the employees who participated in the mass exodus from their work stations, even though they were not ostensibly engaged in a strike?\(^5\)

Professor Northrup describes several other common methods unions use to exert pressure on employers:

The tactics utilized in the inside game include efforts to convince employees to impede or to disrupt production by slowing the work pace, refusing to work overtime, refusing to do work without receiving minute instructions from supervisors or management even though such instructions have not heretofore been required, filing mass charges with government agencies, and mass grievances, castigating management and supervision both within and without the plant, engaging in “work-to-rule” slowdowns, sick outs, hit-and-run strikes, and generally attempting to build a climate in which reasonable worker-management relationships, worker-management cooperation, and normal quality and quantity of production cannot exist.\(^6\)


\(^5\) The classic inside game (what Northrup calls the “capstone of the inside game”) is “work-to-rule.” Describing this tactic, he says:

This involves considerably more than simply following work rules in an orderly, intelligent fashion. Rather it has come to mean doing the minimum possible, doing nothing without minute direction from supervisors, denying or evading personal responsibility for doing the job, wasting as much time as possible, reducing effort from the normal expected and heretofore applied activities, taking no initiatives to handle problems—in effect leaving one’s brains, training, and normal work practices out of the job. In other words, to “work-to-rule” is actually to create a slowdown although unions consistently deny that a slowdown is in process when advocating work-to-rule. Northrup, supra note 3, at 523-24.

\(^6\) Id. at 513.
Corporate campaigns have also included picketing the homes of members of boards of directors, pressuring companies through political figures, attempting to influence brokers and affect the prices of company stock, bringing pressure on customers and suppliers, and creating legal problems for companies by filing complaints.  

New union tactics have increased the need for a standard to differentiate protected and unprotected concerted activity. Like the conventional strike, the success of these union strategies depends on employee participation. The willingness of employees to participate in such concerted activity may depend on the level of protection extended under the Act. Moreover, the Board and courts have been inconsistent in specifying how the means chosen to effectuate even unorganized, garden variety, concerted activity may result in a loss of protection.

The basic grant of protection which the NLRA gives to employees is expressed in section 7 as follows:

- the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.

Thus, employees engaged in protected activity are insulated from various adverse employer actions, most importantly discharge, in response to exercising their statutory rights. On the other hand, as Professor Robert Gorman notes in his excellent treatise:

An employer is free to discharge or otherwise discipline an employee, consistently with the Labor Act, for engaging in activity which is not protected by section 7. Whether employee activity falls within or without the shelter of section 7 is thus a definitional issue of utmost importance in the administration of the Act.

While section 7 enables both the unorganized and organized group activity of employees, the Act generally governs union activity that includes collective bargaining under an administrative apparatus. My concern in this article, however, is less with section 7's protection of organizing activity than with its protection of the "right to . . . engage in other concerted

---

7. See id. at 509.
8. See infra, notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 157. See also Section 2 of the Act for categories of employees that are excluded from coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). The RLA, 45 U.S.C. 151 et.seq., 44 Stat. 577, (1926) and public sector statutes (see e.g. Ohio Rev. Stat. Ch. 4117, as well as a variety of state statutes, see e.g. Wis. Stat. Ch. 111, sec. 111.01 - 111.19) generally give employees protections that are comparable to private sector employees covered by the NLRA.
10. ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 296 (1976).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (outlining the right of duly selected representatives to exclusively bargain on behalf of employees, the Board's obligation to determine appropriate units, and the administrative apparatus for determining bargaining status)
activities for the purpose of . . . other mutual aid or protection."\textsuperscript{12} The reason for this focus is threefold. First, because it affords employees protection beyond or short of organizational activity, section 7 can potentially fill some of the void in employee protection resulting from recent declines in union membership.\textsuperscript{13} Second, even organized employees may forfeit section 7 protection because of the nature of their activity.\textsuperscript{14} Third, decision-makers have applied section 7 in ways that undermine the protection intended for both unorganized and organized employees.\textsuperscript{15}

Part I of this paper examines the components of the three-pronged protected concerted activity doctrine and isolates the branch that is the focus of this article. Part II identifies the sources of the doctrine, discussing its statutory, historical and judicial origins. Part III proposes a standard to govern loss of protection for employees engaged in concerted activity across categories of cases. The jurisprudential literature on rulemaking and an examination of the relative merits of rules and standards in law promulgation,\textsuperscript{16} as well as earlier scholarly and judicial efforts, inform the proposed standard. Furthermore, under the proposed standard this section analyzes the employer’s long term viability in a variety of contexts bearing upon the employer’s legitimate interests. Finally, Part IV tests the proposed standard against various applications.

II. COMPONENTS OF PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY\textsuperscript{17}

Labor lawyers use the term of art “protected concerted activity” to describe the segment of section 7 that gives employees the right “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”\textsuperscript{18} The doctrine of protected concerted activity has three components, only one of which this article will address in detail. Nonetheless, I will briefly describe the other two as important background to this discussion.

\textsuperscript{14} Some union campaigns and inside games are subject to such a finding. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard Broad. Co.), 346 U.S. 464 (1953) (union employees’ distribution of handbills disparaging to employer is adequate cause for employee discharge when action is unrelated to any pending labor controversy).
\textsuperscript{15} See infra notes 27 - 41 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{16} As discussed in this article, a rule supplies the content of the law before the conduct triggering its application (ex ante). In contrast, a standard supplies the law’s content after such conduct has occurred (ex post). See infra notes 32-38 (citing cases showing a lack of consistency in NLRB and Court decisions that will predictably lead to a chilling effect on the exercise of concerted rights under section 7).
\textsuperscript{17} See generally id. at 296-325.
A. Concertedness

The Supreme Court has recognized the Board's interpretation of protected concerted activity as requiring some kind of group activity: "concerted activities" are "the activities of employees who have joined together in order to achieve common goals." Therefore, individuals acting on their own behalf are not engaged in protected concerted activity; instead, individual employee activity must be "linked to the actions of fellow employees" in order to be concerted. 

The issue has arisen whether actions taken individually (not by or on behalf of others), but presumed to be of mutual interest to all employees, should be deemed concerted by a "constructive concerted activity" theory. An example would be a lone employee reporting company safety violations to a state agency. The Board does not currently recognize such activity as concerted.

B. Appropriate Objectives or Ends

Concerted activity must also have appropriate objectives or ends in order to receive protection. The test is whether the ends are related closely enough to legitimate employee concerns to warrant protection. The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the scope of subject matter falling within section 7's protection. However, the breadth of the Supreme Court's standard notwithstanding, lower courts and the Board have narrowed the potential reach of the Supreme Court's approach.

C. Appropriate Means

Under the third branch of protected concerted activity doctrine, properly directed group activity (group activity with a proper purpose under

---

20. In City Disposal Systems an employee who resisted the driving of an unsafe truck based on his good faith understanding of a contractual right was engaged in concerted activity. Even though the action only involved him and not other employees, the Court found this action of a single employee to be concerted because "[t]he invocation of a right rooted in a collective-bargaining agreement is unquestionably an integral part of the process that gave rise to the agreement." Id. at 831.
23. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (holding protected a union newsletter that urged employees to engage in political action such as writing state legislators to oppose a constitutional amendment incorporating a right-to-work statute into the state constitution and defeating the enemies and electing the friends of organized labor). For a discussion of this "ends test" see DOUGLAS N. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW, (1999).
24. See NLRB v. Motorola, Inc., 991 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding employer's ban of on-premises literature distribution by employee members of a political organization was permissible, even though the literature addressed the workplace issue of drug testing); Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, 307 NLRB 182 (1992) (holding concerted activity unprotected because it was directed toward an employee purchase of the company and did not relate to the interest of employees as employees, rather than as owners).
section 7) can lose protection because of how it is conducted. For example, if employees are concerned about their own substandard wages and working conditions, their concerted activity with a legitimate section 7 purpose does not give them a license to destroy the plant or equipment, or to assault the plant manager. On the other hand, the mounting of an economic strike against the employer in order to pressure the employer to meet the union’s demands at the bargaining table is proper activity explicitly protected by Section 13 of the statute.

It should be noted that collective bargaining activity, such as economic strikes, is a subset of protected concerted activity. Just as employees who engage in unorganized concerted activity can lose protection by using improper means, organized employees can lose protection in the same way. The cases regarding strike misconduct are examples of this phenomenon.

However, uncertainty remains whether courts will find other forms of concerted activity protected under section 7. Suppose unorganized employees find plant conditions so intolerably cold that they walk off the job. Can they be fired? Is the manner of protesting these working conditions—or, at least the breach of a work rule—improper? Or suppose the organized employees attempt to bring pressure on the employer at the bargaining table by initiating a public campaign disparaging the company’s product? Are their means improper? What is the test for propriety?

In the walk-out case, the Supreme Court found the activity protected, because walking out was a reasonable way for these unorganized employees to protest the intolerably cold conditions. This was particularly true in light of the employer’s unresponsiveness to earlier individual complaints about the lack of heat.

Conversely, the Court held that the disparagement campaign was unprotected activity. The Court found the employee allegations made in the disparagement campaign to be distinct from the issues involved in the labor dispute. Because the campaign allegations were insufficiently related to the labor dispute, the Court concluded that the campaign constituted disloyalty, a cause for discharge under section 10(c) of the Act.


30. Id. at 476-477.
Justice Frankfurter dissented from the Court’s denial of protection, warning that the imprecision of the standard supported by the majority would “open the door wide to individual judgment by Board members and judges [and] needlessly stimulate litigation.” His warning has proved prophetic. For example, in New River Industries v. NLRB, the Fourth Circuit found unprotected a sarcastic letter written by two employees deriding the employer’s offering of free ice cream to celebrate an important agreement that the employer reached with a supplier. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the Board, which had found the activity protected and the discharges unlawful. In a similar case, Reef Industries, Inc., v. NLRB, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Board’s position and held protected a sarcastic letter and t-shirt protesting what employees perceived to be disparaging remarks made by a company official.

31. 346 U.S. at 481.
32. The earliest example of Frankfurter’s prediction is Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 NLRB 1627 (1956), where the union and employer were negotiating toward a new contract. Following the failure of the parties to reach agreement, the employees organized a strike against the employer, who continued to operate using supervisors to make the paint. The employees distributed circulars informing customers that, as a result of the strike, paint was not being made by “the well-trained, experienced employees who have made the paint you have always bought.” Id. at 1628. It also continued a warning that the paint may “peel, crack, blister, scale or any one of many undesirable things that would cause you inconvenience, lost time and money.” Id. The circular concluded with the assurance that the employees would inform the public when the paint was once again made by regular employees.

Jefferson Standard was susceptible to two readings. One, the Court’s observation that statements were not made in the context of a labor dispute intended to suggest a legitimate means of disparaging employer products. Only disparagement that is disassociated with the labor dispute is unprotected. Two, “means” refers to any use of disparagement.

In Patterson-Sargent, the Board interpreted means to refer to public disparagement of the employer’s product regardless of whether the disparagement is associated with the labor dispute. Id. at 1630. The dissent adopted the first reading. Id. at 1635-36. Reasoning that the handbills were intended to impugn the quality of the employer’s product making their circulation distinguishable from a boycott publicizing an existing labor dispute, the Board majority found the distributing employees’ activities unprotected relying on Jefferson Standard.

33. New River Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1991). The offending letter read:

The employees of New River would like to express their great appreciation of the 52 flavors of leftover ice cream from the closed Meadow Gold Plant. It has boosted morale tremendously. Several employees were heard to say they were going to work harder together, and do better so we could have some more old ice cream.

We realize what a tremendous sacrifice this has been for management and [it] will be long remembered. We hope this has not cut into computer expenses.

Many feel this almost out does the company picnic [sic] this summer [sic]. We are also glad the Milliken employees enjoyed this immensely. They said they have never seen employees treated like this. We sincerely appreciate all the sacrifices management has made for us and anticipate the Thanksgiving and Christmas, New Year Employee Appreciation Day combination dinner.

As the Court noted, there had not been a company picnic that summer nor was a Company dinner for employees planned. Id. at 1292.

34. Id. The court decided New River on the basis of an absence of a section 7 purpose, i.e. it held that “the letter was not a medium intended to resolve or call attention to conditions of employment.” Id. at 1295. Yet, the decision and cited authority hint that the method of protest was improper and thus a Section 7 violation.

35. Reef Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 952 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1991). After a personnel manager testified that the average employee was at a 10th grade education level, employees made a tee-shirt and
The case law is full of such inconsistent decisions. For example, in a case where the employees called the company plant manager "Castro," the conduct was deemed unprotected. However, in a case where company security policies toward minority employees were referred to as "gestapo," such remarks were held protected.

However, no case better demonstrates the need for more consistent and predictable decisions in this area than does Cambro Manufacturing Company. In Cambro twelve employees engaged in a work stoppage to protest their treatment at the hands of their immediate supervisor and the appointment of a particular employee as a leadperson. The supervisor instructed the employees to return to work three times during a span of about two hours. The second and third instructions included a direction to clock out if the employees did not intend to return to work. The third instruction followed a telephone conversation between the supervisor and the plant's general manager. The GM instructed the supervisor to tell the employees to either return to work or to clock out and return to the plant the following morning for a meeting with the general manager. This last instruction prompted one of the employees to return to work. However, the others persisted with the work stoppage without clocking out. The company fired the employees who persisted with the stoppage and spared the one employee who returned to work.

While the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that all of the employees were engaged in a "reasonable, nondisruptive, and limited," hence, a protected — protest, the Board, with one member dissenting, held that only the employee who returned to work after the third instruction was protected. The Board recognized that the peaceful, focused, and non-disruptive nature of the work stoppage entitled the employees to persist for letter. These included a cartoon depicting a head-scratching, cross-eyed, duck-like featured individual, saying, "Don't ask me! Duh I Dunno? I've got a 10th Grade Edukation." The legend "MAD OD-SCENES (sic) '89" and the initials MAD also appear on the cartoon. The employees' letter read: "... As a result of such a flattering, unbiased statement. We here at REEF feel it is in order to present you with this token of our esteem gratitude. We hope you value it and cherish it, as much as we value your opinion of us.

It is apparent that you hold us in you highest thoughts.

Sincerely,

S.B.
REEF EMPLOYEES

P.S. Flattery will get you no where!"

Id. at 833. Unlike some of the courts that have attempted to construct a rule-like standard to apply to loss of protection cases, the Fifth Circuit's finding in this case that the Board's conclusion finding the tee-shirt and letter not so offensive as to lose their protection under NLRA section 7 is not particularly helpful. See infra notes 162-180 and accompanying text.

36. Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1968).
39. Id. at 635.
40. Id. at 637.
a "reasonable period of time." 41 Nevertheless, the Board concluded that the instruction following the supervisor's telephone conversation with the general manager defined the "point at which the Respondent was entitled to reclaim the use of its entire premises." 42

The Board acknowledged that the "line between a protected work stoppage and an illegal trespass is not clear-cut." 43 The Board's approach was to balance the means used by the employees against the property interest of the employer. The Board suggested that this balance favored the employer after the second instruction to either return to work or clock out and return the following morning:

[The directive] did not impair the employees' protected right to present their grievances. They had already discussed their problems among themselves and with [the supervisor]. They had demanded, and were lawfully denied, an unprecedented predawn meeting with Respondent's plant manager or owner. They were assured the opportunity, in full accord with the Respondent's open door policy, to meet in just a few hours with [the general manager] for further discussion of their complaints. They had met with him in the very same manner and at the very same time on October 25. 44

Regarding the employer's interest, the Board said the following:

[The supervisor's third] direction that employees return to work or leave the plant and return later for the meeting served the Respondent's immediate interest in maintaining its established grievance procedure and placed no undue restriction on those employees' right to present grievances within a few hours pursuant to that procedure. . . . Further in-plant refusals to work served no immediate protected employee interests and unduly interfered with the employer's right to control the use of its premises. 45

The problem with the Board's analysis is twofold. First, this balancing formula does not distinguish the case of the one employee who returned to work from those who did not. Returning to work after the second instruction would also have preserved the employee's grievances and served the employer's interest in maintaining an established grievance procedure and ending undue control of the employer's premises. One can argue that by returning to work after the third instruction rather than persisting, the lone employee who was deemed protected challenged the employer's authority less than the others. However, the degree of difference in the challenges seems small enough to raise a question about whether statutory protection should turn on such subtlety. Second, as an ex post balancing analysis, the Board's approach gave the employees no notice of where the line would be drawn or of when their conduct would cease to warrant statutory protection.

41. Id. at 636.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 643.
44. Id. at 635.
45. Id.
The Board not only failed to offer a persuasive distinction between the employee who returned to work after the third instruction and those who did not, but also failed to offer any test that might serve as guidance in subsequent cases. Why was the refusal to return to work after the second instruction not the pivotal point? The points made by the Board about the preservation of the grievance, the employer’s interest in protecting the grievance procedure, and the reclaiming of the employer’s premises are all equally applicable after the second and third instructions. The disagreement between the ALJ and dissenting Board Member Devaney on the one hand, and Board Members Stephens and Raudabaugh on the other hand, point again to Justice Frankfurter’s warning in Jefferson Standard: the imprecision of standards for loss of protection in concerted activity cases has “open[ed] the door wide to individual judgment by Board members and judges.”46

III.

SOURCES AND INTERPRETATION

A. Legislative History

As already mentioned, section 7 of the NLRA gives employees “the right to self-organization,” as well as the right “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”47 Unfortunately, the NLRA spells out no standard or rule distinguishing between protected and unprotected manifestations of concerted activity. However, the legislative history of the Act offers considerable guidance for defining the parameters of protected means of concerted activity.48 To understand these parameters, one must start at section 10(c), an amendment to the original statute made by the Taft-Hartley Act.49

---


48. The language of section 7 made its first appearance in section 2 of the Norris LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. 101 (1932). It later surfaced in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), the precursor of the NLRA, and then in the NLRA of 1935. The political opinion of the time focused on industrial democracy and this theme was reflected in legislative debates over the NLRA. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, How the Wagner Act Came to Be: a Prospectus, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2201, 2205 (1998) (discussing the intellectual sources of Senator Wagner’s thought about concepts of industrial democracy). See Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual And The Requirement Of ‘Concert’ Under The National Relations Act, 130 U.Pa. L. Rev. 286, 331-46; see also Mary Ann Glendon, Civil Service, New Republic, April 1, 1996, at 39 (reviewing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996) (suggesting that the ability of employees to have a say in the government of the workplace—an ability that has been undermined by the changing economy—is an important mediating structure of civil society that is important to self-government in a civic republic).

The formation of Section 10(c) was a reaction to a perceived imbalance in the Act favoring unions. Section 10(c) forbade the Board to reinstate or grant back pay to any employee who had been discharged for cause. The legislative history makes it clear that this amendment was designed to prevent the Board from inferring unlawful—namely anti-union—motivation, where an employer had terminated an employee for cause. Indeed, the legislative history cites several cases where the Board had ordered reinstatement of employees who had engaged in unlawful sit-down strikes, mutiny, and mass picketing, all constituting cause for discharge. However, the House Conferees rejected an earlier version proposed by the House Committee on Education and Labor that would have explicitly excepted from the protection of section 7 certain kinds of concerted activities: unfair labor practices, unlawful concerted activities, and activities violating collective bargaining agreements.

This earlier version was rejected in part to avoid a narrow interpretation that would restrict the loss of protection to merely the enumerated exceptions. Congress was concerned that it might be interpreted in such a way as to protect "improper conduct" that deserved no protection, even though such conduct might not be unlawful. Although it contains no clues about what Congress thought was improper, the legislative history makes it very clear that the legislature intended to limit the statutory protection granted to employees for concerted activities in section 7 of the Act to lawful and proper conduct.

Thus, the interpretive problem under section 7 has been defining the boundaries of improper means for carrying out concerted activity when that activity motivates the discharge. On its face, the statute protects the right to

50. See National Labor Relations Act, supra note 2, known popularly as the Wagner Act.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994) (No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.)
56. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. Moreover, Congress intended the Board in its factfinding to be careful to distinguish legitimate business motives from illegitimate anti-union motives for discharging employees—the Board should use its statutory authority to remedy only unlawfully-motivated employer actions. If an activist maintenance employee is terminated for being unable to repair machines (unsatisfactory performance), for example, the employer should not be deemed unlawfully motivated because the employee happens to be an activist. Essentially the 10(c) amendment reiterated the Board's obligation to practice integrity in factfinding, which is, in the end, an unremarkable expectation.
strike but outlaws certain concerted activities such as secondary boycotts.\textsuperscript{57} Moreover, it explicitly does not protect strikes occurring during cooling off periods within the context of collective bargaining.\textsuperscript{58} In addition, section 10(c) prevents statutory remedies where discharges have been for cause, and the legislative history of section 10(c) states that the section 7 right does not extend to “unlawful” or “other improper conduct.”\textsuperscript{59} Unfortunately, while the legislative history offers several examples of “unlawful conduct,” it offers none of “improper conduct.”\textsuperscript{60} Consequently, the statute leaves decision-makers with the task of determining when concerted conduct is “improper” and should thereby deprive the actor of section 7 protection.

Though this traditional examination of text and legislative history has yielded some important evidence of how an appropriate standard should read, the failure of either text or history to spell out the content of “improper conduct” makes it necessary to consider evolving applications of the statute. Examination of Supreme Court cases, as well as some of the basic policies of the Act, such as the ongoing need to accommodate section 7 rights and legitimate business interests, are helpful in interpreting the statute.\textsuperscript{61}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{58} 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{61} In this sense, the current enterprise resembles Professor Eskridge's model of dynamic statutory interpretation. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., \textit{Dynamic Statutory Interpretation}, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1483-84 (1987).
\textsuperscript{62} NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard Broad. Co.), 346 U.S. 464 (1953)
\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Id.} at 467. The employer wanted a provision that narrowly circumscribed the arbitrator's jurisdiction in discharge cases to determining the facts and leaving the appropriate penalty to the employer. The Union wanted broader authority for the arbitrator to determine whether discharges were for "just cause."
\end{footnotesize}
to businesses, saying that WBTV used stale, piped-in programming such as sporting events from New York, Boston, Philadelphia or Washington. In the handbills the technicians pointedly suggested that the station did not carry local programming and had not purchased the equipment needed to carry such programming, because WBTV regarded Charlotte as a "second class city". The handbills were signed "WBT TECHNICIANS." While it was conceded that the campaign was designed to bring pressure upon the company at the bargaining table, the handbills made no reference to the union, collective bargaining, or the labor dispute between the company and union.

The Supreme Court offered two rationales for finding the handbilling unprotected activity. However, neither supplies much guidance in deciding future cases. Taking the Board's ruling as a signal, the Court's first approach was to view the tactics of the technicians as isolated from the collective bargaining negotiations. Because the handbilling was insufficiently related to the collective bargaining issues at stake, the Court said the technicians' campaign breached a duty of loyalty owed to the company. This breach constituted cause for discharge. The Court treated the case the same way it would treat a case where an employee unsatisfactorily performs the job and cannot be saved by her concurrent union activism, because the discharge is motivated by the performance problem rather than the activism.

The Court's second strand of analysis was to treat the Union's tactic as though it was a conventional appeal for support of the Union in its dispute with the company. On this point the Court simply stated, "the means used by the technicians in conducting the attack have deprived the attackers of the protection of [section 7], when read in the light and context of the purpose of the Act." This conclusory statement creates more confusion than it dispels. Are the means cited by the Court the disparaging of the product without disclosing the existence of a labor dispute and the economic purpose of the campaign? Or are the means simply product disparagement? And if the means are simply "product disparagement," what are the characteristics of those means that cause them to trump the section 7 protection

---

64. Id. at 468.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 468, 476.
67. Id. at 471-76.
69. 346 U.S. at 477-478 (1953).
70. Id., at 475.
71. Id. at 477.
that employees are thought to have when they engage in “concerted activities for mutual aid and protection?”

One could read the Jefferson Standard decision as Justice Frankfurter did in his dissent: that is, the majority establishes a rule that any conduct constituting cause leads to the loss of protection under section 7. However, such a reading would ignore the design of the statute as interpreted in other cases, in the legislative history, and in other Supreme Court interpretations of the effect of cause on loss of protection.

The other important Supreme Court case is Washington Aluminum, decided by the Supreme Court nine years after the Jefferson Standard case. Washington Aluminum involved an aluminum fabrication company that fired a group of seven non-union machinists after they walked off the job to protest bitterly cold shop conditions. As anticipated after Jefferson Standard, the employer in Washington Aluminum made the argument that the employee walkout violated a plant rule forbidding employees from leaving work without the permission of the foreman. This conduct, the argument continued, constituted “cause” for discharge—in the employer’s words, “wholly separate and apart from any concerted activities in which they engaged in protest against the poorly heated plant.” In reasoning that speaks generally to the problem examined in this article, the Court described the relationship between the “cause” language of section 10(c) and section 7 protection as follows:

Section 10(c) of the Act does authorize an employer to discharge employees for “cause” and our cases have long recognized this right on the part of an employer. But this, of course, cannot mean that an employer is at liberty to punish a man by discharging him for engaging in concerted activities which section 7 of the Act protects. And the plant rule in question here purports to permit the company to do just that for it would prohibit even the most plainly protected kinds of concerted work stoppages until and unless the permission of the company’s foreman was obtained.

73. 346 U.S. at 479-480.
74. Section 7 limits legitimate employer prerogatives. See “no solicitation” rule cases: Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (holding unlawful a broad no-solicitation rule) and Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) (holding unlawful a no-solicitation rule barring solicitation in work areas open to the public).
75. Section 7 intended to institute industrial democracy. See supra note 48; Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 480 (Frankfurter dissenting) (the “legislation [was] designed to put labor on a fair footing with management.”).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 16. This argument had been adopted by the 4th Circuit, 291 F.2d 869 (1961), which had reversed the Board order to reinstate the employees with backpay.
79. Id. at 16-17.
As explained in the following section, the Court's holding in *Washington Aluminum* brought some light to the issue after its hazy decision in *Jefferson Standard*; nonetheless it fell short of establishing a clear standard.

**C. Overlapping Categories**

*Washington Aluminum* and *Jefferson Standard*, the statute, and its legislative history demonstrate that protected concerted activities and conduct constituting cause for discharge are overlapping categories that are mutually limiting. Figure 1 demonstrates this overlap.80

![Diagram](image)

Figure 1. The overlapping circles represent the two large separate areas carved out by sections 7 and 10 of the Act and also a shared space. As the question mark indicates, the elusive loss of protection issues addressed in this paper arise in the shared area.81


Washington Aluminum is very helpful in clarifying this relationship after Jefferson Standard left open the possibility that cause always trumps section 7 protection. The Washington Aluminum Court rejected the company’s claim that cause alone—violation of the company’s work station plant rule—is sufficient to justify loss of protection, even when it is intertwined with concerted activity. In doing so, the Court affirmed the reality that section 7 protection sometimes trumps cause.

But Washington Aluminum does only a little better than Jefferson Standard in plotting the boundaries between section 7 protection and loss of protection because of misconduct. The Washington Aluminum Court stated only that walk-outs do “not fall within the normal categories of unprotected concerted activities such as those that are unlawful, violent, or in breach of contract,” nor do they constitute disloyal acts as discussed in Jefferson Standard. Thus, after Washington Aluminum, identifying boundaries remains a problem. What are the other categories of unprotected concerted activities? How are we to know when conduct that cannot be characterized as unlawful, violent, impermissibly disloyal, or as a breach of contract, is nonetheless unprotected?

IV.
PROPOSED STANDARD

A. Loss of Protection: Rule or Standard

A threshold consideration raised by questions of how to identify categories of lawful but unprotected concerted activity (and how to determine their content) is whether loss of protection in labor cases should be governed by a rule or a standard. A related concern is how complex the law should be. Professor Louis Kaplow has discussed both the extent to which laws should be promulgated by rules or by standards and the question of how much complexity is appropriate. The distinction between a rule and a standard is based upon whether content is given to the law ex ante (before conduct triggering the application of the law occurs) or ex post (after such

---

82. 370 U.S. at 17.
conduct occurs). Complexity, on the other hand, deals with the amount of detail contained in the law, whether promulgated by rule or standard.86

A basic cost-benefit analysis reveals why the ex ante/ex post distinction is important. The choice between rules and standards carries cost implications.87 Professor Kaplow observes that rules are more costly to promulgate, while standards increase the cost of learning the law’s contents (advice) and of enforcing the law.88 He examines the relative costs of rules and standards at the three stages of the law’s operation: (1) promulgation (when government enacts the law), (2) individual choice (an individual’s decision about whether to acquire legal advice), and (3) enforcement (an adjudicator’s determination of the law’s application). The brunt of the costs associated with rules occurs at the promulgation stage (ex ante) when materials are assembled and analyzed to determine the rule’s content. However, the specific content of rules makes learning and applying the law’s content less burdensome. Standards, on the other hand, are more general, requiring much less effort in promulgation and much more in learning and applying the law’s content.89

Professor Kaplow posits the frequency of the law’s application as the pivotal determinant of the choice between rules and standards.90 Although promulgation costs are higher with rules, advice and enforcement costs are lower when rules are chosen. High frequency in application justifies promulgation costs because advice and enforcement costs are lower over a larger number of cases.91 In contrast, advice and enforcement costs, including supplying legal content ex post, might be prohibitive if the law is applied with high frequency.92

85. Id. at 559-560. With Kaplow’s notion of the distinction between rules and standards compare Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65, 66-79 (1983). Diver uses the terms rule and standard interchangeably but distinguishes between ex ante and ex post content based on degree of transparency, accessibility, and congruence. Also compare Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis Of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 258, 277 (1974). Posner defines the “difference between a rule and standard [as] a matter of degree—the degree of precision.” He describes a standard as not specifying “the circumstances relevant to decision or the weight of each circumstance but as merely indicat[ing] the kinds of circumstance[s] that are relevant.”
87. Kaplow, supra note 84, at 562-563.
88. Id. at 568-570.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 572-577.
91. Id. at 571-579.
92. Id.
1. Costs And Benefits In Loss Of Protection Law

Loss of protection cases are governed by the standard of impropriety.\textsuperscript{93} For example, in deciding a case where employees protest the employer’s compensation system through a sarcastic open letter to all employees, the Board and Courts must determine whether the letter is “improper” ex post by considering the contents of the letter and the circumstances surrounding its publication. This standard could generate a variety of costs to employees and the legal system.\textsuperscript{94} Employees who consider writing such a letter may incur substantial costs in the following ways. First, a finding of impropriety could result in a loss of employment.\textsuperscript{95} Second, because the contents of the law have not been supplied ex ante, employees concerned about the consequences of sending the letter would need to do their own research or seek legal advice in advance to predict an ultimate finding regarding propriety.\textsuperscript{96} Finally, the NLRB and courts would be required to do legal research and deliberate on the propriety of the letter.\textsuperscript{97}

The standard would also produce less tangible costs. Because employees would have no advance notice of whether the letter was improper, they would be unsure of how to conform their conduct to the law.\textsuperscript{98} In this context they would tend to think of any finding of impropriety as unfair.\textsuperscript{99} Decisionmakers, who would have no guidelines for exercising their discretion, would then reach inconsistent results in similar cases, and to some extent would undermine the legitimacy of the law and legal institutions.\textsuperscript{100}

Although standards may be beneficial in avoiding the cost of ex ante promulgation associated with rules,\textsuperscript{101} the benefits associated with rules may outweigh their costs. For example, it would be costly to generate a rule providing for the protection of non-libelous letters protesting management practices that bear upon wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. Indeed, it might well be possible only after an investigation

\textsuperscript{93} See supra note 55.
\textsuperscript{94} See Kaplow, supra note 84, at 570, 572-573 (explaining the nature of law enforcement under standards and the costs associated with standards).
\textsuperscript{95} See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 477.
\textsuperscript{96} See Kaplow, supra note 84 at 569 (describing the effect of standards on individual choice).
\textsuperscript{97} See id. at 570 (describing the effect of standards on enforcement). See also Diver, supra note 85 (describing the numerous and expensive conflicts and broad range of fact finding and offers of proof under general standards).
\textsuperscript{98} See Diver, supra note 85 (describing an accessible rule as follows: “An accessible rule . . . promotes communal and ‘dignitary’ values by enabling members of its audiences to anticipate its application to their individual circumstances.”).
\textsuperscript{99} See Kaplow, supra note 85, at 607-608 (pointing out that rules provide more notice leading to greater fairness).
\textsuperscript{100} See id. at 609 (noting that rules “may be preferred to standards in order to limit discretion, thereby minimizing abuses of power”).
\textsuperscript{101} See id. at 582 (pointing out that giving content to the law may be cheaper at the enforcement stage because only one set of facts needs to be considered and those facts may well supply information regarding the appropriate content of the law.
and determination of the frequency and impact of such letters, based on information supplied by experts and interested parties.\textsuperscript{102}

The rule would also present what Diver calls congruence problems, because it would be under-inclusive (leave unprotected some conduct that should be protected) and over-inclusive (protect some conduct that should be left unprotected).\textsuperscript{103} For example, the protest letter, distributed both in the plant and the surrounding community, might assert that the company comptroller’s mishandling of company revenues is a major reason for the unavailability of funds to improve employee compensation. This arguably defamatory statement might render the letter unprotected, despite the importance of employee compensation concerns. Conversely, it may protect a calculated, although non-defamatory, effort to destroy the company’s goodwill with general and unfair allegations of poor employee treatment. Neither of these effects would further the underlying statutory purpose of protecting legitimate employee protests and employer business interests.

On the other hand, under the protest letter rule employees would know how to use protest letters “properly” without incurring substantial legal costs, because the rule would give specific guidance. Such knowledge would lead to less unprotected conduct and result in fewer cases alleging violations of the Act.\textsuperscript{104} The Board and Courts, without needing to exercise broad discretion, could limit their consideration to whether the letter was libelous and bore upon “wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment.”\textsuperscript{105} Repeated application of this rule in similar cases should yield consistent results.\textsuperscript{106}

As already noted, Kaplow’s formulation holds that frequency of application is pivotal in determining whether laws should be promulgated by rules or standards.\textsuperscript{107} Frequency refers to a specific component of the law rather than a more general doctrine that may include the relevant component. For example, Professor Kaplow cites the negligence rule as frequently applied. However, a certain aspect of that rule, perhaps due care, involves such variable facts that a given occurrence is infrequent, making a standard appropriate for that aspect.\textsuperscript{108}


\textsuperscript{103} See Diver, supra note 85, at 66-67, 73, 82-83 (discussing congruency and the effect of rule precision on behavior including the pilots as an example).

\textsuperscript{104} See id. at 71-72 (noting “[c]ongruence directly fosters the law’s substantive moral aims by promoting outcomes in individual cases consistent with those aims.”).

\textsuperscript{105} The terms of the non-libelous letter rule would so limit the inquiry.

\textsuperscript{106} See Kaplow, supra note 84, at 611-616.

\textsuperscript{107} See Kaplow, supra note 84 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{108} See id. at 600.
Loss of protection cases have arisen with great frequency. However, they also occur with considerable variation. Although the frequency of such cases suggests application of a rule, the variation suggests a standard. A "rule-like standard" might preserve the benefits of rules (less costly advice and enforcement as well as greater predictability and fairness) and standards (less costly promulgation and greater responsiveness to case variation) while diminishing their costs.

Although a detailed rule like the "protest letter" rule discussed above is not possible for broad, cross-categorical application in loss of protection cases, a clear standard with accompanying criteria would provide rule-like benefits. It would inform employees in advance of the factors to be considered in evaluating conduct without the need for substantial legal advice. This would permit employees to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law and avoid the economic consequences of noncompliance. A rule-like standard would also structure decisional discretion and lead to greater consistency in decision making in loss of protection cases. Decisionmakers could retain enough discretion to address the variation and avoid incongruence in loss of protection cases. Additionally, the investigation costs associated with promulgating a more detailed rule would be avoided.

2. Content

If a rule-like standard is optimal in loss of protection cases, the question about what content to give such a standard remains. How precise and complex should the standard be? Professor Colin Diver has argued that precision in administrative policymaking should be great enough to gener-

---

109. See Appendix showing the categories and frequency of loss of protection cases.
110. As the Appendix shows, LOP cases might be broken down into the following categories: disloyalty, strikes, insubordination, outrageous conduct, and unlawful conduct.
111. Note the frequency within categories and the tendency for scholars and the courts to promulgate rules for categories. The ambition here is to achieve lower costs and greater consistency through a rule that transcends categories.
112. See Kaplow, supra note 84, at 560-561, n.5 (describing "rule-like" standards as facilitating resolution of cases ex post and making prediction easier ex ante; see also, Steven Burton, Judging in Good Faith (Cambridge 1993).
113. As the Appendix suggests, LOP cases occur with a great deal of variation and with varying frequency. Under Kaplow's formulation low frequency suggests a standard, while high frequency makes a rule efficient. Although there is a significant occurrence of LOP cases, the factual variation prevents the kind of frequency that would make useful a detailed rule. See Kaplow, supra note 85, at 599-600 (discussing the difficulty of formulating rules where factual permutations are great and noting that while negligence cases are numerous they may be infrequent "at the relevant degree of detail.").
114. See Kaplow, supra note 85, at 601 ("A legal command is defined here to be rule-like to extent that greater effort has been expended ex ante, rather than requiring such effort to be made ex post.").
115. In Kaplow's usage, a rule, whose contents are supplied ex ante, necessarily removes the discretion of the enforcement authority to supply such content. See id. at 561-562, 600 (noting the effect of a detailed rule on judicial discretion and the rule-like benefits of identifying relevant criteria in advance).
116. See id. at 568-569.
ate in the intended audience an understanding that is easily ascertained and productive of desired behavior. Such precision is a function of the qualities of transparency, accessibility and congruence. Diver emphasizes that varying precision in the law has an impact on behavior and administrative costs.\(^{117}\)

Because precision increases compliance and reduces advice and enforcement costs, the rule-like standard should be sufficiently clear, accessible, and congruent to produce these benefits.\(^{118}\) On the other hand, the promulgation costs, the inaccessibility of excessively complex rules,\(^{119}\) and the probability of under- or over-inclusiveness associated with precision suggests a need for greater generality.\(^{120}\)

Precision, as defined by Diver, and complexity are different qualities.\(^{121}\) Professor Kaplow defines the complexity of legal rules as the "number and difficulty of distinctions the rules make,"\(^{122}\) and he suggests that complexity is a function of the range of possibilities presented by a legal problem.\(^{123}\) Kaplow recognizes the benefits and costs of complex rules, which permit better control of behavior while entailing greater learning and enforcement costs.\(^{124}\) Professor Peter Schuck points out that laws are located on a simplicity—complexity continuum, because no bright line demarks simplicity and complexity.\(^{125}\) He also notes that indeterminacy or uncertainty is an aspect of complexity.\(^{126}\) While conceding certain exceptions, Schuck suggests that reducing complexity generally improves certainty in the law.\(^{127}\)

The "impropriety" standard for determining loss of protection has the rule-like feature of providing some guidance to the audience—employees,

---

117. See Diver, supra note 85, at 66-68, 73.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 69-71.
120. Id. at 73-74.
121. See Schuck, supra note 86, at 2-5.
122. Louis Kaplow, supra note 86, at 150. To explain this point he says the following: A tax on wage income is more complex the more deductions for various expenses are permitted. An environmental regulation is more complex the more types of pollutants or sources of pollution are distinguished. In each case, the more difficult it is to determine the applicable category—whether the difficulty involves understanding the rules themselves or ascertaining the relevant facts—the greater complexity is said to be. Id.
123. Kaplow, supra note 84, at 588-590.
125. Peter H. Schuck, supra note 86, at 2-5 (arguing that legal complexity is a growing and problematic phenomenon caused in part by the "political economy of complexity" and suggesting where and how law should be simplified.)
126. Schuck defines complexity as a composite of four variables: density (numerous and comprehensive regimes, e.g. ERISA governing pension administration), technicality (rules drawing fine distinctions and requiring expertise to decipher, e.g. tax code), differentiation (varied institutional decision-makers, e.g. products liability featuring several agencies, the courts and private organizations), and indeterminacy or uncertainty, using the familiar reasonableness standard of tort law as an example of the last variable. Id. at 3-4.
127. Id. at 4 (describing the relationship between complexity and indeterminacy).
employers, the Board and the Courts—about the kinds of conduct protected under section 7.128 The problem is that this standard’s content is too general to be of much help in reducing advice and enforcement costs or producing acceptable behavior and consistency in decision making.129 Yet, because of the variability among loss of protection cases, promulgating a highly detailed rule that attempts to specify the outcome in all such cases would be too costly to promulgate and too complex to be accessible.130 How much precision should an optimal loss of protection rule contain? How much complexity? Earlier formulations have struggled to find the right balance.

B. Attempts at Formulating a Standard

I. Scholarly Proposals

a. The Coxian Approach

Professor Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law School first recognized the problem in 1951.131 As the following passage indicates, Professor Cox was concerned with identifying standards that would reduce the unpredictability of decisional outcomes (which this paper terms “structuring decisional discretion”):

[S]ection 7 fixes the bias from which the definition of “concerted activities” should be approached; it does not furnish criteria by which to draw the line between protected and unprotected activities. Thus the central problem becomes the establishment of standards by which wholly egregious factors can be eliminated and the subjective attitudes of judges and administrators reduced to minimal roles.132

Cox found sources of objective standards in: (1) express prohibitions in the Act against union activity—if the Act prohibited unions from committing certain acts, employees doing those acts on their own without union sponsorship would be unprotected (although not guilty of an unfair labor practice);133 (2) well-defined policies of the Act that furnish objective standards—for example, strikes in breach of contractual no-strike clauses or activity such as wildcat strikes that undermine the majority representative;134 and (3) other federal statutes such as the mutiny statute and the Wage Stabilization Act.135 From these sources Cox distilled a proposed

---

128. Under the Kaplow formulation, every standard is by implication rule-like to the extent that it announces ex ante some legal content. See Kaplow, supra note 84, at 560-61, n.5.
129. See id. at 569-577 (describing the enforcement and informational characteristics of standards).
130. See Kaplow, supra note 85, at 600; and Diver, supra note 85, at 68-71.
132. Id. at 325.
133. Id. at 325-328.
134. Id. at 328-333. Note that the Cox article preceded Emporium Capwell by 23 years.
135. Id. at 333, 46 U.S.C. Secs. 564,713; see also Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) and American News Co., 55 NLRB 1302 (1944).
standard that would deny protection only for violence, mass picketing and related misconduct outlawed by the labor laws or general criminal statutes.\footnote{Id. at 333-344. Similarly, Cox proposed a section 7 purpose standard that would protect "the federal right to engage in concerted activities [such as] strikes, boycotts and picketing whose purpose is to achieve any objective of collective bargaining which has not been outlawed by the state." Id. at 344. The Cox proposal was elaborated in George Schatski, \textit{Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer—'Protected' Concerted Activities}, 47 Texas L. Rev. 378 (1969) (arguing that employees should not be subject to termination for concerted activities unless they knowingly engage in illegal conduct).}

The Coxian approach has the virtues of clarity and accessibility. Unlike the general impropriety test, it is a rule-like standard that would reduce the decisional task solely to deciphering parameters created by statute or other existing law and determining whether the employee conduct was out-of-bounds under the law. Employees would be presumed to know the content of existing law and to have had notice of the consequences associated with unlawful conduct. Decision making would be more predictable and, hence, more fair.

However, Cox's proposal ignores an important part of the legislative history and undermines legitimate employer concerns that compete with the interest that employees have in such broad statutory protection. As already noted, the House Conference Report on the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Act reflects a well-considered decision to avoid amending section 7 and to add section 10(c) to the Act in order to limit section 7's reach and exclude protection for both "unlawful" and "improper" conduct.\footnote{H.R. Report No. 510, 38-39, reprinted at Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 542-543.} The Coxian approach would give no effect to the category of "improper conduct."\footnote{See Cox, supra note 123, at 333-334.}

Because statutory rights read like unlimited grants of immunity but operate on a delicate balance between legitimate employer concerns and statutory protection, the Coxian approach simply does not go far enough. For example, although section 8(a)(1) prohibits interference with section 7 rights,\footnote{Though this no-solicitation rule interferes, the employer's managerial interest in discipline and order in the workplace limit the potential breadth of employee solicitation rights. \textit{See} Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).} employers have a right to prohibit union solicitation during working time even though such a ban interferes with the union organizing effort.\footnote{See \textit{Wright Line}}, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980) \textit{enf'd}, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), \textit{cert. denied}, 455 U.S. 989 (1982) and NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).} Similarly, even though the termination of an employee may be partially motivated by union or other concerted activity, the employer's legitimate interest in maintaining performance standards may nonetheless sustain the discharge.\footnote{139. Though this no-solicitation rule interferes, the employer's managerial interest in discipline and order in the workplace limit the potential breadth of employee solicitation rights. \textit{See} Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).} Furthermore, because some employee concerted activity, like the product disparagement in \textit{Jefferson Standard}, may involve lawful conduct that improperly undermines the employer's legitimate interest, a stan-
dard recognizing only unlawful conduct as a basis for removing protection would be too narrow. Any standard that purports to govern loss of protection cases comprehensively must account for the competing interests of employees and employers.

b. Getman's Observations

Another thoughtful treatment of this issue can be found in Professor Getman's 1967 article, *The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.* Though his concern is primarily the use of economic weapons, Getman devotes a section of the article to loss of protection due to improper means and discusses some of the issues raised by *Jefferson Standard* (the disloyalty case) and *Washington Aluminum* (the case involving intolerably cold conditions).

Professor Getman addresses the protected use of economic pressure and permissible employer responses and acknowledges the importance of the issue: One of the central unanswered questions about the scope of section 7 is the extent to which lawful economic pressure for a legitimate purpose may be held unprotected.

In addition, Getman challenges the holdings of some courts that equate organized economic pressure with unorganized economic pressure. He also challenges holdings that treat the economic pressure of independent employee groups equally, regardless of whether such tactics are consistent or inconsistent with union positions. Getman argues that unorganized employees should often be protected because of their special circumstances, and that independent employee pressure, not inconsistent with the union's status, should be protected. Getman further advocates reevaluating decisions holding intermittent work stoppages and product disparagement unprotected in light of later enhancement of employer economic weapons and Supreme Court pronouncements against the balancing of economic weapons.

In critiquing such holdings, Professor Getman makes a number of helpful observations that can be integrated into a rule-like standard. First, he recognizes the difficulty of establishing a rule that will always properly accommodate conflicting interests in cases involving attempts to influence third parties. Therefore, he suggests that the Board should decide on a case-by-case basis using factors such as (a) the nature of the issue, (b) the state of labor relations, (c) the number of employees who walk out, (d) the length of

---

142. *Id.* at 1233-1240.
143. *Id.* at 1210.
144. *Id.* at 1237-1240.
145. *Id.* at 1242-1248.
146. *Id.* at 1216-1218.
the walkout, (e) the degree to which the employer was damaged economically, and (f) other similar factors.\textsuperscript{147} Second, he acknowledges the employer's business interest in discharging employees "who engage in continuous and extremely disruptive pressure tactics," such as using disruptive economic pressure where the employer is willing to negotiate.\textsuperscript{148} Third, he criticizes "disloyalty . . . as a basis for distinguishing the cases," because "almost all types of economic pressure are disloyal."\textsuperscript{149} Fourth, he recognizes that economic pressure that is too "inconsistent with a continuing employer-employee relationship" may be a basis for loss of protection.\textsuperscript{150} Finally, he proposes a rule to govern the status of independent pressure:

[The employer] should be able to require the union to either adopt or disavow the employees' action. If the union does the latter, the conduct would be unprotected; if it adopts the employee's action, the company should be able to respond as it would to union sponsored pressure.\textsuperscript{151}

Although Getman's discussion contains several helpful insights that can be used in formulating a comprehensive standard governing this area, his work contains only fragmented suggestions that deal primarily with the use of economic weapons.\textsuperscript{152} Thus, these suggestions fall short of a comprehensive rule-like standard that would apply in the myriad cases involving loss of protection.

c. Atleson's Approach

Professor James Atleson in \textit{Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law} has proposed that neither sit-down strikes nor slowdowns be subject to the loss of protection.\textsuperscript{153} Although many of Atleson's arguments are persuasive, some seem to minimize relevant legislative history and Supreme Court pronouncements. For example, Atleson argues that even illegal activity such as sit-down strikes should be protected because sanctions other than employer self-help are available and that lawful activity such as slowdowns should be protected because the courts should not be balancing economic weapons.\textsuperscript{154} In Atleson's view, courts have incorrectly found that such activity is not costly to employees, and he argues in response that employers can still respond with a whole range of permissible economic pressures.\textsuperscript{155} Atleson, like Getman, is concerned only about eco-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{147} \textit{Id.} at 1222. As noted by Kaplow, setting out factors in advance makes the standard more rule-like.
  \item \textsuperscript{148} \textit{Id.} at 1238.
  \item \textsuperscript{149} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{150} \textit{Id.} at 1240.
  \item \textsuperscript{151} \textit{Id.} at 1245.
  \item \textsuperscript{152} \textit{See supra} notes 143-150.
  \item \textsuperscript{153} \textit{See James Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law} 44-66 (1983).
  \item \textsuperscript{154} \textit{Id.} at 48-55.
  \item \textsuperscript{155} \textit{Id.} at 55.
\end{itemize}
nomic weapons and specifically sit-downs and slowdowns. However, his discussion offers insights into why the basic protected concerted activity analysis has survived, despite the industrial democracy foundation of the Act.\textsuperscript{156}

d. Branscomb's Contribution

In the most recent critique of loss of protection cases, Professor Melinda J. Branscomb examines the role of the loyalty doctrine.\textsuperscript{157} Branscomb advocates jettisoning the disloyalty test as a measure of when employee conduct warrants the loss of protection.\textsuperscript{158} Specifically, Branscomb argues that more clarity is needed in protected concerted activity doctrine. She proposes that the first step required to enhance clarity is understanding and applying consistently the following three part analysis: (1) whether the activity is concerted, (2) whether the purpose is proper, and (3) whether the means are proper. The next step is to disentangle duty of loyalty from product disparagement cases—the two concepts were fatefully linked in Jefferson Standard—and from other "exceptions" to section 7 protection, such as insubordination, interruption of production, illegal conduct, and improper disclosure of confidential information. The final step is acknowledging that "disloyalty" is not a workable standard for separating protected from unprotected means, because most collective activity, such as community publicity, union organizing rallies, lawful boycotts, and strikes, could be characterized as disloyal.

Although Professor Branscomb makes a persuasive case for abandonment of the disloyalty test, she acknowledges that she does not purport to create an overarching standard in loss of protection cases.\textsuperscript{159} Her concluding observation is that such a standard is needed.\textsuperscript{160} As noted, formation of that standard is the goal of this article.

2. Judicial Proposals

Courts have long been aware of the difficulties created by the unstructured discretionary approach to deciding loss of protection cases.\textsuperscript{161} In response, several of the circuit courts have grappled with the formulation of rule-like standards to govern decision-making in this area.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Id. at 57-59 (noting that the pivotal consideration in leaving partial strikes unprotected is preventing employees from determining their level of effort and assuring that employers have the ability to do business planning and direct the working forces).
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Melinda Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, and the Corporate Campaign, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 293 (1993).
  \item \textsuperscript{158} Id. at 387-88.
  \item \textsuperscript{159} Id. at 324, n.148.
  \item \textsuperscript{160} Id. at 388.
  \item \textsuperscript{161} See, e.g., Earle Industries Inc. v. NLRB, 75 F.3d 400 (8th Cir. 1996); NLRB v. New York University Medical Center, 702 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1983).
\end{itemize}
In the recently decided *Earle Industries, Inc. v. NLRB*, an employee, Wallace, defied the personnel manager when he asked Rev. Jesse Jackson, who had entered the plant through the employee entrance, to leave the plant and return by the visitor’s entrance. Wallace urged Jackson to walk past the personnel manager and misrepresented that the front door was locked. Wallace maintained this position, even after the personnel manager told her that she was wrong about the front door. After an exchange between Jackson and the personnel manager, in which the latter was unable to persuade Jackson to leave the plant, the personnel manager retreated to his office amidst cheers from the employees.

Acknowledging the overlap between cause and protected activity, the Board said that Wallace’s conduct was protected in the context of concerted activities by the “leeway” accorded protected misbehavior. The leeway is lost only if the conduct is “flagrant” and “opprobrious.”

Calling the Board’s concept of “leeway” for misconduct “far too blunt an instrument when applied without regard to the situation in which the misconduct took place,” the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that some contexts call for “leeway.” But the court limited acceptable insubordination to grievance proceedings, negotiation meetings, strikes, and captive audience speeches. Other factors considered by the court were impulsiveness on the part of the employee (there was no such evidence in this case) and the company’s interest in maintaining discipline (Wallace’s conduct was seen as undermining the personnel manager’s authority).

Though identifying factors such as impulsiveness and maintaining discipline is more helpful than the Board’s “flagrant” and “opprobrious” standard (since it supplies rule-like content to the doctrine), it is not the overarching approach contemplated in this article. While the employer’s interest in ordering the employment relationship is important, a comprehensive standard must address the employer’s operational and labor-management interests. It must also encompass not only insubordination but also other categories of conduct such as strike misconduct, outrageous conduct, economic weapons, and disloyalty.

---

162. 75 F.3d 400 (8th Cir. 1996). *Earle Industries* is relevant to this analysis because the 8th Circuit takes up the question of whether an employee’s insubordination and dishonesty in effecting concerted activities warrants loss of protection.

163. *Id.* at 404.
164. *Id.* at 405.
165. *Id.*
166. *Id.* at 405-406.
167. *Id.* at 407.
168. See Kaplow, *supra* note 85, at 561-562 (noting that stated criteria supply rule-like content to standards).
169. See Appendix for citations to cases falling into each of these categories.
b. NLRB v. NYU Medical Center

In *NLRB v. New York University Medical Center*, the Second Circuit had to determine whether leaflets were improper that branded the employer as a "gestapo" who used fascist tactics in searching minority employees. The Court said that the test for when objectionable language loses protection is "whether the provocation could be expected to threaten plant discipline" or whether the language is "so violent or of such serious character as to render the employee unfit for further service." The court examined the context of the leaflet and found that it "posed no danger of breach of employee discipline."

The court explained that the leaflet was directed at fellow employees to garner support in a union election rather than at the employer and that there had been no history of violence or labor strife. The court further found that the leaflet had not challenged the employer's authority in the same way as the "Ma Bell is a cheap mother" sweatshirts, held unprotected in *Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.* The Court also noted that defamatory statements are unprotected as measured by the *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* standard: "Erroneous assertions lose their protected status only when they are published with ‘knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were true or false.’" *NYU Medical Center* involves a different type of activity (leafletting) than *Earle* (insubordination and dishonesty) and creates a useful test for the former category of conduct because it focuses on a narrow range of conduct.

---

170. 702 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1983).
171. Id. at 290 (footnote omitted). Other objectionable language cases cited by the court were Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 200 NLRB 667, 671 (1972) (sweatshirts saying "Ma Bell is a Cheap Mother" deemed unprotected) and Borman's Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 1138, 1139 (6th Cir. 1982) (shirt with legend "I'm tired of bustin my ass," where Sixth Circuit reversed a Board finding of protection, because employer conduct was isolated and wearing the shirt was not protected). The court noted Supreme Court precedent that federal law "gives a union the license to use intemperate, abusive or insulting language without fear of restraint or penalty if it believes such rhetoric to be an effective means to make its point," citing National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283 (1974). Id. at 290.
172. Id. at 291.
173. In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 200 NLRB 667, 671 (1972), the Board held permissible the Employer's forbidding the wearing of a sweatshirt with the legend: "Ma Bell is a Cheap Mother." The Board based the holding on its view that the message was a threat to plant discipline: Respondent was under no compulsion to wait until resentment piled up and the storm broke before it could suppress the threat of disruption by exercising its right to enforce employee discipline. 200 NLRB at 671.
174. 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
175. 702 F.2d at 291. The court (702 F.2d at 292) cited the following language from Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58:

Labor disputes are ordinarily heated affairs. . . characterized by bitter and extreme charges, countercharges, unfounded rumors, vituperations, personal accusations, misrepresentations and distortions. Both labor and management often speak bluntly and recklessly, embellishing their respective positions with imprecatory language.
176. Id. at 290.
duct that might result in the loss of protection, the *NYU Medical Center* test is limited by lack of comprehensiveness in the same way as the *Earle* test. The *NYU Medical Center* test’s focus on language may suffice for the category of outrageous conduct, but it will provide little guidance in the areas of strike misconduct, insubordination, disloyalty, and economic weapons.

c. Dreis & Krump v. NLRB

In *Dreis & Krump v. NLRB*, an employee passed out leaflets accusing his supervisor of being malicious, grossly negligent, and careless. The Seventh Circuit adopted a Board standard that turned loss of protection upon whether the conduct “render[ed] the employee unfit for further service.”177 In addressing the employer’s claim that the employee’s leafletting sought to by-pass the grievance procedure, the court further stated that the question was whether the activity: “abandons the principles of exclusive representation by circumventing established grievance procedures, and attempts instead to bargain with the employer regarding working conditions on separate terms.”178 Again the employees’ fitness for future service may well be a useful component of a comprehensive rule, but the *Dreis & Krump* test is limited in the same way that the *Earle* and *NYU Medical Center* rules are limited.179 The *Dreis & Krump* formulation focuses on the employment relationship without considering operational and labor-management concerns of the employer, and it addresses only the category of outrageous conduct.180

C. Comprehensive Rule-like Standard

A comprehensive rule-like standard must strive to give as much content (detail) to the law ex ante as is consistent with the goals of accessibility. The standard must also comprehend the terms, legislative history, and purpose of the Act, in addition to taking into account the principal Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the test for improper means.181 Its usefulness depends upon its predictability and ease of broad application to loss of protection cases.

The proposed standard is:

---

177. *Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB*, 544 F.2d 320, 329 (7th Cir. 1976). The Court restated the standard as articulated by the Board: “communications occurring during the course of otherwise protected activity remain likewise protected unless found to be so violent or of such serious character as to render the employee unfit for further service.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

178. *Id.* at 326.

179. Fitness for service is a concept deriving from the arbitration literature, which refers to whether the employee’s conduct shows that the prospects for rehabilitation are so dim or the impact of the employee’s conduct on the discipline of other employees is so great that termination is the most appropriate sanction. *See* Roger Abrams and Dennis Nolan, *Toward a Theory of ‘Just Cause’ in Employee Discipline Cases*, 1985 Duke L.J. 594.

180. *See* Appendix for other categories and frequency data of conduct leading to loss of protection.

181. *See* discussion, *supra* notes 35-89 and accompanying text.
Employees who engage in lawful concerted activity for a section 7 purpose should not be deprived of protection unless the activity itself (the means) unreasonably threatens the long-term viability (LTV) of the enterprise, the labor-management relationship, or the employment relationship. This standard does not call for an analysis of the actual impact of employee activity on the employer. Rather, in the tradition of agency factfinding, the focus is on the reasonable tendency of the activity to threaten LTV. The qualifying word “unreasonably” is important in view of the centrality of the employer’s legitimate interests throughout the interpretation of the statute. Not only does the standard shield the employer from unreasonable activity, it also protects employees engaged in reasonable activity against economically vulnerable employers.

The latter protection is consistent with the framework of the Act. Conventional strike activity, of course, is specifically protected by Section 13 of the Act, even where it drives employers out of business. The Eastern Airlines situation is a poignant example of this problem. In that dispute, the Union’s strike was a legitimate exercise of economic power in pursuit of its bargaining interests and, along with the intransigency of management, accounted for the demise of the company. If an employer’s LTV is threatened when a less important matter is disputed, the LTV standard suggests a finding of no protection.

This LTV standard is sensitive to the employer’s interests in operational necessity, the labor-management relationship, and the employment relationship. It also governs the loss of protection across the categories of potential employee misconduct, including strike misconduct, outrageous conduct, the use of economic weapons, insubordination, and disloyalty.

At many junctures in the Act’s application the employer’s legitimate interest is limited. At the same time, the protection afforded employees under the statute cannot mean that employees are permitted to engage in conduct that leads to the undoing of the enterprise. Section 7 rights would be very hollow without a source of employment, so those rights are limited

---

182. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (noting that the expertise of administrative agencies makes it appropriate for them to infer statutory violations based on proven evidentiary facts).
183. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 163 provides:
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.
185. Regarding no solicitation rules, see Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); discipline and discharge, see Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980); and secondary boycotts, see 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(4)(B).
by the employer’s interest in continuing to exist. Yet, the Act, given its purpose of facilitating industrial democracy, contemplates employees playing an enhanced role in the decisions that affect their working lives. The Act expressly protects the right to strike, a weapon that is designed to inflict economic harm on the employer. The harm inflicted by the strike is designed to produce short term pressure that will both lead to a favorable settlement and preserve the employer’s competitive position in the longer term. Employee tactics that are different in kind from the economic strike, that aim at destroying the long-term viability of the enterprise, should fall outside the boundaries set by the terms of the statute and its underlying policies.

Employee conduct that does not create direct economic pressure may nevertheless threaten the long-term viability of the enterprise by undermining its employment relationship. Unpunished conduct, such as attacking a supervisor (physically or verbally) or clear instances of insubordination, may so undermine discipline that an employer’s ability to sustain the production of goods and services may be severely hampered. Such conduct would also far exceed what might be reasonably necessary to express a concerted, section 7 concern. Thus, much of the conduct that might con-

---

186. Examples of limitations reflecting the interests of employers are the right to hire permanent replacements in an economic strike, see NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), and the right to confer benefits on employees even in the midst of a union campaign under some circumstances, see NLRB v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 646 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1981) (permitting wage increases during a union campaign to prevent employees from taking other jobs). On the employer’s right to fire union activists even if partially motivated by union activity, see NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (upholding the Board’s dual motive test). On the right to limit the time and place of union solicitation activity, see Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), and the right to control access of non-employee union organizers onto company premises, see Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (upholding an employer’s right to eject non-employee union organizers from company property).

187. See supra note 183.

188. See, e.g., supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text regarding certain corporate campaign-inside game tactics.

189. See, e.g., Marico Enterprises Inc., 283 NLRB 726, 731-32 (1987) (upholding the discharge of an employee spokesperson for insubordination, citing as a rationale that the conduct became so flagrant that it threatened the employer’s ability to maintain order and respect in the conduct of its business).

190. Although the Supreme Court in Washington Aluminum disavowed the relevance of reasonableness, necessity and wisdom in determining whether a labor dispute existed between unorganized employees and the employer, the Court dedicated a portion of the decision to explaining why the action of these employees was reasonable. 370 U.S. at 13. In rejecting the employer’s argument that the employees’ conduct was unprotected “because they [did] not present a specific demand upon their employer to remedy a condition they [found] objectionable,” the Court said the following:

The language of section 7 is broad enough to protect concerted activities whether they take place before, after or at the same time such a demand is made. To compel the Board to interpret and apply that language in the restricted fashion suggested by the respondent here would only tend to frustrate the policy of the Act to protect the right of workers to act together to better their working conditions. Indeed, as indicated by this very case, such an interpretation of section 7 might place burdens upon employees so great that it would effectively nullify the right to engage in concerted activities which that section protects.

370 U.S. at 9, 12. The Court said that under the circumstances the employees had to speak themselves. It also recounted the absence of a bargaining representative and established bargaining procedure, and
stitute “just cause” for discharge under a collective bargaining agreement might actually warrant the loss of protection, because an appropriate employer response to employee misconduct may be necessary to deter further misconduct among employees or protect the effective functioning of the enterprise.\textsuperscript{191} Balancing the employer’s legitimate interest against employee section 7 rights at a minimum calls for a “just cause” floor supporting or justifying employer self-help measures against concerted activities with a section 7 purpose.\textsuperscript{192}

Also, the long-term viability of the labor-management relationship may be as important as the employer’s interest in business viability and employment relations. Where the collective bargaining regime is in place, the employer is entitled to look to the collective bargaining representative as the sole source of employee voice and economic pressure.\textsuperscript{193} The statute supports this entitlement by making the majority representative’s status exclusive.\textsuperscript{194} During the life of the collective bargaining relationship, the health of the enterprise may depend on how well the parties can order their relationship. Independent pressure outside this bilateral structure may violate the spirit of exclusivity and threaten long-term enterprise viability.\textsuperscript{195}

In determining whether the employee activity threatens the long-term viability of the enterprise a number of factors are relevant, though none is necessarily determinative: (1) nature of the enterprise,\textsuperscript{196} (2) conventionality of the tactic,\textsuperscript{197} (3) relationship between means and

---

\textsuperscript{191} See Abrams and Nolan, supra note 179 at 602-06 (detailing the management interests that inform the just cause standard).
\textsuperscript{192} Abrams and Nolan point out that employers in disciplining and discharging employees have a legitimate interest in rehabilitation, specific and general deterrence, and protecting profitability. Courts’ identifying and understanding the importance of these factors in defining the employer’s interest in loss of protection cases would bring greater consistency, predictability and fairness, supra note 179.
\textsuperscript{193} See Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 68-70 (1975) (noting the threat of long term harm to the collective bargaining regime caused by the fragmentation of collective bargaining).
\textsuperscript{194} See section 9(a) of the Act.
\textsuperscript{195} Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
\textsuperscript{196} A walkout at anytime may be reasonable in a manufacturing plant but not at the height of the dinner hour in a restaurant. See Dobbs House, 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963). Also, a fledgling business such as WBTV in Jefferson Standard may run a greater risk of demise than a well-established one. See also Bob Evans Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d (7th Cir. 1998) (holding unprotected a walkout by fifteen employees to protest the discharge of a supervisor and saying “it is enough to reiterate that the Act does not protect employees who protest a legitimate grievance by recourse to unduly and disproportionately disruptive or intemperate means.”).
\textsuperscript{197} If tactics are conventional, historical evidence supports the view that they do not threaten the long-term viability of the enterprise. See CHARLES R. PERRY ET AL., OPERATING DURING STRIKES 114-115, 121 (1982) (discussing the strategy of operating during a strike to secure a long run economic and bargaining benefit). History does offer examples of when conventional tactics have threatened the long-term viability of the enterprise. See supra note 184. This should not mean that unconventional tactics violate the long-term viability standard per se. Such a view would needlessly deprive employees of the creativity that section 7 seems to leave open. See Alan Hyde, Symposium on the Legal Future of Em-
The long-term viability standard, accompanied by the factors to be considered in applying it, supplies employees and decisionmakers with such rule-like benefits as predictability, fairness, and reduced cost.

V.
APPLICATION

A. Explaining Supreme Court Precedent

How well does the proposed standard explain the Supreme Court cases? The LTV standard would produce the same outcome in Jefferson Standard. The television station was a fledgling business, making it particularly vulnerable to the disparagement campaign of the technicians. The total absence of any perceivable relationship between the disparagement campaign and the bargaining dispute removed the activity from the context of a labor dispute and severed any connection between campaign and bargaining table demands. A campaign framed in this way would reasonably tend to inflict greater long term harm on the company than one identified with the union’s economic objectives. The predictable long-term impact of the product disparagement by the union in Jefferson Standard was a threat to the employer’s long-term viability.

198. Reasonable means may have a lower probability of threatening LTV. While means that are not reasonably related to the purpose of concerted activity may signal a long-term threat, means that are reasonably related to the section 7 purpose will probably be protected even if they threaten LTV, e.g. if Washington Aluminum facts occur in a seasonal industry and the intolerable conditions persist for a substantial part of that season, the walkout should be protected (as reasonable) even if it threatens long-term viability. However, it seems unlikely that a massive walkout at the height of a seasonal business over the number of times that a supervisor tours the plant during the work day would warrant protection.

199. The product disparagement in Jefferson Standard is very different, as the Supreme Court suggests, when it is presented as related to the union’s labor dispute with the employer. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1975) (where the context of grievance processing insulated the employee’s insubordination); cf. Earle Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 75 F.3d 400 (1996) (where context led to a lack of protection). In a context such as Cambro, 312 NLRB 634 (1993), where the employer ignores the complaints of employees forcing them to escalate the form of the protest, the employer’s lack of responsiveness indicates the absence of a threat to LTV. Vulnerable employers, on the other hand, may be more likely to strive for accommodation with their employees. See Rafael Gely, Whose Team Are You On? My Team Or My Team?, 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 323 (1997).

200. See Kaplow, supra note 84. In acknowledging the difficulty of formulating law as rules due to the variability of relevant facts or problems and their solutions, Kaplow states: “The choice between rules and standards is one of degree. Deciding solely on the relevant criteria in advance may save costs for both individual actors and adjudicators, while providing individuals some guidance. Also, adopting presumptions or ruling certain options in or out might be possible.” Id. at 600.

201. See supra Section III(B) of this article for a reiteration of the facts of Jefferson Standard and Washington Aluminum.
In *Emporium Capwell*, employee attempts to bargain with the employer over the issue of racial discrimination backed by the economic pressure of picketing and handbilling was properly deemed unprotected under the LTV standard. The dissident employees in that case explicitly ignored the grievance procedure and contractual anti-discrimination provision, the means designed to address the problem.\(^{202}\) Justice Marshall acknowledged the clash between the principles of non-discrimination and exclusive representation in our national labor policy and aptly made the point about long-term viability of the labor-management relationship:

> The policy of industrial self-determination as expressed in section 7 does not require fragmentation of the bargaining unit along racial or other lines in order to consist with the national labor policy against discrimination. And in the face of such fragmentation, whatever its effect on discriminatory practices, the bargaining process that the principle of exclusive representation is meant to lubricate could not endure unhamppered.\(^{203}\)

On the other hand, the walk-out in *Washington Aluminum* occurred in an established manufacturing facility, a viable business.\(^{204}\) The walkout (means) was a direct and reasonable response to the subject matter of the dispute using a tool traditionally used by employees to lodge protests. The context of the protest also made the walkout appropriate, because the employees' earlier efforts to get relief were spurned by the employer.

**B. Further Application**

In addition to the comprehension of Supreme Court precedent by the LTV standard, its application in a variety of cases demonstrates more consistent and predictable results than the approaches used by the Board and the lower courts thus far. In Patterson-Sargent Company, a product disparagement case decided three years after *Jefferson Standard*, chemical workers struck the employer for three and a half months during negotiations for a new contract.\(^{205}\) During the strike, six of the strikers distributed a “Beware of Paint Substitute” leaflet informing the public of the strike; moreover, the leaflet warned potential customers that paint made during the strike was not being made by regular employees who had the expertise and knowledge to make a quality paint.\(^{206}\) The leaflet said that any paint the customer bought during the strike might “peel, crack, blister, scale” or be defective in other ways.\(^{207}\) The leaflet concluded by reiterating the warning and reassuring

\(^{203}\) *Id.* at 70. Cf *Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. NLRB*, 544 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1976) (where employee’s statements criticizing the employer’s treatment of his grievance were not deemed to be an attempt to bypass the contractual grievance procedure).
\(^{205}\) Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 NLRB 1627 (1956).
\(^{206}\) *Id.* at 1627-28.
\(^{207}\) *Id.* at 1628.
the public that the strikers would inform members of the public when they could again purchase paint made by regular employees.\textsuperscript{208}

The Board majority in \textit{Patterson Sargent} ruled the conduct unprotected.\textsuperscript{209} However, under the LTV standard the employees would not have lost protection for this product disparagement. \textit{Patterson-Sargent} was a well-established paint manufacturing business whose dispute with the union was advertised, providing a context for the disparagement. The leaflets essentially encouraged a boycott of the employer's product, a conventional tool that was reasonably related to the union's section 7 purpose of bringing economic pressure against the company at the bargaining table. These factors strongly indicate that the company's long-term viability was not threatened by the strikers' activity.

In \textit{American Arbitration Association},\textsuperscript{210} an employee was discharged for protesting on behalf of fellow employees the employer's ban on wearing jeans in the workplace.\textsuperscript{211} The terminated employee was a tribunal administrator who decided to protest the ban in three ways: (1) wearing jeans to work in defiance of the ban, (2) writing a letter to a Vice-President at AAA headquarters in New York, and (3) writing a letter to a list of users of the agency's services (lawyers, arbitrators and companies).\textsuperscript{212} The letter to the users discussed the effect of the ban controversy on the agency's ability to serve its users and attached a questionnaire that made light of the ban and suggested comparisons between dogs, monkeys, AAA management, and some of the agency's users, a few of whom were named specifically.\textsuperscript{213} Following this letter, the agency's regional director received phone calls

\textsuperscript{208} Id.
\textsuperscript{209} Id. at 1630.
\textsuperscript{210} 233 NLRB 71 (1977).
\textsuperscript{211} Id. at 71. As the Board explains, the American Arbitration Association is a nongovernmental administrative agency that supplies dispute resolution services, primarily arbitration, to parties in a variety of disputes. Tribunal administrators for the AAA assist in the selection of arbitrators, the selection of hearing dates, the handling of correspondence concerning the arbitration, and the issuance of the award. Although the arbitrator's award may be published with the consent of the parties, the arbitration process is private and many of the documents handled by the agency are confidential. See Labor Arbitration Procedures and Techniques, Arbitration Arbitration Association (1994); see generally Robert Coulson, \textit{Labor Arbitration What You Need to Know} (4th ed.) (Rev. 4th ed.) (AAA 1998).
\textsuperscript{212} 233 NLRB at 72-73.
\textsuperscript{213} Id. at 73. The jeans questionnaire contained the following five questions:
1. Should jeans suits be allowed to be worn by (a) supervisors, (b) secretaries, (c) the director, (d) administrators?
2. Are jeans hats more appropriate when worn on the heads of (a) administrators, (b) secretaries, (c) janitors, (d) directors, (e) supervisors?
3. Do jeans jackets look better on (a) dogs, (b) directors, (c) administrators, (d) all of the above, (e) none of the above?
4. When worn in the reception area, are jeans coveralls, more attractive on (a) attorneys, (b) secretaries, (c) supervisors, (d) nobody in the whole world?
5. Should jeans be worn in the office of the AAA by (a) children, (b) monkeys, (c) directors, (d) administrators, (e) electricians, (f) letter carriers, (g) claimant's attorney, (h) respondent's attorney, (i) claimant, (j) dogs, (k) grownups, (l) the President, (m) temporary help, (n) part time help, (o) permanent part time help, (p) supervisors, (q) janitors, (r) anyone from the firm of Sommers, Schwartz, & Silver, (s) nobody from D.A.I.E., (t) reporters,
from users wanting to know what problems precipitated the questionnaire.\textsuperscript{214}

In this case the context of the activity (external communication with customers) exacerbated the likely effect of the conduct. This conclusion is suggested by the nature of the enterprise and the relation between means and ends. The AAA is an enterprise that depends upon the goodwill of its users. Much of this goodwill is generated through the competent and confidential handling of materials and procedures that relate to settling disputes among the agency’s subscribers. The employee’s questionnaire diminished the agency’s goodwill as an enterprise in three ways: (1) the adolescent content of the questionnaire could be expected to raise questions about the level of competence of the staff; (2) questions which compared two named users to dogs and monkeys was likely to cause resentment among both the named and unnamed users; and (3) the letter accompanying the questionnaire indicated that the employer could not competently serve its constituency. Furthermore, the questionnaire was not reasonably related to the employee’s effort to remove the ban. The employee’s letter to the AAA Vice-President was quite appropriate, however, and actually led to the lifting of the ban before the regional director learned of the employee’s questionnaire. The Board appropriately held the perpetrator’s conduct unprotected.

In contrast, the sarcastic letters protesting the treatment of employees by employers in \textit{Reef Industries, Inc.} and \textit{New River Industries} had a \textit{de minimus} impact on long-term viability.\textsuperscript{215} Nothing in the nature of either business made the protests in those cases inappropriate.\textsuperscript{216} Contextually, in both cases the communications were internal and triggered by specific management actions. In \textit{New River} the letter protesting a management policy of inadequate compensation was addressed to no particular management official, while in \textit{Reef} the letter and cartoon were addressed to the offending management official. Both sets of communications addressed employees’ section 7 concerns, and neither so undermined the authority of management in the eyes of all employees as to warrant discharge for general deterrence reasons (relationship of means to ends).\textsuperscript{217} No evidence in either of these

\textsuperscript{214} Id. at 74.

\textsuperscript{215} Reef Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 952 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1991) and New River Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1991) involved the treatment issues of respect and compensation. In neither case was there evidence of any significant threat to the company’s viability. Nor should such an effect be expected, given the nature of the protests.

\textsuperscript{216} New River Industries was an acetate fiber products manufacturer, while Reef Industries was a plastics manufacturer.

\textsuperscript{217} A reasonable and effective response of the personnel manager in \textit{New River} might have been to meet with the employees after receipt of the letter, determine the cause of the employee sentiment, explain the misunderstanding, and reassure the employees of management’s respect for their intelligence.
cases suggested that the business was seriously threatened by these employee actions.218

In Cambro Mfg. Co.,219 the case that motivated this article, the work stoppage did not threaten the long-term viability of the company. The stoppage involved eleven employees out of 400 production and maintenance employees on the second of three shifts of an established manufacturing concern.220 The stoppage reasonably related to the employees’ purpose of addressing the problems of the supervisory treatment of workers. Indeed, the stoppage followed a supervisory interrogation of a single employee with a warning against stirring up grievances.221 Also, the general manager had failed to promptly follow up on an earlier grievance meeting as he had promised.222 The company’s grievance procedure had been unilaterally promulgated, and the employees were unrepresented. In this context, it was questionable whether the structure permitted for the effective processing of the grievance. In such circumstances, a work stoppage is the ultimate, conventional tactic.223

218. This analysis supports the Court’s decision in Reef Industries but not in New River Industries. See Timekeeping Systems, Inc., 323 NLRB 244 at 248 (1997) (finding that Section 8(a)(1) was violated by the discharge of a software engineer for the “tone” of a generally distributed e-mail message that was critical of the chief operating officer’s proposed change in vacation policy). The Board’s approach in this case reflected the stringency of the long term viability standard as follows: “[T]he Board has invoked a forfeiture of the protection of the act only in cases where the concerted behavior has been truly insubordinate or disruptive of the work process.” When the means consist of speech as in New River and Reef, some hold the view that section 7 should be held to protect all speech that is not violent, obscene or incitements to illegal action regardless of content. See, e.g. Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1981) (conceding the propriety of restrictions on the time, place and manner of speech, but arguing analogously from first amendment free speech protection that section 7 should be “held to protect all attempts by employees to communicate with each other on matters of self-defined mutual concern, regardless of the content of the communication”). See also Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution In The Emerging System Of Employment Law, 69 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 149, 167, 168 n.62 (1993) (noting his earlier criticism of rules that make section 7 protection turn on the contents of speech). However, the most apt analogy in first amendment jurisprudence would seem to be cases involving public sector employees who claim free speech protection for workplace communications, where the Court attempts to balance in the manner proposed in this article the interest of employees in free expression against the employer’s interest in the “effective functioning of the public employer’s enterprise.” See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987). Rankin incorporates Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S., 597 593 (1972) (may not discharge employee for reasons that infringe constitutionally protected free speech). See also Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (balancing the interest of employees to speak on matters of public concern and the interest of the employer in promoting the efficiency of the public service—“effective functioning of the public enterprise”) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152-154 (1983)(employee did not establish that speech was a matter of public concern rather than merely personal concern—in balancing, consider “the manner, time, and place” of employee expression and “the context in which the dispute arose.”).

220. Id. at 634.
221. Id.
222. Id.

223. A problem that has concerned the Board and the courts since the early days of the act is the status of unconventional economic pressure tactics such as intermittent work stoppages and slowdowns. See UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (Briggs & Stratton), 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (to
On the other hand, the LTV standard supports the Eighth Circuit's conclusion in *Earle Industries*.\textsuperscript{224} Unlike Jefferson Standard and Emporium Capwell, the employee's actions in this case did not directly threaten the long term viability of the enterprise or the labor-management relationship. Rather, the LTV standard focuses here on the viability of the employment relationship, the maintenance of discipline within the workforce that leads to the ultimate success of the enterprise. Though the employee's conduct in *Earle* might be regarded as unprotected because she aided Jackson's unlawful conduct of trespassing,\textsuperscript{225} under the LTV standard this conduct is also unprotected because it threatened the long-term viability of the employment relationship.

The pivotal factor in *Earle* is the employer's interest in preserving plant discipline through the authority of its supervisors. Not only has management's interest in production and discipline been recognized by the Supreme Court as a limitation on section 7 rights from the earliest interpretation of the statute,\textsuperscript{226} "just cause" theorists have also identified general deterrence as an important reason to impose plant discipline.\textsuperscript{227} Rapid deterioration of plant discipline is likely, if management must tolerate conduct such as employee Wallace's humiliation of the personnel manager to the cheers of co-workers. However, as the Eighth Circuit pointed out, the same

---

\textsuperscript{224} 75 F.3d 400 (8th Cir. 1996). See supra Section IV(B)(2)(a) of this article for a description of the facts of *Earle*.

\textsuperscript{225} Another problem is the dubious relationship between means and ends. Assuming the legitimacy of a purpose to have Rev. Jackson walk through the plant to the management offices (a question of protected ends: step 2 rather than step 3 analysis), this might have been more directly, and less harmfully, accomplished by simply asking the personnel manager on behalf of the group to grant Jackson permission to be on the premises and to visit the management offices.

\textsuperscript{226} Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).

\textsuperscript{227} See Abrams and Nolan, supra note 179, at 603-05. Although the Board's decision in *Timekeeping Systems, Inc.*, supra note 218, reflects an awareness of the concerns underlying the long term viability standard, it uses the following standard couched in the language of specific rather than general deterrence: "[C]ommunications occurring during the course of otherwise protected activity remain likewise protected unless found to be so violent or of such serious character as to render the employee unfit for further service." 323 NLRB at 248 (citation omitted).
conduct in a different context—negotiations, grievance processing, strike—might well have been protected. 228

Application of the LTV standard to two other delicate cases, Dobbs and Aroostook, further demonstrates the LTV standard’s ability to address wide-ranging sets of facts and yield justifiable results. In Dobbs House, 229 the employees’ evening long walkout at the height of the restaurant’s dinner hour to protest the discharge of a favored supervisor unreasonably threatened the long term viability of the restaurant. Restaurant ownership is a notoriously risky business that must provide customers with a predictable quality of service in order to survive. In an industry where one bad service experience can permanently alienate a restaurant’s customers, an unannounced walkout during peak hours is likely to have a devastating effect on future business. The walkout can be considered unreasonable because there was no evidence in the case that less destructive means such as a letter, wire, or phone call to the owner, Mr. Dobbs, who travelled to the restaurant’s location in Birmingham from Memphis the following day, were not likely to be effective. 230

Aroostook involves the discharge of one ophthalmic technician and three registered nurses from an ophthalmology center in Maine. 231 The discharges occurred after the employees complained about a work schedule change within earshot of patients in violation of a company rule. 232 The long term viability of employers in the health care business depends on their ability to provide quality medical service. Such service might be affected by a range of general care factors independent of specific treatment, including patient comfort. If a rule against complaining about working conditions within earshot of patients were not enforceable against caregivers, a medical care facility could not be expected to thrive. 233 The context of such complaints makes the employer rule appropriate and makes the discharges

228. 75 F.3d at 405-06. In a passage that captures the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning: In view of the purposes of the NLRA, we have recognized that an employer cannot insist on subordination in the context of bargaining or grievance processes. These are situations in which the Act aims for equality of bargaining positions between employer and employee to permit meaningful negotiation. (citations omitted).

The Court noted further: [I]t is evident that, in enacting Section 7 of the NLRA, Congress sought generally to equalize the bargaining power of the employee with that of his employer by allowing employees to band together in confronting an employer regarding the terms and conditions of their employment. Id. quoting NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984).

229. 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963).

230. Id. at 538-39.

231. Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

232. Id. at 211.

233. The Supreme Court has recognized the uniqueness of hospitals by supporting broad no-solicitation rules for medical employers. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
justifyable under the LTV standard. This would be particularly true for a small surgery center such as the one in this case.\textsuperscript{234}

The long-term viability of the employment relationship was also an issue in \textit{Aroostook}. The ophthalmology center had a general deterrence concern that compelled the discharges in order to preserve the integrity of the employment relationship.\textsuperscript{235} Also, the employees could have used other equally (if not more) effective and less harmful means, such as written communications and private meetings in order to air their concerns.

Finally, under the LTV test corporate campaigns and inside games are not susceptible to a single analysis.\textsuperscript{236} Just as a range of tactics might fall within the corporate campaign or inside games rubric, the outcomes under a LTV analysis may vary. The placement of a lawful picket at the home of a company executive or appeals to shareholders, customers, creditors, or government agencies in order to apply pressure upon the employer at the bargaining table may be so tailored as to pose no significant threat to the employer’s long term viability.\textsuperscript{237} Similarly, inside games, particularly at the beginning, may be symbolic actions (for example, employees wearing identical clothing, arm bands or buttons, or marching in single file into the plant at the beginning of the shift) that pose no threat to long-term viability.\textsuperscript{238} But as the severity of these tactics escalates from symbolic actions to protracted slowdowns under work to rule programs that threaten a long-term loss in productivity and market share, participating employees would lose section 7 protection under the LTV standard.\textsuperscript{239} This approach favors a contextual analysis of the corporate campaign and inside games strategy over Professor Northrup’s suggestion that all such strategies lead to a forfeiture of employee protection.\textsuperscript{240}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{234} \textit{Id.} at 213.
\textsuperscript{235} One of the components of the fundamental understanding in the employment relationship is the employee’s obligation to protect the profitability of the business. \textit{See} Abrams and Nolan, \textit{supra} note 179.
\textsuperscript{236} \textit{See supra} notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{237} \textit{See generally} Northrup, \textit{supra} note 3, at 507-513 describing the definition and development of corporate campaigns.
\textsuperscript{239} \textit{See} Northrup, \textit{supra} note 3, at 516-537.
\textsuperscript{240} Professor Northrup says:

As a strike, the corporate campaign-inside game combination must be understood as such and treated as such if the company targeted is to deal with its consequences and to continue as a viable organization. Likewise, employees should recognize the combination corporate campaign-inside game for what it is, namely, a form of unprotected partial strike which may result in discipline, discharge, or even the elimination of their jobs. And, of course, government regulators should understand this as well. \textit{Id.} at 538.
\end{flushleft}
VI.
CONCLUSION

The standard proposed in this article seeks to combine the best features of ex ante and ex post law promulgation, while supplying enough detail to guide employee conduct and institutional decisionmaking. However, it does not and cannot avoid the Board’s and courts’ decisional discretion altogether. The article seeks to structure discretion rather than accomplish the impossible—the elimination of discretion in loss of protection labor cases. It is premised on the view that despite the residual indeterminacy permitted under the long term viability standard, it achieves greater clarity, predictability and fairness than the existing regime.

Judges may well disagree on case outcomes under this standard. For example, some may view Earle as involving a single incident of insubordination or the letter in AAA as a silly protest not warranting loss of protection. However, if the disagreements are based on an application of the standard and its relevant factors, the extreme variability and apparent arbitrariness observed under the current approach are likely to be absent. As Steven Burton points out in Judging In Good Faith:

[Dis]agreement on the legal result surely is possible in a way that places all positions in good faith — by dispensing with any need to dismiss as legally invalid the standards relied on by another. We can agree on all the relevant legal reasons at the same time we disagree on the result due to disagreement on matters of weight.241

By identifying the relevant legal reasons to be considered in loss of protection cases, this article has sought to provide more information to potential litigants as well as to aid in more effective judging by agency and judicial decisionmakers.

## APPENDIX: TYPOLOGY OF UNPROTECTED CONDUCT CASES: 1985-1995*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Case name</th>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th><strong>Key number</strong></th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Medite of N.M., Inc.</td>
<td>351 NLRB 681, enforced, 72 F.3d 780 (10th Cir. 1995)</td>
<td>3/8/95</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>50.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>striking, slate and other materials protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>United States Serv. Inc., Inc.</td>
<td>315 NLRB 285</td>
<td>5/30/94</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6050-2500</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>interim work stoppage protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Medite of N.M., Inc.</td>
<td>314 NLRB 1145</td>
<td>9/1/94</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>hitting car with cardboard sign protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Southeast, Inc.</td>
<td>313 NLRB 1197</td>
<td>5/9/94</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>throwing nails in parking lot not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Beard Indus., Inc.</td>
<td>311 NLRB 788</td>
<td>5/13/93</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>dropping roofing tacks in parking lot not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Virginia Mfg. Co.</td>
<td>310 NLRB 1241, modified, 27 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 1994)</td>
<td>5/7/93</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>variety of misconduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Domino Trading Corp.</td>
<td>310 NLRB 777, enforced, 16 F.3d 517 (2nd Cir. 1994)</td>
<td>3/24/93</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>pushing and shoving protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Big Horn Coal Co.</td>
<td>309 NLRB 335</td>
<td>10/16/92</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>blocking entrance to plant not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Circuit-Wise, Inc.</td>
<td>308 NLRB 1081, enforced, 92 F.3d 219 (9th Cir. 1993)</td>
<td>9/26/92</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>variety of misconduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>International Paper Co.</td>
<td>308 NLRB 31, modified, Local 14, United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 47 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1995)</td>
<td>9/26/92</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>threat on life not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ato-Ebauer, Inc.</td>
<td>307 NLRB 1485, enforced, 395 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 866 (1995)</td>
<td>7/24/92</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>threat on life not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Nandi Bros. Inc.</td>
<td>305 NLRB 379</td>
<td>7/26/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>spitting and slamming forks not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Raisevee Cashier Co.</td>
<td>302 NLRB 378</td>
<td>6/20/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>vehicular misconduct not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Wayne Steel Casters, Inc.</td>
<td>303 NLRB 142</td>
<td>9/1/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>obscene gesture and language not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>National Gypsum Co.</td>
<td>302 NLRB 334</td>
<td>4/15/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>rock throwing not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Keco Indus. Inc.</td>
<td>301 NLRB 303</td>
<td>10/23/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>52.345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>gun in vestibule while on campus of plant gate not protected activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* James Powers prepared the Appendix in connection with his survey of NLRB and Circuit Court cases decided from 1985-1995.
** Key number refers to the Labor Relations Reference Manual (BNA) Case Digest Index.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Employer/Inc.</th>
<th>Case Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NLRB No.</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Alaska Pulp Corp.</td>
<td>296 NLRB 1250, enforced, 944 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1991)</td>
<td>10/10/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>6020-3300</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, accessory to vandalism unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Teledyne Indus., Inc.</td>
<td>295 NLRB 181, enforced, 911 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1990)</td>
<td>6/1/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, threats of physical harm -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Ornamental Iron Work Co.</td>
<td>295 NLRB 473, enforced, 935 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1991)</td>
<td>6/1/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, threat of physical violence -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Columbia Portland Cement Co.</td>
<td>294 NLRB 410, rev'd &amp; remand, 915 F.2d 253 (6th Cir. 1990)</td>
<td>5/31/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, harassment of nonunioners with vehicle -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Chesapeake Plywood, Inc.</td>
<td>294 NLRB 201, enforced, 917 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1990)</td>
<td>5/25/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>6050-0100</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, strike violence unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Massachusetts Coastal Seafoods, Inc.</td>
<td>293 NLRB 496</td>
<td>3/30/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, throwing tomatoes and threats -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Virginia Holing Corp.</td>
<td>293 NLRB 187</td>
<td>3/15/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>57,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, setting dummy at gate entrance -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Natio L. Tose Co.</td>
<td>291 NLRB 448</td>
<td>10/21/88</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, nonthreatening statements -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>General Chem. Corp.</td>
<td>290 NLRB 76</td>
<td>7/29/88</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, slashing tires -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Atlantic Gas Lines, Inc.</td>
<td>289 NLRB 1051</td>
<td>7/23/88</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, variety of conduct -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Tube Craft, Inc.</td>
<td>287 NLRB 401</td>
<td>12/15/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, blocking gate for a long period of time -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Autoax, Inc.</td>
<td>285 NLRB 892</td>
<td>9/11/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, chasing nonunionists in car -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>American Gypsum Co.</td>
<td>285 NLRB 109</td>
<td>7/31/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>5020-3300</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, physical violence -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Caril Uniforme Corp.</td>
<td>284 NLRB 1349</td>
<td>7/27/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, blocking parking area for baseball bat -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>GSM, Inc.</td>
<td>284 NLRB 174</td>
<td>6/1/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2017-0800</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, intentionally driving car into striking rock throwers not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>U.S. Gypsum</td>
<td>284 NLRB 4</td>
<td>5/20/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, variety of activities -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>F.E. Itay, Inc.</td>
<td>283 NLRB 771</td>
<td>4/20/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2017-1700</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, threatening nonunioners -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Louisiana-Paciol Corp.</td>
<td>282 NLRB 1053, enforced, 858 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1988)</td>
<td>3/21/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, throwing rocks -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Certifried Corp.</td>
<td>282 NLRB 1110</td>
<td>3/21/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, standing rails up in driveway -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Cambridge Actuated Devices, Inc.</td>
<td>282 NLRB 428</td>
<td>12/15/86</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, scratching car -- protected where disparate treatment of strikers existed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Redmond Recording Corp.</td>
<td>280 NLRB 615, enforced, 936 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1991)</td>
<td>6/24/86</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, throwing rocks, rocks, throwing vehicles, -- all unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Sliham-Williams Co.</td>
<td>279 NLRB 270</td>
<td>4/1986</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, throwing eggs -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Harry Hoffman &amp; Son Printing</td>
<td>278 NLRB 751</td>
<td>3/12/86</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, throwing tomatoes at cars -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Georgia Knit Co.</td>
<td>275 NLRB 636</td>
<td>5/31/85</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2017-0600</td>
<td>Strike Misconduct, threat on life -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 Count</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>Misconduct</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Guardian Indus. Corp.</td>
<td>318 NLRA 542</td>
<td>10/31/95</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>52,2542</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Newark Morning Ledger</td>
<td>316 NLRA 1268</td>
<td>4/10/95</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2017-1700</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>HCA/Portsmouth Regional Hosp.</td>
<td>318 NLRA 919</td>
<td>3/29/95</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>52,2542</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Hertz Corp.</td>
<td>318 NLRA 872</td>
<td>3/9/95</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6080-4100</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Groovlers Haulers, Inc.</td>
<td>315 NLRA 1312</td>
<td>1/13/95</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2017-6000</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Count</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>Misconduct</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Morton Inff, Inc.</td>
<td>315 NLRA 584</td>
<td>11/10/94</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4557-6000</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Brother Indus., Inc.</td>
<td>314 NLRA 1219</td>
<td>9/20/94</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Peter Vitale Co.</td>
<td>313 NLRA 971</td>
<td>3/29/94</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2017-1700</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 Count</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>Misconduct</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>United Parcel Serv., Inc.</td>
<td>311 NLRA 974</td>
<td>5/28/93</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2017-6000</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Count</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>Misconduct</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Southtown Care Ctr.</td>
<td>308 NLRA 225</td>
<td>8/13/92</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6065-0100</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Alpha Piers Corp.</td>
<td>307 NLRA 1219</td>
<td>7/10/92</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>52,2542</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 Count</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>Misconduct</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Woodtown Cemetery</td>
<td>305 NLRA 940</td>
<td>11/20/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>52,2542</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Walkerstorfer Co.</td>
<td>305 NLRA 592</td>
<td>11/12/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2017-0900</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>United Parcel Serv. of Ohio</td>
<td>305 NLRA 433, vacated sub nom. Kane v. NLRA, 8 F.3d 27 (9th Cir. 1993)</td>
<td>10/15/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2017-0800</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Mini-Tags, Inc.</td>
<td>304 NLRA 644, rev'd in part. 980 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1993)</td>
<td>8/27/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2017-1700</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Champion Infl Corp.</td>
<td>303 NLRA 112</td>
<td>5/28/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6070-5000</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>United Enviro Sys., Inc.</td>
<td>301 NLRA 942, enforfed. 958 F.2d 356 (3rd Cir. 1992)</td>
<td>2/27/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>52,2542</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Wasbuck Country Club</td>
<td>301 NLRA 594</td>
<td>2/12/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>52,2542</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Case Description</td>
<td>Citation</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Reed Indus., Inc.</td>
<td>300 NLRB 956, enforced, 957 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 957 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1992)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous conduct</td>
<td>Unflattering cartoon protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Bliss Indus., Inc.</td>
<td>300 NLRB 498</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Obscene language protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>New River Indus., Inc.</td>
<td>229 NLRB 775, min/d, 945 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1991)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Sarcastic letter protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Laminated Prod., Inc.</td>
<td>294 NLRB 810</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Unlawful manner of handling at check-writing not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc.</td>
<td>251 NLRB 986, enforced, 914 F.2d 1442 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 904 (1991)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Telephone call to investigate grievance not harassment protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Washington Adventist Hosp., Inc.</td>
<td>291 NLRB 95</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Misuse of computer system to send message unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Spahn Bldg. Maintenance Co.</td>
<td>299 NLRB 915</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Use of milk epithet protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Roadmaster Corp.</td>
<td>288 NLRB 1165, enforced, 874 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1990)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Signer of employee's name to a grievance protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Freeman Decorating Co.</td>
<td>288 NLRB 1335</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Verbal put down protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>A.H. Sale Corp.</td>
<td>285 NLRB 807</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Intimidating tone of voice not excessive -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Kroger Co.</td>
<td>294 NLRB 661, aff'd 959 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1998)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Protest not excessive or extreme -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>E.R. Carpenter Co.</td>
<td>294 NLRB 273</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Putting flyers on car windows in violation of state law -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Chelsea Lab., Inc.</td>
<td>282 NLRB 500, enforced, 825 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1206 (1988)</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Raised voice held protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Trover Clinic</td>
<td>290 NLRB 6</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Dissemination of cartoon not so inflammatory or outrageous -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Caterpillar Tractor Co.</td>
<td>276 NLRB 1323</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Obscenity cartoon containing obscenities -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Southern Ca. Edison Co.</td>
<td>274 NLRB 1121</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Button with off-color language -- not so offensive as to lose protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Ozark Properties, Inc.</td>
<td>274 NLRB 687, enforced, 794 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1986)</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>203/50</td>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>Abusive language during contract negotiations held protected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | **35** Outrageous Conduct Count | **35**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Company or Place Name</th>
<th>Case No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NLRA No.</th>
<th>Complaint</th>
<th>Outcome/Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Fitchburg Manor Care Center</td>
<td>316 NLRA 201</td>
<td>1/3/85</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>52,344</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Congregating around nursing home lobby to deriving grievances protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Early Indus., Inc.</td>
<td>315 NLRA 310, rev'd, 75 F.3d 400 (8th Cir. 1996)</td>
<td>10/21/94</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>52,2042</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Encouraging Jesse Jackson to go to front office was protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Health Care &amp; Retirement Corp</td>
<td>310 NLRA 1022</td>
<td>3/31/93</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>52,2536</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Walkout protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Mike Yuroseki &amp; Son, Inc.</td>
<td>310 NLRA R31, enforcing, 53 F.3d 261 (8th Cir. 1995)</td>
<td>3/25/93</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>52,2536</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Refusal to work extra hour protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Transpac Fiber Optics &amp; Telecomm., Inc.</td>
<td>305 NLRA 974</td>
<td>12/30/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2017-0805</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Persistently asking questions of management protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>NTI Graphics, Inc.</td>
<td>302 NLRA 921</td>
<td>7/21/88</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5050-7500</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Refusing to leave plant not Insubordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Bridgeport Ambulance Serv., Inc.</td>
<td>302 NLRA 358, enforcing, 908 F.2d 725 (2nd Cir. 1992)</td>
<td>3/29/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>32,2039</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Walkout protected despite no union sanction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>United Parcel Serv., Inc.</td>
<td>301 NLRA 1140</td>
<td>2/28/91</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>52,2536</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Refusal to drive truck because of belief that it would violate contract protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Farley Candy Co.</td>
<td>300 NLRA 849</td>
<td>12/10/90</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>52,349</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Work stoppage not Insubordination or an intermittent strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Sawyer of NAPA, Inc.</td>
<td>300 NLRA 1231</td>
<td>9/28/90</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5050-2500</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>One-time refusal to work overtime protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Eison Concrete, Inc.</td>
<td>287 NLRA 69, rev'd, 904 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir. 1995)</td>
<td>12/11/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2017-0805</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Repeated refusal to &quot;shut up&quot; held unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Eckar Mfg. Corp.</td>
<td>286 NLRA 170</td>
<td>9/30/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2017-0800</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Raised voice held not to be Insubordination -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Finlay Bros. Co.</td>
<td>262 NLRA 737</td>
<td>1/14/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2017-1700</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Consistent refusal to wear work uniform -- Insubordinate and unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>U.S. Postal Serv.</td>
<td>252 NLRA 696</td>
<td>1/8/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2017-1700</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Repeated refusal to lower voice -- not protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Dandridge Textile, Inc.</td>
<td>279 NLRA 89</td>
<td>3/31/86</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2017-0801</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Disrespectful remarks to supervisor not Insubordination -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>Zack Co.</td>
<td>278 NLRA 958</td>
<td>3/13/86</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2017-1700</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Excessive talking about grievances without doing work -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>BASF Wyandotte Corp.</td>
<td>278 NLRA 173</td>
<td>12/23/86</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2017-0800</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Destroying papers in meeting with management -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>Mead Corp.</td>
<td>275 NLRA 323</td>
<td>4/30/95</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2017-1700</td>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>Refusal to work overtime held Insubordination when a grievance procedure existed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Mike Yuroseki &amp; Son, Inc.</td>
<td>305 NLRA 1037</td>
<td>3/31/97</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>8650-7500</td>
<td>Economic Weapon</td>
<td>Refusing to work overtime protected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 19

**Insuf. Count:** 19
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Count</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990 Count</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Count</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 Count</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 Count</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 Count</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 Count</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hostar Marine Transp., Sys., Inc.</th>
<th>298 NLRB 189</th>
<th>4/9/90</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>52.349</th>
<th>Economic Weapons</th>
<th>refusal to work -- protected; not an intermittent strike</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aubrey Eaton</td>
<td>297 NLRB 958, enforced, 919 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1990)</td>
<td>3/2/90</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>52.359</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>walk-out protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillips Indus., Inc.</td>
<td>295 NLRB 717</td>
<td>6/15/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8025-8790</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>slowdown was unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All American Gourmet</td>
<td>292 NLRB 1111</td>
<td>2/1/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>52.349</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>sick-out -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Dodge Ctr., Inc.</td>
<td>289 NLRB 194, enforced sub nom. Roseville Dodge, Inc. v. NLRB, 885 F.2d 1355 (6th Cir. 1989)</td>
<td>6/17/88</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>9050-2500</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>no intermittent strike where no planned walkout/work stoppage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jasper Seating Co.</td>
<td>285 NLRB 550, enforced, 857 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1988)</td>
<td>8/31/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>52.349</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>one-day walkout over bad working conditions -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumbee Farms Coop., Inc.</td>
<td>285 NLRB 497, enforced, 850 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989)</td>
<td>8/31/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>52.359</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>strike protected despite economic harm to employer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmon-Hon Community Action Agency</td>
<td>283 NLRB 1273, enforced, 843 F.2d 1295 (6th Cir. 1988)</td>
<td>5/18/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>52.350</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>work stoppage -- protected; not dilatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCI Mining Corp.</td>
<td>283 NLRB 698, enforced, 849 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1988)</td>
<td>4/21/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>6050-0100</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>work stoppage protected where no evidence of violence, dishonesty, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buck Brown Contracting Co.</td>
<td>263 NLRB 489</td>
<td>3/31/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2017-6700</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>threatening wildcat strike -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Engraving Co.</td>
<td>262 NLRB 1266, enforced, 860 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1988)</td>
<td>2/17/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>6050-1280</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>refusal to work overtime is not a partial strike -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Iron Works, Inc.</td>
<td>281 NLRB 1119</td>
<td>9/30/96</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>52.348</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>walkout protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands Reg'l Med. Ctr.</td>
<td>278 NLRB 1067</td>
<td>3/21/86</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>6050-1280</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>partial refusal to work -- unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Insr. Corp.</td>
<td>277 NLRB 795</td>
<td>11/26/85</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6050-1280</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>spontaneous 1 day work stoppage -- protected; not a partial or intermittent strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McEver Engg. Inc.</td>
<td>275 NLRB 921, enforced, 784 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1985)</td>
<td>6/28/85</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6050-1280</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>one-time strike ending after weather conditions improved -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance Cleaning Serv.</td>
<td>274 NLRB 942</td>
<td>3/13/85</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6050-1280</td>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>one-time refusal to work not an intermittent strike -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearpower, Inc.</td>
<td>316 NLRB 496</td>
<td>2/22/95</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6080</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
<td>appealing to building manager to intervene in labor dispute protected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 18 Economic Weapons Count: 19
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Case Name</th>
<th>NLRB Case</th>
<th>Decision Date</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reason for NLRB Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>Odomon Walnut Growers, Inc.</td>
<td>315 NLRB 36</td>
<td>1/20/85</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>52,345</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>boycott of product protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>315 NLRB 1129</td>
<td>12/20/94</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5070-5900</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Complaining in front of major customer not disloyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>NKO, Inc.</td>
<td>315 NLRB 570</td>
<td>11/10/94</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5060-5000</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employer's Remains not defamatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>315 NLRB 23</td>
<td>5/28/93</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>52,2535</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Printing leaflets about company's burning of hazardous waste protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>Delta Health Ctr., Inc.</td>
<td>315 NLRB 60</td>
<td>1/17/93</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>52,2535</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sending memo to funding agency protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>Doughterty Lumber Co.</td>
<td>299 NLRB 295</td>
<td>7/31/90</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4067-9000</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sending letter to newspaper protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>United Cable Television Corp.</td>
<td>299 NLRB 138</td>
<td>7/27/90</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6060-5000</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Posting note not disloyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>Brownsville Garment Co.</td>
<td>298 NLRB 907</td>
<td>5/16/90</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6070-5000</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Comments about employer's product not reckless or unfair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>Elnor Nordstrom</td>
<td>292 NLRB 638</td>
<td>2/8/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>4067-9500</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public complaints about team doctor not disloyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>Sierra Publix Corp.</td>
<td>291 NLRB 540</td>
<td>1/21/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5060-5000</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter to newspaper advertisers not disloyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>San Juan Hotel Corp.</td>
<td>269 NLRB 1433</td>
<td>7/25/88</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6070-2500</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Statements in leaflet protected where leaflet was directed only at employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>Cincinnati Suburban Press, Inc.</td>
<td>299 NLRB 958</td>
<td>7/20/89</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>4067-9500</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Newspaper letter not disloyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>Amoreu Transfer Serv., Inc.</td>
<td>287 NLRB 1244</td>
<td>2/25/88</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>4067-9500</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strikes collusion with employer's competitor not disloyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>Emerco, Inc.</td>
<td>284 NLRB 432</td>
<td>6/30/87</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>5070-5500</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communication with general contractor — not disloyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Falsify,astic newsletter — not disloyal where no derogation of employer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>Thomas Steel Co.</td>
<td>281 NLRB 369</td>
<td>9/9/86</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2017-1700</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interfering with customer-employer relationship and misrepresentation to customer — unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>Local No. 980, UAW</td>
<td>290 NLRB 1279</td>
<td>7/31/86</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>6060-5000</td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>False statements to newspaper not disloyal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Charge</th>
<th>Disloyalty</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>Mitchell Motors, Inc.</td>
<td>280 NLRB 220</td>
<td>5/30/85</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
<td>false statements about employer -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>Turner Beverage Co.</td>
<td>279 NLRB 160</td>
<td>3/5/86</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
<td>making anonymous calls to employer's franchiser -- disloyal and unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>Sahara Datsun, Inc.</td>
<td>278 NLRB 1044, enforced, 811 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1987)</td>
<td>3/20/88</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
<td>false accusation against employer -- held disloyal and unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1988 Count 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>Bell Hafer, Inc.</td>
<td>276 NLRB 1208</td>
<td>9/30/85</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
<td>false statements about employer -- unprotected/disloyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>Squier Distrib. Co.</td>
<td>276 NLRB 1195, enforced sub nom, Squier Distib. Co. v. Local 7, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 801 F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1986)</td>
<td>9/30/85</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
<td>reporting employer misconduct to sheriff not disloyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>Technicolor Gov't Serv., Inc.</td>
<td>276 NLRB 393, enforced, 795 F.2d 916 (11th Cir. 1986)</td>
<td>9/24/85</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
<td>disseminating employment application forms for a competitor of employer -- protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>Crystal Uniform &amp; Uniform Serv., Inc.</td>
<td>274 NLRB 846</td>
<td>3/14/85</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
<td>persuading employees to work for competitor -- disloyal and unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1985 Count 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 28 Disloyalty Count 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grand Count 145 Grand Count 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike Misconduct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outrageous Conduct</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insubordination</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Weapons</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disloyalty</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>