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Rafael Gely
Leonard Bierman

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Labor Law Access Rules and Stare Decisis: Developing a Planned Parenthood-Based Model of Reform

Rafael Gely*
Leonard Bierman**

This article deals with labor law access rules, particularly the rights of unions to gain access to employers' private property for organizing purposes. Professors Gely and Bierman provide a comprehensive analysis of the access issue and identify two major problems with the manner in which the Supreme Court has approached this area. First, the Supreme Court has dealt piecemeal with the various aspects of this problem without attempting to develop a coherent framework. Second, the Court has been reluctant to analyze the access issue within the context of today's workplace.

Professors Gely and Bierman attribute the Supreme Court's flawed approach to this area to the doctrine of stare decisis. They examine the role of stare decisis in this context and argue that the Supreme Court's own recent decision on stare decisis in the Planned Parenthood case, mandates a need for reform with regard to labor law access rules.

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** Texas A&M University. The authors thank Professors Michael C. Harper, Hal Krent, and Martin Malin for their comments on this paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For over five decades the United States Supreme Court, the National Labor Relations Board ("Board"), and most recently Congress, have struggled with the question of what access unions and employees should have to the workplace.\(^1\) While either granting unlimited access to unions and employees or completely closing the workplace to them, would represent simple clear-cut answers, neither provides a satisfactory resolution within the statutory context provided by the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act").\(^2\) The Act establishes the rights of employees to "form, join, or assist labor organizations, [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."\(^3\) This right, as the Court has recognized, must be accompanied by a corresponding right to have the opportunity to receive information about the benefits and costs of collective action.\(^4\) Thus, the Act's substantive organizational rights are of little import if not accompanied by employee rights to obtain comprehensive information from unions and other employees about unionization.\(^5\) Conversely, Congress and the judiciary have been very concerned with the encroachments that the Act, in particular its provisions granting organizational rights to employees, makes on the constitutionally protected property rights of employers.\(^6\) By defini-

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6. This concern was recognized earlier in the legislative debates over the original NLRA. Senator Wagner, the bill's chief sponsor, noted: "No sensible person would interpret that language [of section 7] to mean that while a factory is at work the workers could suddenly stop their duties to have a mass meeting in the plant on the question of organization." 79 Cong. Rec. 7676 (1935). The Court also has
tion, any expansion of the rights of unions and employees to enter the workplace and communicate their message to potential members results in an intrusion on the rights of private employers to have control over their property.  

As the result of this difficult clash of policy priorities, the Board and the courts have struggled to develop a coherent policy concerning the "access" question. This article looks at the development of the law in this very contentious area. We argue that while this is certainly a difficult problem, the Court and the Board have made it a much more complex issue than necessary. We argue that there have been two basic flaws in the Court's treatment of the "access problem." First, decision-makers have failed to comprehensively deal with the access problem. Over the years, the courts and the Board have dealt piecemeal with various aspects of this problem without attempting to develop a coherent framework. This disjunction has most recently been illustrated in Court's decisions dealing with the definition of the term "employee" under the Act. Second, the Court, and to some extent the Board, has not analyzed the access issue within the context of today's workplace. The Court has been "stuck" in its understanding of the dynamics of the workplace and of workplace behavior, exhibiting a frame of mind that is more representative of the 1940's and 50's than of today's workplace in its understanding of the dynamics of the workplace and of worker behavior. This article provides a new perspective on the access problem and the Court.

Part II describes and analyzes the development of the law concerning the access problem. We examine the historical development of the law concerning employee access, from the initial distinctions of work time/non-work time, and employee/non-employees, to the recent decisions concerning salting. Part III identifies two basic problems in the access problem jurisprudence.

In Part IV, after identifying what we believe is the doctrinal problem in the development of the case law concerning the access problem, attention


8. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.


10. See infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.

11. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.

12. See infra notes 126-45 and accompanying text.

13. See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
turns to the theoretical issue of explaining why the Board and the Court have applied a flawed approach to the access problem. We argue that the problems in this area of law are rooted in a key component of the judicial process in the United States, i.e., the doctrine of *stare decisis*. We argue that the Board and Court's continued reliance on policy judgments they made decades ago are responsible for the complex state of affairs in this area of law. We turn to behavioral economics and decision making research to help us frame this problem. We find some partial answers in the "escalation of commitment" perspective. In Part V, we comprehensively analyze the access problem within an escalation of commitment framework.

In Parts VI and VII we move back from the theoretical discussion to a more doctrinal discussion. Our focus here is to identify possible solutions to the access problem. We find an unlikely ally in our quest: the Supreme Court. In a number of decisions over the last ten years, culminating with the high-profile decision in *Casey v. Planned Parenthood*, the Court has developed an approach to *stare decisis* which maintains the reliance on precedent while at the same time avoiding the decision-making flaws examined by the escalation of commitment research. Using this model, we provide a road map to resolve the access problem. In Part VII we identify the major components of a comprehensive model of reform which combines both the lessons of *Planned Parenthood* on precedent and the lessons of more than sixty years of industrial relations in the United States. Our proposed reform looks at multiple aspects of the access problem. We propose the outlawing of salting in a manner similar to that advanced in a recent congressional proposal. Similarly, we suggest limits on unions visiting employees at their homes, in recognition of the need to protect employees’ privacy interests. To balance the negative effects that these two proposals are likely to have on the ability of unions to organize new employees, we also propose a number of other reforms. We recommend that Congress reconsider expanding both the rights of unions under the *Excelsior* list doctrine, as well as the rights currently afforded to off-duty employees regarding organizing activities. We also propose overruling the *Lechmere* decision, at least with respect to "quasi-public" employer property such as retail store parking lots. In Part VIII we will summarize our
arguments and conclude. We argue that our proposals for reform provides a vehicle for constructive discussions in this important area.

II. THE ACCESS PROBLEM

A. "In The Beginning": Republic Aviation, Babcock and NuTone

The rules governing labor organizing at the workplace are fraught with an inherent tension between the rights of employees to “form, join, or assist labor organizations” (under section 7 of the Act) and the rights of employers as property owners and managers. One of the key early cases addressing this conflict is the United States Supreme Court’s 1945 decision in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB. Republic Aviation drew a sharp distinction between workplace organizing during work time as opposed to non-work time. The Court found non-solicitation rules to be presumptively valid when applied to work time, while such rules were found to be presumptively invalid when applied to non-work time.

In Republic Aviation, the Court did not distinguish between employee organizers and non-employee organizers. The Board subsequently afforded both groups broad freedom to organize at the workplace during nonworking hours. However, eleven years later in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., the Court sharply reversed the Board differentiating between the workplace organizing rights of employees and non-employee or outside union organizers.

The Court in Babcock held that employers were free to deny access to their property and the workplace to outside, non-employee union organizers so long as “reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels of communication” would enable the union to reach employees with its message. The Court in Babcock emphasized that a large percentage of the company’s employees lived in a nearby small town. As a result those employees were reasonably accessible to the union at their homes and through other means, thus obviating the need for union access to employer property.

Republic Aviation and Babcock mean employers can develop general rules prohibiting on-site solicitation by outside union organizers, and any union solicitation during working time. These decisions do not address,
however, the question of how these rights might be impacted by an employer’s decision to wage a vigorous campaign against a union at the worksite during working time. This question has arisen most frequently in the context of an employer’s decision to give a “captive audience” speech—i.e., an anti-union speech given to all gathered employees at the workplace during working time. Various observers have characterized such speeches as perhaps the most potent legal weapon in an employer’s anti-union arsenal.31

For this and related reasons, the Board has at times in the past found such “captive audience” speeches to violate the Act32 or required employers who choose to make such speeches to give the union the opportunity to come onto company premises to reply.33 Later Board cases, though, have denied unions any workplace reply to employer speeches of this kind,34 and this latter approach was affirmed by the Court in its 1958 decision in NLRB v. United Steelworkers (NuTone).35 In NuTone, the Court held that an employer can lawfully enforce a workplace no-solicitation rule against unions while at the same time “violating” this policy by engaging in anti-union solicitation at times and places prohibited by the rule.36 The Court noted that under the Act, unions have other available avenues of communication, and they are not “entitled to use a medium of communication simply because the employer is using it.”37 Significantly, Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the Court in NuTone, noted that employers were not free to implement rules in this manner where a substantial “imbalance in the opportunities for organizational communication” exists.38

B. The “Home Visits” Doctrine

In the late 1950s, apparently responding to several of the Court’s decisions limiting union organizational opportunities, developed its “home visits” doctrine. Under this doctrine, unions would continue to legally visit employees at their homes. Employers are prohibited from engaging in this method of campaigning.

The Board’s differentiation between unions and employers in this regard rests on two prongs. First, the Board has found employer campaign

32. See, e.g., Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 804-05 (1946), enforced, 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
34. See, e.g., Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
36. Id. at 358, 364.
37. Id. at 364.
38. Id. at 362.
visits to employee homes to be per se coercive. The Board stated that unions lack the employer’s “control over tenure of employment and working conditions” of the kind which imparts the coercive effect to systematic individual interviews.

Second, and far more significantly, the Board has also held that unions should be allowed to visit employee homes while employers are not so permitted in order to offset the lack of union access to employees at the workplace and in other contexts. It is this latter prong concerning the need for union home visits to offset employer organizational advantages which has over time emerged as the major underlying theme of the “home visits” doctrine.

C. Excelsior/General Electric

The notion of union home visits as an “organizational counterbalance” to employer advantages in reaching employees at the workplace was further solidified by the Board in its famous 1966 holdings in the companion cases of Excelsior Underwear, Inc. and General Electric Co. In General Electric, unions sought greater access to employees at the worksite, particularly the ability to respond directly to employer “captive audience” speeches on company premises during paid time. In Excelsior, refusing unions workplace access, the Board held that unions should be provided with a list of names and addresses for all employees in the given election unit within seven days of a representation election.

The Excelsior decision was clearly intended to facilitate the ability of unions to contact employees at home, thereby offsetting employer organizational advantages at the workplace. Yet the question remains whether the ability to engage in home visits really offsets employer communication advantages at the workplace. In General Electric, the Board ruled that broader union organizational access issues should be deferred “until after the effects of Excelsior become known.” Yet, it is now over thirty years since these cases were decided, and the Board has never squarely reconsidered this issue.

41. Id. at 133.
42. See generally Bierman, supra note 25.
44. 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966).
45. See id. at 1250.
46. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239-40.
47. See id. at 1246 n.27.
D. Proposed Labor Law Reform Act of 1977-78

Congress did attempt to step into the breach left by the Excelsior and General Electric cases in the proposed Labor Law Reform Act of 1977-78. They introduced legislation which contained various proposals designed to broaden union organizational access to employees. Among these proposals was legislation which would have essentially overturned the Court's decision in NuTone and provided outside union organizers with the opportunity to respond at the worksite to all employer workplace anti-union campaigning, as well as language permitting union workplace replies to employer “captive audience” speeches. In tandem with these legislative proposals calling for increased union access to employees, Republican members of the House of Representatives offered an amendment to overrule the Board's home visits doctrine and allow employers to campaign by visiting employees at their homes. Some House Democrats chastised this proposal as the “trick or treat” amendment, while other members of Congress questioned whether either unions or employers should be permitted to campaign by visiting employees at their homes. Ultimately, the proposed “home visits” amendment was tabled, and the legislation died on June 22, 1978 when Senate Democrats failed to break a filibuster by Senate Republicans.

E. Lechmere

While the successful Senate filibuster put a temporary end to the discussion of union access in Congress, the issue surfaced once again before the Court in the 1992 case of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB. In Lechmere, a union sought to organize employees of a large Connecticut retail store located in a “strip” shopping center surrounded by a parking lot co-owned by the shopping center owner and the store. When the union's initial efforts to reach employees by way of ads in the local newspaper proved unsuccessful, non-employee union organizers began passing out handbills in the store parking lot. Lechmere's manager and security personnel told the union


50. See Bierman, supra note 25 at 20-22.

51. See id.

52. See id.

53. See id. at 22-23

54. Id.

55. See id. at 23.

56. See id.

57. See id. at 22; see also Penn Comment, supra note 31, at 795.


59. See id. at 529.

60. See id.
organizers they were trespassing on private property, relegating them to a grassy strip of public property between the parking lot and an adjoining four lane public highway. From this grassy strip, the union organizers passed out handbills and recorded license plate numbers of cars parked in the employee parking area of the Lechmere parking lot. The union apparently had a "mole" at the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles who gave them the names and addresses of the individuals who owned these cars. The union was ultimately able to obtain the valid names and addresses of about twenty percent of the employees it was trying to organize and to send them mailings, call some on the phone, and make a few home visits.

Ultimately, however, these organizing efforts failed and the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, alleging that Lechmere’s refusal to allow it to organize in its parking lot violated the union’s section 7 rights. The Board upheld the union’s complaint, applying a “balancing test” which weighed the impairment of section 7 rights against the impairment of employer property rights. The Board found that denying the union access to the parking lot would seriously impair section 7 rights because the union’s alternative organizing methods were “ineffective,” “expensive,” and “unsafe.” The Board also found that granting such union access did not substantially impair the company’s property rights since the Lechmere parking lot was “essentially open to the public,” and the union’s distribution of leaflets was “unobtrusive.” On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the Board’s opinion.

The Court reversed. The opinion represented a very strong reaffirmation of its 1956 holding in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., and Babcock’s sharp distinction between the access rights of employees (who have broad access) and non-employee/outside union organizers (who can generally be denied all access to employer property). Under Babcock, non-employee union organizers are denied all access to employer property, except in the case where employees are completely inaccessible through “usual channels.” In Lechmere, the Court interpreted this exception to be an extremely narrow one, applying only to the “rare
where employees live at a mining or logging camp or a mountain resort hotel and thus absolutely cannot be reached by the union unless union organizers come onto company property. In the instant case, although employees lived in a large metropolitan area (greater Hartford, Connecticut), they were not deemed completely "inaccessible." Indeed, the Court cited the union's ultimate success in reaching a substantial percentage of them "via mailings, phone calls and home visits" as well as other methods. Consequently, Lechmere could legally bar the non-employee union organizers from its parking lot and other property.

F. "Salting"

Frustrated by Lechmere in attempting to expand their organizing efforts, unions began looking for solutions. The Lechmere decision essentially prevents non-employee union organizers from reaching employees at the workplace. But what if union organizers apply for jobs at and "hire into" targeted workplaces? These union organizers would then be "employees" and, consistent with the Court's holding in the Republic Aviation case, would have broad rights to organize fellow employees at the job site during non-working time.

Salting is among the most controversial current issues in the field of employment law. The United States Chamber of Commerce recently surveyed readers of its national magazine and found that salting was the employment law issue they most wanted Congress to reform. On March 26, 1998, by a vote of 202 - 200, the United States House of Representatives passed legislation outlawing salting in small businesses. President Clinton, however, has threatened to veto this legislation. This legislative attention has been sparked, in part, by the Court's 1995 decision on the topic in NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc. The issue also has begun commanding considerable attention in the scholarly community.

72. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537.
73. See id. at 539.
74. Id. at 539-40.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 541.
78. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Salting the Contractors' Labor Force, 15 J. LAB. RES. 309 (1994); Michael H. Gottesman, Union Summer: A Reawakened Interest in the Law of Labor?, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 285; Susan E. Howe, Comment, To Be or Not To Be An Employee: That Is the
As various observers predicted, Lechmere has led to a sharp increase in such union "hiring into" or salting of targeted workplaces. Employers have responded to this activity either by refusing to hire or by firing individuals to the extent said employers become aware that these individuals are paid union organizers trying to "salt" their workplace and workforce. The Board, however, has viewed employee organizers, even if they are on a union payroll, as "employees" entitled to the full protection of the Act, including its prohibition of employer discrimination against employees on the basis of "union activity." Some federal courts of appeals, though, refused to uphold the Board's holdings in this regard, instead finding that salter's divided loyalties left them without protection under the Act. In 1995, the Court addressed the issue in the case of NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.

G. Union Access and Town & Country

1. Overview

Traditionally, non-employee union organizers have been prohibited from campaigning on employer premises, even when the employers have used their premises to actively campaign against unions. The Lechmere decision strongly reaffirms this proposition, extending the ban on union access to "quasi-public" property owned by employers, e.g., retail store parking lots generally open to the public.

To offset these access prohibitions, unions are afforded the opportunity to visit employees at their homes, while such visits by employers are prohibited. The Court has also specifically upheld the right of unions to obtain lists of employee names and addresses once a Board representation election has been scheduled, in order to facilitate union home visits and other

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84. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 1, at 321 n. 109. See also Bierman & Gely, supra note 83, at 310.


86. See Hearing on Oversight of the National Labor Relations Board: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. at 75-79, 171.


88. See e.g., Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F. 3d 625 (8th Cir. 1994); Ultra Systems Western Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F. 3d 251 (4th Cir. 1994).

outside-of-work contact with employees. Finally, unions have started getting around the access bans facing non-employee union organizers by getting union organizers to apply for and obtain jobs at given worksites. By "hiring into" these workplaces, these "salters" then officially become "employees," and are afforded broad rights to organize fellow employees at the workplace. Salting thus allows union organizers to achieve through the "backdoor" what *Lechmere* prohibits them from obtaining through the "front door."\(^{91}\) 

In its *Town & Country* decision, the Court resolved the conflict between the Board and some of federal appeals courts regarding whether "salters" can be deemed "employees" entitled to the protection of the Act.\(^{92}\) The Court agreed with the Board that "salters" are indeed "employees" under the Act.\(^{93}\) The Court noted that the Board's interpretation of the term "employee" in this regard was consistent with the "broad language" of the statute, and that it generally accords the Board considerable leeway in interpreting the Act.\(^{94}\) The Court expressly rejected the notion that "salters" should not be protected under the Act because of potential disloyalty.\(^{95}\) 

The Court's decision in *Town & Country* is thus a quite narrow one, focusing solely on the definition of "employee" under the Act. The Court cited *Lechmere* only once, simply noting that employers "may as a rule limit the access of nonemployee union organizers to company property."\(^{96}\) The Court submitted that *Lechmere* and *Town & Country* would not conflict if workers took a "Trojan horse"\(^{97}\) approach. As an observer put it, the *Town & Country* decision was "somewhat surprising after *Lechmere.*"\(^{98}\)

2. Employer Privacy and Property Rights

The Court's decision in *Town & Country* makes sense from the perspective of an overall "balancing" of union/management organizational rights. *Lechmere* severely restricted union organizing rights in considerable measure, relegating unions to making home visits and otherwise contacting employees at their homes.\(^{99}\) As examined below,\(^{100}\) the home visits ap-

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91. See Letter From Douglas E. Witte, Counsel for Town & Country Electric, Inc. to Leonard Bierman, Professor, Texas A&M University (February 20, 1995) (on file with Texas A&M University).
93. *Id.* at 87.
94. *Id.* at 90-91.
95. See *id.* at 95-96.
96. *Id.* at 97.
100. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
approach is a difficult one for unions, and may sometimes intrude on employee privacy rights. Indeed, two years after Lechmere, in Department of Defense v. FLRA (DOD) the Court ruled that federal employee unions were not entitled to listings of employee addresses on employee privacy grounds. While decided under another statute and not applicable to private sector employees, the decision raises an interesting challenge to the Court's rationale in Lechmere. The Court noted, for example, that "many people simply do not want to be disturbed at home by work-related matters" and that it was "reluctant to disparage the privacy of the home which is accorded special consideration" under our laws. If Lechmere allowed unions to make home visits, and if, according to DOD, unwanted home visits are a bad thing, then salting is one of the remaining alternative ways for unions to organize. The problem with salting is its high cost and limited availability.

Arguably, salting burdens employer privacy and property rights. During the early years of the Act, employers got employees "hired into" positions in unions to collect information as spies or "moles." This was held to be spying and industrial espionage, and outlawed under the Act. While there are clear differences between "industrial espionage" aimed at union prevention and salting aimed at union organization, salting raises some of the same privacy problems. For instance, both industrial spies and salt-

103. DOD, 510 U.S. at 502-03.
104. Id. at 501. Interestingly, Justice Thomas authored both the Lechmere and Department of Defense opinions. In DOD, Justice Thomas appeared to have been substantially impressed by the privacy concerns of the employees ("... it is clear that [the employees] have some nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure, and in avoiding the influx of union-related mail, and, perhaps, union-related telephone calls or visits, that would follow disclosure.") DOD, 510 U.S. at 501. This concern over employees' privacy rights is curious for at least two reasons. First, Justice Thomas recognized that the Court's decision created a situation under which public sector federal unions were being deprived of information to which their private sector counterparts were presumptively entitled. As Justice Ginsburg observed in her concurring opinion, this result is almost certainly contrary to any reasonable congressional intent. See id. at 506 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Second, while Justice Thomas appeared to have been substantially concerned with the privacy rights of public sector employees in their homes, he evidenced no such concern in Lechmere with respect to private employees. In Lechmere, Justice Thomas pointed particularly to the ability of unions to reach employees at their homes as an alternative to workplace contact. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992). Thus, the concern that was at least one of the reasons that the dissemination of information was denied to the union in DOD was not much of a concern in Lechmere.
106. For example, one aspect of industrial espionage that was particularly damaging to unions, but that does not appear to have a similar counterpart in the salting situation, is the fact that employers' spies could participate in strategic planning by unions and alert the employer in advance. See KennThomas Gagalak, Union Organizing and Staying Organized 27 (1983) (describing the problems industrial espionage creates for unions).
Employers and their advocates argue that the burdens of salting are particularly harsh with respect to smaller employers that don't have the financial resources or the large legal and labor relations staffs to effectively formulate policies and otherwise deal with salting. For example, Gaylor Electric Co., a fairly large electrical contractor in Indiana, reportedly budgets $250,000 a year for legal fees, mainly in opposition to salting decisions by the Board. These charges arise when an employer unlawfully fires, disciplines, or refuses to hire “salters.” The company's president, John Gaylor, contends that the company has not been found liable for any unfair labor practices with regard to taking an adverse employment action against salters. He attributes this to the fact that “I can afford $175,000 in legal fees.” Mr. Gaylor also submits that some smaller non-union contractors have been put out of business because they could not afford the legal fees to fight salting. Given this opposition, it is not surprising that the Chamber of Commerce wants salting reformed and supports legislation outlawing this practice which recently passed the House of Representatives.

H. The Newest Wrinkle: “Salting” and Striker Replacements

The latest chapter in the development of the case law concerning the access problem further illustrates the complexity of this area of the law and the need for a comprehensive approach to its resolution. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB involved probably the two most contentious issues in labor law over the last two decades: the access problem and striker replacements.

Diamond Walnut arose out of an economic strike at a California walnut packing and processing plant. Just about two years after the beginning of the strike, and a few weeks before a representation election to determine if the union would maintain its exclusive representation status, the union notified the employer that four economic strikers wished to return to work unconditionally. The strikers were reinstated and assigned to seasonal positions, one as a packer, and the others cracking and inspecting

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107. For an exhaustive list of eleven preventative steps employees should take in dealing with salting, see Miscimarra & Altschul, supra note 83, at 84-87.
108. See Hess, supra note 85, at 50-51.
109. Id. at 51.
110. See id.
111. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
113. 113 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
114. See id. at 1261.
115. The union had lost an earlier election, but after objections, the Board ordered a rerun election.
116. See id.
walnuts. Two of the returning strikers had, however, previously held preferable positions. Nevertheless, the employer refused to hire them back to their regular positions, raising concerns about employee safety and possible sabotage. During the following weeks, the reinstated strikers campaigned for the union and monitored the activities of the employer, reporting to the union attorney after each shift. Following the election, which the union lost, the returning strikers submitted letters of resignation and returned to the picket line. The union then filed a complaint with the Board, arguing that the employer had violated sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act by unlawfully discriminating against the returning strikers. The complaint alleged that because of the employees’ protected activity, the employer declined to put them in certain available seasonal positions for which they were qualified, and which were preferable to the positions in which they were actually assigned.

The key issue before the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was whether the employer had a “legitimate and substantial” business justification for its decision to assign the returning strikers to “non-sensitive” positions. In its initial disposition of the case, the court examined the reasoning behind the job placement of the returning strikers, noting the two concerns the employer had advanced for its decision. First, the employer had argued that the returning strikers represented a high risk of unrest, due to the fact that earlier in the strike violence had erupted between the strikers and the replacements. Second, the court recognized the employer’s fear that returning strikers could engage in sabotage, product tampering, and otherwise disrupt the company’s operations. The court accepted these two concerns, concluding that the employer had established substantial and legitimate business justifications for its “seasonal” placement of the returning strikers.

In an en banc proceeding, however, the full D.C. Circuit recently vacated the three judge panel’s initial judgment. The full court considered the case of the two particular strikers involved independently. With respect to one of the returning strikers, the court found that a generalized fear of violence or sabotage fails to constitute a legitimate concern. The court noted that there will be some risk of sabotage or violence anytime a striker returns to work while a strike is ongoing. Citing the Supreme Court’s’s decision in Town & Country, the court noted that if an employee in such a situation

117. See id. at 1262.
118. See Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 80 F. 3d 485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
119. 113 F.3d at 1262.
120. Id. at 1263.
121. 80 F. 3d 485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
122. See id.
123. See id. at 492.
engaged in sabotage, the employer would likely find out and could then take disciplinary action.\textsuperscript{124}

With respect to the other returning striker, the court found that the employer had legitimate business reasons for assigning him to a "non-sensitive" position. The \textit{en banc} court noted that the position that this second employee was seeking was that of quality control assistant. In that position, the court concluded she would have had a special opportunity to commit sabotage with little risk of detention. Because the sabotage could be committed with little risk of discovery, argued the court, the remedies contemplated in \textit{Town & Country} would be inadequate, and thus it was proper for the employer to take preemptive action against this particular employee.\textsuperscript{125}

Thus, employers are not able to discriminate against known "salters" absent very strong justifications. Where jobs exist, and organizers might be hired, salting affords unions opportunities for workplace access, even in the context of reinstated economic strikers.

III.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH?

A. Overview

The review of the case law concerning the access issue, and of the various legislative efforts to deal with this issue, illustrates two basic flaws. First, there has been very little effort to provide a framework that comprehensively relates the various aspects of the access problem. Second, the Court has been particularly reluctant to reevaluate its prior decisions in the access area in light of changes in the economic and social aspects of the employment relationship that have taken place over the last forty-plus years. In this section, we first discuss the two basic flaws that we see in the approach the Court has developed to deal with the access problem. We then introduce a theoretical framework to understand and resolve the problems we believe afflict the law concerning workplace access.

B. The Basic Problem

1. Piecemeal Approach

Criticizing the Court for a piecemeal approach to solving the access problem is somewhat unfair, in that the Court, as well as any other adjudicatory body, is constrained by the cases that are brought to its attention.\textsuperscript{126}
Both the facts of a case as well as the issues that the parties seek to litigate are to some extent imposed on the Court. These constraints make it difficult for the Court in every case to make comprehensive policy statements that are both consistent with prior rationales and responsive to the litigants’ concerns. Our criticism, however, is of a different kind. Our concern is that the Court and the Board have failed to recognize how the different parts of the puzzle fit together. This failure has been particularly pronounced in more recent decisions, such as those involving the salting issue. As discussed above, the focus of the Court in its Town & Country decision was quite narrow. The Court made only one reference to Lechmere, recognizing that a possible inconsistency existed between the two cases. The Court, however, made no effort to explore an issue that was very ripe for analysis — the role of salting within the access problem debate. Why are unions engaging in what appears to be a fairly expensive organizing strategy? By allowing salters to enter the workplace, and by protecting those individuals as “employees,” is not the Court undermining the rationale of Babcock, and the sharp employee/non-employee organizational distinction? Moreover, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in NuTone seemed to mandate Court examination of the overall “balance” of organizational opportunity.

2. Failing to Recognize the Changing Context

A second problem with the current approach to the access problem is a failure to consider the issue in the context of the social and economic forces facing workers today. An important aspect of the early access cases de-

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127. See Wasby, supra note 126, at 190-216.
128. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
130. We refer here to the costs, both direct outlays (e.g., paying the “salter”) and the opportunity costs of salting. See Michael D. Lucas, Salting and Other Union Tactics: A Unionist’s Perspective, 18 J. LAB. RES. 55 (1997) (describing the development of “salting”).
133. Various key changes have been identified in the economics, industrial relations, and sociology literature. Among those changes, the following are particularly relevant to the access problem. First, there has been a growth of single-parent and dual-career families and an increase in labor force participation of mothers of young children. See Eileen Appelbaum & Peter Berg, Balancing Work and Family: Evidence from Surveys of Manufacturing Workers, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 115, 115 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1997) (analyzing the factors influencing the choice of companies to provide family-friendly policies). For example, between 1982 and 1993, the number of women in the U.S. civilian labor force increased almost twice as fast as that of men. See Robert Drago, et. al., The Time Crunch and School Teachers, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 123, 123 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1997). Similarly, sixty-seven percent of mother of infants under the age of three were on payrolls in 1991, and dual-earner status is the norm among families with children. See id at 124. These changes have been identified as creating a particularly acute pressure on the balancing of family and work responsibilities. See id. at 125. This suggests that with less time available for family matters, employees are more likely to view the decreasing “family-time” as truly
ceded by the Court, particularly Republic Aviation and Babcock, is the centrality of context in those holdings. In Babcock, for example, the Court strongly considered the fact that employees lived in a nearby small town, and were reasonably accessible to the union outside of the workplace. Similarly, the "home visits" doctrine appears to be based on a model of economic life that suggests that employees live in close proximity to the workplace. Indeed, such demographic patterns provide a rationale for the "home visits" rule. By granting unions the ability to access the employees at their homes, the Board was in effect balancing out the limiting effects the Babcock rule had earlier imposed on unions. The "home visits" doctrine only makes sense if such demographic patterns are controlling. However, if employees are scattered over a wide geographic area, allowing access to employees' homes hardly compensates for the denial of access to the workplace. Thus, whether the context has changed has great bearing on access issues.

In Lechmere, by contrast, the Court flatly refused to consider the present day context in which the access question arose. The Court's refusal to consider the changing context in which union organizing takes place today is particularly troublesome given the fact that before Lechmere the Board had dealt with the access problem in a manner that showed considerable recognition of these changing contexts.

Two Board cases — Fairmont Hotel and Jean Country — illustrate this approach. Devising a balancing test for access questions, the Board in Fairmont specifically noted that an analysis of the section 7 rights of employees was more complicated than an analysis of private property rights. Analyzing private property rights requires the Board look at factors such as the use to which the property in question was put, restrictions on public access to the property, and the size and location of the property. On
the other hand, analysis of section 7 rights requires a more comprehensive analysis. This analysis should include an assessment of the following factors: the nature of the right asserted; the purpose of the exercise of section 7 rights; the situs; the intended audience; the relationship of the situs to the target of the section 7 activity; and the manner in which the section 7 rights were asserted. While the Board in Fairmont specifically discarded the consideration of alternative means of communication as part of this initial balancing test, its description of the balancing test clearly indicates a need to look at the context in which the access question is presented.

The Board broadened its consideration of the present-day context of union organizing in Jean Country, making it patently clear that the changing context matters. In Jean Country, the Board considered whether it was a violation of NLRA section 8(a)(1) for the owner of a shopping mall to deny access to non-employee union organizers who were picketing a non-union clothing store. The Board's decision in Jean Country emphasized the importance of "balancing" employer property rights and the section 7 rights of unions and individual employees. The Board then expanded on Fairmont by specifically including the "availability of reasonable alternative means" factor as part of the initial balancing test. This requires the Board to look at the demographic and living patterns of the intended audience of a union's message. In fact, following Jean Country, and until the Court decision in Lechmere, the Board and the various courts of appeals considering the issue engaged in comprehensive assessment of the availability of reasonable means for unions to reach their intended audiences.

IV. WHO OR WHAT IS TO BLAME?

The two flaws in the development of the law concerning the access issue we identified in Part III raise serious concerns about the manner in which courts decide cases. Why did the Court overlook the changing industrial relations environment in which union organizing occurs, rendering its access analysis myopic? Are there any structural or procedural decision-making obstacles that caused these deficiencies? In the next section, we identify what we believe to be the potential cause of these decision-

140. See Fairmont, 282 N.L.R.B. at 142.
141. See Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 11.
142. Id. at 12-14.
143. See Collyer, supra note 137, at 843-44.
144. See id.
145. See Emery Realty Inc. v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 1259 (1988) (enforcing Board's order requiring owner of building complex to allow nonemployee union representatives to distribute union handbills to hotel employees on owner's property); Laborers' Local Union No. 204 v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 715 (1990) (affirming Board's finding that employer had not violated the Act by denying access to nonemployee handbillers engaged in an area standards picketing).
146. See supra notes 126-145 and accompanying text.
making problems. We then briefly sketch the parameters of a theoretical framework that we believe is useful in understanding these problems.147

A. The Culprit: Stare Decisis and Precedent

One of the most basic principles of common law legal systems in general and the American judicial system in particular is the notion that courts ordinarily should follow precedent.148 Under stare decisis, courts adhere to precedent in deciding cases.149 This adherence has been justified on various grounds, ranging from issues of efficiency, limiting judicial power, and resource allocation, to rationales based on equity and basic notions of fairness.150

Supporters of precedent have argued, for example, that given the limited resources available to the judiciary, and given that to reconsider each case “from scratch” would place undue burdens on these limited resources, the doctrine of stare decisis promotes judicial efficiency.151 Others have argued that the use of precedent ensures that similarly-situated litigants will be treated equally over time, and allows individuals to plan their affairs by knowing the future legal consequences of their actions.152

Opponents of stare decisis have attacked the doctrine on various grounds. Critics of precedent have argued that none of these justifications are compelling enough to justify the adherence to precedent, and that the goals of equity, efficiency, and consistency can be achieved through less draconian principles. Opponents also point out that there are various costs associated with adherence to precedent. These costs include, for example, diminished flexibility and adaptability153 as well as inefficient decision-

151. See id. Justice Cardozo argued that “the labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.” BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1925).
152. See Maltz, supra note 150, at 368.
153. See id.
making. Opponents of *stare decisis* argue that these costs clearly outweigh the alleged social benefits of the doctrine.

Arguing the merits of the use of precedent is beyond the scope of this Article. The extent of our argument is that regardless of whether *stare decisis* is or is not a "good" idea, the Court’s reliance on precedent helps us understand the two flaws we identified in Part III concerning the case law development of the access problem (i.e., a piecemeal approach by the Court and the Board, and a failure to recognize the changing context of industrial relations). Before we develop that argument, however, we provide a brief sketch of a theoretical framework that may be applied to understand our argument that reliance on the use of precedent is in part responsible for the current state of the law in this area.

**B. Escalation of Commitment**

Researchers in the decision-making sciences have for a long time identified a particular flaw in the way individuals make decisions. This "escalation of commitment" problem parallels our argument regarding the use of *stare decisis*. Escalation of commitment refers to the tendency for decision makers to increase their commitment to what objectively appear to be failing courses of action. Escalation situations occur both at the individual as well as at the organizational level. Common examples of escalation situations at the individual level include a decision to wait for a bus for a period of time substantially longer than it would have taken to walk to a destination, and decisions to put additional money into fixing a broken car. At the organizational level, situations involving decisions to open new plants, start new projects, and enter new markets, are all potential examples of the problem of escalation of commitment.

What makes these situations fit the escalation of commitment prototype is the inability of individuals to reach a decision under the rational model of decision-making. Under one rational model theory, a decision-

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154. "If the best solution to today's case is identical to the best solution for tomorrow's different but assimilable facts, then there is no problem. But if what is best for today's situation might not be best for a different (but likely to be assimilated) situation, then the need to consider the future as well as the present will result in at least some immediately suboptimal decisions." Schauer, *supra* note 149, at 589.

155. See id. at 368-72. See also Pierce, *supra* note 149, at 2237-48.

156. See *supra* notes 126-145 and accompanying text.


maker should make decisions based on the comparison of marginal quantities. That is, the decision-maker should only consider the future costs and benefits of making a given choice. Under this particular rational model, any previous losses or expenses should not be considered, as they do not affect the comparison of marginal quantities.

At the center of the escalation of commitment problem is the presence of sunk costs. Sunk costs are to costs that have been incurred and that are beyond recovery at the point in time when the decision is made. That is, sunk costs may be conceptualized as a payment that was made in response to an earlier decision. The payment could have been in the form of money, but also in the form of time or effort. Sunk costs are by definition constant and thus should not enter into decisions whether or not to continue a previously chosen course of action. Once made, sunk costs should not influence subsequent decisions.

Sunk costs arise in situations in which over time there are streams of anticipated costs and revenues, that is, in multiple-decision or multiple time-period situations. If the realization of costs and revenues occur at a single decision point, there can be no sunk costs. Multiple time-period decisions have been characterized in the escalation literature as involving four steps. First, decision-makers make initial determinations concerning allocation of resources, with the anticipation of attaining some goal. Second, decision-makers receive some negative feedback, either signaling that they are engaged in a failing venture or that at least they have not yet attained their goals. Third, the decision whether to continue the initial course of action is taken under conditions of uncertainty with respect to whether or not committing more resources would bring about the desired result. Finally, and very importantly, the decision-makers have a choice in deciding whether to continue or withdraw from their initial course of action. In sequential deci-

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163. See id. at 402.

164. See ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 11-14, 231-32 (1991) (discussing the sunk costs effect as a pitfall to rational decision-making).

165. See Howard Garland & Stephanie Newport, Effects of Absolute and Relative Sunk Costs on the Decision to Persist with a Course of Action, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 55 (1991) (showing that relative rather than absolute magnitude sunk costs have a significant impact on subjects' reported likelihood of escalation commitment).

166. See id. at 56.

167. See Kogut, supra note 161.

sions, individuals often fail to disregard sunk costs, thereby engaging in escalation of commitment.169

C. Behavioral Manifestations of Escalation of Commitment Situations

The effect of escalation of commitment is the continued adherence to a prior decision on the grounds that changing a previously chosen course of action will result in a loss of prior expenditures. This insistence continues despite the fact that the decision-maker receives feedback indicating that the initial decision resulted in some unanticipated outcome. This decision-making process is typically behaviorally manifested in two ways: failure to account for all available information, and the tendency to decide issues based on partial information. First, individuals engaged in escalation fail to consider all the information available to them when making decisions. In particular, decision-makers tend to ignore information that suggests that the conditions under which the initial decision was made have changed. In their analysis of the Long Island, New York Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, Professors Ross and Staw provide multiple examples of how the executives at the Long Island Lighting Company ignored detailed information regarding new cost projections and projected electric demand needs.170 This behavior resulted in their involvement in the project way beyond the point when it would have been rational to quit.171

A second behavioral manifestation of escalation of commitment involves the tendency of the decision-maker to compartmentalize particular aspects of a decision, without making an attempt to analyze the “big picture.” For example, a major tenet of rational decision-making theory is that wealth is fungible.172 An implication of the fungibility concept is that what should matter to individuals are changes in total wealth, not changes in a particular “account” of their total wealth portfolio (e.g., housing, food, education accounts). Decision-making researchers have found consistently,

169. See Conlon & Garland, supra note 162. To see the relationship between sunk costs and the escalation problem, consider the following often-used thought experiment. Imagine you have just spent $200 on a pair of dress shoes, finding out shortly after getting home that they are painfully tight. Even after being broken in, the shoes continue to cause major discomfort. Should you continue wearing the shoes, or should you give them away? What would your response be if you had not paid for the shoes, but instead had gotten them as a gift? The choice under the rational response model will be to compare the marginal costs and benefits of continuing wearing the shoes, without any attention being given to the initial expenditure. However, experimental data confirms that individuals are more likely to choose to continue wearing the shoes when they have paid for them, as opposed to situations in which the shoes were a gift. Thus, the escalation problem is closely related to the tendency of individuals to consider sunk costs in choices about future behavior. See Frank, supra note 164, at 231-32.


171. Shoreham’s cost, estimated to be $75 million when the project was announced in 1966, rose over the next 23 years to a total of over $5 billion. The project was finally abandoned without ever having begun operations. See id. at 701.

172. See Frank, supra note 164, at 227-28.
however, that individuals are likely to make decisions that can only be explained by reference to changes in individual accounts, not in total wealth.\textsuperscript{173} Making decisions based on changes in the "balance" of a particular account is akin to making decisions based on partial aspects of the decision, not on the overall gamut of issues involved in the particular choice.

The two types of behaviors that are observed in individuals that engage in escalation of commitment situations match the two flaws that we have identified as existing in the development of case law on the access problem. The Court's failure to recognize the changing context surrounding the access issue is a behavior similar to that of participants in decision-making research who consistently ignore information that tends to contradict their prior assumptions. Similarly, the Court's reluctance to comprehensively deal with the "access" issue parallels the "mental accounts" explanation for escalating-type behavior. The Court appears to be compartmentalizing the "access" issue into various separate and unrelated dimensions, and thus failing to recognize the interrelationships among these various aspects.

V.
ANALYSIS OF THE ACCESS PROBLEM

A. Overview

In this section we look at the access problem as an escalation of commitment problem. Using this structure, we identify the various aspects of the case law dealing with the access problem that we believe fit the escalation of commitment framework.

Our basic argument can be summarized as follows. An analysis of the case law development concerning union and employee access to the workplace reveals an increasing tendency to decide current disputes on the basis of precedent, and an unwillingness to reconsider the totality of arguments advanced on both sides of the dispute. Recent decisions, like \textit{Lechmere}, illustrate the Court's insistence on applying standards developed over forty ago, and its unwillingness to reevaluate the impact of the changing context upon those standards which currently are being applied. This reluctance, a classic prototype of the escalation commitment problem, is startling given

\textsuperscript{173} Professors Kahneman and Tversky provide the following experimental demonstration. They tell one group of people to imagine that, having earlier purchased tickets for $10, they arrive at the theater to discover that they have lost them. Individuals in a second group are told to picture themselves arriving at the theater to buy the tickets just to find out that they have lost $10 from their wallets. People in both groups are then asked whether they will continue with their plans to attend the performance. Since losing a $10 ticket has the same effect in terms of total wealth as losing a $10 bill, the rational model will predict that individuals in both groups should make a similar decision. In repeated trials, however, most people in the lost-ticket group say they would not attend the performance, while an overwhelming majority in the lost-bill group say they would. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, \textit{The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice}, 211 SCIENCE 453, 457 (1981).
the overwhelming amount of negative feedback that has followed the Court's initial decisions in this area of labor law.

B. The Initial Decisions: Republic Aviation and Babcock

The Court's decisions in Republic Aviation and Babcock & Wilcox can be characterized as the initial decisions concerning the question of union and employee access to the workplace for organizing efforts. A careful reading of these two decisions reveals language and reasoning characteristic of an initial decision under the escalation paradigm. For instance, in both cases, the Court recognizes that the question they resolve is new and requires assessment of a variety of relevant factors. The Court also recognizes the uncertain nature of its task and, accordingly, defines a goal by which to measure the success of task at hand. In Republic Aviation, for example, the Court states:

The Wagner Act did not undertake the impossible task of specifying in precise and unmistakable language each incident which would constitute an unfair labor practice . . . . Thus a 'rigid scheme of remedies' is avoided and administrative flexibility within appropriate statutory limitations obtained to accomplish the dominant purpose of the legislation. So far as we are here concerned that purpose is the right of employees to organize for mutual aid without employer interference.

In Babcock & Wilcox, the Court similarly shows concern for defining the appropriate goal of the legislation and the role of the Board and reviewing courts in achieving this goal. In the often-quoted passage, the Court says: "Organization rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other."

Thus, in Babcock and Republic Aviation, the Court made clear assessments of the context in which its decisions were being rendered.

C. The Negative Feedback: Increasingly Clumsy Rules and Legislative Efforts

With respect to the access problem, the negative feedback was communicated in two forms. First, the development of the doctrine by the Board and lower courts became increasingly complex, and as recent decisions prove, contradictory. Second, further feedback was received by means of serious legislative attempts to comprehensively amend the Act.

175. For a discussion of the escalation paradigm, see supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
176. See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 798; Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
177. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 798 (citation omitted).
178. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
In the decades following the Republic Aviation and Babcock decisions, the Board and reviewing courts set in motion the process of implementing the rules and goals identified by the Court in these two seminal decisions. As discussed in Part II, the Board first dealt with the issue of captive audience speeches. Originally, the Board found these speeches to be unlawful. Later, it required that employers who chose to make such speeches give the union an opportunity to reply on the employer's property. A few years later, the Board reversed this policy (that is, no longer required that unions be given a chance to reply), and the Court approved this reversal in its NuTone decision. Unlike later decisions in this area, the NuTone decision illustrates the Court's willingness to reconsider the principles and goals established in earlier decisions in the context of the ever-changing industrial relations environment. For example, in the majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter refuses to provide a "mechanical answer" with respect to the union and employee access problem, and instead issues a reminder of the importance of continuing to reevaluate "the way in which the particular controversy arose."

The regulation of the access problem entered a new dimension a few years later with the Board's development of the "home visits" doctrine and the Excelsior lists requirement. The Board devised these two new doctrines in order to compensate for the lack of opportunity of labor organizations to gain access to the workplace. As discussed in Part II, the home visits doctrine allows unions to visit employees in their homes, without a corollary right being afforded to employers. Under the Excelsior list requirement, unions are entitled, within seven days of the Board issuing a representation election order, to obtain from the employer a list of names and addresses for all employees in the given election unit. We have criticized these two doctrines as poor solutions to the access problem. As we discussed in Part III, they are both cumbersome and basically ineffectual in achieving any kind of parity with respect to reaching employees. The home visits doctrine, for instance, may raise issues concerning employees' privacy rights, shifting to some extent to employees the burden of maintaining the Babcock case's balancing of labor/management interests. The related Excelsior list requirement has been criticized as ineffective, and as coming too late in the election process to be very meaningful.

179. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
180. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America (NuTone), 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
181. Id. at 364.
182. Id. at 362. "For us to lay down such a rule of law would show indifference to the responsibilities imposed by the Act primarily on the Board to appraise carefully the interests of both sides of any labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases and in light of the Board's special understanding of these industrial situations." Id. at 362-63.
183. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 24-125 and accompanying text.
During the period between Babcock and Lechmere, the Court and the Board received further feedback with respect to the effect that their rulings on the access problem were having when, in the late 1970s, Congress sought to comprehensively amend the Act. In the context of escalation analysis, the congressional efforts in 1977-1978 are significant in that they sent a message to the Court (and the Board) that continued reliance on the rules and goals established in Republic Aviation and Babcock had become so complex that there was a real need to review the problem anew. The proposed legislation, for example, sought to allow broader access to union organizers, especially when confronted with on-site employer anti-union campaigning. Amendments were also introduced to review the home visits doctrine, by allowing employers to campaign by visiting employees at their homes. While there was, and still is, considerable debate over the soundness of all these measures, the debate that surrounded the congressional effort certainly produced a much needed reassessment of the access problem. Unfortunately, as evidenced by more recent Court decisions, this message did not reach the nation's highest court.

D. Uncertainty: The Quandary of Property Rights and Organizing Rights

Substantively, the access problem balances the property rights of employers and the rights of employees to organize and form labor organizations. As discussed in Part II, the Court had set the judicial goal to be that of accommodating the two “with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.” Almost by definition, this area has inherent uncertainty. Any fine tuning between protecting the private property rights of employers, and the right of employees to organize, will have to be continuously evaluated in the context of the particular circumstances, not only of the particular dispute, but also the general state of industrial relations and the social context in which the dispute arises.

The same rationale which in the late 1950s might have justified the Board’s finding that union visits to employees’ homes were not per se coercive (e.g., small community, minimal privacy invasion) might or might not be present in the late 1990s. Similarly, while in the 1950s it was probably sound to assume that employees lived in fairly close proximity to the workplace, and thus that there were alternative channels for unions to reach employees in the community as well as at their homes, such an assumption might be totally unfounded in the 1990s, in which long commutes are com-

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185. Of course, the timing of the legislative push was also affected by political considerations. With both Congress and the White House under the control of Democrats, labor saw this as a unique opportunity for labor law reform. See Penn Comment, supra note 31, at 755-97.
186. See supra notes 24-125 and accompanying text.
188. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 331-32.
mon to the American worker’s experience. It is this constant change that creates the uncertainty which makes an escalation situation so likely, and which in turn forces the Court to be willing to reassess the rules governing the union and employee access problem.

E. Real Choice: Lechmere and Town & Country

1. Background

In two recent decisions, Lechmere and Town & Country, the Court had the opportunity to reevaluate various aspects of the access problem. Unfortunately, it appears that in Lechmere the Court disregarded this opportunity, choosing instead to decide the case primarily on the rationale and analysis of a forty-plus year-old case\(^1\) and without any serious attempt to analyze the case with an eye on the future impact of the decision.\(^2\) Similarly, in Town & Country, the Court, while willing to consider a broader set of factors in clarifying the meaning of the term “employee” under the Act, did not raise the level of analysis to that necessary to de-escalate the problems created by its prior decisions.

2. Lechmere

The Lechmere decision relied heavily on the Court’s prior 1956 Babcock & Wilcox decision. Almost half of the Court’s opinion is devoted to a very detailed description of the facts of the Babcock decision\(^3\) and of the way Babcock had been interpreted in subsequent, yet marginally related, Court decisions.\(^4\) After this long recanting of Babcock, the Court starts its analysis with the following quote from an earlier decision: “Once we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute’s meaning.”\(^5\)

This quote illustrates the sunk cost character of relying on precedent. The parameters of the Court’s analysis entail a retrospective, rather than a prospective, mode of analysis.

The Court then went on to argue that the Babcock decision provided the necessary tools for deciding the dispute in Lechmere. In particular, the Court noted that under Babcock, the only exception to the rule that non-employee organizers do not have any right to enter the workplace is where

189. See Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 105.
190. As the dissenting opinion of Justice White points out in Lechmere, “... the Court’s decision fails to recognize that Babcock is at odds with the current law of deference to administrative agencies and compounds that error by adopting the substantive approach Babcock applied lock, stock, and barrel.” Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 546 (1992).
191. See id. at 531-35.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 536-37 (quoting Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990)).
"the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them..." The Court then cited as classic examples cases where employees will be beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts situations, like logging camps, mining camps, and mountain resorts. Even if the Court was correct in arguing that Babcock stands for the proposition that only in those situations will access be permitted, it is difficult to argue that such examples are to a large extent characteristic of the 1990s industrial and social context of the dispute the Court faced in Lechmere. The Court appeared to be deciding Lechmere, not only bound by the rule and rationale provided in Babcock, but also on the basis of a contextual view of industrial relations completely inappropriate given the period in which the case arose. Justice White's dissenting opinion captures the essence of this argument:

If the Court in Babcock indicated that nonemployee access to a logging camp would be required, it did not say that only in such situations could nonemployee access be permitted. Nor did Babcock require the Board to ignore the substantial difference between the entirely private parking lot of a secluded manufacturing plant and a shopping center lot which is open to the public without substantial limitation. Nor indeed did Babcock indicate that the Board could not consider the fact that employees' residences are scattered throughout a major metropolitan area; Babcock itself relied on the fact that the employees in that case lived in a compact area which made them easily accessible.

In Lechmere the Court bases its decision on a set of assumptions about industrial relations which is more in tune with the 1950s than with the 1990s. Like decision-makers engaged in escalation situations, the Court fails to consider the nature of the current environment in evaluating whether to follow a previously chosen course of action.

As we discussed earlier, the practical response to Lechmere was, or should have been, clear to the Court. With very few options available, unions post-Lechmere turned to organizing practices like salting, that are cumbersome and potentially more intrusive of both employer's business and property rights than union organizers "trespassing" in a shopping mall's public parking lot.

195. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 539.
196. Id. at 543.
197. The Lechmere decision has also been explained as the product of Justice Thomas' view of the primacy of property rights over the statutory rights created under the Act. See generally Leonard Bierman, Justice Thomas and Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB: A Reply to Professor Robert A. Gorman, 10 Hofstra Lab. L. J. 299 (1992).
198. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
3. Town & Country

Compared to Lechmere, the Town & Country decision\(^\text{199}\) avoids the escalation commitment decision-making process. Unlike the Court in Lechmere, the unanimous Town & Country decision shows a willingness to reevaluate the issue at hand, i.e., whether a worker can be a company’s “employee” within the terms of the Act if, at the same time, a union pays that worker to help organize the company, without giving undue weight to precedent.\(^\text{200}\) The Court, for example, focuses on the purposes of the Act, and discusses how a broad definition of the term “employee” appears to be consistent with achieving Congress’ intent.\(^\text{201}\) The Court also discusses at length the effects which salters could have on the employer’s business operations.\(^\text{202}\)

Thus, given the above escalation analysis, the Court’s decision in Town & Country is a vast improvement over the Lechmere decision. The decision fell short of serving a model of de-escalation, in that it failed to consider the question of the definition of the term “employee” in the broader context of the law concerning union and employee access to the workplace for organizing purposes. Our concern is that it will likely motivate more unions to engage in behavior like salting, which, as previously noted, is costly and may be ineffective.\(^\text{203}\) The access problem requires a comprehensive approach one dealing not only with salting, but also with issues such as non-employee access, home visits, Excelsior lists, and off-duty employee rights.

VI. PLANNED PARENTHOOD AND DE-ESCALATING THE “ACCESS” PROBLEM

A. Overview

Our argument up to this point can be summarized as follows. First, we aver that there are some serious doctrinal problems with the legal rules concerning the access problem. In particular, we argue that an analysis of the access problem case law reveals that courts have been unwilling to evaluate the access problem in light of the changing industrial relations environment,\(^\text{204}\) and that they have failed to deal with the access problem in a

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200. In fact, unlike in Lechmere, there was not much case law, and for that matter, no real precedent on the issue before the Court. This supports our argument that, unhindered by precedent, the Court was able to strike a better balance between the competing interests and make a proper analysis based on a realistic and current view of the situation.
202. See id. at 93-97.
203. See supra notes 77-125 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
We attribute both of these flaws in part to the doctrine of **stare decisis**. Second, we note that these problems are not unique to the judicial decision-making process, but are common to sequential type decision-making. Using the escalation of commitment framework, we identify the underlying aspects of the access problem.

In order to complete our analysis, we now provide a potential solution to the problem we have identified. In this part of the Article, we look, paradoxically, to the Court for guidance. We discuss a model of **stare decisis** which the Court has developed in the last decade. This model, we argue, can be used by the Court to justify abandoning the precedents that have forced it into this “complexity corner.” This contemporary model of **stare decisis** provides support for the argument that the Court should look at the changing industrial relations environment, and that it should attempt to deal comprehensively with the various aspects of the “access” problem. In Part VII we provide the contours of a comprehensive solution to the “access” issue which is consistent with the Court’s guidance on the use of **stare decisis**.

### B. Planned Parenthood and Stare Decisis

Although a unified approach to precedent has been a topic of discussion at the Court for many years, the last ten years have seen increased interest in such an endeavor. Various Justices have attempted to provide some guidance regarding the proper use of **stare decisis** in the context of statutory, constitutional and common law disputes. Unfortunately, given the “spasmodic way” in which the Court has manipulated **stare decisis**, it is not clear whether the Court is serious about its new approach. It is not certain whether it will apply this new approach consistently. Because the new model of **stare decisis** may provide significant guidance with the “access” issue, it warrants closer examination.

The most extensive discussion of **stare decisis** provided by the Court over the last decade took place in the controversial **Planned Parenthood v.**

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205. See supra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 157-73 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 174-202 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 254-318 and accompanying text.
210. See generally Maltz, supra note 150, at 367.
212. See Freed, supra note 211, at 1778.
213. Various commentators have noted how, over time, the doctrine of **stare decisis** has been supported or abandoned as a matter of political expediency. In the 1960s, for example, conservatives facing a liberal Court attacked the inclination of the Court to overrule precedent. By contrast, liberals now facing a conservative Court are quick to criticize it for failing to adhere to precedent. See id. at 1779.
Casey decision. In Planned Parenthood, the Court was confronted with the issue of the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute imposing a number of restrictions on women seeking abortions. As evidenced by the opening sentence of Justice O'Connor’s opinion, a major theme of the decision was to resolve the doubt and confusion concerning a woman’s constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy, which the Court had recognized some 19 years earlier in Roe v. Wade. The Court clarified its position on stare decisis en route to its reaffirmation of the central holding of Roe v. Wade. In Planned Parenthood, stare decisis served as one of Justice O'Connor’s justifications for the Court’s upholding of the core of Roe. Notably, Justice O'Connor’s opinion would provide the basic model of stare decisis used by the Rehnquist Court.

The joint opinion began by pointing out that the obligation to follow precedent is not absolute. The opinion noted the outer limits of the doctrine. On the one hand, efficiency and consistency arguments make precedent indispensable. On the other hand, precedent would seem dispensable when “a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed.” The opinion went on to describe the four “pragmatic considerations” which courts should use to decide when to overrule or reaffirm a prior case: (1) whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; and (4) whether facts have so changed, or come to

215. See id. at 844.
216. “Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.” Id.
218. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 846. According to Justice O’Connor’s decision, the central holding of Roe v. Wade was threefold. First, a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Second, the State has the power to restrict abortions after viability. Finally, the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus. See id. See also John Wallace, Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision of Activism, Passivism, and Politics in Casey, 42 Buff. L. Rev. 187, 209-11 (1994).
220. “With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it.” Id. (citation omitted). “Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.” Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 854-55.
223. See id. at 854.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 855.
be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.  

1. Workability

The first consideration in deciding whether to follow or overrule precedent is whether the rule established in a prior case has proven unworkable. Justice O'Connor's joint opinion appears to define workability in terms of whether the prior rule required courts to undertake tasks outside their realm of competence.  

The joint opinion also cited approvingly the Court's decisions in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority and Swift & Co. v. Wickham. Garcia and Swift define workability not only in terms of judicial competence, but also in terms of the actual effects of the prior ruling. In particular, workability requires an examination of whether the prior ruling has produced inconsistent results in its application and whether the ruling has produced "mischievous consequences" to litigants and courts alike.  

Finally, workability also has been defined in terms of the relationship between the precedent and construction of a statute and other relevant statutes. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, for example, the Court noted that a prior ruling would be found to be unworkable to the extent that it "poses a direct obstacle to the realization of important objectives embodied in other laws."  

2. Reliance

In deciding whether to adhere to a prior ruling, courts should also consider the cost of repudiating the rule to "those who have relied reasonably on the rule's continued application." This second argument is the basic reliance argument normally advanced as a justification for stare decisis.  

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226. See id.

227. In finding that Roe has not proven unworkable, Justice O'Connor noted that while Roe required courts to assess state laws affecting the exercise of the choice to terminate a pregnancy, such determinations were "within judicial competence." See id.


230. In Garcia, for example, the Court pointed out that the application of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), requiring the Court to decide whether a particular governmental function was integral or traditional and thus immune from particular federal regulation, was inconsistent with the principles of federalism. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531 (overturning National League of Cities).


233. Id. at 173.


235. See Maltz, supra note 150, at 368 ("In planning their affairs, it is argued, people should be able to predict the legal consequences of their actions. Such predictability can only be obtained if judges can be expected to follow precedent in making their decisions.").
In *Planned Parenthood*, Justice O'Connor provides a useful summary of the relevant considerations in assessing the reliance factor.

The joint opinion starts its discussion of reliance by pointing out that the reliance argument is to a large extent context-specific. Reliance, according to the joint opinion, will weigh more heavily in the commercial context, i.e., in cases involving property and contract rights, where “advance planning of great precision is most obviously a necessity.” On the other hand, in other contexts, such as cases involving procedural and evidentiary rules, the reliance argument will be of a lesser significance.

The O'Connor opinion goes on to argue that reliance should be broadly defined. Justice O'Connor first conceded that since abortion could be seen as an “unplanned response to the consequence of unplanned activity,” a reliance claim appeared to be fairly weak. Justice O'Connor, however, argued that the reliance argument should be defined more broadly to include consideration not only of “specific instances of sexual activity,” but also the role that *Roe* has played in other areas. In particular, Justice O'Connor pointed out two key developments. First, for over two decades people had organized intimate relationships and made choices that defined their views of themselves and society in reliance on the availability of abortion. Second, the decision in *Roe* and the ability that it provided women to control their reproductive lives had impacted substantially the “ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.” Both of these factors, concluded Justice O'Connor, should be factored in the reliance argument, since they are evidence of the way individuals have ordered their thinking and living around the rule established by *Roe*.

3. **Intervening Developments in the Law**

The decision whether to adhere to precedent will also be affected by the extent to which related developments in the law have either removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision. The court should assess whether later developments have rendered the prior decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies. The focus of the inquiry here is on legal developments related to the precedent case. It is not clear whether “the intervening developments in the law” factor encompasses only the decisional law of the Court, or whether it also...

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240. *Id.*
241. *See id.*
242. *Id.*
244. *See id.*
encompasses decisions by lower courts and or actions by the legislature.245 The Court originally defined intervening developments only in terms of its own decisions.246 However, in its 1995 Hubbard v. United States decision,247 a plurality of the Court defined the intervening developments somewhat more broadly, examining its own and lower court decisions as well as actions of Congress.

4. Changed Facts and Perceptions

In her joint opinion in Planned Parenthood, Justice O’Connor stated that the decision to follow precedent will depend in part on “whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.” This fourth factor appears to require the decision-maker to evaluate two different aspects of the initial decision. First, it requires an evaluation of the factual background supporting the prior ruling. Second, it goes further by permitting the decision-maker to evaluate not only factual changes, but also society’s perceptions of those changes.

With respect to the first element, consideration of changed facts, the decision-maker is asked to inquire about the factual assumptions underlying the prior ruling and decide whether changes in the landscape of potential relevant facts challenge the central holding of the prior ruling.249 The second element is somewhat different in that it allows the decision-maker to inquire not only about factual changes, but about society’s interpretation of those changes. In a case decided just a couple of years before Planned Parenthood, the Court, described this element as follows: “[i]t has sometimes been said that a precedent becomes more vulnerable as it becomes outdated and after being ‘tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare.’”

In short, in deciding whether to follow precedent, courts should look at the factual context in which the prior ruling arose, with a view towards evaluating whether the circumstances have so changed, or have come to be seen so differently, as to justify a refusal to follow the prior ruling.

245. See id. See also Freed, supra note 211, at 1782-90.
249. In Planned Parenthood, for example, while admitting that technological changes in maternal and neonatal healthcare may have changed since the Roe’s decision, Justice O’Connor concluded that those changes did not affect the central ruling in Roe, “that viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.” Id. at 860.
C. Implications from Planned Parenthood

While Planned Parenthood was decided after Lechmere and obviously could not have been cited in the Court’s opinion, it is somewhat puzzling that there is no mention in Lechmere about the Court’s new approach to precedent. Although Planned Parenthood provides the clearest description of this model, the various components of the model had all been discussed in earlier Court decisions. Yet the Court disregarded its own advice, choosing instead to base its Lechmere decision on a rigid adherence to precedent. A persuasive argument can be made that if the Court would have considered Lechmere in the context of its new model of stare decisis, a very different result could have resulted.

Of the four factors that the Planned Parenthood decision proposes should be considered by the Court when deciding whether to follow precedent, three of them support a decision to change the access rules. The workability, intervening developments of the law, and changed facts and perceptions factors are consistent with moving away from Babcock and towards a new approach to the access problem.

As argued earlier, one of the central problems with the law concerning the access problem is the complexity that the initial decisions in Republic Aviation and Babcock have generated. While implementing Babcock is not per se an unworkable task, the Court and the Board quickly recognized that the Babcock decision had significant implications in other areas. In order to compensate for the limited access to the workplace created under Babcock, the Board devised the home visits and Excelsior lists doctrines. As discussed in Part V, these doctrines became increasingly unworkable and ever less effective, and have been criticized as poor solutions to the access problem.

The “intervening developments in the law” factor also supports the argument for abandoning the Babcock approach. In addition to the case law developed since Babcock concerning the home visits doctrine and the Excelsior doctrine, two other recent cases illustrate the application of this factor. The Court’s “salting” decision in Town & Country raises a significant conflict with both Babcock and Lechmere. One of the underlying principles of both Babcock and Lechmere is the ability of employers to keep absolute control over their private property. Town & Country appears to challenge that premise, at least indirectly, by allowing union organizers to achieve through the back door what Lechmere prohibits them from obtaining through the front door. A similar conflict is raised in the Diamond Walnut case decided by the D.C. Circuit, which upheld the ability of unions to

251. See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
engage in salting in the context of striker replacements.\textsuperscript{253} The Court of Appeals holding not only expands the potential implications of salting, but also raises a potential conflict between the law with respect to striker replacements and the law regarding the access problem.

Under the intervening development factor, the court should assess whether later developments have rendered the prior decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies. The focus of the inquiry here is on legal developments related to the precedent case. The recent decisions in \textit{Town \\& Country} and \textit{Diamond Walnut} arguably are beginning to make patently clear the doctrinal conflicts embedded in the current approach to the access issue.

An argument can also be made that the changed facts and perceptions element requires the decision-maker to inquire about the factual assumptions underlying the prior ruling, and decide whether changes in the landscape of potential relevant facts challenge the central holding of the prior ruling. There can be little doubt that the factual assumptions supporting the \textit{Babcock} approach to the access issue have all but vanished in the workplace context of the 1990s. In particular, a key factual consideration in \textit{Babcock} was the understanding that in only a limited number of cases, e.g., mining and logging camps, were employees inaccessible to the reach of labor organizations. Thus, only in those limited instances would it be proper to require employers to allow union organizers access to the workplace. This understanding was based on the assumption that except in unusual cases, employees were likely to live very close by to the workplace and thus be accessible through other efforts. Indeed, the \textit{Babcock} decision discussed the number of employees in that case living within a walking distance of work. Today's living and work patterns challenge that factual assumption, giving the Court another reason to adopt a new approach to the access problem.

\section*{VII.}
\textbf{FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT'S LEAD IN} \textit{PLANNED PARENTHOOD}

\subsection*{A. Background}

If our argument so far is correct, and there are good reasons for the Court to change its approach regarding the access problem, the next step in our analysis is to provide a comprehensive model to lead us out of the current situation. In this section we attempt to provide the contours of a new approach to the problem of union and employee access to the property of employers for organizing purposes. We start by evaluating recently in-

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{253} Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 80 F. 3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1996), \textit{vacated and reh'g en banc granted}, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996).}
roduced legislation dealing with the question of salting. Such legislation, while probably a good first step, falls short of providing a comprehensive solution to the access problem. We then identify various other dimensions of the access problem that need to be addressed either legislatively or judicially for a comprehensive solution to occur in this area of the law.

B. Proposed Legislation

Last year, opponents of salting introduced companion bills in the House of Representatives\(^2\text{54}\) and the Senate\(^2\text{55}\) to outlaw the practice. These bills were entitled the “Truth in Employment Act of 1997.”\(^2\text{56}\) According to one of their sponsors, Republican Congressman Harris Fawell of Illinois, they were designed to “make it clear that an employer is not required to hire any person who seeks a job in order to promote interests unrelated to those of the employer.”\(^2\text{57}\) Congressman Fawell contends that under current laws, employers must choose between “two unpleasant options” — hiring a “salt” who may “disrupt the workplace and file frivolous charges resulting in costly litigation,” or denying the “salt” employment and being sued for discrimination under the Act.\(^2\text{58}\) The proposed legislation would permit employers to deny employment or fire salts while purportedly not infringing “on the rights or protections otherwise accorded employees under the NLRA.”\(^2\text{59}\)

Section 2 of the proposed legislation is based on a number of congressional “findings.” First, it begins with the premise that an “atmosphere of trust and civility in labor-management relationships is essential to a productive workplace and a healthy economy.”\(^2\text{60}\) The legislation asserts that the “tactic of using professional union organizers and agents to infiltrate a targeted employer’s workplace, a practice commonly referred to as salting . . . threatens the balance of rights which is fundamental to our system of collective bargaining.”\(^2\text{61}\)

The legislation insists that salting has “evolved into an aggressive form of harassment not contemplated” when the NLRA was enacted,\(^2\text{62}\) and that “union organizers are seeking employment with nonunion employers not because of a desire to work for such employers” but rather “primarily to organize the employees of such employers or to inflict economic harm.”\(^2\text{63}\)

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255. S. 328, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter “Senate Bill”].
256. See id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. House Bill, supra note 254, and Senate Bill, supra note 255, at § 2(1).
261. House Bill at § 2(2).
262. Id.
263. Id. at § 2(3).
Further, the legislation asserts that employers “should have the right to expect job applicants to be primarily interested in utilizing” their skills “to further the goals of the business of the employer.”264 Toward this end it proposes a specific amendment to section 8(a) of the Act.265 Pursuant to this proposed amendment, nothing in section 8(a) of the Act would be “construed as requiring an employer to employ any person who seeks or has sought employment with the employer in furtherance of other employment or agency status.”266

On February 24, 1998, however, H.R. 758, introduced in 1997, was incorporated into a new House Bill, H.R. 3246,267 introduced by Congressman William Goodling and entitled the “Fairness for Small Business and Employers Act of 1998.” This bill added various other pro-small business NLRA reforms to the truth-in-employment language.268 The House Committee on Education and the Workforce’s report on the bill was sent to the full House on March 18, 1998.269 It passed the House on March 26, 1998 by a count of 202 – 200.270 The legislation was then sent to the Senate, as S. 1981,271 which updated the Truth in Employment Act with the language of the bill which had been passed by the House in 1998.

The language of H.R. 3246 and S. 1981 is identical to the original Truth in Employment Act bills’ language with one exception. While the original bills amend section 8(a) of the Act272 to state that nothing in section 8(a) shall be construed as requiring an employer to hire a person who seeks employment to further the objectives of another organization, the new bill clarifies this provision. Under the new legislation, the issue is whether the job applicant’s “primary purpose” is one of “furthering another employment or agency status.”273 The Committee report for H.R. 3246 spells this out further by stating that a job applicant must have “at least a 50 percent motivation to work for the employer.”274 If a job applicant meets this fifty percent test, the new legislation makes clear that such a “bona fide employee applicant” will be entitled to the full protections of the Act.275

264. Id. at § 2(4).
265. Id. at § 4.
266. Id.
268. Id. Titles II, III and IV (dealing with small business bargaining units, expeditious handling of unfair labor practice complaints, and attorneys fees awards to small businesses that prevail in litigation against the Board).
270. See 144 CONG. REC. H1622 (daily ed. March 26, 1998). See also supra note 81.
274. H.R. REP. NO. 105 – 453, supra note 269, text accompanying notes 6-7 (stating the Committee’s view that if at least 50% of a prospective employee’s intent is not to work for the employer, the employer may legally refuse to hire the person).
In any event, it is the clear intent of this legislation to congressionally outlaw salting. In doing so, Congress would legislatively overrule the Court’s recent decision in *Town & Country*. President Clinton has forcefully vowed to veto such legislation should it pass the House and Senate and reach his desk.

C. Limitations of the Proposed Legislation

We agree with legislative pronouncements that salting “threatens the balance of rights which is fundamental to our system of collective bargaining.” As argued above, salting intrudes on the property and privacy rights of employers. Salting arguably represents an incursion on employees’ rights to run their businesses. Internal labor market analysis would suggest that salting allows unions to behave “opportunistically” vis-à-vis employers. We believe an overturning of *Town & Country* and a direct outlawing of salting would be a positive step by Congress.

The problem, though, is that it represents only a positive first step. Outlawing salting without more creates a strong organizational imbalance in favor of employers. Pursuant to the proposed legislation and *Lechmere*, union organizers would be completely barred from all employer property including quasi-public employer property such as retail store parking lots. Unions would be relegated to reaching employees outside of the workplace, primarily at their homes. Such organizing is both extremely difficult for unions to conduct and intrusive on workers’ non-work lives.

Consequently, while the proposed congressional legislation outlawing salting seems correct in that salting “threatens” the proper “balance of rights” in our collective bargaining system, it seems incorrect in that outlawing salting will “preserve” a proper “balance of rights” among the relevant parties. Taken alone, the proposed legislation helps create a further considerable imbalance of organizational fights against unions. The

276. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
278. House Bill, supra note 254; Senate Bill, supra note 255, at § 2(2).
279. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
280. The ability of unions and employees to behave opportunistically arises from the internal labor market features of the employment relationships. Employers have invested in employees’ training, potentially teaching employees skills somewhat idiosyncratic to the particular employer. In such a context, employees can behave opportunistically in situations in which monitoring of work effort by the employer is less than perfect. See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, *Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics and Negotiations Approach*, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 363 (1995) (applying internal labor market theory to the striker replacements debate).
281. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
282. Among other things, union organizers operating in this context are frequently viewed as being “unauthoritative.” See Mark Barenberg, *Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production*, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 753, 934-35 (1994).
283. See id.
284. House Bill, supra note 254; Senate Bill, supra note 255, at § 2(2).
285. Senate Bill, supra note 255, at § 3(1).
proposed legislation is only tenable as a first step part of a package of comprehensive labor law reform in this area.

D. A Model for Comprehensive Reform

1. Overview

A comprehensive model for reform must focus on legal rules which are the least intrusive on employer and employee privacy and property rights. Moreover, while the Court has stated that there are no "mechanical answers" in the complex area of union organizational access,\(^\text{286}\) former Harvard University President Derek Bok correctly points out that the legal rules in this area of employment law have become far too obfuscated and unclear.\(^\text{287}\) In short, in addition to protecting privacy rights, there is a need for "bright lines" so that parties explicitly know what they can and cannot do. Towards this end, explicitly outlawing salting, along the general lines of the pending congressional legislation,\(^\text{288}\) would be a positive first step. An explicit outlawing of salting would protect employer privacy and property rights and remove the considerable murkiness created by the Court's decision in *Town & Country* regarding how employers are to properly deal with this "Trojan horse" union organizing technique.

2. The "Home Visits" Doctrine

Similarly, the reform package should contain language directly overruling the Board's "home visits" doctrine.\(^\text{289}\) This doctrine is in many ways anachronistic, harkening back to an era when employees all lived in homes near the workplace, and there was only one wage-earner in the family.\(^\text{290}\) Today, employees tend to live in widely dispersed areas\(^\text{291}\) and as Professor Marion Crain has noted, female employees juggling employment, housework and child care may have little desire or opportunity to deal with union issues once they get home.\(^\text{292}\) Moreover, the home visits doctrine represents a strong general invasion of employee rights of privacy, rights the Court recently emphasized in its *DOD* decision.\(^\text{293}\)

\(^{286}\) NLRA v. United Steelworkers (NuTone), 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958).

\(^{287}\) See Derek C. Bok, *The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act*, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 102-03 (1964).

\(^{288}\) See supra notes 254-77 and accompanying text. The 50% or "primary purpose" element of this proposed legislation, though, also seems quite "murky."

\(^{289}\) See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.


\(^{291}\) See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 543 (White, J., dissenting).


\(^{293}\) See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
Finally, it seems a bit disingenuous to argue doctrinally that home visits by employers are "coercive" and "harassing" while such visits by union organizers are not. Certainly, a review of some of the recent literature regarding continued organized crime infestation of some unions might be somewhat persuasive to the contrary. Moreover, people today are generally wary of opening their doors to any strangers. In sum, the Board's home visits doctrine as it currently stands is riddled with problems. Incremental reform of the doctrine proved a significant stumbling block when Congress considered the proposed Labor Law Reform Act in 1977-78. A far better approach is the "bright line" repealing of the doctrine and the outlawing of home visits by both unions and employers. This approach also significantly bolsters protection of employee privacy rights.

3. Extending Excelsior

In the Excelsior case, the Board, as noted above, held that unions be afforded a list of names and addresses for all employees in a given election unit within seven days of the Board's ordering of a representation election in that unit. The problem, though, is that the Board will not order such an election until the union has provided the Board with evidence that at least thirty percent of the employees in the given bargaining unit are interested in being represented by a union. Moreover, most unions, for strategic purposes, do not seek to schedule such elections until at least fifty percent of the employees have expressed interest. Thus, unions simply have no rights to employee lists under Excelsior during the critical early stage of an organizing campaign when they are trying to garner enough support to actually have an election scheduled. Simply put, the rights afforded unions under Excelsior come too late, as many unions never even make it to the point where Excelsior rights are triggered.

This dynamic was well illustrated in the Lechmere case. In that case a representation election had not yet been scheduled triggering union Excelsior rights. Instead, the union was just trying to garner at least a thirty percent showing of interest by unit employees in order to schedule an election. When the employer kicked the union out of the shopping center parking lot, union organizers stood on a public grassy strip near a highway and recorded license plate numbers of cars parked in the employee area of the


295. See generally Estlund, supra note 1, at 331-32.

296. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.

297. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.


Then, the union apparently received the names and addresses of the individuals who owned these cars from a “mole” at the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles. It seems a bit ridiculous to put unions through such “hoops” in order to get employee names and addresses. An offset to the reform package’s removal of union rights to engage in salting or home visits would be the triggering of union *Excelsior* rights at a much earlier stage in the process. One possibility would be to trigger such rights once a union demonstrates a showing of interest from ten percent of the bargaining unit’s employees.

Extending union *Excelsior* rights would not intrude on employer privacy or property rights, and would represent only a relatively mild incursion on employee privacy rights, since unions would not be able to use the name and address lists to make home visits. Unions could, however, use the lists to engage in mailings, place targeted advertising in local media, or perhaps make phone calls to employee homes.

Professor Cynthia Estlund and others have argued, however, that unions need “sustained face-to-face contact with employees” in order to conduct meaningful organizational campaigns, and that union mailings and phone calls are unlikely to be particularly effective. While extending union *Excelsior* rights is clearly not a major counterbalance to the removal of union salting and home visits rights, it does seem to represent a worthwhile first step. Although mailings and phone calls may not be the most effective union organizing tools, they are obviously of some use in union organizing campaigns. Moreover, unions, as illustrated in the *Lechmere* case, appear to be eager to get employee name and address lists early in organizing campaigns.

4. Bolstering Off-Duty Employee Rights

The Board has vacillated over the years with respect to the organizational rights of off-duty employees. At times, it has likened their status to that of “trespassing” nonemployees, although it currently appears to allow union organizational activity by off-duty employees so long as such

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300. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
301. *Id.*
303. See *id.* at 28. Telephone calls to employees homes, while intrusive to privacy, do not seem to rise to the same level as home visits and would thus probably be acceptable. See *id.* at 28 n.252.
304. See Estlund, *supra* note 1, at 331.
306. *Id.*
307. See *GAGALA, supra* note 106, at 167-68.
308. The union in *Lechmere* used the names and addresses it obtained from its “mole” at the Motor Vehicles Department to send mailings, make phone calls, and conduct some home visits. *Lechmere*, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 530 (1992). Under our proposal, the mailings and phone calls would still be permissible, while the home visits would not.
activity is conducted outside "the interior of the plant and other working areas . . . ."\textsuperscript{310} Thus, Professor Robert A. Gorman appears correct in his recent assertion that even after Lechmere, off-duty employees have the right to place a handbill under the windshield wiper of an automobile known to belong to a fellow employee."\textsuperscript{311} Unlike "salters" and other "on-duty" employees, however, off-duty employees are not permitted to engage in union organizing activities inside the workplace in non-work areas, such as an employee lounge, or the company cafeteria.

The interior versus exterior off-duty employee workplace "compromise" fashioned by the Board seems like a rather artificial one,\textsuperscript{312} and certainly appears open to question in the context of legislative reform outlawing union salting and home visits. One possible reform might be to bolster off-duty employee organizational rights by according them the same rights as "on-duty" employees. Since these off-duty employees are already admitted onto company property, such a reform would appear to represent little additional incursion on employer privacy and property rights.\textsuperscript{313} It would also help counter losses in union organizational opportunities due to the outlawing of salting and union home visits.\textsuperscript{314}

5. Overruling Lechmere

A comprehensive overhaul of the law concerning access will also require a reassessment of the Babcock and Lechmere decisions. In particular, the factors that led the Court in 1956 to create the non-employee/employee dichotomy for purposes of access clearly have changed in the interim period. To a large extent, that is our criticism of the Court's decision in Lechmere. The Court's decision is a classic example of the escalation of commitment trap in decision-making, in that it evidences an unwillingness to reevaluate the initial determination in the current context.

In this sense, a legislative reversal of Lechmere might be a necessary step in de-escalating the access problem. Such a reversal will imply that non-employee organizers will have some form of right to access to the workplace, even if just to quasi-public employer property, such as retail store parking lots. Whether such a reversal is proper requires us to evaluate a number of factors. For example, is the industrial relations context different enough from the time when Babcock was decided, as to require us to reassess the nature of the balance struck by the Court in that decision? In

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{310} Tri-County Medical Center, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976).
\item \textsuperscript{313} See Bierman, supra note 25, at 33.
\item \textsuperscript{314} It is probably true, however, that such off-duty employees are not as effective at organizing as trained professionals. See Gresham, supra note 26, at 153-54. However, they do not pose the "Trojan horse" loyalty problems of "salters."
\end{itemize}
answering this question, decision-makers would have to consider factors such as changes in the demographic characteristics of the labor force, changes in the living and commuting patterns of employees, and changes in location of industries. While it is possible to argue, as the Court did in Babcock, that in the 1950s only those employees in logging or mining camps were really inaccessible to the union’s message, it might very well be that in the late 1990s inaccessibility is defined in terms of other characteristics. Answering these questions is likely to generate some heated debate. Such a debate, however, is what we argue is needed to de-escalate an institutional commitment to a decision that is over forty years old.

6. Captive Audience Replies: Overturning General Electric or Election Debates?

Within the context of comprehensive labor reform, it is essential that all aspects of the problem be subject to reassessment. Having proposed abolishing the right of unions to engage in home visits, and having prevented the ability of unions to use “salters,” it is important to consider alternatives that offset these losses for unions and that in turn create a better balance in union/management organizational access. Direct union access to employer workplaces, at least for the purpose of participating in some direct election dialogue, will help achieve this balance.315

One idea worth exploring in this context “is the possible institution of Board sponsored union/management election debates.”316 While the general notion of promoting “free debate on issues dividing labor and management”317 has of course long been a central one under the Act, this concept has never been operationalized by the actual scheduling of Board sponsored give-and-take election debates.

There are various ways in which the debates could be structured and relatively easily incorporated into the current regulatory framework. For instance, Congress may mandate a set number of such debates to be held on working premises during working time as part of any given representation election campaign. Such debates would replace the right of employers to deliver “captive audience” speeches, as well as the argued-for right of unions to reply to such speeches.318 The discourse generated in such debates would better serve to inform and educate the individual employees about the issues involved in the organizing campaign than the combination of an employer captive audience speech and a possible reply by the union.


316. Biernan, supra note 25, at 34.


318. See id.
7. Summary

We have outlined in this section what we argue is a strategy to change the direction of the law regulating the access of unions and employees to the employer’s private property for purposes of organizing. Our contention is that such a strategy requires a comprehensive assessment of the access problem in the context of the industrial relations system of today.

VIII. Conclusion

One of the most complex and difficult areas of labor law is the regulation of union and employee access to employer property for purposes of organizing. Starting from the initial “clear-cut” distinctions between working time and non-working time and employees and non-employees, the rules governing the access issue have become increasingly and unduly complicated. In particular, the recent Court decisions in Lechmere and Town & Country have exacerbated an already difficult situation. We have suggested a theoretical framework which we believe may be helpful in understanding these developments.

We first reviewed the case law regarding the access problem and identified two major problems with the current legal approach to this problem. First, the Court has dealt piecemeal with the various aspects of this problem without attempting to develop a coherent framework. Second, the Court has been reluctant to analyze the access issue within the context of today’s workplace. We then argued that these two problems are related to doctrine of stare decisis. Relying on theoretical developments in decision-making sciences, we argued that the Court’s use of precedent can be understood as an escalation of commitment problem. Having developed this theoretical framework, we proposed a comprehensive set of reforms which include: the outlawing of salting and of union’s home visits; the expansion of the Excel-sior list doctrine, and of the rights of off-duty employees; and the overruling of the Lechmere decision. This proposed legislative reform is presented in the context of legislation which was recently enacted by the House of Representatives and is currently before the Senate. We believe that our proposals are comprehensive, and that they address the problems we identified in our review of the case law in this area. We hope these proposals provide the framework for a positive and robust debate.