Committment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance

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Abstract

Over the past twenty years, a growing number of empirical studies have provided evidence that governance arrangements protecting incumbents from removal promote managerial entrenchment, reducing firm value. As a result of these studies, “good” corporate governance is widely understood today as being about stronger shareholder rights.

This Article rebuts this view, presenting new empirical evidence that challenges the results of prior studies and developing a novel theoretical account of what really matters in corporate governance. Employing a unique dataset that spans from 1978 to 2008, we document that protective arrangements that require shareholder approval—such as staggered boards and supermajority requirements to modify the charter—are associated with increased firm value. Conversely, protective arrangements that do not require shareholder approval—such as poison pills and golden parachutes—are associated with decreased firm value. This evidence suggests that limiting shareholder rights serves a constructive governance function as long as the limits are the result of mutual agreement between the board and shareholders. We argue that this function commits shareholders to preserve a board’s authority to exploit competitive private information and pursue long-term wealth maximization strategies.

By documenting that committing shareholders to the longer-term matters as much as, if not more than, reducing entrenchment for good corporate governance, our analysis sheds much needed light on issues such as the optimal allocation of power between boards and shareholders, managerial accountability, and stakeholder interests. We conclude by outlining the implications of our analysis concerning the direction corporate governance policies ought to take.
INTRODUCTION

Corporate governance matters. The complex framework of institutions and processes by which corporations are organized and managed\(^1\) affects corporate

\(^1\) Corporate governance comprises both external and internal mechanisms. The board of directors, shareholder rights, and compensation schemes are often described as primary examples of internal governance mechanisms. External governance, instead, refers to the role of market forces in constraining corporate behavior, including the capital, labor, and product markets. Existing studies, however, have largely focused on internal governance. See Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Governance 10 (2008). Although two of us have explained elsewhere why a thorough approach to corporate governance should not leave aside the interactions between internal and external mechanisms, in this Article we will also primarily
performance and thus the aggregate welfare of society. This explains why the question of what draws the line between “good” (i.e., value-increasing) and “bad” (i.e., value-decreasing) corporate governance has long been central to corporate legal theory. Attempts to answer that question took a step forward in the 1980s, when empirical analysis to investigate and counterpoise alternative governance models first became available. Discussions over the merits of such models no longer needed to rely on opinions only. Rather, empirical predictions following from each model could be tested against the actual data, through statistical analysis that estimated the validity of those predictions. Studies employing corporate governance indices, which first made their appearance in the late 1990s, proved especially useful. By benchmarking a firm’s governance quality against several governance provisions, governance indices provided a research design well suited to evaluate the various dimensions of a governance model.

The rise of corporate governance indices has made winners and losers in the corporate governance debate. With its empirical evidence that incumbent protection from removal by shareholders—“entrenchment”—is detrimental to firm value, the literature on governance indices has provided strong support for a shareholder-centric governance model. Economically, the case for this model rests on the proposition that shareholders, as the corporation’s residual claimants, have the greatest incentives to provide value-enhancing governance inputs. As a corollary, shareholder advocates view any restrictions on shareholder power as inefficiently insulating managers from shareholder discipline. Conversely, since the emergence of governance indices, advocates of the traditional board-centric model of the corporation—under which boards were largely protected by shareholder interference—have largely stood in the minority.

Further evidence of the influence of governance indices has been the rise and popularity of commercial governance indices, which are widely used by proxy advisory firms to provide voting recommendations to investors. Indeed, commercial indices not

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2 See infra note 24.
3 See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
4 See infra Part II.B.
5 See Id.
6 See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (describing the historical development of this model).
8 See La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. Econ. Lit. 285, 285 (2008) (describing the proposition that protection of outside investors limits the extent of their expropriation by insiders as “standard in corporate law”).
9 See infra note 60.
10 See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
only share the same methodology of academic indices, but also their unequivocal support for enhanced shareholder rights.\textsuperscript{11}

This Article rebuts, empirically and theoretically, the currently dominant view that stronger shareholder rights are an all-purpose remedy in corporate governance. It does so by revisiting the evidence obtained in the empirical literature on governance indices—employing what is, to the best of our knowledge, the largest available dataset on corporate governance arrangements, covering thirty years of governance choices (from 1978 to 2008)—and developing a novel theoretical account of what really matters for firm value.

In revisiting the existing empirical evidence, we focus on the more widely used among the academic governance indices, the entrenchment index or “E-Index”. Introduced in 2009 by a team of legal and financial experts—Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell (BCF)\textsuperscript{12}—the E-Index provides evidence that six entrenchment provisions matter the most for firm value: staggered boards, poison pill, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements for charter amendments, supermajority requirements for bylaws amendments, and supermajority requirements for mergers.\textsuperscript{13} As of August 2015 over three hundred empirical studies had used the E-Index as a measure of governance quality,\textsuperscript{14} indicating that, as a matter of fact, the E-Index has become the standard reference to define entrenchment and, hence, “bad” governance. Yet, in estimating the association between the E-Index (and each of its six constituent components) and firm value, BCF only relied on a twelve-year period (from 1990 to 2002).\textsuperscript{15} Conversely, we can rely on a much more comprehensive dataset over a much longer period of time, allowing for a more robust statistical analysis of the time series association between corporate governance and firm value.\textsuperscript{16}

Our empirical findings call into question the “kitchen sink” approach to incumbent protection from removal as adopted by the E-index and other academic and commercial governance indices. In contrast to that approach’s assumption that any form of incumbent protection is detrimental to shareholders,\textsuperscript{17} we show that only protective

\textsuperscript{11} See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{12} See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 784-85 (2009).

\textsuperscript{13} See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 784-85; see also infra Part III.B.1 (discussing each of these governance arrangements in detail).

\textsuperscript{14} Professor Bebchuk reports on his website that as of August 2015, at 307 studies have used the E Index that he and his coauthors developed. See Professor Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Links to 307 Studies Available on SSRN That Use the Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009), HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/studies.shtml (last updated August 2015). Discussions of the E-Index have also frequently appeared in law reviews. See, e.g., Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1821-23 (2008); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1685-86 (2013); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1353, fn. 155 (2013).

\textsuperscript{15} See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 796.

\textsuperscript{16} See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of using a time-series analysis in empirical research).

\textsuperscript{17} See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 788.
arrangements that can be unilaterally adopted by directors (i.e., “unilateral protection arrangements”)—poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements to amend the bylaws—are associated with decreased firm value and hence fit the entrenchment theory of incumbent protection. Conversely, protective arrangements that require shareholder approval (i.e., “bilateral protection arrangements”)—staggered boards, supermajority requirements to amend the charter and to approve mergers—are associated with increased firm value. This finding suggests that these arrangements serve a constructive, rather than detrimental governance function.

That function, we argue, is mitigating what we refer to as the shareholders’ limited commitment problem,18 which arises out of market imperfections—in the first instance, the possibility that market prices may fail to fully capture the long-term implications of directorial decisions.19 Faced with asset-pricing inefficiency and vested with strong exit rights, shareholders—all public shareholders, as a matter of course—are unable to credibly commit to long-term value creation. That is, they have no basis on which to decide not to seek board removal or dump their shares upon a disappointing short-term outcome, as they are unable to distinguish whether such an outcome is due to mismanagement or to the pursuit of a project whose value will not be realized until later. In response to this problem, to protect themselves, directors and managers rationally develop incentives to privilege short-term stock price gains over long-term cash flows. Similarly, shareholders’ inability to commit to the long term may distort the incentives of other firm stakeholders—employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors—to optimally invest in their relationship with the firm, if the specificity of their investments makes them vulnerable to short-term changes in investment policy. In either case, the result is reduced firm value in the long run.

Bilateral protection arrangements help mitigate the above distortions by committing shareholders ex-ante not to interfere with board decision-making in the near term, increasing longer-term shareholder and firm value. The adoption of a staggered board commit shareholders to longer directorial terms, making it more difficult for shareholders to renege on prior engagements vis-à-vis managers and stakeholders. Similarly, supermajority requirements to amend the charter and approve mergers add to a firm’s long-term commitment by introducing a bias in favor of institutional stability—making it more difficult to alter basic organizational rules unless both the board and a large majority of shareholders agree to the changes.

This novel theoretical account suggests that promoting a firm’s commitment to the long-term matters as much as—and potentially more than—reducing entrenchment in corporate governance. In order to empirically corroborate this conclusion, we divide the E-Index into two separate sub-indices: a commitment index (or, more briefly, C-Index),

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18 Two of us have coined the term “shareholders’ limited commitment problem”, as well as explored its theoretical foundations in full, in a recent earlier work. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with authors).

19 After the 2008 financial crisis, asset-pricing models that allow for the possibility of mispricing have been the subject of a large literature. See, e.g., Darrell Duffie, Asset Price Dynamics with Slow-Moving Capital, 65 J. FIN. 1238, 1238 (2010) (providing a summary of these studies).
only including the E-Index’s three bilateral provisions, and an incumbent index (or, more briefly, I-Index), only including the E-Index’s three unilateral provisions. Consistent with our account of corporate governance, we document that increased scores on the C-Index (i.e., more commitment) are associated with increases in firm value. Conversely, increased scores on the I-Index (i.e., more entrenchment) are associated with decreases in firm value. As a further empirical test, we examine whether the use of bilateral protection arrangements is more valuable to firms where the shareholders’ limited commitment problem appears to be more severe, as predicted by our theory. To this end, we focus on three categories of firms: (1) firms with more long-term innovation, (2) firms for which stronger firm-specific investments by non-financial stakeholders, such as employees and customers, are likely to be more important, and (3) firms with more potential for excessive future risk taking to the detriment of financial stakeholders such as creditors. In all three cases, we find empirical results that strongly support our commitment theory of bilateral protection arrangements.

This Article’s analysis bears major implications for the debate on both the means and ends of corporate governance. Shareholder advocates have been very successful in portraying a shareholder-centric model as an efficient form of direct corporate democracy. They have been equally successful in representing the board-centric model as an inefficient form of corporate dictatorship, where incumbents can unilaterally and opportunistically protect themselves from removal at the expense of shareholders. This account of corporate governance, however, misleadingly throws everything into one pot, failing to recognize the importance of the shareholders’ limited commitment problem. It also omits to consider that some protective arrangements are bilateral, i.e., premised on prior shareholder consent—consistent with the basic organizational principles of a republic rather than a dictatorship.

Our analysis redresses both mistakes. Shedding much needed light on the inter-temporal dynamics of value maximization, we first show that pursuing that goal requires enhanced board protection in the short-term without eliminating exposure to shareholder discipline in the longer-term. Increased protection from removal is necessary at the beginning of a director’s tenure, when directors are more likely to have competitive private information that the market lacks on the actions that contribute to longer-term value. This is because that protection efficiently enables directors to take actions that “tolerate,” rather than “punish,” what may mistakenly appear to the market as “early failure” (e.g., low short term earnings). Conversely, over time, as a director’s tenure matures and market prices are more likely to catch up with directors’ informational advantage, shareholders become better positioned to discipline directorial and managerial actions.

Second, we show that the “republican board-centric model”—which empowers boards to resist short-term market pressure with the prior agreement of shareholders—

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20 See infra notes 225-27, 237 and accompanying text (discussing the proxies that we use to identify these specific features of corporate production).
21 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
better approximates the above organizational structure. Such a model adds value that a
direct shareholder democracy cannot provide by ensuring that shareholder discipline
operates in the long-term, rather than the short-term. Contrary to what frequently argued
by shareholder advocates, a staggered board does not remove directors from the
judgment of the market. Rather, it provides a time frame for directorial evaluation by the
shareholders that is less likely to be biased by informational inefficiencies. Similarly,
supermajority requirements to amend the charter and to approve mergers do not reduce
long-term directorial accountability, but constructively strengthen board authority in the
short-term.

Our analysis also bears noteworthy policy implications. For one thing, it suggests
that the emphasis placed by providers of commercial governance indices on stronger
shareholder rights may be pushing governance practices at many U.S. corporations in
counter-productive directions. This is especially troubling if one considers that
supporting stronger shareholder rights (and less incumbent protection) promotes
increased shareholder activism, which, in turn, leads to more voting advisory activity and
increased revenues for proxy advisors. In response, action by the Security Exchange
Commission (SEC)—requiring, as a first step, disclosure of the proprietary algorithms
used in the construction of commercial indices—would be desirable to allow more
transparency and discussion about the governance recommendations provided by proxy
advisors. This in turn, would help answer the question of whose interests those
recommendations really serve. Similarly, the evidence produced in this Article challenges
reform interventions that have increasingly sustained shareholder empowerment in the
past two decades. Going forward, policymakers would do well to reconsider the case for
limiting shareholder power in the short-term and the direction governance policies ought
to take to support long-term value creation.

The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides background on
the history of the corporate governance debate, the rise of governance indices, and the
present state of corporate governance research. Part III revisits the evidence for the
association between the E-Index (and each of the six provisions it includes) and firm
value, and, based on that evidence, develops a novel theoretical account of what really
matters in corporate governance. Part IV puts that account to further empirical testing,
finding strong support for our claim that promoting shareholder commitment to the long
term matters as much as, if not more than, reducing entrenchment for good corporate
governance. Part V discusses the implications that our analysis bears for the optimal
allocation of power between boards and shareholders, managerial accountability, and
stakeholder interests. Part VI outlines desirable policy changes. Part VII concludes.

II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHERE DO WE STAND?

The optimal allocation of power between boards and shareholders, the resolution
of conflicts of interests among corporate constituencies, and the structuring of managerial

23 See e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 14, at 1681 (“[H]aving a staggered board considerably enhances
the extent to which directors are insulated from shareholder pressure.”)
incentives are widely recognized as essential corporate governance objectives. However, the principles that should guide corporate actors and lawmakers in structuring governance arrangements that efficiently pursue these objectives continue to be the subject of an intense debate. In this Part, we provide the background for understanding the importance and context of this debate, beginning with an overview of the main concepts that have historically informed corporate governance discussions. After that, we continue to trace the trajectory of those discussions by focusing on the rise of empirical corporate governance research—and, in particular, governance indices—and its increasing influence over time in defining what “good corporate governance” is about. We conclude this Part with an assessment of the present state of the corporate governance debate.

A. Organizations, Markets, and American Corporate Law

Although corporate governance theories tend to defy easy classification, a recurring distinction is between the corporation as a social organization—largely based on notions of entity, centralization, and authority—and the corporation as a creature of the market—largely based on notions of individualism, decentralization, and contract.

Until about the end of the 19th century, the corporate legal discourse took for granted that corporations owed their existence to a public concession by the state that chartered them. Emphasizing the state’s constitutive role, this view conceived of the corporation as an entity transcending its individual participants and charged with the pursuit of public, rather than private, interests. The regulatory notion of early American corporate law was accordingly justified as a means to preserve the public purpose utility of the corporate form.

Things began to change at the turn of the century. With the rise of the large corporation characterized by the separation of ownership from control, and the ascent of

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24 Scholarly contributions on these issues are too voluminous to be cited in full. For a non-exhaustive review of these and other prominent governance issues, see e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance Research, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 939, 939 (2010).
25 For a seminal attempt at capturing the different ideals that have historically characterized the corporate governance debate, see Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923 (1984).
27 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 25, at 931. The earliest corporations were generally chartered to undertake activities advancing the commonwealth—such as public utilities, transportation, banking, insurance, and water works—rather than corporate profitability. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 17-18 (1970).
28 See, e.g., David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L. J. 201, 207-13 (1990) (discussing the extensive body of statutory and common law rules to which early corporations were subject).
29 The classic reference is to the work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, who first exposed the separation of ownership from control as the distinctive trait of the public modern corporation. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
individualism and economic laissez-faire attitude, corporations increasingly came to be seen as pursuing primarily private rather than public interests. As illustrated by the classic debate between Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd in the 1930s, the shift to a private law approach to corporate relationships raised novel questions about the direction that developing corporate law rules ought to take. By analyzing the corporation through the lens of shareholders’ property rights, Berle (both writing alone and in its famous book with Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property) naturally insisted on maximizing shareholder wealth as the appropriate corporate end and, in turn, on curbing managerial discretion as the means to reach that end. On the polar opposite side, Dodd remained true to the view of the corporation as a social organization, advocating a corporate model that granted directors and managers broad discretion in the pursuit of corporate interests—including the interests of other stakeholders.

Although Berle and Means’s corporate paradigm has exerted enduring influence on the modern corporate governance discourse, it is Dodd’s account that more closely captures the business model that long prevailed in corporate America. At the center of that business model was the “management corporation,” revolving around directors and executives who did not see themselves as shareholders’ trustees. Rather, they saw themselves as retaining virtually exclusive authority over the corporation, including authority to consider non-shareholder interests. After a brief encounter with corporatism during the New Deal—in which the idea of a public role of the corporation

31 See, e.g., id. at 139-40; Millon, supra note 28, at 213.
33 See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1928) [BERLE, CORPORATE FINANCE]; Adolph A. Berle, Corporate Powers As Powers In Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) [Berle, Powers in Trust]; Adolph A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1932) [Berle, Trustees Note].
34 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 29, at 84-89.
35 See id. at 247-76; BERLE, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 33, at 36-39; Berle, Powers in Trust, supra note 33, at 1050-74; Berle, Trustees Note, supra note 33, 1365-70.
36 See Merrick Dodd, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147-48 (1932).
37 See id. at 1154.
38 Berle himself later came to concede that his debate with Dodd “ha[d] been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.” ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954). Even before this concession to Dodd, Berle had adjusted his positions as events unfolded in his own time, embracing a view of corporate law that was closer to organicist ideals. See Bratton & Wachtler, supra note 32, at 120-21; Romano, supra note 25, at 936.
39 See Bratton, supra note 26, at 1477-78 (describing the appearance, success, and endurance of the management corporation).
41 Corporatism emphasizes groups over individuals and cooperation over competition. A classic reference is Leo Panitch, The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies, 10 COMP. POL. STUD.
resurfaced under the form of a call for the social responsibility of managers\textsuperscript{42}—the management corporation thrived on a unique corporate capitalism system. This system abandoned any element of economic progressivism,\textsuperscript{43} but continued to privilege a centralized decision-making paradigm: a governance model centered on “empowered boards,” largely protected from shareholder interference.\textsuperscript{44} Undergirding that model was a tacit social consensus that corporate growth took priority over corporate profits, as long as managers could compensate shareholders with stable dividends.\textsuperscript{45} In the prevailing mindset of the time, only empowered boards could accomplish that goal, both because of their informational advantage over dispersed shareholders and their unique ability to resist the risk appetite of the “money makers”—bankers, brokers, and all sorts of speculators—who had played a major role in contributing to the Great Depression.\textsuperscript{46}

That mindset suddenly changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, mainly due to sudden stagflation and abysmal stock market performance, both of which problematized the productive mode of the management corporation.\textsuperscript{47} Concurrently, the rise of the hostile takeover challenged boards’ empowered status—with the tender offer granting shareholders the right to remove incumbents through the simple exercise of stock market purchasing power, as well as a novel lever to influence investment policy.\textsuperscript{48} With perfect timing, it was then that the neoclassical theory of the firm made its appearance. Rejecting centralized decision-making as a distinctive trait of totalitarianism,\textsuperscript{49} neoclassicists viewed the firm as a web of contractual relationships among individuals, whose ongoing transactions were efficiently coordinated by the price mechanism.\textsuperscript{50} Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s 1976 article, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, is the landmark publication that

\textsuperscript{42}See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 32, at 110-11.

\textsuperscript{43}According to political scientist David Ciepley, it was the impress left on the United States by the rise of totalitarianism—of which economic progressivism was seen as a dangerous antecedent—which had a major role in directing this change of approach. See Ciepley, supra note 41, at 1-9; see also David Ciepley, Authority in the Firm (and the Attempt to Theorize it Away), 16 CRITICAL REV. 81, 83-84 (2004).

\textsuperscript{44}See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 2-4.

\textsuperscript{45}See Bratton, supra note 26, at 1492-93.

\textsuperscript{46}See id. (describing management discretion as an essential feature of the management corporation); Ciepley, supra note 43, at 105-107 (discussing the concerns caused by the “money makers” during the New Deal’s progressive era); Lynn Stout, Response - The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2005 (2013) (describing the management corporation as immune to the logic of share price maximization).

\textsuperscript{47}See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 32, at 144; Stout, supra note 46, at 2007-2008.

\textsuperscript{48}See Bratton, supra note 26, at 1520-21.

\textsuperscript{49}See Ciepley, supra note 43, at 139-40.

\textsuperscript{50}See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, in ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 73-74 (Armen Alchian ed., 1972).
formalized and directed the change of approach.\textsuperscript{51} Emphasizing the position of shareholders as the firm’s residual claimants, Jensen and Meckling re-conceptualized shareholder wealth maximization as the best proxy for overall wealth maximization and managerial moral hazard as the primary inefficiency to be addressed by corporate governance.\textsuperscript{52} Viewed through this perspective, the market for corporate control was recast as the exercise of discrete contracting among shareholders that efficiently limited opportunistic managers from misusing valuable assets.\textsuperscript{53}

With the end of the hostile takeover era in the mid-1990s, the case for a decentralized decision-making paradigm of the corporation took the novel form of a claim for “shareholder empowerment,” which has since gained consistent consensus.\textsuperscript{54} Shareholder empowerment first emerged as a response to the alleged impairment of the market’s operation due to the introduction of antitakeover statutes and the increased use by incumbents of anti-takeover measures.\textsuperscript{55} Its original agenda mainly included proposals for facilitating managerial and board removal by shareholders,\textsuperscript{56} but it has progressively expanded to include proposals substantially shifting control of business policy from the board to shareholders.\textsuperscript{57} Underpinning this extensive reform program is the argument, built on neoclassical assumptions, that shareholders, as residual claimants, have the best incentives to provide value-maximizing governance inputs.\textsuperscript{58} Conversely—shareholder advocates argue—the incentives of directors and managers may deviate, driven by their private interest in compensation, private benefits, and job retention.


\textsuperscript{52} See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 7, at 305-08.

\textsuperscript{53} See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965) (pioneering theoretical assertions that the takeover phenomenon constituted efficient market control of the corporation).


\textsuperscript{55} See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 671 (2010) (including among the reform items of the original shareholder agenda majority voting, the right to replace all incumbents every two or three years, the right to expanded access to the proxy statement, and the reimbursement of solicitation expenses).

\textsuperscript{56} See id. (including among the items of the extended shareholder agenda access to management’s proxies statements, the power to trump contrary board-adopted bylaws, and shareholder-initiated charter amendments)

\textsuperscript{57} See id.

\textsuperscript{58} See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Rainier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 449 (2001) (“[I]f the control rights granted to the firm’s equity-holders are exclusive and strong, they will have powerful incentives to maximize the value of the firm.”).
Board advocates—defending the received board-centric model of the corporation on the ground of directors’ informational advantage vis-à-vis dispersed shareholders—have largely stood in the minority since the emergence of the shareholder empowerment claim. In fact, shareholder empowerment has become more a reality than an aspiration today, mainly due to steady increases in shareholder concentration and activism, and the occurrence of legal changes that have rewarded the efforts of shareholder advocates. There is, however, one additional factor—largely underappreciated in the corporate law scholarship—which has played a significant role in advancing the shareholder empowerment case. As we explain below, that factor is the rise of corporate governance research supporting the idea that stronger shareholder rights equate to better corporate governance.

B. The Rise of Governance Indices

Neoclassical theorists not only introduced new economic and financial concepts into the corporate governance debate, they also ushered in a revolution in methodology, incorporating empirical analysis into the study of corporate law. Jensen and Meckling’s postulate that maximizing shareholder value is the best means of maximizing firm value provided the theoretical underpinning for that revolution. On that postulate, it was now possible to test the efficiency of corporate law rules and corporate governance arrangements by estimating their impact on corporate performance as proxied by measures of shareholder value.

Since the mid-1980s, the march of corporate law scholars into the realm of empirical research has steadily and inexorably increased, producing innumerable


60 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 32, at 100, 146.

61 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 3, 15-16.


63 See id. at 356 (noting that empirical work depends on shared goal specification and that the end of maximizing shareholder wealth provided that specification). See also infra Part III.A.2. (revisiting this view of the relationship between shareholder wealth maximization and efficiency analysis of corporate law).

studies examining how individual governance arrangements empirically relate to corporate performance.65 Arrangements and mechanisms that have been studies include, among others, board composition and size, shareholder activism, proxy fights, antitakeover defenses, and voting rights.66 These studies, however, have failed to identify a consistent relationship between governance and performance. A plausible explanation for this outcome—as observed by Professors Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton, and Roberta Romano—is that “there are limitations with a research design that examines the effect on performance of only one dimension of a firm’s governance when governance mechanism are numerous and interaction effects are quite probable.”67

The limitations affecting studies of individual governance arrangements also help explain the growing popularity of governance indices. Unlike the former studies, empirical studies employing governance indices investigate a firm’s governance quality by focusing on multiple governance provisions, which are assumed to be conducive to either desirable or undesirable outcomes. These multiple provisions are then combined into an index, in which, typically, a score is added for any of the selected provisions that is present in a given firm. This methodology thus effectively collapses the multiple dimensions of a firm’s governance into one number: the overall index’s score.

For Baghat et al., this ability of governance indices to “quantify” a firm’s governance quality through one easily understandable measure is the indices’ key attribute.68 From a policy perspective, however, the indices’ primary advantage is to offer an empirical design that is well suited to test theoretical predictions about the efficiency of alternative governance models, which, by definition, involve a multiplicity of governance dimensions rather than just one dimension. Consistent with this view, the three governance indices that are widely regarded in the literature as the most influential—the “Antidirector Index,” the “G-Index,” and the “E-Index”—all focus on governance elements that attempt to test for the efficiency of the two most popular models of governance: the traditional board-centric model and the increasingly popular shareholder-centric model.

The Antidirector Index represented the first, seminal attempt at pursuing such an analysis of corporate governance. Introduced in 1998 by a team of financial economists—Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny—69 this index focused on shareholder protection laws around the world,70 providing evidence that stronger shareholder protection is correlated with economic growth and market capitalization.71

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65 See Bhagat et al., supra note 14, at 1814.
66 See id. at 1814-18 (providing a summary of these studies).
67 See id. at 1818.
68 See id.
70 Specifically, the Antidirector index focused on rules on “voting powers, ease of participation in corporate voting, and legal protection against expropriation by management.” See id. at 1115.
71 See id. at 1116. The other notable result delivered by the Antidirector index was that common law countries are more protective of investors than civil law countries. See id. For a review of the follow-up research as well as of the criticism engendered by Law and Finance, see La Porta et al., supra note 8.
The G-Index, introduced in 2003 by another team of financial economists—Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick—extended the analysis begun by the Anti-director index, considering firm-level governance arrangements in addition to laws “on the books” and focusing on a sample of large public U.S. firms. Specifically, the G-Index is constructed as a composite of twenty-four “management power” (or “weak shareholder rights”) features. Higher index scores capture firms with a more board-centric governance model, which Gompers et al. call a “dictatorship” model. Lower index scores capture, instead, firms with a more shareholder-centric governance model, which Gompers et al. refer to as a “democratic” model. Like the Anti-director index, use of the G-Index yielded results consistent with the theoretical assumption that stronger shareholder rights equate to better governance practices, showing that from 1990 to 1999 firms with higher index scores (i.e., the “Democracy Portfolio”) had higher financial value than firms with lower index score (i.e., the “Dictatorship Portfolio”).

The E-Index (or entrenchment index) is an index including a sub-set of G-Index provisions. Developed in 2009 by a team of Harvard Professors—Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell (BCF)—the E-Index was motivated to overcome the major methodological concern raised by the G-Index: the inclusion of an excessive number of governance-arrangements of unequal relevance. The E-Index only retained six of the twenty-four G-Index provisions, which BCF hypothesized mattered the most for excessive management power, i.e., entrenchment. These provisions include staggered boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers, supermajority requirements for charter amendments, and supermajority requirements for bylaws amendments. Consistent with the hypothesis that reducing entrenchment is what matters the most in corporate governance, BCF found that the E-Index’s six governance provisions fully drove the negative empirical correlation of the G-Index with firm value.

Therefore, the evidence obtained for each of the above governance indices supports the view that stronger shareholder rights, and correspondently lower entrenchment levels, is what draws the line between good and bad governance. The connection between this empirical finding and the case for empowering shareholders is

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72 See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107, 107 (2003).
73 See id. at 109, fn. 4.
74 See id. at 109.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 109-10.
78 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12.
79 See id. at 784. (arguing that some of the G-Index provisions “might have little relevance, and some provisions might even be positively correlated with firm value. Among those provisions that are negatively correlated with firm value or stock returns, some might be more so than others.”)
80 See id. at 788.
81 See id. at 784-85; see also infra Part III.B.1 (providing a summary of the explanations offered by BCF to account for the specific institutional mechanisms that create entrenchment within each provision).
82 See id. at 786.
immediate and, as we shall discuss next, has exerted huge impact not just within academic circles, but among policymakers and real corporate actors as well.

C. The End of History for Corporate Governance

In theory, both a shareholder-centric model and a board-centric model have merits. The introduction of governance indices, however, enabled shareholder advocates to assert seemingly objective empirical evidence to defend the shareholder-centric model as superior: firms with stronger, empowered shareholders outperformed their peers with empowered boards. On this view, it is unsurprising that a few years after the introduction of the Antidirector index, Professors Reinier Kraakman and Henry Hansmann declared that “the end of history for corporate law” had arrived.\footnote{See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 439.} The shareholder-centric view of the corporation, they argued, had “earned its position as the dominant model of the large corporation the hard way, by out-competing” alternative governance models, including the traditional board-centric model.\footnote{See id. at 468 (referring to the board centric model as “the managerialist model”).} As proved by the empirical findings obtained for the Antidirector Index—and even more so by the subsequent empirical findings obtained for the G-Index and E-Index—the market itself had provided a negative answer to the value of these alternative models, showing that enhanced board authority and managerial discretion inevitably resulted in “inefficiency of operations and excessive investments in low-value projects.”\footnote{See id. at 444.}

The idea that good corporate governance is equivalent to stronger shareholder rights, while managerial entrenchment epitomizes bad governance, has won not just the academic debate. It has also gained predominance in the policy debate, both in the United States and internationally. At the national level, the enhancement of shareholder protection has figured prominently in both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002\footnote{See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (2002) (“To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws . . . .”)} and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.\footnote{See id. at 468 (referring to the board centric model as “the managerialist model”).} Likewise, at international level, the influential Principles of Corporate Governance issued by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development have placed strong emphasis on market forces and the alignment of manager and shareholder interests as primary disciplining devices.\footnote{See id. at 444.}

Yet perhaps the most tangible sign of the support provided by governance indices for shareholder empowerment is the use to which they have been put by proxy advisory

\footnote{See id. at 4.}
firms. These firms provide investors with voting recommendations on the election of directors, shareholder resolutions, merger proposals, and any other matter on which shareholders vote, playing a major role in influencing corporate governance policies at many U.S. corporations. Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) alone, the largest proxy advisory firm, claims to advise over 1,700 clients, who manage over $25 trillion in assets.

In providing their services, ISS and other proxy advisors rely on commercial ratings that not only share the same methodology of academic governance indices, but also their basic assumption that enhanced shareholder rights are consistent with best governance practices. Thus, whether the “company is incorporated in a state without any state anti-takeover provisions” and has a unitary board (or passed a proposal to declassify the board) figure prominently among the most important variables included in the ISS’ “Corporate Governance Quotient.” Even more noticeably, the “Board Accountability Index” used by Glass, Lewis & Company, the second largest proxy advisor, includes five of the six entrenchment components of the E-Index.

Further, while the studies employing academic governance indices have generally been cautious in avoiding any causality claim, proxy advisory firms exercise no such caution. ISS, for example, claims that its ratings can “identify the worst corporate offenders.” Anecdotal evidence also suggests that advisory ratings do change a firm’s governance practices, as boards have grown increasingly aware of the effect that a bad rating can have on their firm’s capacity to attract investors. It is thus unsurprising, that Martin Lipton, noted corporate lawyer and outspoken defendant of the received board-centric model of the corporation, blames “influential proxy advisory firms” as having

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80 See Robert D. Hershey, A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, § 3, at 6 (describing proxy advisors generally as wielding extraordinary influence over corporate practices and identifying ISS as the most prominent advisory firm).
81 Academic and commercial governance indices share the same methodology to the extent that they both collapse several governance dimensions into one single number, i.e., an overall index score. See Baghat et al., supra note 14, at 1807. However, commercial governance indices also “differ distinctively in several important dimensions.” See id. at 1825. For example, commerce indices vary the weights accorded to different governance provisions, rather than attributing the same weight to each provision as academic indices do. See id.; see also Robert M. Daines et al., Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings?, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 439, 441-42 (2010) (discussing methodological differences between academic and commercial indices).
82 Although the exact variables (and how they are weighted) are proprietary, ISS has disclosed the most important variables in the Corporate Governance Quotient. See ISS, 2014 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY GUIDELINES, available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/2014ISSUSSummaryGuidelines.pdf [hereinafter ISS GUIDELINES].
83 See Bhagat et al., supra note 14, at 1822-23. As compared to the E-Index, the Board Accountability Index excludes supermajority requirements for charter amendments. See id.
84 See id. at 1806-07.
85 See Daines et al., supra note 91, at 439.
86 In a recent survey, for example, public firm directors have listed corporate governance advisors as the third most influential institution on board, behind only institutional investors and analysts. See id. at 440.
played a major role in contributing to the increasing erosion of board authority in favor of enhanced shareholder rights.\textsuperscript{97} What is less frequently observed, though, is that the rise of academic governance indices has provided the intellectual support for the engagement of proxy advisory firms among shareholder advocates.

D. The End of “The End of History”?

For almost two decades, shareholder advocates have relied on the empirical literature on governance indices in their push for shareholder empowerment. They have been remarkably successful, holding the upper hand not just among academics, but also among policymakers and real corporate actors. “Corporate governance,” however, “is a moving target.”\textsuperscript{98} As illustrated earlier, its history is studded with recurring turning points as changes in the marketplace or legal rules continuously bring about new practices and refocus scholar attention on new matters of interest.\textsuperscript{99} After the 2008 financial crisis, we seem to have arrived at another one of these points. Indeed, while the regulatory response to the crisis has again involved an enhancement of shareholder power, corporate governance research has registered a major shift in interests, both theoretically and empirically.

Theoretically, after several years in the rearguard, the case for a board-centric governance model has received renewed interest due to the prominence gained by short-termism concerns during the crisis. These concerns arise out of the risk that “impatient” shareholders—with short-term liquidity needs and discounting future gains heavily\textsuperscript{100}—might prefer investments with high short-term results at the expense of long-term firm value.\textsuperscript{101} Challenging the assumption that shareholders have the best incentives to provide value-maximizing governance inputs, short-termism undermines the normative desirability of shareholder empowerment. The standard response by shareholder advocates is that short-termism depends on a market imperfection that has yet to be shown as real.\textsuperscript{102} Under the mainstream neoclassical assumption that current stock prices fully capture the present discounted value of a firm’s future income (i.e., the strong version of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis),\textsuperscript{103} short-termist incentives could be assumed to translate into a lower stock price today and, then, to be competed away by

\textsuperscript{99} See supra Part II.A.
\textsuperscript{100} See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 98, at 36 (describing short-termism as a problem arising for “short-term investors who need to sell while the stock is underpriced.”).
\textsuperscript{101} It appears that the first commentator to raise short-termism concerns was Martin Lipton. See William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a Champion: The Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton’s Vision of Corporate Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1383, 1383-84 (2005). In more recent times, short-termism concerns have come from academics, organizational leaders, business columnists, corporate lawyers, and business organizations. See Bebchuk, supra note 14, at 1639-40 & n.2-11 (quoting the most important contributions expressing short-termism concerns).
\textsuperscript{102} See, e.g., Mark Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977, 978–79 (2013).
efficient markets. Today, however, that argument is diluted of much of its strength. As shown by the near collapse of the U.S. financial system, “security mispricing, instead of being a temporary self-correcting problem, [is], ..., a problem that could and had spiraled out of control.” Therefore, short-termism concerns are not merely theoretical; they are real, and weaken the case for efficient shareholder control of the corporation.

The argument that the rise of activist hedge funds and the steady increase in institutional shareholdings have added to the risk of short-termism has also proved central to the new momentum of board advocates. On the one hand, most hedge funds are impatient investors in search of near or intermediate term value. On the other, money managers—who exercise much of shareholder power today—are also likely to support corporate policies designed to boost short-term earnings, as they thrive by increasing their portfolios’ current value. In spite of the attempt by shareholder advocates to downplay short-termism as a marginal problem, the current corporate scenario would thus make it much more likely that a substantial number of shareholders might have a short-term investment horizon.

Empirically, new studies have also appeared that examine the ill effects stemming from the combination of asset pricing inefficiency and short-term shareholder pressure. Theoretical models of rational managerial myopia—which were developed during the takeover era but so far lacked empirical confirmation—have provided the common starting point of these studies. Departing from the mainstream neoclassical account of the market for corporate control, myopia models suggested that an excessive focus on stock market results, combined with imperfectly informative market prices, could induce managers to privilege short-term stock price gains over long-term cash flows. As these

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104 See Roe, supra note 102, at 981-83.
105 See Allen & Strine, supra note 101, at 1383-84 (quoting Michael Jensen).
107 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 55, at 682.
109 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 41-42 (arguing that the rise of activist hedge funds and increased institutional shareholdings may increase the likelihood of Keynesian prices).
110 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 98, at 50-58 (providing a brief summary of new myopia studies).
111 See supra notes 53 and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., Adam Brandenburger & Ben Polak, When Managers Cover their Posteriors: Making the Decisions the Market Wants to See, RAND J. OF ECON. 523, 529 (1996) (arguing that managers may have incentives to take the decisions an uninformed market wants to see when they fear shareholder discipline); M. P. Narayan, Managerial Incentives for Short Term Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469, 1469-70 (1985) (“[B]y selecting a project that yields short-term profits, the manager can expect to improve the perception about her ability . . .”); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. Pol. ECON. 61, 63-67 (1988) (showing formally that managers threatened by a takeover will sell underpriced assets); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate
concerns challenge the assumption that a firm’s anti-takeover provisions are merely a product of managerial opportunism, such provisions have naturally represented a major focus of interest in the new empirical profile. In particular, a series of recent studies has challenged prior empirical results documenting a negative value impact of staggered boards— one of the most widely used takeover defenses and a central component of both the G-Index and the E-Index. In arguably the most comprehensive among these studies (hereinafter, the “Cremers-Sepe study”), two of us examined over thirty years of staggering and de-staggering decisions, showing that as firms adopted a staggered board, their financial value increased, whereas firms that repealed a staggered board suffered subsequent drops in firm value.114

Our explanation for the constructive governance role that staggered boards seem to serve—an explanation for which we find strong support in the data—is that they help mitigate what we call the “shareholders’ limited commitment problem” (hereinafter, the “limited commitment problem”).115 Faced with asset pricing inefficiency and vested with strong exit rights, shareholders are unable to credibly commit to long-term value creation. That is, they cannot commit not to seek board removal or dump their shares upon a disappointing short-term outcome, as they are unable to tell whether such an outcome is due to mismanagement or to the pursuit of a longer-term project. In response to this problem, directors and managers rationally develop myopic incentives. A related problem arises with the firm’s other stakeholders—employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors—as the value of their firm-specific investments might also be reduced by the shareholders’ ability to seek a short-term change in investment policy or rapidly sell their shares.116 In either case, the result is a decrease in firm value in the long run. Viewed through this lens, the adoption of a staggered board adds value by providing for longer directorial terms and, thereby, limiting the ability of shareholders to interfere with directors’ decision-making in the short-term.117

The new matters of interest taken up by governance scholars—asset pricing inefficiency, short-termism, myopic concerns, and the limited commitment problem—all point in the same direction: empowering shareholders may produce externalities that

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114 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 27-32

115 See id. at 40-41.

116 See id. at 44-45.

117 See id. at 47-49; see also Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Whither Delaware? Limited Commitment and the Financial Value of Corporate Law, working paper, November 2014, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2519238 (documenting that firm value increases following (re)incorporation in a state with more, or more severe, antitakeover statutes, especially for firms that are more likely to be affected by the limited commitment problem); William Johnson et al., The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1923667 (empirically documenting that in IPO firms takeover defenses reduce the possibility that a change in control will harm the firm’s stakeholders, promoting more favorable contracting terms and increasing firm value).
outweigh any potential benefits. The contrast with the evidence on governance indices and their basic proposition—that stronger shareholder rights are the essential component of good corporate governance—is immediate. Surprisingly, however—and in spite of the huge impact the indices have exerted, and continue to exert, on the real corporate governance debate—no revision of the value impact of the indices, and each of their components, has yet appeared in the literature.

We hence turn to that task, revisiting the empirical evidence obtained for the E-Index as well as each of its six constituent provisions. Three main reasons motivate our choice of focusing on this index among those examined above. First, the Antidirector index focuses on a cross-country analysis, rather than the internal governance arrangements of U.S. corporations, which represent our field of interest.118 Second, as compared to the G-Index, the E-Index presents fewer methodological concerns, as it considers a more restricted number of entrenchment provisions that allegedly fully drive the negative association with firm value.119 Third, as of May 2015 over three hundred empirical corporate governance studies had used the E-Index as a measure of governance quality.120 This suggests that, as a matter of fact, the E-Index has become the standard reference in the literature to identify what matters for corporate governance and firm value.

III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVISITED

In this Part, as well as Part IV that follows, we empirically revisit the association between the E-Index (and each of the six provisions it includes) and firm value, expanding the original analysis that appeared in the BCF study (i.e., from 1990 to 2002) to a much larger data sample, which covers thirty years of corporate governance choices (i.e., from 1978 to 2008). In doing so, as explained below, we pursue a two-fold research objective, concerning both the means and ends of corporate governance.

A. Research Objectives and Empirical Methodology

1. The Means Axis

Our primary purpose in revisiting the results obtained for the E-Index is to advance the ongoing debate on the means of corporate governance, offering novel evidence as to what matters for firm value and desirable governance models. The BCF study suggests that reducing managerial entrenchment is what matters the most, strengthening the case for a shareholder-centric governance model.121 That evidence, however, stands in contrast with more recent empirical studies suggesting that empowering boards to resist shareholder and market pressures is beneficial to promote long-term value creation.122 A potential explanation for this conflicting evidence is that not all the provisions included in the E-Index matter equally for aggravating entrenchment, or may have offsetting benefits like mitigating the limited commitment

118 See supra text accompanying note 70.
119 See supra text accompanying note 82.
120 See supra note 14.
121 See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
problem.

Relatedly, it might be that the E-Index is affected by either a “specification problem” or a “reverse causality problem.” Empiricists refer to the former problem when changes in the dependent variable might be attributable to factors other than changes in the independent variable. As applied to the E-Index’s analysis, it could thus be that changes in firm value might be attributable to differences in firm characteristics other than having adopted one of the index’s entrenchment provisions. A reverse causality problem is instead said to occur when the dependent variable causes changes in the independent variable, rather than the other way around. In our case, low firm value could thus motivate, rather than being caused by, the adoption of any entrenchment provisions.

In order to empirically verify the above hypotheses, we employ both a cross-sectional analysis and a time-series analysis of the association between the E-Index (and its components) and firm value. A cross-sectional analysis compares how differences in firm value are associated with differences in the adoption of the E-Index provisions across different firms for any given year in a panel dataset. This kind of analysis can provide useful snapshots of the association between firm value and the E-Index provisions over different years. However, it cannot capture temporal variations within the same firms and, therefore, is especially vulnerable to either specification or reverse causality problems. This explains why using a time-series analysis that employs firm fixed effects is regarded as a more reliable method of identifying empirical relationships in econometrics. Unlike a cross-sectional analysis, a time series analysis controls for any and all firm-variables that do not change over time—that is, a firm’s “fixed effects”—for each firm included in a panel dataset. In other words, this analysis adds a separate dummy variable for each unique firm, allowing the examination of what change in firm value within that firm occurred before or after a change in any of the E-Index components. Controlling for firm fixed effects thus significantly mitigates both specification and reverse causality problems.

We emphasize that while BCF also employ firm-fixed effects, they can only rely on a twelve-year period (from 1990 to 2002). Conversely, we can rely on the availability of data over a considerably longer time-period (from 1978 to 2008) and arguably many more changes in the E-Index components. As significant time

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124 See id.
125 See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 444 (2009).
127 JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 668 (2002) (“The time series dimension . . . allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the cross section units, and to estimate certain dynamic relationships.”).
128 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 802, Table 4.
129 This seems especially important if one considers the transformations that have taken place in the corporate landscape both before and after the time period examined by BCF. As discussed earlier, the
variation is essential to meaningful time-series analysis, our analysis should then be regarded as allowing a more robust statistical analysis of the time series association between corporate governance and firm value.\textsuperscript{130} 

2. \textit{The End Axis}

Our ability to trace the association between governance arrangements and firm value over thirty years also matters for the debate around the ends of corporate governance. In the standard account, that debate would have been resolved by Jensen and Meckling’s intuition that maximizing shareholder wealth is the best means toward maximizing overall wealth.\textsuperscript{131} As received by many corporate law scholars, especially in the 1990s and early 2000s, that intuition implied that maximizing shareholder wealth was the only end of corporate law.\textsuperscript{132} As a proof of claim, these scholars argued that it was the empirical consensus on shareholder primacy that had enabled the use of empirical tools in corporate governance research, opening the door to employing shareholder value metrics as measures of corporate governance efficiency.\textsuperscript{133}

This account, however, fails to consider the inter-temporal dynamics of the shareholder wealth maximization mandate, while also oversimplifying the relationship between that mandate and the use of shareholder value metrics in efficiency analysis. Without a specification of what the process of creating shareholder wealth involves over time, such a process inevitably turns into a requirement to cater to today’s stock price. That requirement, however, ignores crucial inter-temporal issues in the efficiency of market prices. Indeed, only under the assumption of perfectly informative prices can managing based on the current market price be assumed to serve the end of overall value maximization. Yet, as soon as we depart from the strong version of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, a hypothesis that the crisis has exposed as unrealistic, managing based on the current price promotes short-termism and other inefficiencies.\textsuperscript{134} Further, for similar negative results to arise, one need not to assume that market prices are

\textsuperscript{130} Our ability to investigate comparisons of the long-term value associations of governance choices also helps addressing more general criticisms that have been raised against the use of governance indices. These criticisms have mainly been directed at challenging the notion that a “one-size-fits-all” model of corporate governance might exist. \textit{See, e.g.}, Bhagat et al., supra note 14, at 1808; Rose, supra note 89, at 924-25. For these scholars, corporate governance “depends on context and on firm’s specific circumstances”. \textit{See} Bhagat et al, supra, at 1808. Hence, governance arrangements that are good for one firm might be bad for another, and vice versa. Empirically, this argument translates into an endogeneity concern—more precisely, a specification problem—which our time-series analysis should help to mitigate.

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{See supra note 52 and accompanying text.}

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{See supra note 63 and accompanying text.}

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.}
systematically uninformative. It is instead sufficient to assume that market prices are “discontinuous”, that is, unable of fully capturing the implications of directorial and managerial decisions until those implications begin to show up in cash flows over time.

Corporate law scholars have grown wary of the limitations affecting a “static” mandate to maximize shareholder wealth, especially after the roller-coaster ride of share prices during the 2008 financial crisis. In response, they have increasingly emphasized the need to focus on long-term shareholder value as a more appropriate proxy for overall value maximization. This signals a scholarly effort to transition to a more dynamic understanding of the shareholder wealth maximization mandate, which seeks to incorporate inter-temporal directives. Yet, acknowledging that short-term shareholder wealth might not be an accurate proxy for aggregate wealth does not challenge the use of shareholder value metrics for efficiency analysis altogether, as suggested by some scholars. Rather, it suggests that claims of societal efficiency (rather than mere shareholder efficiency) should rely less on event studies, which focus on short-term variations in measures of shareholder value, and more on studies that examine changes in such measures over the long-term. Accordingly, our ability to rely on long-term changes in shareholder value well positions our study to derive broader efficiency implications—advancing the understanding of the inter-temporal aspects of the shareholder wealth maximization mandate as a means to an end, rather than as an end in itself.

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135 Uninformative prices (or Keynesian prices), however, might cyclically occur, as two of us have explained in earlier work. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 38-42.

136 See Michael Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 17 (2011). More technically, discontinuous prices are “nonmonotonic,” in the sense that they do not follow a consistent informational pattern. The economic mechanisms explaining such inconsistency hinges on Bayesian updating, which identifies the process through which rational investors update their beliefs about firm value. See Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications, 12 BELL J. ECON. 380, 380 (1981). Because investors cannot observe project selection by management (i.e., the moral hazard problem), they may rationally infer that the manager is “bad” upon observing low earnings at the interim stage, although such an outcome may be due to an investment in a long-term project by a “good” manager (i.e., the adverse selection problem). See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 115-19, 241-44 (2006) (discussing basic moral hazard and adverse selection models). In the long term, however, if the manager is good, it is likely that hard information on the long-term project will become available (i.e., the long-term project begins to pay back). Accordingly, the investors will change their belief about the quality of the manager (i.e., from bad to good) and, in turn, the share price will increase. See BRUNNERMEIER, ASSET PRICING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 16-20 (2001) (providing an exhaustive discussion of the relationship between asset pricing and asymmetric information).

137 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 359 (2009); COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT 246-47 (2013); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 7 (2010). But see Jessie Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L. J. 1554, 1560 (2015).

B. E-Index Provisions and Data Description

Turning to our empirical analysis of corporate governance, we begin by briefly reviewing the specific institutional mechanisms that, according to BCF, would explain why each of the six E-Index provisions causes entrenchment. Understanding those institutional mechanisms is important as they underlie the broader policy implications BCF derive from the results obtained for the E-Index. After that, we present the data for our empirical investigation of those provisions.

1. E-Index Provisions

(a) Staggered Boards. Unlike in a unitary board, where directors serve a one-year term, in a staggered board directors are grouped into different classes (usually three), with each class standing for reelection in successive years. When the staggering provision is in the charter, as is typical, this requires challengers in a proxy contest to win at least two election cycles to gain a board majority. The costs this delay raises for the challenger would explain why staggered boards have come to be regarded as a “powerful defense against removal” of incumbents.

(c) Supermajority requirements. Similar to staggered boards, supermajority requirements would limit the ability of shareholders to use voting rights “to have their way” in corporate affairs. In particular, supermajority requirements to amend the bylaws (“supermajority bylaws”) could considerably strengthen the effectiveness of a target’s defenses, preventing challengers from removing defenses that incumbents previously placed in the bylaws. Supermajority requirement to amend the charter (“supermajority charter”) and supermajority requirements for mergers (“supermajority mergers”) are instead described by BCF as providing “a second line of defense” against takeovers by allowing insiders with a control block to defeat charter amendments or mergers even if they have lost control of the board.

(b) Poison Pills. A poison pill consists of stock purchase rights, which are granted to existing shareholders in the event a corporate rider accumulates more than a certain threshold of outstanding stock and which entitle the shareholders (but not the rider) to acquire newly issued stock at a substantial discount from the market price.

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139 A unitary board structure is the default in all states, except for Massachusetts, Indiana, and Iowa, where the default is reversed. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 156D, § 8.06 (b)-(g) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011); IND. CODE. ANN. § 23-1-33-6(c) (LexisNexis 2010); IOWA CODE § 490.806A (Supp. 2011).

140 See Richard H. Koppe et al., Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate Over Classified Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1029 fn. 29.

141 Dismantling a staggered board established in the charter, rather than the bylaws, involves the coordinated action of the board and the shareholders, as charter amendments can only be initiated by the board and require shareholder approval. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 242(b) (2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (1999).

142 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 791.

143 See id.

144 See id., at 792.

145 See id.

146 See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Share Purchase Rights Plans, in RONALD J. GILSON
Hence, by significantly diluting a bidder’s economic rights, a poison pill prevents hostile bidders from being successful unless the bidder can have the pill redeemed by a majority of newly appointed directors. However, if the target also has a staggered board in place, a bidder is required to wait through two annual elections before being able to do so. This would explain why poison pills are generally regarded as having “considerably strengthened the protection against replacement that incumbents have.”

(d) Golden Parachutes. A golden parachute is an executive pay component that entitles its beneficiaries to substantial payments following a change in control of their company, “sweetening” the adverse effects such a change imposes on management. While recognizing the existence of several explanations for the adoption of golden parachutes, BCF state that they “might have an adverse effect by increasing slack on the part of managers as a result of being less subject to discipline by the market for corporate control.”

2. Data Description

Our data for examining the E-Index provisions comes from several sources, with the overall data sample covering 2,186 large publicly traded U.S. firms for the time period 1978-2008. In particular, we obtain data for Poison Pill, SM Charter, SM Bylaws, SM Merger, and Parachutes (all indicator variables for the presence of the respective governance provision) from two main sources. For the time period 1990-2008, we use the corporate governance dataset maintained by Risk Metrics, which acquired the former Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). For the time period 1978-1989, we use a dataset constructed by one of us for an earlier coauthored study that provides information on the same provisions tracked by the IRRC for the period 1990-2008, including the five provisions of interest. For Staggered Board (an indicator variable for the presence of a staggered board), we instead obtain data for the entire 1978-2008 period from the dataset used in the Cremers-Sepe study. As in the BCF study, in employing these provisions to construct the E-Index, we give equal weight to all provisions, attributing one point for each provision a firm has.

Since our main focus is on the value relevance of corporate governance, the main dependent variable in our analysis is firm value. Consistent with many prior studies.

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147 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 792.
149 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 792.
150 See id. at 793.
151 Variables are briefly explained in Appendix Table A and descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix Table B.
152 BCF also use data from IRRC for the period 1990-2002. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 796-97.
153 See Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 129, at 1168.
154 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 23.
investigating the relationship between governance arrangements and firm value, including the BCF study, we measure firm value using Tobin’s Q ($Q$),\(^{155}\) retrieving data from Compustat.

Finally, to control for factors other than the adoption of the six provisions included in the E-Index that could have an impact on firm value, we always include the following standard controls using Compustat data: the log of the book value of total assets ($\text{Assets}$), the return on assets calculated as the ratio of the firm’s EBITDA over the book value of total assets ($\text{ROA}$), the ratio of capital expenditures over the book value of total assets ($\text{CAPX}$), the ratio of research and development expenditures over sales ($\text{R&D}$), and, finally, a proxy of M&A activity at the industry level ($\text{Industry M&A Volume}$).\(^{156}\)

C. Incidence of the E-Index Provisions

We begin our reexamination of the E-Index by documenting the incidence of each of its six components in our sample of firms in Figure 1 below.


\(^{156}\)In the cross-sectional analysis, we also include a control for whether the firm is incorporated in Delaware. See infra Table 1. In the time-series analysis, we omit this control, as it is absorbed by the control for firm fixed effects, i.e., the inclusion of a dummy variable for each firm. See *id.* Further, as standard in the literature, we also exclude firms with a dual class structure, as concentrated ownership tends to insulate managers and renders other protective features relatively unimportant. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 797. We also exclude financial firms, as the corporate governance of such firms suffers due to heavy federal regulation. While we keep real estate investment trusts (REITS) (i.e., firms with a SIC Code of 6798) in our data, running our regressions on a subset excluding REITS yields similar results throughout. This excludes that REITs’ special governance features may drive our results.
We observe that since the mid-1980s, staggered boards, poison pills, and golden parachutes have been the most largely used among the E-Index provisions. In particular, staggered boards and poison pills are characterized by a similar pattern. They both exhibit a slow trend from 1978 to 1984, which rapidly accelerates starting in 1985 and lasts until the early 1990s. This seems not coincidental as the Delaware courts first made clear that the use of the pill was legitimate in the 1985 decision of *Moran v. Household International, Inc.* With that legitimacy, the combined use of a staggered board and a poison pill acquired new force as a powerful antitakeover defense. Both staggered boards and poison pills then stabilized in the 2000s, hovering at rates around 60% and 55% respectively. After 2006, they both begin to decline. For poison pills, however, this data needs to be interpreted with caution, as a board of directors can unilaterally adopt a

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157 500 A.2d 1346 (Del 1985). Under *Moran*, Delaware directors were subjected to the heightened form of judicial review established in *Unocal*, under which they need to prove the reasonableness and good faith of their actions. See *Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.*, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). That constraint, however, disappeared in the 1989 decision of *Paramount v. Time*, which substantially gave directors the right to maintain a poison pill indefinitely, essentially providing them with the ability to “just say no” to unsolicited bid acquisitions. See *Paramount v. Time*, 571 A2d 1140, 1154 (Del 1989).

158 See John C. Coates IV, *Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence*, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 271, 326 (2000) (suggesting that “[i]t was largely for this reason that the pill was invented.”)
pill at any time, so that it has become common in the literature to refer to the existence of “shadow” poison pills. Hence, the fact that after 2006 fewer firms in our samples have a poison pill cannot be unequivocally interpreted as indicating a declining use of such provisions. At best, one can infer a decline in the use of “visible” poison pills.

Concerning golden parachutes, we first observe a steady increase during the period 1978-1989—from virtually no firms in our sample having a golden parachute in 1978 to about 52% of the firms in our sample having such a provision in 1989. As the period 1978-1989 roughly coincides with the takeover era, the observed pattern would seem to lend support to the BCF’s hypothesis that golden parachutes serve as an anti-takeover defense. From 1989 to 1997, the ratio of firms with a golden parachute slightly declines, while it begins to increase again starting in 1998 (although with a more discontinuous pattern than that observed during the 1978-1989 period), reaching 77% in 2008. The more recent rise in the use of golden parachutes seems more difficult to reconcile with BCF’s anti-takeover hypothesis. An alternative explanation for this rise, as suggested by one of us elsewhere, is increased competition among firms, which may justify the attribution of a parachute to managers even in firms that are less exposed to the risk of a change in control.

Concerning supermajority requirements, SM Charter registers a very low incidence throughout our entire sample period, hovering at a rate between 3% and 9%. SM Bylaws also remain relatively stable, in the 15-20% range, throughout our entire 1978-2008 period (except for three years, from 1980 to 1982, where they fall below 10%). SM Merger, instead, exhibits a different pattern. Until the mid-1980s, SM Merger accounted for the most widely used E-Index provision, whose incidence largely surpassed that of any other index provisions, including staggered boards. After 1978, however, the incidence of SM Merger begins to decline, stabilizing at a rate around 40% in the 1990s and further declining in the 2000s.

These patterns seem to suggest that staggered boards and poison pills have progressively come to dominate supermajority requirements, and especially SM Merger, as defensive measures. Before the pill’s development in the 1980s, the deterrent effect of a staggered board is regarded as having been limited, because its adoption could not prevent a bidder from acquiring a large block of shares; it could only delay a bidder’s

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159 See id. at 289 (arguing that since the endorsement of the pill by Delaware courts, “all Delaware firms … have had a shadow pill in place, witting or not.”)
160 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
161 See Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 149, at 24 (suggesting that in a market in which most boards are willing to offer a chute to executives, failure to do so may reduce a firm’s competitiveness in targeting the best hires).
162 BCF also document a low incidence of supermajority requirements for charter in their sample. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 798.
163 See Coates, supra note 159, at 323.
ability to exercise voting control.\textsuperscript{165} This tactical weakness increased the defensive value of supermajority requirements.\textsuperscript{166} After the introduction of the pill, however, supermajority requirements lost much of their defensive value, as a pill on its own could now deter any bid that such requirements would deter.\textsuperscript{167} Some scholars have thus argued that after the pill, the presence or absence of supermajority requirements has become irrelevant, with the results that most of these measures have disappeared.\textsuperscript{168} Yet, while we find that the incidence of \textit{SM Merger} declines after the introduction of the pill, these provisions seem far from disappearing. Moreover, this account seems also unable to explain the stable pattern we observe in our sample for \textit{SM Bylaws}.

\textbf{D. Corporate Governance and Firm Value}

Moving to the core of our empirical analysis, in this Section we estimate the impact of the \textit{E-Index} and each of its constituent provisions on firm value, presenting results for both cross-sectional and time-series analyses. As discussed earlier, both analyses are directed at verifying whether the \textit{E-Index}'s theoretical proposition—that incumbents protection from removal epitomizes bad governance—holds over a much longer sample period. However, the use of a time-series analysis is better suited to mitigate possible endogeneity concerns as it incorporates firm fixed effects.\textsuperscript{169}

\textit{1. Cross-sectional Results}

Table 1 presents our results for the cross-section of firms, including control for both industry and year fixed effects. Column (1) present results for the association between the \textit{E-Index} and firm value (i.e., \(Q\)). Columns (2) through (7), instead, present results for the association between the single index provisions and firm value, to explore the possibility that not all of the index provisions contribute—or contribute analogously—to the aggregate index’s relation to firm value.\textsuperscript{170} For added robustness, in Column (8) we also verify the impact on \(Q\) of each \textit{E-Index} provision while controlling for the other index provisions.

We also note that in this table and Table 2 that follows, we show the absolute value of the t-statistics of all coefficients\textsuperscript{171} based on both robust standard errors that (i) are not clustered, as in BCF, and (ii) that are clustered, as it has become standard in more recent empirical studies. Indeed, the use of clustered standard errors is important because

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{166}In particular, Coates suggests that supermajority mergers provided a valuable defense against coercive two-tiered tender offers—involving a higher initial offer for a number of shares sufficient to acquire control, followed by a lower offer for the remaining outstanding shares. See Coates, supra note 159, at 321.
\item \textsuperscript{167}See \textit{id.} at 322-23.
\item \textsuperscript{168}See \textit{id.} at 324-25.
\item \textsuperscript{169}See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{170}See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 805-06.
\item \textsuperscript{171}T-statistics conventionally indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. This means that the null hypothesis (the hypothesis that an independent variable has no impact on a dependent variable) cannot be rejected with a probability of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. In statistics, when the significance level is above 10%, it is standard to consider the result to be statistically insignificant or uninformative.
\end{itemize}
it addresses within-firm dependence, or correlations between observations of the same firm across years.\footnote{See Mitchell A. Petersen, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Set: Comparing Approaches, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 435, 435 (2009).}

**Table 1. Firm Value and E-Index Provisions: Cross-sectional Analysis**

In this table, we present the cross-sectional association between firm value and the level of the E-Index or its six constituent provisions, using pooled panel regressions of $Q$ on the E-Index or its provisions with year and industry fixed effects (4-digit SIC) plus a set of standard controls: Assets, Delaware Incorporation, ROA, CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. All columns use the full time period of 1978-2008, except Columns (2) and (3), which use data for 1978-2011. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by $^{***}$, $^{**}$, and $^*$, respectively. We provide two t-statistics below each regression coefficient, namely first the t-statistic based on robust standard errors that are not clustered and, second, the t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. The statistical significance indicated by $^{***}$, $^{**}$, and $^*$, refers to the first coefficient in parenthesis (i.e., robust standard error that are not clustered).

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Consistent with BCF, in Column 1 we document that the cross-sectional
coefficient on E-Index is negative and statistically significant—suggesting that firms with more entrenchment experience a reduction in value as compared to firms with less entrenchment.\textsuperscript{173}

As shown in Column (2) through (7), the cross-sectional coefficients of the single index provisions are likewise negative. The coefficients are also statistically significant for all provisions except SM Charter, which could be explained by the low incidence of such provision throughout our sample.\textsuperscript{174} However, when we use robust standard errors clustered at firm level, both the coefficients of SM Merger and SM Bylaws become insignificant.\textsuperscript{175} The statistical significance of the cross-sectional coefficients of the single provisions is reduced even more when we control for the other E-Index provisions (shown in Column (8)). In particular, both the coefficients of SM Merger and SM Charter become insignificant. With clustering, the effect is even more evident, with all the coefficients becoming insignificant, but for those on Poison Pill and Parachutes. This seems to suggest that these two provisions largely drive the negative cross-sectional association of the E-Index with firm value.\textsuperscript{176}

2. Time-Series Results

Table 2 presents results for regressions that replace industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects, examining the association between firm value and changes that firms made in the E-Index provisions during the 1978-2008 period. Column (1) presents results for the association between E-Index and firm value, Columns (2) through (7) present results for the association between each of the E-Index provisions and firm value, and Column (8) simultaneously considers all six E-Index provisions.

\textsuperscript{173} Economically, firms with an E-Index that is a standard deviation higher than the mean tend to have a level of $Q$ that is 4.4% lower relative to firms with an E-Index and $Q$ that are at the mean. We calculate this economic significance as follows. First, we multiply the E-Index coefficient of $-0.0453$ times the standard deviation of E-Index of 1.37, and then divide this by 1.69, which is the average $Q$ in the sample. We also observe that the coefficient’s estimate on E-Index remains statistically significant based on using robust standard errors clustered at firm level, although the t-statistic decreases from 11.45 to 5.57.

\textsuperscript{174} See supra text accompanying note 162.

\textsuperscript{175} The t-statistics statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm of -0.95 for SM Merger and -1.57 for SM Bylaws are less significant than 10% confidence level and, in turn, are considered statistically insignificant. See supra note 171.

\textsuperscript{176} Given the effect of clustering standard errors by firm on our cross-sectional results, a note on its use seems worthwhile. Using standard errors that are clustered by firm accounts for the tendency of governance provisions to be quite stable across time, whereas using standard errors that are not clustered amounts to assuming that observations for a given firm are independent across time. This independence assumption, however, has come to be recognized as inappropriate today, as it ignores a strong dependency of governance provisions across time for individual firms. See Petersen, supra note 172, at 405. This means that using more conservative robust standard errors that are clustered by firm is more reflective of the actual confidence we can have in reported estimates. Accordingly, the fact that all cross-sectional coefficients—except Poison Pill and Parachutes—become insignificant upon clustering standard errors by firm (and controlling for the use of other E-Index provisions) seems to deliver a different picture of incumbent protection from removal than that described by BCF.
### Table 2. Firm Value and the E-Index Provisions: Time-series Analysis

In this table, we present the time series association between firm value and the level of the E-Index and its six constituent governance provisions, using pooled panel regressions of $Q$ on the E-Index or its provision(s) with year and firm fixed effects plus a set of standard controls: Assets, ROA, CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. All columns use the full time period of 1978-2008, except Columns (2) and (3), which use data for 1978-2011. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. We provide two t-statistics below each regression coefficient, namely first the t-statistic based on robust standard errors that are not clustered and, second, the t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. The statistical significance indicated by ***, **, and *, refers to the first coefficient in parenthesis (i.e., robust standard error that are not clustered).

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<tr>
<td><strong>Parachutes</strong></td>
<td>-0.0497***</td>
<td>(-4.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Year + Firm</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>21,414</td>
<td>28,281</td>
<td>27,818</td>
<td>21,455</td>
<td>21,555</td>
<td>21,840</td>
<td>24,348</td>
<td>21,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R-sq</strong></td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.734</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td>0.744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown by Table 2, in the firm fixed effect regressions, the coefficient of $E$-
Index remains negative, but becomes statistically insignificant based on using robust standard errors clustered at firm level.\footnote{The t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm of -1.07 for E-Index is less significant than 10% confidence level and then considered statistically insignificant. \textit{See supra} note 172.} This suggests that once correlations between observations of the same firm across years is taken into account,\footnote{\textit{See supra} note 176.} there is no statistically significant evidence that firm value increases as the level of the E-Index decreases (nor, correspondently, that firm value decreases as the level of the E-Index increases).

Columns (2) through (7) document our most striking results. Consistent with the Cremers-Sepe study documenting a positive role of staggered boards, Column (2) shows a statistically significant positive time series association between Staggered Board and Q.\footnote{\textit{See} Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 29, Table 1.} The economic magnitude of this positive association is also considerable, suggesting that the adoption of a staggered board is associated with an increase in firm value of 4.2%.\footnote{The economic significance of the time series impact of Staggered Board on Q is obtained by dividing the regression coefficient of 0.0706 by the sample average Q during 1978-2008 of 1.69.} The coefficient of Staggered Board remains statistically strongly significant even using robust standard errors clustered at firm level. Similarly, Columns (4) and (6) show a positive coefficient on SM Charter and SM Merger, although both coefficients become statistically insignificant when we use clustering by firm.\footnote{The t-statistics statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm of 1.21 for SM Charter and of 0.82 for SM Merger are less significant than 10% confidence level and then considered statistically insignificant. \textit{See supra} note 172.}

Conversely, the coefficients on Poison Pill, SM Bylaws, and Parachutes remain negative. The economic magnitude of these negative associations is also considerable, especially for Poison Pill and Parachutes. Indeed, the adoption of a poison pill is associated with a decrease in firm value of 2.0%,\footnote{The t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm of -1.58 for Poison Pill is close but marginally lower than being significant at 10% confidence level.} which remains marginally statistically significant when we use robust standard errors clustered at firm level.\footnote{The economic significance of the time series impact of Poison Pill on Q is obtained by dividing the regression coefficient of - 0.034 by the sample average Q during 1978-2008 of 1.69.} The adoption of a golden parachute is associated with a similar decrease in firm value of 2%,\footnote{The economic significance of the time series impact of Parachutes on Q is obtained by dividing the regression coefficient of - 0.0497 by the sample average Q during 1978-2008 of 1.69.} which remains statistically significant when we used robust standard errors clustered at firm level.

Importantly, the results for both the E-index provisions exhibiting a positive impact and a negative impact on firm value are confirmed in Column (8), where we simultaneously consider the time series association with firm value for all six E-Index provisions—with most coefficients becoming considerably stronger. The exception is SM Merger, whose coefficient decreases (from 0.0269 in Column (2) to 0.0117 in Column (8)). This suggests that the adoption of supermajority mergers serves a function
to some extent independent of the adoption of a staggered board, in contrast to what argued by some corporate law scholars.\textsuperscript{185}

Empirically, the conflicting signs of the cross-sectional versus the time series results for \textit{Staggered Boards}, \textit{SM Charter}, and \textit{SM Merger} seem to suggest that the cross-sectional results for these provisions may be due to reverse causality. In other words, a relatively low firm value would induce firms to adopt such provisions, rather than the other way around.\textsuperscript{186} Most importantly, from an institutional perspective, our time-series evidence challenges BCF’s postulate that any form of protection from removal is a logical antecedent to managerial moral hazard, documenting that half of the E-Index provisions are associated with an increase, rather than a decrease, in firm value. Thus, as we explain in the following Section, the problem seems not to lie with incumbent protection from removal \textit{per se}, but rather in the form this protection takes.

3. “Dictatorial” and “Republican” Protection Arrangements

Shareholder advocates, starting with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, have consistently portrayed the shareholder-centric model as an efficient form of direct corporate democracy, while portraying the board-centric model as an inefficient corporate dictatorship, where incumbents can arbitrarily secure their protection from removal at the expense of shareholders.\textsuperscript{187} This stylized representation of incumbent protection, however, is ill suited to capture all the governance arrangements included in the E-Index. Indeed, it fails to consider that some of these arrangements are premised on prior shareholder agreement, consistent with republican organizational principles, under which any form of power is bilateral and only vested in the elected representatives with the prior agreement of voters.

This more nuanced representation of incumbent protection from removal is well suited to capture the difference between E-Index provisions with a negative and positive time series association with firm value, respectively. Poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority bylaws all share the features of unilateral—and thus “dictatorial”—governance provisions. The board of directors can unilaterally adopt poison pills and golden parachutes, even against shareholder opposition.\textsuperscript{188} Similarly, in most companies, the initial charter tends to grant directors a unilateral right to amend the bylaws.\textsuperscript{189} Although this practice cannot divest shareholders of their own unilateral right

\textsuperscript{185} See supra text accompanying notes 168.


\textsuperscript{187} See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.

\textsuperscript{188} See Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 809; see also Coates, supra note 159, at 287 n. 62 (“Technically, pill adoption is a dividend of rights to purchase stock. Dividends . . . are within the authority of the board and do not require shareholder approval.”).

\textsuperscript{189} See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 109(a).
to amend the bylaws (which, under Delaware law, is the default), the power attributed to directors becomes virtually exclusive when the exercise of the concurrent shareholders’ right is subject to a supermajority requirement. Indeed, under these combined governance arrangements, if the directors decide to amend the bylaws—for example to add a provision that delays a bidder’s ability to replace a majority of the board—it becomes much more difficult for the shareholders to reverse that decision. This is especially true considering that the size of supermajority requirements is often very high, up to 90-95 percent.

Conversely, staggered boards, supermajority charter, and supermajority mergers embody bilateral—and thus “republican”—governance provisions as they are all premised on shareholder consent. In virtually all U.S. states, shareholder approval is required to adopt a staggered board. Further, while the board retains exclusive power to initiate a charter amendment, shareholder approval is required. Accordingly, rules for charter amendments are described as being characterized by a bilateral veto, i.e., neither the shareholders nor the board can amend the charter alone. The same logic of granting shareholders a veto right over fundamental corporate transactions explains the requirement of shareholder approval for mergers.

Distinguishing between unilateral and bilateral protection arrangements explain our time-series results. On the one hand, unilateral protection arrangements that can be adopted without any dialectical confrontation with the shareholders are more likely to be motivated by managerial moral hazard—consistent with the negative association with firm value that we document. On the other hand, bilateral protection arrangements that require the prior agreement of shareholders seem to serve a constructive governance role—as we document that their adoption has a strongly positive association with firm value.

We argue that this positive role is mitigating the limited commitment problem. Such a problem, as discussed earlier, is the result of the inability of public shareholders vested with strong exit rights and faced with discontinuous market prices to credibly commit to longer-term projects and stable stakeholder relationships, at the expense of firm profitability and, ultimately, their own interests. Staggered boards help mitigate the limited commitment problem by serving as a unique commitment device that makes it

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190 See id.
191 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(4).
193 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2010). The notable exception is Maryland, where the board has the unilateral power to adopt a staggered board. See MD. CORP. & ASSOC. CODE § 3-803 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
194 See supra note 141.
196 See id.
197 See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
more difficult for shareholders to renege on prior long-term engagements and interfere with directorial and management decisions in the short-term.\textsuperscript{198}

Along the same lines, supermajority charter and supermajority mergers provisions add to a firm’s commitment to the longer term by introducing a bias in favor of institutional stability.\textsuperscript{199} Indeed, requiring that changes to basic institutional rules (such as those included in a firm’s charter or regulating the approval of mergers) receive both board support and overwhelming shareholder consensus helps promote the organizational conservatism\textsuperscript{200} that is necessary to strengthen a firm’s commitment towards longer-term stakeholder relationship and value creation.

\section*{IV. The Value of Commitment}

Our analysis of the E-Index, which expands the original analysis carried out by BCF over thirty years of corporate governance, challenges the proposition that any form of incumbent protection from removal is detrimental to shareholder value. Contrary to this proposition, our time series results suggest that only unilateral protection arrangements, which the board can adopt without the need for shareholder approval, result in value-decreasing entrenchment, or bad governance.\textsuperscript{201} Instead, bilateral protection arrangements, which require the mutual agreement of the board and the shareholders, promote beneficial commitment to longer-term value creation and stronger stakeholder relationships, or good governance.\textsuperscript{202}

In this Part, we put our novel account of what matters in corporate governance to further empirical testing. First, we decompose the E-Index into two separate sub-indices: a \textit{commitment index} (or, more briefly, C-Index), only including the E-Index’s three bilateral provisions, and an \textit{incumbent index} (or, more briefly, I-Index), only including the E-Index’s three unilateral provisions. If our account of corporate governance is correct, we expect to find that increased scores on the C-Index (i.e., more commitment) are associated with increases in firm value. Conversely, increased scores on the I-Index (i.e., more entrenchment) should be associated with decreases in firm value. Second, we verify whether the use of bilateral protection arrangements is more valuable in firms where the limited commitment problem appears to be more severe, as predicted by our theory. As discussed below, for both inquiries, we find results that strongly support our novel account of incumbent protection from removal.

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{199} This is a classic argument in political science for the adoption of supermajority requirements. \textit{See} \textsc{Melissa Schwartzberg}, \textsc{Counting the Many: The Origins and the Limits of Supermajority Rule} 7-9, 125-33 (2014) (stating that modern supermajority rules are primarily regarded as a remedy against the “instability” of majority rules).

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Cf. id.} at 127 (“Stable institutions afford us the security of expectations …. By protecting the institutions that “constitute” our political arrangements, we can enable ordinary political life … without constantly renegotiating the “rules of the game.”)

\textsuperscript{201} \textit{See supra} text accompanying notes 188-92.

\textsuperscript{202} \textit{See supra} text accompanying notes 193-96.
A. The Commitment Index and the Incumbent Index

In this Section we test the value associations of two sub-indices of the E-Index: the commitment index (C-Index), which is meant to capture the level of shareholder commitment to the long-term, and the incumbent index (I-Index), which is meant to capture a firm’s level of entrenchment.

Table 3 presents our results. Columns (1) through (3) present results for our full period, 1978-2008. After that, we perform sub-sample analyses to establish the robustness of our results across different sample periods. Specifically, Columns (4) through (6) present results for the first part of our sample, 1978-1993, while Columns (7) through (9) present results for the second part of our sample, 1994-2008. For all columns of this table, we include year and fixed effects and provide the t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered at firm level.

Table 3. Firm Value, the C-Index, and the I-Index
In this table, we present the time series association between firm value and the level of the C-Index and the I-Index, using pooled panel regressions of $Q$ on each index with year and firm fixed effects plus a set of standard controls: Assets, ROA, CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. The first three columns use the full time period of 1978-2008, Columns (4) – (6) use data for 1978-1993, and Columns (7) – (9) for 1994-2008. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by “***”, “**”, and “”, respectively, based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dep. Variable: $Q$</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time Period:</td>
<td>Time Period:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Indep. Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Index</td>
<td>0.0508**</td>
<td>0.0610**</td>
<td>0.0164</td>
<td>0.0141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.04)</td>
<td>(2.45)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-Index</td>
<td>-0.0432***</td>
<td>-0.0496***</td>
<td>0.0108</td>
<td>0.0109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.81)</td>
<td>(-3.19)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects:</strong></td>
<td>Year + Firm</td>
<td>N: 21,438</td>
<td>21,555</td>
<td>21,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.828</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consistent with our commitment theory of bilateral protection arrangements, in Column (1), which shows results for our full sample, we document a statistically significant positive time series association between C-Index and $Q$. The economic magnitude of this positive association is also considerable, suggesting that a unit increase in C-Index is associated with an increase in firm value of 3%. Correspondently, in Column (2), which shows the time series relation between firm value and I-Index for our full sample, we document a statistically significant negative time series association between I-Index and $Q$. The economic magnitude of this negative association is also

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203 The economic significance of the impact of C-Index on $Q$ is obtained by dividing the regression coefficient of 0.0508 by the sample average $Q$ during 1978-2008 of 1.69.
considerable, suggesting that a unit increase in I-Index is associated with a decrease in firm value of 2.6%.\footnote{The economic significance of the impact of I-Index on $Q$ is obtained by dividing the regression coefficient of -0.0432 by the sample average $Q$ during 1978-2008 of 1.69.} These results are confirmed by Column (3), where we simultaneously consider both indices, finding that the C-Index continues to have a statistically significant positive time series association with $Q$, while the I-Index continues to have a statistically significant negative time series association with $Q$\footnote{As we show in Appendix Table C, the results in Table 3 are not all driven by time variation in Staggered Board, Poison Pill and Parachutes, even if those three provisions have the most time variation (as shown in Figure 1) and have the strongest time series association with firm value (as documented in Table 2). Columns (1) and (3) of Appendix Table C shows that adoption of SM Charter is associated with an increase in $Q$, but primarily for firms without a staggered board. Columns (2) and (3) show a similar result for SM Merger, albeit with lower economic significance and without statistical significance. In Columns (4) and (6), we find a strong negative association between adopting SM Bylaw and $Q$, but only for firms that also have adopted a poison pill, suggesting a strong complementarity. Finally, as shown in Columns (5) and (6) of Appendix Table C, golden parachutes and poison pills appear to be substitutes, as we find that the adoption of Parachutes is strongly negatively related to $Q$, but only for firms that have not adopted a poison pill.}.

Results for the sub-period 1978-1993, shown in Columns (4) through (6), are considerably different. Indeed, all the C-Index and the I-Index coefficients—whether used singularly or simultaneously—become economically smaller and statistically insignificant. Conversely, results for the sub-period 1994-2008 are even stronger than the results we obtain for the full 1978-2008 period. As shown in Column (7), the coefficient of C-Index is positive and statistically significant, and almost twice the coefficient of C-Index for our full time period. Economically, this means that a unit increase in C-Index is associated with an increase in firm value of 5.2% during the 1994-2008 time period. Concerning the coefficient of I-Index, as shown in Column (8), it remains negative, although is only marginally significant. This could potentially be explained by more limited within-firm variation in the I-Index over this time period. Finally, as shown in Column (9), where we verify the contemporaneous impact of the two indices during 1994-2008, we similarly find that that the coefficient of C-Index is positive and statistically significant and that the coefficient of I-Index is negative and statistically significant.

Overall, the results of Table 3 suggest that the divide between good and bad governance practices—as embodied by bilateral protection arrangements and unilateral protection arrangements, respectively—has only emerged in the past two decades. Conversely, before the mid-1990s, firms’ governance quality seems best understood as context-specific, where heterogeneity in governance arrangements may have reflected firms’ idiosyncratic features. Indeed, the insignificance of the results using the 1978-1993 period is not just of a statistical nature, but also economical, as shown by the small (in absolute value) coefficients. This raises the question of what caused corporate governance to transition from a system in which best practices exhibited highly customized features to one in which bilateral protection arrangements seem to represent an appropriate set of best practices for most firms—and, conversely, unilateral protection
arrangements seem to represent universally bad practices. We turn to that question next.

B. The Dynamics of Incumbent Protection

The erosion of the traditional board-centric model due to the rise of shareholder power—which started in the mid-1990s with the emergence of institutional investor ownership—seems to provide a plausible answer to the question of what caused bilateral protection arrangements to progressively gain systematic value as best practices. With its strong focus on board authority and the central discretionary function of management over capital (i.e., shareholders), the traditional, managerialist model of U.S. corporations was well suited to constrain the distortions arising from the limited commitment problem. Indeed, under these organizational principles, directors were naturally empowered to resist short-term shareholder and market pressure. This, in turn, could explain why the benefits arising from the adoption of bilateral protection arrangements do not exhibit a systematic nature under that model. In the shareholder empowerment era, however, U.S. corporate boards have grown increasingly disempowered vis-à-vis shareholders. As a result, the limited commitment problem emerges as much more severe today. This could explain why the adoption of governance arrangements fostering commitment to the long-term has become systematically valuable in more recent times. In other words, bilateral protection arrangements would have emerged as a means to re-empower boards—with the agreement and in the longer-term interest of shareholders—to constrain the distortions arising from the limited commitment problem.

As to unilateral protection arrangements, such as poison pills and golden parachutes, one possible explanation for their emergence after 1993 as seemingly universally bad practices relates to changes in takeover activity. During the takeover era, it was more likely that the need to address an actual takeover threat motivated the adoption of a poison pill. To the extent that such a threat could jeopardize a firm’s commitment to long-term value creation, a poison pill could provide incumbents with an exceptional remedy—to be added on top of already empowered boards—to force investors to be “patient.” With the end of the hostile takeover era in the mid-1990s, however, similar threats have become much less frequent, making it more likely that the adoption of a poison pill may be motivated by managerial moral hazard.

207 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
209 As observed by Delaware Justice Jack Jacobs, in the management corporation directors could force investors to “patiently ‘sit still’” for the time required to “to innovate new products, to bring those products to market, and to plan for the long-term”. Jacobs, supra note 59, at 1646-49.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
211 In the Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling of the Paramount v. Time takeover case (later affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court), Chancellor Allen provided a similar motivation. See In re Time Incorporated Shareholder Litigation, Del.Ch., C.A. No. 10670, Allen, C., 1989 WL 79880 (July 14, 1989). Framing the case as hinging on whether Time’s directors were allowed to accept less current value today in the hope of greater value in the future, Chancellor Allen ruled in favor of the board’s use of the pill as a manifestation of the board’s willingness to manage the corporation for the long-term profit. See id.
It is important to emphasize, however, that so far, for simplicity and empirical tractability, we have assumed that a firm is to adopt only good or bad governance arrangements. In actuality, however, it will often be the case that a firm has some good arrangements and some bad ones. For example, a firm might have adopted—as often happens in practice—both a staggered board and a poison pill. How should one interpret this organizational variant under our account of corporate governance? Our analysis of the results obtained for the I-Index suggests that evaluation of this variant should turn on whether any actual takeover threat justifies the adoption of a pill to strengthen the long-term commitment device provided by a staggered board. A recent case on point is the use by takeover target Airgas of a poison pill to defeat AirProduct’s attempt to win over the company. After a battle that drew massive investor attention, Airgas was able to successfully fend off AirProduct’s offer following a ruling by the Delaware’ Chancery Court that upheld the company’s use of the pill as consistent with the objective of long-term value creation. Tellingly, in the months after the ruling, Airgas’ stock price rose steadily, validating the view of the Airgas staggered board that the use of the pill was necessary to defend the company’s “commitment to creating shareholder value through the disciplined execution of core business strategies.”

Finally, concerning the use of golden parachutes, we emphasize that the 2010 introduction by the Dodd-Frank Act of “Say-on-Golden-Parachute” rules has weakened the unilateral nature of these provisions. Pursuant to Section 951 of the Act, all U.S. public companies are now required to conduct a non-binding shareholder advisory vote on parachute payouts in connection with mergers and other significant corporate transactions that are presented to the shareholders for approval. Our account of corporate governance suggests that by introducing an element of dialectical confrontation with the shareholders, this legal change could potentially serve to mitigate the likelihood that golden parachutes be primarily motivated by managerial moral hazard. Consistent with this hypothesis, one of us has argued elsewhere—with the support of empirical evidence for the period 2007-2012—that golden parachutes have grown into a governance arrangement designed to ensure managers will benefit from the

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213 The Delaware Chancery Court initially upheld a shareholder-initiated bylaw amendment that accelerated the date of Airgas’ next annual shareholder meeting—substantially shortening the two-annual-meeting delay forced on AirProduct by Airgas’ staggered board. See Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., C.A. No. 5817-CC, 2010 WL 3960599, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2010). About a month later, however, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancery decision and held that measures designed to shorten the terms of service of staggered directors were impermissible. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., C.A. No. 5817-CC, 2010 WL 3960599, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2010).


long-term value of their specific investments, even if their company is later acquired.\textsuperscript{216} As encouraging managers to specifically invest in the firm is essential to creating and sustaining firm value over time, the benefits derived from such assurance would accrue to managers and shareholders alike, which could explain why the use of golden parachutes kept increasing after 2008.\textsuperscript{217}

C. Managerial and Stakeholder Engagement

Our results for the C-Index and the I-Index largely downplay the relevance of incumbent protection from removal that is detrimental to shareholder interests. That protection appears to be beneficial to shareholder and societal interests, as long as it takes a republican form—empowering boards to resist short-term market pressure with the prior agreement of shareholders (or even without shareholder agreement if this is justified by exceptional circumstances).

As a further test to our novel account of incumbent protection from removal, in this Section we verify the channels through which the republican board-centric model would add corporate value: the pursuit of long-term projects and firm-specific stakeholder investments. Empirically, if our theoretical account is correct, we would expect to find that the adoption of bilateral protection arrangements is more strongly associated with increases in firm value in firms whose corporate production depends on long-term innovation and the participation of stakeholders, including creditors.

1. Innovation and Stakeholder Participation

Our theoretical account predicts that firms that are more involved in long-term innovation and where stronger firm-specific investments by non-financial stakeholders (such as customers and employees) are likely to be more important should be affected by a more severe limited commitment problem. Indeed, information about investments in innovation tends to be “soft,” that is, mostly limited to firm insiders and hence less accurately captured by market prices in the short term.\textsuperscript{218} This increases the risk that shareholders may misinterpret a short-term drop in profits to be a sign of underperformance when, instead, it reflects the expenses of an attractive investment

\textsuperscript{216}See Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 149, at 17 (“[C]hutes serve as insurance against a change in the firm’s investment strategy, and a chute’s payments—similar to specified (or liquidated) damages—reflect the loss to managers of the value resulting from their sunk costs.”)

\textsuperscript{217}See id. (empirically documenting that the adoption of a golden parachute was positively associated with firm value for a sample of firms during the time period 2007-2012). According to a coauthored work of another of us, the increase in golden parachutes might have been more significant than it appears according to RiskMetrics data. See Martijn Cremers et al., Introducing the CFGM Corporate Governance Database: Variable Construction and Comparison to the RiskMetrics and IRRC Governance Databases, working paper, September 2015 (on file with authors). Indeed, in hand-checking RiskMetrics data, this work finds that RiskMetrics appears to have underreported the levels of golden parachutes for the period starting in 2008.

\textsuperscript{218}See TIROLE, supra note 136, at 250 (defining soft information as information that cannot be easily verified even when it is disclosed); Alex Edmans et al., The Real Cost of Financial Efficiency when Some Information is Soft 2, (ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 380/2013, Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2316194 (describing information on intangible assets as a classic example of soft information that cannot be credibly disclosed to outsiders).
whose value will not be realized until later.\(^{219}\)

Similarly, firms where the nature of the business requires more commitment between the corporation and one or more of its stakeholders should be more penalized by short-term shareholder pressure directed at seeking a change in investment policy or a change in control. While a shareholder advocate could argue that the contract is a sufficient instrument to address the higher risk of stakeholder expropriation arising in such firms, this view overvalues the ability of the contractual instrument to contain this risk.\(^{220}\) Preventing stakeholder expropriation by contract can be impossibly difficult, as the long-term nature of most stakeholder contracts and the complex and uncertain process of corporate production necessarily makes such contracts highly incomplete.\(^{221}\)

Our working hypothesis is thus that firms with more long-term innovation and those that require stronger firm-specific investments by stakeholders should both benefit more from the adoption of the bilateral protection arrangements included in the C-Index. In order to capture these features of corporate production, we use the following variables: \(R&D\), \(Labor Productivity\), and \(Large Customer\). \(R&D\) is a standard measure of innovation,\(^{222}\) which we use as a proxy for the importance of long-term research and development projects. \(^{223}\) \(Labor Productivity\) identifies industries with a higher marginal product of labor and, hence, we use it as proxy for the level of firm-specific investments by the employees.\(^{224}\) Finally, \(Large Customer\) is an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm has at least one customer accounting for 10% or more of its sales, which we use as a proxy for the importance of (long-term) firm customers in creating financial value.\(^{225}\)

Table 4 shows the results of pooled panel \(Q\) regressions on the E-Index, the C-Index, and the I-Index with and without the interactions with the above proxies (plus our standard controls, whose coefficients are not shown to save space). For all columns of this table, as well as of Table 5 below, we include year and fixed effects and provide the t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at firm level.

**Table 4. Indices and Firm Value: Commitment Proxies Interactions**

In this table, we present the time series association between firm value and three governance indices (the E-Index, C-Index and I-Index) and their interactions with three proxies of the importance of longer-term commitments: \(R&D\), \(Labor Productivity\), and \(Large Customer\), using pooled panel regressions of \(Q\) with

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\(^{219}\) See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.

\(^{220}\) For a long time now, this has been shareholder advocates’ standard response to the risk of stakeholder expropriation by shareholders. See e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, *An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties*, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (1991) (arguing that the contracting problems facing “[o]ther constituencies . . . can be solved at far less cost than those confronting shareholders”).

\(^{221}\) See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 45-46.


\(^{223}\) Data for \(R&D\) is from Compustat.

\(^{224}\) Data for \(Labor Prod.\) is at industry level and comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (using the four digit SIC code). This data is available for only a subset of firms.

\(^{225}\) Data for \(Large Customer\) comes from the historic Compustat Segment tapes for 1986-2007. About a quarter of firms in our sample have a Large Customer.
year and firm fixed effects plus a set of standard controls: \textit{Assets}, \textit{ROA}, \textit{CAPX}, \textit{R&D}, and \textit{Industry M&A Volume}. All columns use the full time period of 1978-2008. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1\%, 5\%, and 10\% levels by ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’, respectively. We provide the t-statistics below each regression coefficient based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm.

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<td>-0.0921***</td>
<td>-0.0505***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>\textit{E}-Index × \textit{Labor Productivity}</td>
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<td>\textit{I}-Index × \textit{Labor Productivity}</td>
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<td>\textit{C}-Index × \textit{Large Customer}</td>
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<td>\textit{Large Customer}</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>\text{Year + Firm}</td>
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<td>\textit{R-sq}</td>
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<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>0.743</td>
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</table>

As shown by Columns (1) and (2), when interacting with \textit{R&D}, \textit{E-Index} has a negative but statistically insignificant time series association with \textit{Q}, \textit{C-Index} has a positive and statistically significant time series association with \textit{Q}, and \textit{I-Index} has a negative but statistically insignificant time series association with \textit{Q}. Consistent with our commitment theory of bilateral protection arrangements, this seems to suggest that such arrangements are considerably more strongly related to changes in firm value for firms.
with more R&D investments. Specifically, a one point increase in C-Index during 1978-2008 is associated with a 4.5% larger increase in firm value for firms whose R&D is one standard deviation higher than the mean relative to firms whose R&D is at the mean.  

Our most striking results are those on labor productivity. As shown by Columns (3) and (4), the interaction of Labor Productivity with each of the three governance indices has a coefficient that is positive and statistically significant. Economically, these effects are meaningful. A one point increase in C-Index during 1978-2008 is associated with a 1.8% larger increase in firm value for firms whose Labor Productivity is a standard deviation above the average relative to firms with average Labor Productivity. The economic magnitude of the I-Index interaction is similar. This suggests that in firms where employee contributions are relatively more important for value creation, committing shareholders to a more stable relationship with employees is so relevant that benefits accrue even when unilateral provisions are used to protect managers. In other words, in these cases the positive effects stemming from incentivizing employee firm-specific investments outweigh the detrimental effects generally displayed by such provisions in terms of increased managerial moral hazard.

Finally, results on the three governance indices when interacting with Large Customer are similar. As shown by Columns (5) and (6), when interacting with Large Customer, E-Index has a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient; C-Index has a positive and statistically significant coefficient; and I-Index has a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient. Similar to R&D investments, this suggests that changes to the governance provisions included in the C-Index are considerably more strongly related to changes in firm value for firms with a Large Customer. Economically, Column (6) shows that a unit increase in the C-Index is associated with a 2.1% larger increase in Q for firms with a large customer. In results that we do not report (due to brevity concerns), we also find that the larger the percentage of a firm’s sales accounted for by a Large Customer, the greater the positive impact of C-Index on firm value (meaning that if a firm’s customer accounts for more than 10% of the firm’s sales, the impact of C-Index on firm value also increases).

Overall, these results strongly support the view that the ability of bilateral protection arrangements to mitigate the limited commitment problem is a primary channel through which these arrangements are positively associated with firm value. The adoption of such arrangements is indeed more strongly related to increases in firm value in firms where ensuring the commitment of shareholders to the longer horizon is more relevant—such as (i) firms that are more engaged in innovation, (ii) firms with large

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226 The economic significance for the interactions presented in Table 4 and 5 is calculated as follows. First, we multiply the interaction coefficient and the standard deviation of the proxy that is interacted with the governance index, and, second, we divide the product by the average firm value in our sample. For R&D, that calculation is equal to 1.272 x 0.06 / 1.69 = 4.5%.

227 The economic significance for the interaction between C-Index and Labor Prod. is calculated as follows: 0.044 x 0.7 / 1.69 = 1.8%.

228 The economic significance for the interaction between C-Index and Large Customer is calculated as follows: 0.0356 x 1 / 1.69 = 2.1%. 

44
long-term customers, and (iii) firms with more firm-specific labor productivity or where employee commitment is more important for value creation.\textsuperscript{229}

2. Excessive Risk-Taking

Creditors are often described as the most important of the firm’s stakeholders after shareholders, whose participation in the corporate enterprise is essential to ensuring a corporation’s ability to expand and thrive. This has become increasingly the case in the twenty-first century, as radical changes have not only occurred in corporate production, but also in capital structures.\textsuperscript{230} Departing from the all-equity (or low leverage) capital structure of the Berle and Means era, today’s corporations exhibit capital structures in which non-equity investments have grown into a steady source of capital—in fact, even a primary source of capital in some industrial sectors.\textsuperscript{231}

It is thus unsurprising that creditors, as a group, are regarded by the law as “a useful proxy for the wider non-shareholder social interest in firm success.”\textsuperscript{232} Indeed, as fixed claimants, creditors and other stakeholders are exposed to the risk of wealth-transferring actions that enrich shareholders at their expense.\textsuperscript{233} The classic wealth-transfer example is excessive risk-taking, which may penalize various firm stakeholders, but especially creditors, given their position as primary providers of non-equity capital.\textsuperscript{234} Economically, this problem arises out of the divergent upside and downside potential exhibited by creditors versus shareholders. As fixed claimants, creditors are largely indifferent to increases in returns from corporate assets, while they are highly sensitive to declines in asset value—thus preferring safer investment strategies. In contrast, as residual corporate claimants, shareholders are highly sensitive to increases in equity returns, while the protection of limited liability makes them comparatively less sensitive to losses. Once a corporation has outstanding debt, this payoff structure induces shareholders—and managers acting on their behalf—to prefer riskier over safer projects. Indeed, if things go well, shareholders expect to capture most of the upside potential of riskier projects. If things turn awry, instead, creditors will bear most losses.

\textsuperscript{229} Many firms are likely to present similar features today, due to firm value having grown increasingly dependent on investments in technological know-how and specialized human capital in the modern corporation. See Cremers & Sepe, \textit{supra} note 18, at 44-45. This has been especially so since the mid-1990s, with the emergence of the digital revolution, consistent with our hypothesis that the importance of bilateral protection arrangements for best governance practices—which began around the same time—is best understood as a response to the intensification of the shareholder limited commitment problem. See \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 207-10.


\textsuperscript{231} See id.


\textsuperscript{233} See Sepe, \textit{supra} note 230, at 319-20.

\textsuperscript{234} In addition to excessive risk-taking (or “asset substitution” or “overinvestment”), other actions that may illegitimately transfer wealth from debtholders to stockholders include the payment of excessively large dividends, the issuance of additional debt, and the rejection of projects with a positive net present value when the benefits from such projects accrue solely to the debtholders. The classic reference on shareholder opportunism toward fixed claimants is Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, \textit{On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants}, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 (1979).
Once one acknowledges the dangers that arise from the shareholders’ risk preferences and the possibility that they may be transmitted to managers, logic requires acknowledgment that situating directors and managers at some distance from shareholders might be helpful to constrain excessive risk-taking. On this view, we pose that bilateral protection arrangements may serve as a beneficial commitment device through which shareholders bind themselves ex-ante to limit their future ability to pressure management to undertake riskier projects. This would reduce a corporation’s cost of debt, avoiding that creditors may raise interest rates in anticipation of future excessive risk-taking. Empirically, if our interpretation of the relationship between bilateral protection arrangements and excessive risk-taking is correct, we would expect to find that the adoption of such arrangements is more strongly related to increases in firm value in firms that are more exposed to the likelihood of future excessive risk taking.

To test our hypothesis, we employ a widely used proxy for bankruptcy risk, Z-Score. By construction, a higher Z-Score indicates a firm with low bankruptcy risk, while a lower Z-Score indicates a firm with more bankruptcy risk. In running Z-Score regressions (i.e., where Z-Score rather than Q is the dependent variable), which we do not report here to save space, we find that a higher C-Index score is associated with a higher Z-Score (i.e., less bankruptcy risk). Conversely, a higher I-Index score, as well as a higher E-Index score, are associated with a lower Z-Score (i.e., more bankruptcy risk).

These results show that the adoption of bilateral protection arrangements benefit creditors by reducing a debtor’s risk of default, consistent with our theory that such arrangements strengthen a firm’s long-term relationship with the various stakeholders. Instead, unilateral protection arrangements are detrimental to creditors, as they increase a debtor’s risk of default. This also seems consistent with our interpretation of unilateral protection arrangements. Indeed, when managerial protection from removal is implemented without explicit shareholder agreement, it is, in general, more likely to have the exclusive purpose of advancing manager self-interest at the expense not only of shareholders, but also creditors.

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235 Data for Z-Score is from Compustat.
236 Specifically, firms with a high Z-Score are firms with more liquid assets, higher historical and current profitability, better growth opportunities or market valuations of current assets, and higher asset turnover (and vice versa for firms with a low Z-Score).
237 We report these results in Appendix Table D.
238 In the case of golden parachutes, the detrimental effect that such provisions produce on creditors is rather straightforward. Indeed, the substantial payment that a golden parachute may trigger in favor of managers upon a change in control can be regarded as a form of claim dilution, which reduces the expected future cash flows on which creditors can count for the repayment of debt. See Smith & Warner, supra note —, at 118. In the case of the poison pill, the detrimental effect produced on creditors also follows from claim dilution. Having a visible pill (rather than only a “shadow pill”) suggests that management is particularly set against any acquisition attempts from outsiders, regardless of whether that attempt constitutes a threat to a firm’s commitment to the long-term horizon or a value-increasing replacement of underperforming management. Firms with a visible pill may also be more apt to employ additional leverage as a second line of defense against a potential takeover, as adding leverage increases a bidder’s prospective costs. Sudip Datta & Mai Iskandar-Datta, Takeover Defenses and Wealth Effects on Securityholders: The Case of Poison Pill Adoption, 20 J. BANK. & FIN. 1231, 1232-33 (1995). Alternatively, if a bidder is able to acquire the target (i.e., by having the pill removed), the financing of the
Z-Score regressions, however, are not informative of the relation between a firm’s risk exposure and firm value (i.e., shareholder value). However, our conjecture is that a lower level of risk (i.e., a higher Z-Score), as promoted by the adoption of bilateral protection arrangements, should result in higher firm value in the long-term, benefiting creditors and shareholders alike. In order to verify whether the association between firm value and risk taking is influenced by specific governance arrangements, we hence run Q regressions on the governance indices interacted with Z-Score. Table 5 below shows our results.

**TABLE 5. FIRM VALUE, BANKRUPTCY RISK, AND GOVERNANCE INDICES**

In this table, we present the time series association between firm value and Z-Score, a proxy of bankruptcy risk, as interacted with three governance indices (the E-Index, C-Index and I-Index) using pooled panel Q regressions with year and firm fixed effects plus a set of controls: CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. All columns use the full time period of 1978-2008. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. We provide the t-statistics below each regression coefficient based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm.

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<td>(-0.08)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Index × Z-Score</td>
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<td>-0.0132**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.64)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-Index</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(1.51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-Index × Z-Score</td>
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<tr>
<td>(-2.37)</td>
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<td>Z-Score</td>
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<td>R-sq</td>
<td>0.725</td>
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</table>

takeover generally leads to additional leverage as well (especially if the change of control is implemented through a leveraged buyout). See id. In both cases, the claim of existing creditors to corporate assets emerges as diluted by the addition of new, unanticipated debt, increasing the risk to which existing creditors are exposed.

In Table 5, we do not control for Assets and ROA, as these variables capture similar firm characteristics as those embedded in Z-Score. If we add Assets and ROA as controls to Column (2), the coefficient and t-statistic for the interaction of Z-Score and C-Index remain unchanged, but the coefficient of the interactions of Z-Score and I-Index goes down to -0.0072 with a t-statistic of 1.37, indicating lower statistical significance with an associated p-value of 17% (i.e., above typical levels of statistical significance used in the literature).
Consistent with our conjecture, Table 5 shows that a higher Z-Score has a positive coefficient equal to 0.101 (with a t-statistic of 9.35). This suggests that firms with a Z-Score that is a standard deviation higher than the mean experience a 14.6% higher firm value relative to firms with a Z-Score that is at the mean. Combined with the results we obtain in Z-Score regressions—that increases in the C-Index are associated with increases in the Z-Score, strengthening firm stability and thus creditor prospects—this result supports the view that bilateral protection arrangements benefit both creditors and shareholders.

This interpretation of the relationship between governance arrangements, risk, and firm value is further supported by the results we obtain for the Q regressions on C-Index when interacting with Z-Score. As shown by Column (2), the interaction coefficient is positive and equal to 0.0116, implying that a one point increase in C-Index is associated with a 1.7% larger increase in firm value for firms with a high Z-Score relative to firms with a low Z-Score. This suggests that bilateral protection arrangements are more strongly associated with increases in firm value in firms that currently have a relatively low bankruptcy risk and hence may have more potential to engage in future excessive risk (as their level of risk is not excessive already).

In contrast to the coefficient of the C-Index, the coefficient of the I-Index is negative and statistically significant, equal to -0.0132 (shown in Column (2)). This suggests that a one point increase in I-Index is associated with a 1.9% larger decrease in firm value for firms with a high Z-Score relative to firms with a low Z-Score. The adoption of the provisions included in the I-Index thus seems more detrimental to firms that are more likely to engage in future excessive risk, consistent with our interpretation of unilateral protection arrangements as likely to have, in general, an opportunistic motivation, to the detriment of both shareholder and creditor interests.

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240 We calculate the economic significance as follows. We multiply the coefficient of 0.101 for Z-Score by the standard deviation of Z-Score (2.44), and divide the result by the average Q in the sample (1.69).

241 The statistical significance of the interaction of Z-Score and C-Index has a t-stat of 1.51, which has an associated p-value of 13%. This means that it is just above the typical level of marginal statistical significance used in the literature, but in our interpretation suggests that the interaction is relevant, though should warrant a more cautious interpretation than coefficients that are strongly statistically significant.

242 We calculate the economic magnitude of the effect as follows. We multiply the coefficient of 0.0116 by the standard deviation of Z-Score (2.44), and divide by the average Q in the sample (1.69). As a result, the difference between ‘high’ and ‘low’ Z-Score here is assumed to be one sample standard deviation in Z-Score, equal to 2.44.

243 Similar to C-Index, also here we multiply the coefficient of -0.0132 by the standard deviation of Z-Score (2.44), and divide by the average Q in the sample (1.69). As a result, the difference between ‘high’ and ‘low’ Z-Score here is assumed to be one sample standard deviation in Z-Score, equal to 2.44.
IV. BOARD AUTHORITY, MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS

Our analysis of the E-Index challenges the view that reducing entrenchment is what matters the most in corporate governance—suggesting that promoting a firm’s commitment to the long-term matters as well, and potentially much more. The implications of this analysis are significant for debates concerning both the means and ends of corporate governance. Theoretically, it shows that when the shareholder wealth maximization mandate is rightly understood as focusing on the long-term horizon, the republican version of the board centric model emerges as better suited to pursue that mandate than a direct shareholder democracy model. By protecting directors from short-term removal with the ex-ante agreement of shareholders, the republican model preserves a board’s ability to put in place a commitment to the long-term—which shareholders themselves are unable to provide due to their limited commitment problem.

Empirically, this conclusion is corroborated by the evidence that the republican corporate model is strongly associated with increases in long-term firm value, especially in firms where the limited commitment problem is likely to be more significant.

Our account of corporate governance, however, has still not addressed the major criticism raised by shareholder advocates against the board-centric model: that enhanced board authority necessarily comes at the expense of reduced managerial accountability. Because under that model directors and managers are removed (even if only temporarily) from the judgment of shareholders, it is argued that there no longer is a mechanism through which they are held accountable for their actions—with the result that in the end the only wealth that is maximized is that of directors and managers themselves. The clearest implication of this account of board authority concerns the consideration of stakeholder interests. When directors and managers are empowered to consider such interests, so the argument goes, they can more easily camouflage opportunities for managerial moral hazard as being beneficial to stakeholders, at the expense of corporate profitability.

Yet, this Article’s evidence that the republican board-centric model is strongly associated with increased firm value suggests that something is missing in current analyses of the relationships among board authority, managerial accountability, and stakeholder interests. In this Part, we draw on the economic theory of soft and hard

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244 See supra Part III.A.2.
245 See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
246 See supra Parts III and IV. Of course, changes in the six constituent provisions in the E-Index are endogenous, and partly under the firm’s control. As typical of corporate governance studies, we do not have clear exogenous variation in firm-level changes to these provisions. Rather, our identification is indirect and comes from two sources. First, our alternative account of what really matters in corporate governance predicts the opposite sign (i.e., positive rather than negative) for the association with firm value of bilateral protection arrangements as compared to unilateral arrangements. Second, our alternative governance account identifies firms where the limited commitment problem is more severe as those where bilateral protection arrangements are likely to be more positively associated with firm value. In our empirical work, we test these two sets of predictions and find strong support for both in the data.
247 See Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 565-66 (summarizing this argument).
248 See id. at 581.
budget constraints to shed light on those relationships, and explain how criticism of the board-centric model has been misdirected due to the wrong assumption that board authority and accountability are antithetical.

A. Soft and Hard Budget Constraints

The criticism that a board-centric model is lacking in managerial accountability can be framed as a “soft budget constraint” problem. Originally formulated by economist Janos Kornai, the term soft budget constraint is used to describe an economic environment in which the occurrence of “failure”—poor performance as benchmarked against objective metrics, such as those captured by prices—triggers inefficient support rather than being “punished” (for example through the liquidation of the failing entity). The classic example is that of firms in planned economies. Conversely, economists refer to a “hard budget constraint” when failure leads to efficient ex-post settling up, as generally happens in the context of market economies.

The intuition for why a market framework is more likely to hold to a hard budget constraint is that decentralized decision-making mitigates the likelihood that private interests may arise motivating rescue in cases where it would be efficient to reduce or cease an activity. In contrast, when the decision process is centralized, such as in planned economies or within the boundaries of the firm, decision-makers are more likely to exhibit private interests that motivate them to “meddle” with failure.

By making it more credible that decision-makers will hold to a hard budget constraint, decentralization thus provides a better remedy against the risk of agents’ moral hazard. When an agent expects failure to be punished ex-post by the decision-maker, with punishment being costly to the agent, she will have stronger incentives to expend costly effort. On the contrary, when the agent expects failure to be tolerated by the decision-maker, the agent’s incentives for effort are weakened, as expending effort may be more costly to the agent than the consequences of failure. It is then easy to see why the soft budget constraint literature seems to support the desirability of a direct democracy model of the corporation with stronger shareholder rights, i.e., market discipline. When authority is vested in financial markets (i.e., shareholders) rather than the board, the firm’s budget constraint naturally hardens, as markets can more credibly commit to punish low firm outcomes than directors, whose incentives may deviate according to their private interest in compensation and job retention.

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250 See id. at 806-08; see also Kornai et al., Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 1095, 1097 (2003).
251 See Kornai et al., supra note 250, at 1096.
252 See id., at 1098-1100.
Yet, as straightforward as this account of corporate relationships may appear, it oversimplifies the conceptual apparatus of the soft/hard budget constraint. It does so by downplaying the risk that informational inefficiencies and other market imperfections may make performance benchmarks potentially inaccurate. Indeed, with discontinuous prices, the market may be unable to fully capture fundamental values in the short-term and therefore to accurately gauge whether “failure” has occurred. Under these circumstances, holding the corporation to a hard budget constraint may lead to undesirable effects, as shareholders may end up punishing corporate insiders in the short-term when efficiency would require them to commit to the long-term.

Within this analytical framework, neither a pure hard budget constraint model of the corporation (i.e., a shareholder democracy) nor a pure soft budget constraint model (i.e., unilateral incumbent protection) is desirable, as they both provide corner solutions. The former model minimizes moral hazard at expense of the distortions arising from the limited commitment problem, and vice versa. Optimal corporate governance should instead provide an “interior solution” (or a “hybrid”), which holds the corporation to a soft budget constraint in the short-term, so as to mitigate the distortions arising from the limited commitment problem, and a hard budget constraint in the long-term, so as to reduce the risk of managerial moral hazard. A republican corporate model is the governance system that better approximates this interior solution.

On the one hand, unlike the shareholder democracy model, the republican model grants directors the ability to soften the budget constraint in the short-term—toward the beginning of a director’s tenure, when it is more likely that directors may have an informational advantage over financial markets and, hence, that prices may fail to fully reflect the implications of a given investment policy. Softening the budget through bilateral protection arrangements emerges thus as necessary to empower directors to take actions that tolerate, rather than punish, what may appear to the market as “early failure” (e.g., low short term earnings), when short-term tolerance is required to foster innovation and other long-term projects, as well as to promote stronger stakeholder relationships.

On the other hand, the republican model departs from the dictatorial model that shareholder advocates seem to have in mind when criticizing any form of directorial protection from removal. In contrast to this account, protecting directors from removal does not emerge as antithetical to board accountability, as long as it is the result of the mutual agreement of the board and shareholders (or, if board protection from removal has

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254 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
255 Economists Mathias Dewatripont and Eric Maskin formally showed that the disciplinary effects of a decentralized credit model (i.e., a hard budget constraint) may foster an over-emphasis on short-term results if the realization of the firm’s project only occurs in the long-term and, at the interim stage, good projects are hardly distinguishable from bad projects. See Dewatripont & Maskin, supra note 253, at 542.
256 See Michael Carter, Foundations of Mathematical Economics 502 (2001) (defining a boundary, i.e., corner, solution as the one that “lies on the boundary of the feasible set” of solutions to an optimization problem).
257 See id.
a unilateral nature, it is limited in time). Indeed, only by assuming that directors and managers that experience chronic losses are punished rather than rescued—being held to a hard, rather than soft, budget constraint in the long-term—can one explain the positive association we document between adopting bilateral protection arrangements and increases in firm value over time.\footnote{See supra Tables 2 and 3.}

This suggests that the republican model of the corporation does not jeopardize market-based accountability mechanisms, but rather ensures that those mechanisms operate in the time frame in which they are more likely to be effective. As time progresses and a director’s tenure matures, the implications of directorial decisions begin to show up in cash flows. As a result, market prices become more likely to incorporate the real value of past corporate policies and convey accurate information as to how well or poorly a firm has been managed. Viewed through this lens, bilateral protection arrangements ensure that shareholders hold incumbents accountable in the long-term, when the former are likely to be better positioned to evaluate directorial and managerial actions.

For example, in spite of the oft-repeated remark by shareholder advocates that a staggered board insulates directors from market discipline, the usual three-year term served by directors in a staggered board does not permanently remove them from the judgment of the market. Instead, that longer term provides a time frame for directorial evaluation by the shareholders that is less likely to be biased by informational inefficiency. Similarly, supermajority requirements to amend the charter and to approve mergers do not reduce long-term directorial accountability, but constructively strengthen board authority in the short-term. The logic is the same as the logic that underlies proposals—also advanced by shareholder advocates—that managers should be compensated for good performance only after a time frame that allows for adequate evaluation of managerial actions.\footnote{See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 54, 191 (arguing for limits on managers’ “freedom to unwind the equity-based incentives created by their compensation plans”). As remarked by Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr., this position seems difficult to reconcile with “Bebchuk’s career-long obsession” for shareholder democracy, sounding like an admission on Bebchuk’s “part that increasing demands on corporations to manage to immediate stock market pressures might not be good for stockholders or society generally.” Strine, supra note 108, at 467.} In the same way, managers should be punished, if that is appropriate, only after sufficient time has passed to gauge the full implications of their allegedly bad actions.

\section*{B. Demystifying the Stakeholder Interests Problem}

Viewing the republican corporate model as a unique organizational solution that holds directors to a soft budget constraint in the short-term and a hard budget constraint in the long-term demystifies much of the criticism levied against the consideration of stakeholder interests in corporate governance. One classic criticism is that consideration of such interests is designed to pursue social goals unrelated to corporate profitability.\footnote{See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 549 (summarizing this argument).} On this view, the board’s commitment to stronger shareholder relationships would come
at the expenses of shareholder profits, empowering directors with the ability to reallocate wealth from shareholders to stakeholders. This view of shareholder-stakeholder relationships, however, is lacking both empirically and theoretically.

Empirically, we have shown that protecting board authority to secure a firm’s commitment to long-term stakeholder relationships seems to benefit stakeholders and shareholders alike, especially in firms where specific stakeholder investments are likely to matter the most. The remarkable economic success of the management corporation is also consistent with our empirical results. As discussed earlier, bilateral protection arrangements seem to have emerged as a corrective to the erosion of board authority brought about by the rise of shareholder power. Accordingly, if the above criticism of shareholder advocates was correct, shareholders should be better off today than they have historically been under the management corporation model. For that model granted directors discretion to consider a wide range of corporate interests, as long as this was instrumental to promote corporate growth. Instead, the management corporation “generated wealth in a stable, steep-curved way” during the so-called golden age of American capitalism.

Theoretically, the above criticism both underestimates the value to shareholders of securing optimal stakeholder investments and erroneously seems to treat shareholder wealth maximization as an end in itself. As a result of the radical changes that have occurred in both corporate production and capital structures, promoting firm-specific stakeholder investments—such as investments by specialized employees or long-term relationships with creditors or large customers—has become increasingly essential to the pursuit of corporate profitability. Further, short-term transfers of wealth from shareholders to stakeholders may be instrumental in increasing long-term shareholder and firm value in the context of asset pricing inefficiency. Indeed, with discontinuous market prices, directors are likely to have superior information regarding whether a course of action deviating from short-term shareholder wealth maximization will enhance long-term firm value. Hence, as long as a transfer of wealth from shareholders to stakeholders

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262 See supra text accompanying notes 207-10.
263 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
264 See Jacobs, supra note 59, at 1646.
265 One study reports that from 1933 until 1976 (i.e., roughly speaking, the era of managerial capitalism), the total real compound annual return on the stocks of the S&P 500 was 7.6 percent. See Roger Martin, The Age of Customer Capitalism, 2010 HARV. BUS. L. REV., available at https://hbr.org/2010/01/the-age-of-customer-capitalism. From 1976 until 2011, during which period board authority has increasingly been weakened by empowered shareholders, the comparable return has been 5.9% percent. See id.
266 See supra note 229. A concrete example is offered by the value that the outstanding skills of Google engineers deliver to the company. This might explain why “googlers” enjoy an extremely high level of perks—including, among others, free food and shuttle services, travel insurance, on-site physicians and nurses, generous maternity/paternity leaves, low-cost legal advice, and death benefits. GOOGLE, Careers, Benefits, https://www.google.it/about/careers/lifeatgoogle/benefits/. Whereas the classic account of stakeholder-stakeholder relationships portrays the improvement of employees’ social conditions as necessarily antithetical to shareholder profits, the Google’s example speaks to the contrary. Google’s perks might raise expenses to Google’s shareholders. Yet, they are likely to deliver them benefits that largely outweigh those expenses by helping to retain key employees and—as stated on the company’s website—by removing barriers that could prevent googlers from optimally focusing on their work. See id.
is going to pay off in the long run, such a transfer should be deemed beneficial, rather than detrimental, to shareholder interests.\(^{267}\)

Another classic criticism raised against the consideration of stakeholder interests in corporate governance is that it would exacerbate managerial moral hazard, necessarily leading to abandonment of the goal of shareholder wealth maximization and, hence, to indeterminate results.\(^{268}\) As we have shown, however, the republican model does not discard the shareholder wealth maximization mandate; rather it ensures that such a mandate efficiently operates in the long-term. In practice, this means that while directors and managers are free to assess the inter-temporal tradeoffs that must be made among competing corporate constituencies—exploiting their informational advantage on the long-term value to shareholders of stakeholder participation—they remain accountable for those tradeoffs against the benchmark of long-term shareholder value. This mitigates the risk that directors and manager may opportunistically exploit stakeholder interests to pursue their personal interests, as the possibility of long-term shareholder retribution continues to ensure the existence of effective accountability mechanisms.\(^{269}\)

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\(^{267}\) Consider the classic example of directors faced with the decision of whether closing an obsolete plant. In the standard narrative, this example is used to illustrate the inefficiency to which allowing directors to consider stakeholder interests may lead. Increased directorial discretion—so the argument goes—enhances directors’ ability to camouflage their own interests as concern for stakeholder interests, making it easier for the directors to keep the plant open even when it would be efficient to close it. See Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 581-82. Yet, this narrative takes for granted that any attempt to rescue the plant is value destroying, while also assuming that this is public information. In actuality, however, directors are likely to have competitive private information on the future value of an apparently obsolete plant, as well as on the gains to be made by strengthening a firm’s commitment to non-shareholder constituencies, such as local communities. Allowing directors to take actions that take into account similar inter-temporal tradeoffs will benefit shareholders and stakeholders alike in the long-term. Yet, a shareholder advocate could argue that a relaxation of directors’ focus on shareholder wealth maximization might allow them to justify a decision to keep the plant open even when there are no future gains to be made. This argument, however, can only be sustained if one assumes a static context (i.e., a one-shot game), in which allowing directors to deviate from the shareholder wealth maximization mandate in the short term is equivalent to abandoning that mandate altogether. However, in a dynamic context, in which directors are held accountable for the decision to keep the plant open based on long-term outcomes and share value, they are unlikely to do so unless they expect substantial future gains from this course of action.

\(^{268}\) See id. at 581 (relying on this criticism as the “too many masters” argument).

\(^{269}\) Our account of the relationship between board authority, stakeholder interests, and managerial accountability also helps bridge the gap between the two most prominent board-centric models of the corporation—the “team production model” developed by Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout and the “director primacy model” developed by Professor Steven Bainbridge. See Blair & Stout, supra note 59; Bainbridge, supra note 59. For Blair and Stout, protecting board authority vis-à-vis shareholders is instrumental to promote optimal firm-specific investments by all the corporate participants, avoiding that shareholders might use their corporate power to opportunistically expropriate other stakeholders. See Blair & Stout, supra, at 251-54. They accordingly argue that directors are charged with maximizing the joint welfare of all constituents who make firm-specific investments. See id. For Bainbridge, instead, board authority is the response to shareholders’ informational and collective action problems, but needs to exclusively focus on the end of maximizing shareholder value. See Bainbridge, supra, at 557-59, 574. The alleged differences between these models, however, are much reduced when one conceives of enhanced board authority as a response to the limited commitment problem and the distortions arising from a static approach to shareholder wealth maximization. On the one hand, our theoretical framework re-conceptualizes suboptimal stakeholder investments as a major cost arising from the inability of shareholders with strong exit rights to commit not to predate the board’s informational advantage over time—reconciling the theoretical foundations of the two models. On the other hand, it rationalizes short-
**V. Policy Considerations**

The conclusion of our analysis of the relationship between corporate governance and firm value is that incumbent protection from removal benefits shareholder and societal interests as long as it is result of the mutual agreement of the board and the shareholders (or, if this protection has a unilateral nature, it is limited in time). It does so by committing shareholders to preservation of a board’s ability to optimally pursue long-term value maximization strategies, without jeopardizing board exposure to shareholder discipline in the longer-term. This conclusion not only is at odds with the findings of the literature on governance indices. It also has fundamental implications both for the providers of commercial governance indices and for regulators, which have largely adhered to the misguided proposition that stronger shareholder rights are an all-purpose remedy in corporate governance.

**A. Are Commercial Indices Reliable?**

As discussed, proxy advisors’ indices share the basic assumption of academic governance indices like the G-Index and the E-Index, namely that stronger shareholder rights unequivocally equate to best governance practices. From a theoretical perspective, then, commercial indices are exposed to criticisms analogous to those affecting academic indices. However, the former bear much more significant practical implications, given the direct, and huge, influence they exert on corporate practices at many U.S. corporations, as well as on the corporate governance strategies of most American institutional investors.

Under our analysis of corporate governance, the strong emphasis placed by proxy advisors on shareholder rights emerges as pushing U.S. corporations in directions that are likely to be counter-productive, and, potentially, accountable for the increased short-termism observed in U.S. markets. This result is even more problematic if one considers the conflicts of interests that may affect the actions of proxy advisors. Importantly, we are not just referring to the conflict arising out of the additional role many of them serve as governance advisors. This dual role raises the concern that these firms’ voting recommendations to investors may be influenced by whether or not the subject company has also purchased any governance advice from such firms. Our concern is much
broader and arises by a simpler consideration. The case for stronger shareholder rights inherently promotes shareholder empowerment and thus increased shareholder activism, resulting in more intense voting advisory activity and hence increased revenues for proxy advisors. Therefore, while shareholder empowerment may or may not benefit shareholder and societal interest in the long-term, it definitely advances the private interests of proxy advisors.272

The potential for this conflict raises the question of why investors continue to rely on indices that have the potential to push corporations toward bad, rather than good, corporate governance. Simply concluding that proxy advisors have manipulated the investors purchasing their services does not seem plausible, given the sophisticated nature of all involved parties.273 Three alternative explanations seem more plausible. First, second-guessing the voting recommendations of proxy advisors, as well as the construction of commercial indices, would substantially require investors to turn into governance specialists—which seems incompatible with a cost-effective division of corporate roles. Second, the intellectual support provided by academic governance indices to the use of commercial governance indices might have reinforced investors’ belief that there was, after all, no urgent need to second-guess the recommendations of proxy advisors. When one considers the additional endorsement that the case for stronger shareholder rights has received by recent regulatory reforms,274 that need becomes even less urgent. Third, at least as concerns hedge funds and some institutional investors, one cannot exclude that these corporate actors may have had their own reasons to endorse voting recommendations that supported enhanced shareholder power and, hence, facilitated the exercise of short-term speculative options.275

For all the above reasons, the fact that firms selling governance ratings are commercially successful cannot be interpreted as evidence that governance ratings are unequivocally useful to investors. On the contrary, the results of our study raise severe challenges for investors’ use of commercial governance indices, calling into question the

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272 We are not the first to acknowledge similar concerns. Former SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher has voiced similar concerns in several speeches and commentaries. See, e.g., Daniel Gallagher, Outsized Power & Influence: The Role of Proxy Advisers, The HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 5, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/09/05.Outsized-power-influence-the-role-of-proxy-advisers (arguing that a central problem with investment advisers is making sure that they vote in the investor’s best interest rather than their own).

273 See Bhagat et al., supra note 14, at 1859.

274 See infra Part VI.B.

275 See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
indices’ main proposition—that stronger shareholder rights are an all-purpose remedy in corporate governance. In response a shareholder advocate could argue that we produce no direct evidence on the association between commercial governance indices and firm value and, hence, cannot derive implications on the reliability of such indices in identifying good governance practices. Yet this position seems to overlook the following three facts. First, the index adopted by the second most widely used proxy advisory firm, Glass Lewis & Company, almost exactly replicates the E-Index. Second, while the ISS’s Corporate Governance Quotient notably includes many variables that are not captured by the E-Index (or other academic indices), the ISS notably opposes governance arrangements that protect directors from shareholder removal or otherwise weakens shareholder rights. Third, other recent empirical studies support the conclusion that commercial governance indices are not reliable predictors of good governance practices and may even “have the unintended economic consequence that boards of directors are induced to make choices that decrease shareholder value.”

Hence, the possibility that self-interest might explain the uniform defense of stronger shareholder rights by proxy advisors cannot be easily dismissed. Instead, action by the SEC would be desirable to exclude with certainty that some among the most influential corporate players are acting to primarily advance their own interests, rather than that of the investors for which they serve as fiduciaries. To this end, we share the call for an intervention of the Commission to require proxy advisory firms to disclose the proprietary, quantitative algorithms they use in the construction of commercial indices. Of course, it might be that these algorithms can better capture the relationship between governance choices and firm performance than our study—for example, because they are constructed to more accurately take into account market trends or because they can rely on more comprehensive data sources. Nevertheless, our study—covering thirty years of corporate governance choices—strengthens the case for requiring that the proprietary information of proxy advisors be made available to the

276 See supra note 93.
277 See Daines et al., supra note 91, at 441.
278 See ISS GUIDELINES, supra note 92, at 10.
279 See id. at 3.
280 See Daines et al., supra note 91, at 460 (concluding that commercial indices “have either limited or no success in predicting firm performance or other outcomes of interest to shareholders”).
281 See David F. Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J. LAW & ECON. 173, 174 (2015) (examining the consequences of proxy advisory firms recommendations during the 2011 proxy season and finding that a negative stock market reaction to compensation changes adopted in accordance with such recommendations).
283 See Daines et al., supra note 91, at 441 (arguing that commercial governance indices might provide better measures of governance quality than academic indices).
Commission. More generally, our analysis also raises the question of whether governance ratings should not be administered by a public or non-profit independent agency. This solution would have the benefit of minimizing the risk of potential conflict of interests. To be sure, more extensive investigation into the feasibility and the costs of such a proposal would be necessary, but a discussion of the potential for public governance ratings seems worthwhile to pursue under the challenges this Article has raised for commercial governance indices.

B. The Shareholder Direction of Federal Regulation

A further important implication of our analysis involves the appropriate form of governance regulation. In the recent past, the view that shareholder empowerment embodies that form has made substantial gains. Among others, these gains have included (1) the introduction of amendments to proxy filing requirements facilitating the use of shareholder precatory proposals; (2) changes to the Delaware General Corporation Law enabling majority voting—which is better than the traditional plurality voting—in the election of directors, as well as greater shareholder access to the ballot box; and (3) the Dodd-Frank Act’s introduction of say-on-pay shareholder votes and further expansion of the scope of shareholder proposals.

Shareholder advocates have praised these reform interventions as consistent with the assumption that “statistics provided by academic research provide objective evidence that is valuable for policymaking.” While we share that assumption, we challenge the contention that available empirical evidence supports the case for shareholder empowerment. Contrary to that contention, our comprehensive analysis of corporate governance has showed that there is value in limiting shareholder rights to interfere with board decision-making in the short-term, if such limits involve a bilateral commitment of both shareholders and directors to corporate stability, longer-term investment strategies, and stronger stakeholder relationships. Unless shareholder advocates can expose flaws in our research and counter it with research that avoids these flaws, the evidence produced

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285 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 987, 1013-15, 1017-22 (providing a thorough discussion of the changes occurred in proxy rules in the past twenty years).

286 For being elected to the board under a majority voting system, a director is required to win the votes of a majority of the shares voting. In contrast, in a plurality voting system, the director with the most votes—and thus, potentially, even a single vote—wins. See id. at 1010-11.


289 See Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1667.
by this Article should be regarded as changing the relevant empirical facts to be considered by regulators and policymakers.

In particular, that evidence challenges the introduction of amendments to proxy rules, as well as more recent amendments expanding the scope of shareholder proposals. As a result of these reforms, it has today become possible—and increasingly common—for shareholders to solicit (i) opposition to a management proposal, including merger proposals, (ii) the withholding of votes in directors elections, and (iii) support for shareholder precatory proposals under Rule 14a-8 of the Security Exchange Act, including proposals to destagger the boards. All of these changes go in the direction of enabling increased shareholder empowerment at the expense of weakened board authority, which our empirical and theoretical analysis has showed can produce detrimental effects. In keeping with that analysis’ conclusion that efficient governance requires short-term incumbent protection from removal without jeopardizing long-term accountability mechanisms, we suggest that current proxy rules should be amended so to restrict increased shareholder activism to the long-term. This means, in practice, that the above shareholders proposals should be banned for the first three years since the inception of a new director’s tenure, for two reasons. First, a three-year term is the standard for directors serving on a staggered board, whose adoption our empirical results (consistent with the Cremers-Sepe study) show to be associated with an increase in firm value. Second, considering that the average CEO’s tenure is seven years, identifying the short-term with a horizon of less than three years seems reasonable.

This Article’s evidence similarly exposes recent changes enabling majority voting in the election of directors as potentially detrimental. In recent years, majority voting has emerged as the most potent weapon in the new arsenal of shareholders’ governance levers, with activist shareholders increasingly threatening to engage in withholding campaigns against incumbents so to obtain desired governance changes—including the removal of bilateral protection arrangements. This weakens the commitment value of such arrangements, as what makes a commitment credible is the level of difficulty encountered in attempting to renege on the commitment, ex-post. Accordingly, our analysis raises the question of whether majority voting should be repealed from state laws governing the election of directors.

Say-on-pay shareholder votes, instead, are a potentially beneficial reform, as they increase the scope for constructive dialectical confrontation between boards and

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290 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 285, at 1014. Under Rule 14a-8, shareholder can use precatory proposals to request the board of directors to take a certain action without mandating the action. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008).

291 See supra note 140.

292 See supra Table 2.

293 See N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 INT. REV. FIN. 57, 58 (2012) (documenting that, from 1992 to 2007, for a sample of large U.S. companies, the average CEO turnover was about seven years).


295 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 285, at 517.
shareholders. However, the way this instrument has been implemented raises concerns under the analysis developed by this article. The Dodd-Frank Act itself does not specify a default rule for the frequency of say-on-pay votes, delegating regulation of the matter to the SEC. Regulation under the SEC, on the one hand, provides that a "a say-on-pay vote is required at least once every three calendar years." On the other, however, it provides that, unless a majority of a company’s votes is cast in favor of having biennial or triennial say-on-pay votes, companies cannot exclude subsequent shareholder proposals for annual votes. Although concededly less than clear, these combined provisions have been commonly interpreted as meaning that, unless another choice is made, companies must give shareholders a subsequent vote on the prospect of having a say-on-pay vote each year. This raises concerns, as it transforms say-on-pay votes into an additional bargaining lever that shareholders can exploit to exercise counterproductive short-term pressure on boards. Accordingly, we suggest that the SEC regulation should be amended so to establish a mandatory triennial rule for the frequency of say-on-pay votes.

On the other hand, our analysis suggests that the use of unilateral protection arrangements, such as poison pills and golden parachutes, should be limited in time. The reason is straightforward. As repeated throughout this paper, it is possible that prices in the short term do not fully capture the implications of directorial decisions. In the long term, however, the size of directorial and managerial private information tends to decrease. Accordingly, unilateral protection arrangements may add needed short-term protection to directors and managers pursuing long-term projects. However, in the long run, when those projects materialize, there is no economic rationale to continue to protect firm insiders from shareholder discipline.

Of course, we are aware of the practical difficulties that each of these outlined proposals is likely to encounter in the current political environment. Nonetheless, a necessary first step toward attempting future reform intervention necessarily involves re-educating regulators as to the considerations that better serve the interests of shareholders and society as a whole. The framework of analysis offered in this Article, and the conclusion it achieves, should hopefully prove useful to that end, providing policymakers

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297 Id. at 43.
298 Id. at 43. We observe that while annual say-on-pay votes seem to have become, in practice, the default, the SEC’s wording is puzzling. On the one hand, the SEC regulation seems to specify a three-year default when it comes to a company’s obligation to hold say-on-pay votes; on the other, it grants shareholders a default right to demand say-on-pay votes annually. In other words, there would seem to exist an inconsistency between the default duty of corporations and the default right of shareholders concerning say-on-pay votes.
299 We observe that while proxy advisory firms remain strongly opposed to bilateral protection arrangements, our proposal is consistent with their most recent guidelines on poison pills. Indeed, these firms do not oppose the adoption of a poison pill as long as the pill expires within a term of 12 months or less and is adopted in response to a specific threat. See, e.g., ISS Guidelines, supra note 92, at 11.
with tangible reasons for reconsidering the current direction of corporate governance policies.

CONCLUSION

The case for shareholder empowerment rests on a very simple proposition: If maximizing shareholder wealth is the mandate on which we can all agree as the best means to achieve overall wealth maximization, shareholders necessarily emerge as the party best placed to provide governance inputs that pursue that end. As a corollary of this proposition, limiting shareholders’ ability to provide governance inputs—by removing incumbents from the “hard” judgment of the market—impairs the pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization. Empirical studies employing governance indices have been used to support the case for shareholder empowerment and the value-decreasing effect of incumbent protection from removal.

Relying on these propositions, and empowered by the seemingly objective evidence obtained for governance indices, shareholder advocates have been very successful in advancing the case for stronger shareholder rights in the past two decades. On the other hand, expert lawyers and academics supporting the case for the traditional board-centric model of the corporation have been painted into a corner—being accused by shareholder advocates of defending claims unsupported by “the existing theoretical understanding and the available empirical evidence”.

This Article shows, theoretically and empirically, that it is time to halt the shareholder empowerment crusade. It does so by examining over thirty years of corporate governance choices (from 1978 to 2008), demonstrating that such a crusade hurts, rather than benefit, U.S. shareholders by placing excessive reliance on market efficiency and jeopardizing the organizational principles that have historically contributed to the success of U.S. corporations. Those principles emphasize the authority of boards of directors over shareholders as a response to market imperfections. Indeed, when the potential for asset-pricing inefficiency is fully considered, enhanced board authority emerges as a necessary response to the inability of shareholders vested with strong exit rights to credibly commit to long-term value creation.

The proposition—defended by those who constructed prior governance and commercial indices—that incumbent protection from removal is uniformly detrimental to shareholder interests is thus both theoretically and empirically wanting. As shown by this Article’s reexamination of the E-Index over a much longer period of time, bilateral protection arrangements that protect incumbent from short-term removal with the agreement of shareholders are not a reflection of managerial moral hazard. Rather, they are a means to re-empower U.S. boards with their historical authority to commit shareholders to long-term value creation. At the same time, that protection does not jeopardize market-based accountability mechanisms, because it does not prevent

300 See Bebchuk, supra note 14, at 1644, 1687.
301 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18, at 68.
shareholders from exercising their disciplining function in the long-term. Hence, a republican corporate model advances both shareholder and societal interests.

This conclusion calls for reform intervention directed at rolling back the gains made by shareholder advocates, both in the real corporate world and among policymakers. To that end, both commercial governance ratings supporting the case for stronger shareholder rights, as well as shareholder-friendly changes that have occurred in the legal landscape, should be put under intense scrutiny.

Along the same lines, future empirical research examining the relationship between governance and performance should abandon the “kitchen sink” approach of the past. Ironically, that same criticism provided the motivation for the construction of the E-Index. Our analysis, however, has shown that avoiding a “kitchen sink” approach not only requires identifying “the key provisions that matter,” but also correctly understanding “why” those provisions matter.

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302 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 787, 823.
**APPENDIX TABLE A. DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES**

Appendix Table A presents brief definitions of the main variables that appear in the analysis. All continuous variables are winsorized at one percent in both tails.

### Dependent Variables:

| $Q$ | Tobin’s Q, defined as the Market value of assets (i.e., Total Assets – Book Equity + Market Equity) divided by the book value of assets. Calculation follows Fama and French (1992). Source of data is the Compustat annual data file. |

### Independent and Interacted Variables:

#### Governance Indices and Their Constituent Provisions

| I-Index | Incumbent index, which is the sum of 3 governance provision indicators in the corporate charter or bylaws: Poison Pill + SM Bylaws + Parachutes. |
| C-Index | Commitment index, which is the sum of 3 governance provision indicators in the corporate charter or bylaws: Staggered Board + SM Charter + SM Merger. |
| Staggered Board | Indicator variable equal to one (zero otherwise) if the board is staggered. Data is obtained from Cremers and Sepe (2015). |
| Poison Pill | Indicator variables equal to one (zero otherwise) if the firm has a poison pill in place, under which shareholders are typically issued rights to purchase stock in the company (or in the acquiring company) at a steep discount if a hostile bidder acquires a certain percentage of outstanding shares, where the rights of the hostile bidder are void. |
| SM Charter | Indicator variables equal to one (zero otherwise) if the firm has adopted a charter amendment that restricts shareholders from amending the corporate charter. A typical restriction requires a supermajority shareholder vote. |

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303 See Fama & French, supra note 156.
304 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12.
305 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 18.
SM Bylaws

Indicator variables equal to one (zero otherwise) if the firm has adopted limits or prohibitions on the rights of shareholders to amend the corporate bylaws. A typical restriction requires a supermajority vote.

SM Merger

Indicator variables equal to one (zero otherwise) if the firm has established shareholder vote requirements that are higher than the minimum levels set by the relevant state laws to approve a merger or other business combination, which typically require a simple majority for approval. A typical higher requirement is 67%, 75% or 80% of votes, but includes firms incorporated in a state with a control share acquisition statute that did not opt out of those.

Parachutes

Indicator variables equal to one (zero otherwise) if the firm has a golden parachute in place, which is a severance agreement providing cash and/or noncash benefits to senior executives if specific events occur after a change in control of the company. Events triggering payments include termination, demotion, or resignation of these executives within some specified period of time after the change of corporate control.

Standard Controls

Assets
Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets.

Delaware Incorporation
Indicator variable if the company is incorporated in Delaware.

ROA
EBITDA/Total Assets.

CAPX
Capital Expenditures/ (Total Assets).

R&D
R&D expenditures/ Sales.

Interacted Variables

Large Customer
Indicator variable set equal to one if the firm has at least one customer accounting for 10% or more of its sales, from Compustat Segment data.

Labor Productivity
Industry-level measure of the marginal product of labor, from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (using the four digit SIC code).

Industry M&A Volume
The ratio of mergers & acquisitions’ dollar volume in SDC to the total market capitalization from CRSP for a calendar year, as per a given Fama-French 49 industry. The CRSP annual industry market capitalization is for ordinary stocks only and excludes
ADRs and REITs. If no M&A activity per given industry-year is reported in SDC, we assume it to be zero. We include transactions where buyer achieves control of the target.

Proxy for the risk of bankruptcy as proposed by Altman (1968). The Z-Score is calculated as follows: $Z = 1.2 \times T_1 + 1.4 \times T_2 + 3.3 \times T_3 + 0.6 \times T_4 + 0.99 \times T_5$. Here, $T_1 = \text{Working Capital} / \text{Total Assets}$, a measure of the liquid assets in relation to the size of the company; $T_2 = \text{Retained Earnings} / \text{Total Assets}$, a measure of profitability that reflects the company’s historical earning power; $T_3 = \text{Earnings Before Interest and Taxes} / \text{Total Assets}$, measuring current operating efficiency apart from tax and leveraging factors; $T_4 = \text{Market Value of Equity} / \text{Book Value of Total Liabilities}$, proxy of the market’s perception of the efficient use of the firm’s assets; $T_5 = \text{Sales} / \text{Total Assets}$, measure for total asset turnover.

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**APPENDIX TABLE B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MAIN VARIABLES.**

Appendix Table B presents sample descriptive statistics for the main dependent and independent variables, as well as the interacted variables, for the main sample for which all provisions of the E-Index are available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables:</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.72</td>
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<td>18,894</td>
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<tbody>
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<td>1.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-Index</td>
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<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>C-Index</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staggered Board</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poison Pill</td>
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<td>0.38</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SM Charter</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Parachutes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assets</td>
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<td>7.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPX</td>
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<td>0.046</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<td>Labor Productivity</td>
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<td>Industry M&amp;A Volume</td>
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APPENDIX TABLE C. C-INDEX AND I-INDEX PROVISIONS: TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS

In this table, we present the time series association between firm value and the level of the three constituent governance provisions in the C-Index in columns (1)–(3) – namely Staggered Board, SM Charter and SM Merger – and of the three constituent governance provisions in the I-Index in columns (4)–(6) – namely Poison Pill, SM Bylaw and Parachutes – using pooled panel regressions of Q on the governance index or its provision(s) with year and firm fixed effects plus a set of standard controls: Assets, ROA, CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. In columns (1) and (3), we also include the interaction between Staggered Board and SM Charter, in columns (2) and (3) the interaction between Staggered Board and SM Merger, in columns (4) and (6) the interaction between Poison Pill and SM Bylaw, and, finally, in columns (5) and (6) the interaction between Poison Pill and Parachutes. All columns use the full time period of 1978-2008. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. We provide the t-statistics below each regression coefficient based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm.

<table>
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<th>Dep. Variable: Q</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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<th>(6)</th>
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<td>0.104**</td>
<td>0.107**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.45)</td>
<td>(2.30)</td>
<td>(2.32)</td>
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<td>0.141</td>
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<td>SM Charter x Staggered Board</td>
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<td>(0.48)</td>
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<td>SM Merger x Staggered Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poison Pill</td>
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<td>-0.0583</td>
<td>-0.0731***</td>
<td>-0.0924***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>SM Bylaw</td>
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<td>(0.17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SM Bylaw x Poison Pill</td>
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<td>-0.0858**</td>
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<td>Parachutes</td>
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<td>Parachutes x Poison Pill</td>
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Fixed Effects: Year + Firm

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<th>21,555</th>
<th>24,348</th>
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<td>0.744</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.740</td>
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APPENDIX TABLE D. BANKRUPTCY RISK AND GOVERNANCE INDICES

In this table, we present the time series association between Z-Score, a proxy of bankruptcy risk, and three governance indices (i.e., the E-Index, C-Index and I-Index) using pooled panel regressions of Z-Score with year and firm fixed effects plus a set of controls: Assets, CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. All columns use the full time period of 1978-2008. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***", **", and *, respectively, based on robust standard errors that clustered by firm. We provide the t-statistics below each regression coefficient based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm.

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<th>(4)</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(-2.71)</td>
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<td>C-Index</td>
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<td>0.161***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.91)</td>
<td>(2.65)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-Index</td>
<td>-0.197***</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects:</strong></td>
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