Beyond Identity and Racial Politics:  
Asian Americans and the Campaign  
Fund-raising Controversy  

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The campaign finance scandal of 1996, based on my own collection and estimate, has generated no less than 4,000 newspaper and magazine articles between September 1996 and February 1998 on the so-called "Asian connection." At the eye of the storm were John Huang and Charlie Yah-lin Trie, two Asian American donors/fundraisers for President Bill Clinton's re-election and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). Not since the advent of the Asian American movement in the late 1960s have Asian Americans experienced a more significant civil rights setback than the setback resulting from the deluge of negative, and at times, racist coverage of the scandal, as Ed Chen and Dale Minami's petition to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, also published in this issue, demonstrates.¹

Several things become apparent upon investigation into this matter. First, the opponents of President Clinton exploited the traditional ambivalence and even fear of Asian Americans to their political advantage. Second, the Democrats' response was calculated and unprincipled. Third, Asian Americans' exclusion from full political participation can be traced in part to the class divide within the Asian American community and its dependency on foreign governments which exploit it.

HOW RACE PLAYED INTO A CAMPAIGN FINANCE SCANDAL

The scandal at issue is the result of the ethic of the political parties

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seeking campaign donations by any means necessary. The practice of this ethic leads to corruption, illegal practices, and ultimately a crisis for American democracy. The benefit of racializing political corruption for both political parties is that it diverts the public’s attention from this crisis. Instead of addressing the systemic problem of money corruption in politics, politicians discovered a fetching distraction: blame the problem on “Asians” and the unscrupulous “agents” of communist China. Little wonder, both parties have expressed no interest in passing even the toothless McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill. Money has become the lifeline of and prerequisite for participating in American democracy, resulting in the increasing alienation of the public from the democratic process.

The partisan political power struggle and the media played a decisive role in racializing the scandal. Two months before the 1996 presidential election, Bob Dole and Ross Perot had failed to make a dent in President Clinton’s commanding lead at the polls. But then with the help of columnists like William Safire of the New York Times and the editorial writers of the Wall Street Journal, they discovered and dipped into the well-entrenched reservoir of anti-Asian sentiment and launched an attack on President Clinton and the DNC for using John Huang to raise money from illegal foreign Asian sources, most notably James Riady, owner of the Indonesia-based, multinational Lippo Group. The media began employing

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terms such as the "Asian connection" and "Asian Americans" as synonymous with political corruption and foreign subversion of the political process, even though Huang and Trie raised only about $4.5 million out of the total of $2.2 billion raised in the 1996 federal elections.\(^4\) In fact, Dole, Perot and the national media went out of their way to Asianize or Orientalize the political corruption and to lay the problem of corruption on several Asian Americans and their so-called "foreign connections" to several Asian countries, not the least of which was "communist" China.\(^5\) Clinton, Gore, and the DNC were accused of selling out the presidency and public policies and of compromising our national security by accepting money from foreigners and having "foreign Asian" guests in the White House. This line of thinking and argument persisted throughout 1997 with Safire insinuating in the \textit{New York Times} that several Asian Americans, including Huang and Trie, were "Red Chinese" spies. Bob Woodward made similar allegations in a sensational "exclusive" in the \textit{Washington Post}.\(^6\)

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\item 5. The so-called "China connection" was established by the fact that the Lippo Group had investments in China, just as it had investments in the U.S. This characterization of the money raised by Huang, Trie and others to a "China connection" did not surface until \textit{New York Times} columnist William Safire first constructed the link. \textit{See William Safire, \textit{I Remember Larry}, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1997, at A19; William Safire, \textit{Beware the Princelings (of China)}, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at A33.}


\item 6. Bob Woodward & Brian Duffy, \textit{Chinese Embassy Role in Contributions Probed}, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1997, at A1. The Woodward article was based on leaks supposedly from counter-intelligence sources in the FBI. Since there has been no further confirmation of the allegation, the leaks could have been politically calculated or part of a disinformation campaign, either to discredit President Clinton or to make him look like an innocent victim of some vicious "communist plot." \textit{See also Marcus W. Brauchli, et al., \textit{Iving for Influence: Fund-Raising Flap Has Roots in Bitter Rivalry between China, Taiwan}, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1997, at A1; Nigel Holloway, \textit{The China Connection, FAR E. ECON. REV.}, Feb. 27, 1997, at 16; Mark Hosenball & Evan Thomas, \textit{White House: A China Connection?}, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1997, at 34; Mark Hosenball & Evan Thomas, \textit{A Break in the Case}, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1997, at 54; David Johnston, \textit{U.S. Agency Secretly Monitored Chinese in '96 on Political Gifts}, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1997, at A1; Phil Kuntz, \textit{Asian Tycoon with Ties to...
Not only was the scandal effectively racialized, it was transformed into a national security concern and a partisan struggle for control of the White House.

Led by Senator Fred Thompson, the Republican chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, several committees of both houses of Congress also pursued a similar line of investigation, likely aimed at discrediting President Clinton and the DNC, in part by playing off the post-Cold War fear of and hostility toward “Red” China, and at scoring points with the electorate. The Thompson Committee conducted four months of highly publicized public hearings, from July to October 1997, aimed at proving two theses: (1) “Red China” had laundered money to influence President Clinton and subvert American democracy and (2) John Huang and Charlie Trie were Chinese spies.7 The Senate hearings ended in disarray, failing to produce any evidence in support of its two theses, but it did raise disturbing questions about its strategy of smearing Asian Americans and demonizing China to discredit President Clinton and the DNC and to divert public attention from the need for campaign finance reform.8

The Democrats’ response to Republican pressure was an unprincipled


political act. DNC chairman Ron Brown had quietly reinstated what his predecessor, Paul Kirk, eliminated in 1985—the constituent caucuses—and developed a race-based strategy in an attempt to expand the party's political mobilization and fundraising capability in various ethnic constituencies across the nation. John Huang, recruited to work under Ron Brown in the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1992, was brought into the DNC in December 1995 and 1996 specifically to raise "soft money" ($7 million to be exact) from Asian American communities to help jump-start Clinton's re-election campaign. Huang faced a daunting task. Asian American communities had very little of the big money and less of a tradition of political donation. As a result, Huang and others heavily relied on the "big money" of transnational Asian sources in Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Japan to meet their fundraising goals.

Dole, Perot, and anti-Clinton forces in the media might have seen John Huang as a liability for President Clinton and therefore decided to exploit latent racist and nationalistic sentiments against Asians. But when they accused Clinton and the DNC of selling the presidency to foreign Asians and Asian Americans, they deliberately conflated the two, failing to distinguish one group as citizens and treating both as foreigners. Overnight, Asian Americans were collectively and effectively de-naturalized in the eyes of the public.

Clinton and the DNC's response to accusations of foreign Asian influence indicated their minimal affinity with and commitment to Asian Americans and their readiness to play the "race card" when to their advantage. At the suggestion of Senator Christopher Dodd, the general chair of the DNC, several Asian American leaders hastily called a series of four pre-election national press conferences before the election in which they angrily accused Dole, Perot, and the media of being racist toward and unfairly portraying Asian Americans as foreigners and characterizing Asian contributions as "foreigners buying up America." The strategy might


10. Press conference participants Stewart Kwoh and Frank Wu wrote in an op-ed column, "The Huang matter has become much more than an issue of partisan politics. It has turned from a question of one person's dealings into scapegoating of a racial minority group." Stewart Kwoh & Frank Wu, Don't Build Reform on a Scapegoat, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1996, at B9. The role of Senator Dodd in instigating this strategy of orchestrating press conferences of Asian American activists was not known until after the election. His role was discovered among the DNC documents subpoenaed by the Justice Department. See Jill Zuckman, DNC Stumbles on Asian Issue, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1997, at A1. The four press conferences were held in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington, DC. The press conference in Washington, DC, included representatives from the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus Institute (CAPACI), the Organization of Chinese Americans (OCA), the Japan-
have been effective, but post-election investigations soon uncovered that many large donations indeed had come from questionable, if not illegal foreign sources, and the DNC was forced to return several million dollars. The illegality of the contributions embarrassed those Asian American leaders who had been called up to defend the DNC and made several national Asian American organizations vulnerable to editorial ridicule.11

Success breeds contempt. Clinton’s electoral victory finally allowed the DNC to distance itself from the Asian American liability. Immediately after the election, the Democrats abandoned Huang and began to treat Asian Americans, including a few big donors, as if they were strangers or worse. Still under a continuous media barrage, the Democrats responded in two different ways to distance themselves in the public’s perception from Asian Americans. First, the DNC decided after the November election to conduct its own investigation and to demonstrate its commitment to “clean money” by accepting money from citizens only. It hired private auditors and investigators to look for donors of allegedly “dirty money,” which resulted in further targeting of Asian and Asian American donations. Many Asian Americans felt harassed and criminalized on account of their ancestry as the DNC tried to sanitize its image of the “Asian connection.”12 Second, the Clinton administration also decided to distance itself from Asian Americans in the appointment of high-ranking officials, thus reneging on Clinton’s promise to have his cabinet reflect America’s diversity. Despite an organized national campaign led by the Asian Pacific American Coalition for Presidential Appointments, Clinton failed to name any Asian American to both cabinet-level and sub-cabinet positions immediately after his re-election.13
CLASS AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY

The question unasked during the controversy of the campaign finance scandal is whose interests do John Huang, Charlie Trie and other Asian American fundraisers really represent. John Huang himself has steadfastly insisted that his sole motive in raising funds for the DNC was to help empower and to represent the interests of Asian Americans.\textsuperscript{14} He believed that the only way for the Asian American minority to gain political influence was to make significant contributions to politicians. Others agreed. For example, Keith Umemoto wrote in the defense of John Huang:

The relatively low numbers of APA voters compared with other groups and our scarcity of APA representatives holding elected offices accounted for our lack of political influence. One of the ways we have begun to generate success in gaining access and recognition has been through financial contributions \ldots John left the private sector to devote his energy to public service and to help elevate the power of our community by serving a bridge between the influential Asian donors he had access to and the APA community in general.\textsuperscript{15}

But did this bridge really exist? When we examine the fundraising schemes Huang and others had devised, targeted primarily at large Asian donors, it is clear that they represent the interests of only a very small group of people within the Asian American community—the handful of the business owners and professionals and, above all, persons with extensive connections to transnational Asian capital and multinational corporations based in places like Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.\textsuperscript{16} The majority of Asian Americans are middle- or

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\textsuperscript{15} Keith Umemoto, \textit{In Defense of John Huang}, ASIAN WEEK, Nov. 29, 1996, at 7. I believe that this article is representative of the view of most of the Asian American political insiders.

\textsuperscript{16} For a highly Orientalized depiction of the major Asian figures involved in the scandal, see Lena Sun & J. Pomfret, \textit{The Curious Cast of Asian Donors; Some Sought Access to Clinton, Others' Motives Remain Murky}, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1997, at A1. For examples of the various schemes used to raise political donations from Asian and Asian American sources, see Alan C. Miller, \textit{Democrats Reimburse Temple for Fund-Raiser}, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1996, at A1 (referring to the Hsi Lai Tem-
lower-class and do not have the money to make the kind of political donations John Huang and others brought in.

The economic changes in Asia since the early 1970s and the influx of Asian immigrants, refugees and capital have given rise to both demographic and cultural diversity and class division and conflict within each of the many Asian American communities. This conflict is most viscerally captured by the infamous International Hotel in San Francisco Chinatown where poor Chinese and Filipino elderly have been fighting with Supasit Mahaguna, a Thailand-based Chinese landlord, since at the since 1973. The poor and disadvantaged Asian American working class have been the real victims of transnational capital in their own communities. John Huang and Charlie Trie, in fact, represent the class interests of those tied to transnational capital and, not infrequently, to foreign political interests.

There is no evidence that the foreign Asian donors had the welfare


18. See generally PETER KWONG, THE NEW CHINATOWN (1987), as a study of New York City's Chinatown since the 1970s that demonstrates this assertion.

19. See id. For articles on how foreign government interests influence and affect U.S. politics and government, see Jill Abramson, Taiwan Won Platform Terms with Democrats, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1996, at A16; Taiwan Political Donations Implicated in the U.S. Presidential Election (in Chi-
and political empowerment of Asian Americans in mind when they made their donations through Huang. The alleged bridge between the two parts of the Asian American community does not exist.

While the Republican vilification of Asians as “foreign” is unjustifiable, particularly when considering its invidious impact on U.S. citizens of Asian ancestry, it is nevertheless true that foreign influence pervades campaign fundraising, reflecting a serious failure in our democracy. From the perspective of Asian American history, John Huang, Johnny Chung and Charlie Trie, in fact, are the “Johnnys-come-lately” in this story of foreign influence. Among the earlier big donors or fundraisers are figures like Eddie Chin of New York and Pius Lee of San Francisco of the 1980s; Tongsun Park and Susie Park Thompson of Washington, D.C., in the so-called “Koreagate” scandal of the 1970s; Ana Chennault of Washington, D.C., of the 1960s, a key figure on the Finance Committee of the National Republican Committee; and H.H. Kung of New York and Albert Chow and Doon Yen Wong of San Francisco in the 1950s. Instead of representing the interests of lower- and middle-class Asian Americans in their local communities, they represented the interests of the transnational political and economic elite and their pursuit of profit, market penetration and political influence. In this sense, these individuals, in fact, did not do anything differently from what all businesses, foreign and domestic, routinely do in the U.S.—that is protecting their interests by buying political access and influence and extracting economic favors for themselves. This occurs whether the donors are the Riadys of the Lippo Group in Indonesia,


the Bronfman brothers of Seagam in Canada, the Rothchilds of France, the Rupert Murdoch of Australia, or the Bill Gates of the U.S. Big money may often come in the form of donations proffered by foreign hands, but—like domestic big money—they are all motivated by similar transnational interests. The rise of transnationalism or globalism and multinational corporations has substantially challenged and eroded traditional notions of the nation-state, sovereignty, national borders, political loyalty, and citizenship. Subsidiaries of foreign-owned corporations in the U.S. are treated as U.S. corporations and, under the laws of the U.S., as persons with the same rights and privileges protected by the Constitution, including the right to contribute huge amounts of money, though not the right to vote. In this regard, the campaign finance scandal has raised important questions about whether transnational capital is undermining our democratic process by silencing the voices of individual citizens.

An integral component of transnationalism is extraterritoriality, for it allows immunity from the restrictions of sovereignty. This idea was imbedded in the infamous treaties imposed by Western imperialist powers on China between 1842 and 1949. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. government, businesses, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) carried on this tradition by interfering—both covertly and overtly—with other countries’ political and business affairs, including massive use of public money to influence elections in over 100 foreign countries, the most recent being Boris Yeltsin’s presidential campaign in the Russian Federation. The irony is in the double-standard we employ. America cannot bear the thought that its political process is being influenced by foreign governments and corporations, even as it is our Government’s practice to routinely do so abroad. More ironic is that this ideal is a sham. Multinational money plays a decisive role in our “democratic” process.

Within Asian American communities, extraterritorial domination takes the form of a perverse reciprocity. Historically, racist and exclusionary policies confined Asian immigrants into ghettos. This “ghettoisation” of Asian America permitted the local business elite and the agents of foreign Asian governments to control the affairs of the Asian American community. The continued discrimination by the American mainstream against Asian Americans encouraged the rise of highly institutionalized extraterritorial domination by Asian governments as Asian Americans were excluded from allegiance to the U.S. government through the denial of any right to citizenship. The legacy continues to this day. For example, the Chinese American and Korean American communities

were used by Taiwan and South Korea to support their respective military dictatorships throughout the Cold War and to lobby the interests of the two governments. Community dissidents or critics were invariably intimidated, harassed, and sometimes murdered. In recent years, foreign Asian businesses frequently use Asian American communities for their investment and as their covers or beachheads for launching their penetration into the American market. Some of the most important fundraising activities of John Huang, in fact, fit into this historical pattern. If Asian Americans were to achieve full freedom and citizenship in the U.S., they must be liberated from this structure of racial oppression and extraterritorial domination.

CONCLUSIONS

Race has been used to divert public attention from a severely corrupted system of democracy. John Huang was responsible for raising $3.5 million, a minuscule amount when compared to the $2.2 billion raised in the last federal elections. Yet, he and other Asian Americans are the center of the campaign finance controversy. Republicans vilified Asian Americans to incite public outrage over widespread political corruption, the media sensationalized them to sell papers and advertisement, and Democrats abandoned them in order to counter Republican criticism and to demonstrate its commitment to "clean money" and politics. Asian Americans were the straw men employed by both parties to blunt public demand for something both parties fear—campaign finance reform. In the process, Asian Americans were collectively denaturalized, marginalized, and disenabled.

This analysis does not mean John Huang and other Asian Americans are innocent victims of media and Republican racism. They, in fact, represent the tip of an iceberg of political corruption and a cancer of democracy arising out of big money and transnationalist influence. If we do nothing about it, more and more ordinary Americans will drop out of the political process, including Asian Americans, and democracy will exist in name only. Asian Americans have been dealt a severe blow and setback in the

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23. The most famous example of extraterritorial domination and repression by a foreign Asian government is the political assassination of a Chinese American journalist, Henry Liu, by hired agents of the Taiwan government on October 15, 1984, in his home in Daly City, California, because he had written articles and books critical of Taiwan's president Chiang Ching-kuo. See DAVID E. KAPLAN, FIRE OF THE DRAGON: POLITICS, MURDER, AND THE KUOMINTANG (1992). Only very preliminary studies have been made on the foreign Asian investments in Asian American communities. Among them are: KWONG, supra note 18; PAUL ONG, ET AL., THE NEW ASIAN IMMIGRATION IN LOS ANGELES AND GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING (1994); TIMOTHY FONG, THE FIRST SUBURBAN CHINATOWN: THE REMAKING OF MONTEREY PARK, CALIFORNIA (1994).
scandal. But, the disaster also presents a rare opportunity to learn, to clarify key issues concerning both the Asian American community and the nation, and to join forces with other public interest and community groups in a nationwide movement to achieve substantive campaign finance reform and to revive and restore democracy in the United States. Public financing of elections is the way to remove the cancer. While neither Republicans nor Democrats are genuinely interested in real campaign finance reform and have played the “race card” to divert public attention from political corruption, Asian Americans should neither allow themselves to be vilified nor condone this hoax of democracy.