CITIZENSHIP UNDONE

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In August 2006, it was revealed in the press that the United States had, since April of that year, been refusing to admit two of its citizens back into the country.1 The two citizens were father and son: Muhammad Ismail, a forty-five-year-old naturalized citizen who had been born in Pakistan,2 and Jaber Ismail, his eighteen-year-old son who had birthright citizenship in the United States.3 Neither father nor son was charged with any crime.4 But the Ismails were uncle and cousin to Hamid Hayat, a twenty-three-year-old U.S. citizen who had worked as a cherry packer in Lodi, California, and who had been convicted of providing material support to terrorists through his alleged attendance at a "Pakistani training camp."5 After having lived in Pakistan for the previous four years, the Ismails had attempted to return to the United States in April 2006 for their relative's trial, only to be told that they had been placed on a no-fly list because they had listed the "wrong person" as their emergency contact in their passports five years earlier—namely, their relative Hamid Hayat.6 Interviewed by FBI agents in Islamabad, they were informed that they could return to the United States only after completing a lie detector test.7 After refusing to submit to further questioning without a lawyer present, they were, in the words of one blogger, "banished from their own country."8

The case of the Ismails raises many questions about the nature and meaning of citizenship. Does the fact that the Ismails were precluded from entering the country of their citizenship nullify their citizenship? U.S. law

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2. Bulwa, supra note 1.

3. Id.

4. Id.

5. Id.


7. Id.

is silent as to the internationally guaranteed right of return, or a person’s right to return to his own country.\textsuperscript{9} The right to be present in one’s own country would appear a precondition to all other civil, political, and social rights of citizenship. We might presume that this foundational, enabling aspect of citizenship remains unstated in U.S. law because it constitutes an unquestioned sine qua non to the rights of citizenship.\textsuperscript{10}

Or can one, in fact, engage in citizenship without being physically present in one’s country? Were the Ismials performing a kind of deterritorialized U.S. citizenship? Arguably, even while located in Pakistan, they engaged in that most civic and American of activities, namely, contacting the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to help them with their case.\textsuperscript{11}

Or were the Ismials being punished for their failure to perform U.S. citizenship? The state wanted the Ismials to perform citizenship in the sense of proving their allegiance. I am reminded here of the historian Lucy Salyer’s recent work on denaturalization during World War I, which she calls the “‘alienation’ of American citizens.”\textsuperscript{12} She notes a shift in naturalization from a formal process to one that emphasized “internal allegiance,” whereby naturalized citizens could be denaturalized for insufficient loyalty.\textsuperscript{13} Citizenship became understood not just as something gained through certain formal steps, but as an “affair of the heart.”\textsuperscript{14}

Were the Ismials thus stripped of the rights of citizenship for supposed insufficient love of country—signified through their kinship ties to Hamid Hayat? (Hamid Hayat, who is currently appealing his case, was prosecuted because of conversations he had with an informant who was paid nearly $225,000 by the FBI to infiltrate Lodi’s only mosque, despite the fact that the informant falsely told agents that he had seen three of the world’s most notorious terrorists in Lodi, including Al Qaeda second-in-command


\textsuperscript{10} For a rare judicial expression of this foundational aspect of citizenship, see \textit{Colon v. U.S. Department of State}, 2 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (describing the plaintiff’s desire to exercise “one of the fundamental rights of citizenship, namely the right to travel freely throughout the world and when he wants to, to return and reside in the United States”).

\textsuperscript{11} See Archibold, supra note 1.


\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Id.} at 3.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Id.}
Ayman al Zawahiri.\textsuperscript{15} Was exile the Ismails’ punishment for insufficient allegiance? Following decisions made by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1950s and 1960s, citizens are no longer involuntarily stripped of their formal citizenship for acts that might signify insufficient allegiance, such as voting in foreign elections or serving in foreign armies, as expatriation without the intentional renunciation of citizenship is considered cruel and unusual punishment.\textsuperscript{16}

The Ismails were not threatened with having their formal citizenship removed. But did the U.S. government’s acts—acts that appear utterly without legal authority\textsuperscript{17}—nonetheless so strip the Ismails of their citizenship that it rendered them stateless? Neither Muhammad nor Jaber Ismail holds dual citizenship with Pakistan; thus, their U.S. citizenship is their only citizenship.\textsuperscript{18} The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons identifies a stateless person as someone who does not have the legal bond of nationality with any state, someone who is “not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.”\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} One purported source of authority was proffered by William West, former Chief of the National Security Section for the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Miami, to Daniel Pipes. West asserted that section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (2006), “allows for the ‘travel control’ of the entry and departure of citizens. U.S. citizens use their passports only within the rules, regulations, and proscriptions as issued and decided by the president.” \textit{See Daniel Pipes, Five Years after 9/11, U.S. Makes Progress on Security}, N.Y. Sun, Sept. 5, 2006, at 5. However, section 215(a)(1) of the Act states that “it shall be unlawful . . . for any alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.” 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (emphasis added). Section 215(b) does contain a section headlined “Citizens,” but it states only that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport.” \textit{Id.} § 1185(b). The meaning of this section is to require the U.S. citizen to travel with a U.S. passport, unless the President otherwise allows him to do so without a passport; one cannot logically understand it to mean that the U.S. citizen would require more than the passport to depart from or enter into the country.
\item \textsuperscript{18} See Bulwa, \textit{supra} note 1.
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definition generally refers to de jure stateless persons. The Ismials would be more accurately described as de facto stateless persons, because this category would include circumstances where a state refuses to acknowledge the citizenship of a national abroad for purposes of consular protection or repatriation. The refusal to admit the Ismials into their country arguably removed not only the state protection that would come with citizenship, but also restricted their ability to exercise any of the rights of citizenship.

In Hannah Arendt's classic formulation, written with reference to the phenomenon of statelessness, the right to belong to some kind of organized community is the necessary grounding for the "right to have rights." Or, we could say, formal citizenship in a sovereign state is a precursor to enjoying the full rights of citizenship. The Ismials' case challenges that formulation, as the Ismials are possessors of formal citizenship that, nonetheless, did not sustain their right to have full rights. So what is the meaning of their formal citizenship? In the words of Usama Ismail, Jaber Ismail's brother and Muhammad Ismail's son, "What's the point of being a citizen?"

While citizens through birth cannot have their citizenship involuntarily stripped, naturalized citizens can have their citizenship revoked at any time, if that naturalization was illegally procured or procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. The Ismials, despite Jaber Ismail's birthright citizenship, and arguably like all Muslim Americans at this moment, are in a position akin to the naturalized citizen, if we agree that naturalized citizens, as citizens who have come from elsewhere, are seen as potentially suspect citizens, as lesser citizens, and as citizens tinged by a possible disloyalty. In public perception, naturalized citizens possess a weaker citizenship than do birthright citizens; legally, they are citizens whose citizenship can be taken away in a process which deems their

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20. For a criticism of the 1954 Convention's restriction of the concept of statelessness to de jure statelessness, see David Weissbrodt & Clay Collins, The Human Rights of Stateless Persons, 28 Hum. Rts. Q. 245, 251-53 (2006) (noting that some legal scholars believe the concept of statelessness should be broadened to include de facto statelessness, to encompass those individuals who might have a legal claim to the benefits of nationality, but whose governments withhold the protection and assistance that come with citizenship).


24. See Malinda L. Seymore, The Presidency and the Meaning of Citizenship, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 927, 957 (2005) (describing a prevalent "presumption that birthright citizens are automatically loyal and trustworthy, and automatically committed and connected to the United States, while naturalized citizens are less—less loyal, less trustworthy, less committed, and less connected to their adopted country").
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This perception of weaker citizenship exists despite the fact that naturalized citizens bear a contractual relationship to the state. (In fact, in a society premised upon social contract, naturalization should be considered the idealized form of citizenship, compared to what we would consider the “accidental” nature of jus sanguinus, or citizenship by descent, which Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith nonetheless chose to retain in their call to repeal birthright citizenship.)

When I say that all Muslim Americans are in a position akin to the naturalized citizen, I mean they possess a citizenship that is always now at risk of being undone. Their identity as Muslims—in other words, “potential terrorists”—means that they are perennially suspected of having engaged in fraud or misrepresentation, with that fraud or misrepresentation consisting of a pretense of loyalty or allegiance to the United States.

We could note here cases where the U.S. government has in fact sought to undo the formal citizenship of Muslim Americans by denaturalizing those who are accused of material or other support for terrorist organizations. We could look to the United Kingdom, which recently amended its Nationality Act to permit the Secretary of State to revoke the citizenship of naturalized or even of birthright citizens, to be followed by deportation—with the standard for revocation having been amended shortly after last July’s bombings in London to one where the Secretary of State need only be “satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good.”

In July, the Guantánamo Bay detainee and Australian citizen David Hicks was stripped of his British citizenship through this provision just one day after he successfully gained British citizenship, which, because of his mother’s British citizenship, had been granted through the principal of jus sanguinus.

The U.S. government is also rendering it impossible for formal citizenship to be obtained. Several lawsuits have been filed challenging the

25. See id. (explaining that naturalized citizens can have their citizenship revoked on less compelling grounds than those facing a birthright citizen).


28. Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act, 2006, c. 13, § 56(1) (Eng.).

government’s delays in approving the naturalization of Muslim applicants, delays that have lasted for years in some cases.\footnote{See Aziz v. Gonzales, No. 06-4791 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 1, 2006); Yakubova v. Chertoff, No. 06-3203 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 28, 2006); Alsamman v. Gonzales, No. 06-2518 (N.D. Ill. filed May 4, 2006). The proposed class in Alsamman consists of “[a]ll Muslim males, or those males appearing Muslim on the basis of their ethnic heritage due to their national origin, who are or will be lawful permanent residents applying for naturalization to become U.S. citizens, and whose swearing-in ceremony has been delayed more than 120 days since the applicant passed his naturalization interview.” Alsamman, No. 06-2518, at 3-4. For more on these types of delays, see Diana Day, Los Angeles Civil Rights Groups Sue the Government Over Citizenship Delays, Carnegie-Knight Initiative on the Future of Journalism Education, Aug. 2, 2006, http://newsinitiative.org/story/2006/08/02/los_angeles_civil_rights_groups. Anecdotally, immigrants’ advocates have noted that naturalization applicants from predominantly Muslim countries, China, Russia, and other former Soviet countries, appear to be disproportionately affected by delays. Email from Cecillia Wang, Senior Staff Counsel, ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project, to Leti Volpp, Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, U.C. Berkeley (Feb. 5, 2007, 11:41 PST) (on file with author and the Fordham Law Review).}

The citizenship of Muslim Americans is undone in another sense. Muslim Americans’ experience of citizenship has suffered as collateral damage from what is called the “war on terror.” The government has imposed a massive network of surveillance upon Muslim communities. Every aspect of Muslim immigrant life is being watched in locations such as Detroit, “from IRS scrutiny of international Muslim charities and businesses, to FBI surveillance of local meeting places.”\footnote{Tamara Audi, Terror War Hits Home: Secret Sweep: Detroiters Caught in Widening Investigation, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 12, 2002, at 1A.} This has effected, as Moustafa Bayoumi recently suggested in The Nation, an isolation of these communities under the rubric of suspicion.\footnote{See Moustafa Bayoumi, Arab America’s September 11, The Nation, Sept. 25, 2006, at 22, 22, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060925/bayoumi.} This suspicion is, of course, shared by the public. In a July 2006 poll conducted by USA Today/Gallop, thirty-nine percent of Americans admitted to being prejudiced against Muslims.\footnote{Id. at 26.} The same percentage of Americans polled think that Muslims, including U.S. citizens, should carry special IDs.\footnote{Id.} More than twenty percent do not want Muslims for neighbors.\footnote{Id.} It goes without saying that Muslim Americans do not enjoy citizenship as a matter of identity. Muslim Americans are not perceived as fellow citizens in the sense of having affective ties of kinship; rather, the collective identity of American citizenship coalesces against them.\footnote{See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575, 1594 (2002).}
noncitizens. Noncitizens were targeted in the form of detention and removal immediately after September 11, the so-called "voluntary" interviews, the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, and the Special Registration program. But, five years out, we must acknowledge that, even while the "war on terror" continues to rely upon a double standard between foreign nationals and citizens, the "war on terror" also selectively impairs the rights of certain citizens.

The hostility in the air that Muslims are breathing is exemplified by the case of Raed Jarrar, who was barred from boarding a Jet Blue flight from New York to California because he wore a T-shirt with the words "we will not be silent" in Arabic and English. He was told by one of the men intercepting him that going to an airport with a T-shirt in Arabic script is "like wearing a t-shirt that reads 'I am a robber' and going to a bank." After Jarrar refused to remove his T-shirt, he was told by a Jet Blue employee that she would buy him another to cover his own. She asked, "Should I get you an 'I heart New York T-shirt?'" One of the men who barred Jarrar from boarding responded, "No, we shouldn't ask him to go from one extreme to another." Jarrar asked why this man assumed that he

42. At the Symposium, Rogers Smith suggested that the new Military Commissions Act passed by Congress, which allows the President to declare an American citizen to be an enemy combatant if that citizen "provides material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, an act of terrorism" could be seen as signifying a shift in the war on terror to target citizens. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2630 (2006) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950(v)(b)(25)(A)). It is important to note here that the citizen/noncitizen distinction continues in the Military Commissions Act, as it reserves military commissions for noncitizens only. Citizens, even enemy combatants charged with war crimes, are tried either by court martial or in federal court under the War Crimes Act, both of which offer procedural and substantive rights absent from the military commission system. See Muneer I. Ahmad, No Right to Have Rights: Reflections on Litigation at Guantánamo Bay, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the author and the Fordham Law Review).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
hated New York if he had Arabic script on his T-shirt, but got no answer.\textsuperscript{48} His parting words on his blog entry about the incident were, "It sucks to be an Arab/Muslim living in the U.S. these days."\textsuperscript{49}

The Ismails were cleared to return home in September 2006, and they finally returned in October 2006.\textsuperscript{50} In the Kafkaesque world of Homeland Security, there was only one official utterance upon their being cleared: "[t]here's been a change," spoken by an official on condition of anonymity.\textsuperscript{51} While the Ismails' limbo has come to an end, as they have now been allowed to return to their country,\textsuperscript{52} there has indeed been a change—a change in the citizenship of all Muslim Americans who, at this moment, and into the foreseeable future, can only experience a citizenship at risk of being undone.

\textsuperscript{48} Id.

\textsuperscript{49} Id.

